uid

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win. -Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place. Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.” -A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant. Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty” and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” - Edward Snowden

Special

Here is what the Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, which examined the draft N I A Bill said.

1. There is no feasibility study of the project]

2. The project was approved in haste

3. The system has far-reaching consequences for national security

4. The project is directionless with no clarity of purpose

5. It is built on unreliable and untested technology

6. The exercise becomes futile in case the project does not continue beyond the present number of 200 million enrolments

7. There is lack of coordination and difference of views between various departments and ministries of government on the project

Quotes

What was said before the elections:

NPR & UID aiding Aliens – Narendra Modi

"I don't agree to Nandan Nilekeni and his madcap (UID) scheme which he is trying to promote," Senior BJP Leader Yashwant Sinha, Sept 2012

"All we have to show for the hundreds of thousands of crore spent on Aadhar is a Congress ticket for Nilekani" Yashwant Sinha.(27/02/2014)

TV Mohandas Pai, former chief financial officer and head of human resources, tweeted: "selling his soul for power; made his money in the company wedded to meritocracy." Money Life Article

Nilekani’s reporting structure is unprecedented in history; he reports directly to the Prime Minister, thus bypassing all checks and balances in government - Home Minister Chidambaram

To refer to Aadhaar as an anti corruption tool despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary is mystifying. That it is now officially a Rs.50,000 Crores solution searching for an explanation is also without any doubt. -- Statement by Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP & Member, Standing Committee on Finance

Finance minister P Chidambaram’s statement, in an exit interview to this newspaper, that Aadhaar needs to be re-thought completely is probably the last nail in its coffin. :-) Financial Express

The Rural Development Ministry headed by Jairam Ramesh created a road Block and refused to make Aadhaar mandatory for making wage payment to people enrolled under the world’s largest social security scheme NRGA unless all residents are covered.


Tuesday, April 4, 2017

10951 - Is Aadhaar a breach of privacy? - The Hindu

Is Aadhaar a breach of privacy?


MARCH 31, 2017 00:15 IST



Aadhaar is very poorly designed. The technology needs fixing today; the law can wait for tomorrow

Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Centre for Internet and Society

Aadhaar is mass surveillance technology. Unlike, targeted surveillance which is a good thing, and essential for national security and public order — mass surveillance undermines security. And while biometrics is appropriate for targeted surveillance by the state — it is wholly inappropriate for everyday transactions between the state and law abiding citizens.
When assessing a technology don't ask — “what use it is being put to today?”. Instead ask “what use can it be put to tomorrow and by whom?”. The original noble intentions of the Aadhaar project initiators will not constrain those in the future that want to take full advantage of technological possibilities.  However, rather than frame the surveillance potential of Aadhaar in a negative tone as three problem statements — I will propose three modifications that will reduce but not eliminate the surveillance potential.
Shift from biometrics to smart cards
 In January 2011, the Centre for Internet and Society had written to the parliamentary finance committee that was reviewing what was then called the “National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010”. We provided nine reasons for the government to stop using biometrics and instead use an open smart card standard. Biometrics allows for identification of citizens even when they don't want to be identified. Even unconscious and dead citizens can be identified using biometrics. Smart cards which require pins on the other hand require the citizens' conscious cooperation during the identification process. Once you flush your smart cards down the toilet nobody can use them to identify you. Consent is baked into the design of the technology. If the UIDAI adopts smart cards, we can destroy the centralized database of biometrics just like the UK government did in 2010 under Theresa May's tenure as Home Secretary. This would completely eliminate the risk of foreign government, criminals and terrorists using the breached biometric database to remotely, covertly and non-consensually identify Indians.

Destroy the authentication transaction database
 The Aadhaar Authentication Regulations 2016 specifies that transaction data will be archived for five years after the date of the transaction. Even though the UIDAI claims that this is a zero knowledge database from the perspective of “reasons for authentication” - any big data expert will tell you that it is trivial to guess what is going on using the unique identifiers for the registered devices and time stamps that are used for authentication.  That is how they put Rajat Gupta and Raj Rajratnam in prison. There was nothing in the payload ie. voice recordings of the tapped telephone conversations – the conviction was based on meta-data. Smart cards based on open standards allow for decentralized authentication by multiple entities and therefore eliminates the need for a centralized transaction database.
Prohibit the use Aadhaar number in other databases
 We must as a nation get over our obsession with Know Your Customer [KYC]. For example, for SIM cards there is no KYC requirement is most developed countries. Our insistence on KYC has only resulted in retardation of Internet adoption, a black market for ID documents and unnecessary wastage of resources by the telecos without preventing criminals and terrorists from using phones. Where we must absolutely have KYC for security, elimination of ghosts and regulatory compliance – we must use a token issued by UIDAI instead of the Aadhaar number. This would make it harder for unauthorized parties to combine databases. But at the same time would enable law enforcement agencies to combine database using the appropriate authorizations and infrastructure like NATGRID. The NATGRID unlike Aadhaar is not a centralized database. It is a standard and platform for the express assembly of sub-sets of up to 20 databases which is then access by up to to 12 law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
To conclude, even as a surveillance project — Aadhaar is very poorly designed. The technology needs fixing today, the law can wait for tomorrow.

