In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Saturday, May 5, 2018

13460 - The question of identity cards - Financial Times


Four writers discuss the political and social impact they have had around the world



Sebastian Payne, Karuna Nundy, Frederick Studemann and Tammy Lai-Ming Ho YESTERDAY

Print this page

In the wake of the UK’s Windrush scandal, which has burdened a generation of migrants from the Caribbean with having to prove their right to live in the country, a conversation about the value of identity cards has been reignited in Britain. In response, four writers talk about their advantages and pitfalls.


UK

Identity cards are back in Britain, writes Sebastian Payne. Or, possibly not. It has been 12 years since Labour introduced a system of national ID cards and eight since the coalition government scrapped them. Killing off the project made sense in 2010: the public had lost faith in the government’s ability to protect its data (after a huge breach at HM Revenue & Customs) and the post-9/11 security arguments for introducing cards had dispersed. But chatter is increasing among politicians that the idea should be revisited.

Across Europe, control of borders and immigration are serious concerns. In the UK, anxiety manifested itself with the 2016 vote to leave the EU. Voters suspected that the Home Office did not know exactly who was in the country. As a member of the bloc, Britain was subject to free movement of people across the continent. Border checks are still not comprehensive and existing forms of identification — passports, national insurance numbers, driving licences — are not linked by a single coherent system.

So, the argument goes, identity cards are a straightforward solution. Give every Brit a little piece of plastic and the authorities can find out instantly whether or not they have the right to be here. Simple. But the strongest argument against ID cards has not changed from when the nation last went through this debate: they would fundamentally reshape the relationship between citizens and the state.

Many Britons find the idea of being instructed to ‘show your papers’ at any given time appalling

Sebastian Payne

It does not take much imagination to see how even a voluntary system could become compulsory. Being required to carry ID cards at all times and show them to the authorities on demand is not a very British tradition — many find the idea of being instructed to “show your papers” at any given time appalling.

The problem could be resolved without physical cards. Technology has evolved since 2006 and the government could build a national database of citizens and residents using biometrics — facial or fingerprint recognition can be used for identification. In Estonia, the e-Estonia system is an example of how this could work. Whether the Home Office is able to build it is a valid concern; Whitehall has a dismal record of delivering big technological projects.

A new identity system should not be dismissed based on this basis alone. The Home Office is under a lot of pressure to find a way of tackling immigration without resorting to the kind of crude target-based measures that have come under increasing criticism in recent weeks.

In just under a year, the country will have left the EU. And by the end of 2020, the UK government will be fully responsible for its national borders. It will have a new immigration policy and, along with it, a new strategy for securing border controls. This cannot work without a better way of tracking individuals. The Home Office needs to look to a secure comprehensive database. No cards required.