Aadhaar protects privacy by design. It uses the best possible technology relating to data protection

R.S. Sharma, is a chairman at TRAI. The views expressed are personal

Since its inception, Aadhaar has been criticised as a project which violates privacy. India does not have a law on privacy. In fact, then chairman of UIDAI, Nandan Nilekani, wrote to the Prime Minister as early as in May 2010 suggesting that there was a need to have a data protection and privacy law.
In a digital world, search and aggregation of data have become relatively easy. Aadhaar was designed as a digital identity platform which is inclusive, unique and can be authenticated to participate in any digital transaction. This has transformed the service delivery in our country, conveniencing residents and reducing leakages. Direct benefit transfer, subscription to various services and authentication at the point of service delivery are some of the benefits which have accrued.
In-built privacy
Aadhaar followed the principle of incorporating privacy by design, a concept which states that IT projects should be designed with privacy in mind. Collection of biometrics has often been quoted as one of the means of violating privacy. Biometrics are essential to ensure uniqueness, a key requirement for this project. Additionally, these biometrics can be used for authentication for financial transactions, getting mobile SIMs and various other services using electronic KYC (e-KYC).

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Another principle of privacy by design states that you should collect only minimal data. As UIDAI was creating identity infrastructure, it was decided that only a minimal set of data, just sufficient to establish identity, should be collected from residents. This irreducible set contained only four elements: name, gender, age and communication address of the resident.
Another design principle was to issue random numbers with no intelligence. This ensures that no profiling can be done as the number does not disclose anything about the person. The Aadhaar Act has clear restrictions on data sharing. No data download is permitted, search is not allowed and the only response which UIDAI gives to an authentication request is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. No personal information is divulged.
When a biometric-based authentication takes place, it is the individual who must participate in the process by submitting his or her biometrics, typically at the service delivery point to prove his identity. Typical examples are at the time of lifting ration from a PDS shop, opening a bank account to provide eKYC to the bank or submission of Digital Life Certificates by pensioners. The basic purpose of authentication is to facilitate residents in getting service in a digital, paperless and convenient way. As no information is divulged to any agency without the consent of the concerned individual, it cannot be construed to violate any privacy.
Purpose of authentication
Besides the minimal data which UIDAI has about a person, it does not keep any data except the logs of authentication. It does not know the purpose of authentication. The transaction details remain with the concerned agency and not with UIDAI. This is the best model of keeping data where each data-owner has the responsibility of data confidentiality and security.
Aadhaar authentication and e-KYC ensures that documents cannot be misused. Physical papers are amenable to misuse. We know of situations where multiple SIMs are issued based on some document, and the real owner is not even aware. On the other hand, e-KYC ensures that the document cannot be used for any other transaction. UIDAI has also built a facility wherein one can ‘lock’ the Aadhaar number and disable it from any type of authentication for a period of one’s choice, guarding against any potential misuse.

Aadhaar is necessary but we also need a robust data privacy and data protection law

Baijayant Jay Panda, a Lok Sabha MP and frequently pens articles on socially relevant issues

I see many people taking what I call a black-and-white position on Aadhaar. Either they support or red-flag it. I am for Aadhaar but I also feel very strongly about a robust data privacy and data protection law. As a matter of fact, a bill to this effect will be introduced by me in the Lok Sabha. Having said that, I have for long maintained that Aadhaar was the United Progressive Alliance government’s best idea; they were not enthusiastic about it and I wish they had done more. I am also glad that Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who had earlier opposed Aadhaar, listened to Nandan Nilekani with an open mind and has emerged as its strongest votary.

Plugging loopholes
In my constituency and in other places which I visit frequently, I see enormous leakages in social schemes. Aadhaar can plug these loopholes. I will quote former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who said that out of every rupee spent by the Indian government, barely 15 paisa reaches its citizens. A Planning Commission study done six years ago on the Public Distribution System found 27 paise reaching the citizens. The remaining 73 paise went on payments of salaries, administrative costs and corruption. MPs are required to chair a quarterly review of their constituencies. I do this often and when I ask for an audit, I invariably discover that the district authorities are faced with large number of fake names or fake roll numbers, either for PDS or the mid-day meal scheme. That’s where Aadhaar can help. Look at how Aadhaar assured transparency in LPG allocations. Of course, this was largely achieved by a concerned campaign spearheaded by the Prime Minister himself. Similarly, there are States where PDS has worked comparatively well, but not on all fronts. In Odisha, the rice scheme by the Chief Minister has worked well but the same cannot be said about, say, kerosene distribution.

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While that’s one half of the debate, it is also true that we are rapidly becoming a digital economy. We are a nation of billion cell phones and yet we have antiquated laws for data protection and privacy. Problems of ID theft, fraud and misrepresentation are real concerns. We submit ourselves knowingly or unknowingly to personal information sought online, even without Aadhaar. In the U.S., there is a legal battle on to make a case for better informed consent. Let me give an analogy here. In the case of medical emergencies we are required to sign a consent form, often running into pages. In the U.S., it has been decided that it is not enough to sign the consent form; the doctor must explain to the patient the consequences of a medical procedure about to be performed.
Safeguards needed
Similarly, we need to educate people on the risks involved, and highlight examples of ID thefts and fraud. We have a multiplicity of laws which overlap. Our IT laws have to be modernised and we have to put the liability on the company handling the data so that it is not stolen or shared without consent.
This century comes with certain risks. If we want a risk-free environment, as extreme as it may sound, we have the option to go back to the stone age. It is like saying ban cars as driving has become risky. Cars are essential and we create road safety norms to mitigate their risk. Similarly, we need to take a level-headed approach and ensure that ample safeguards are put in place for data protection and privacy.

As told to Anuradha Raman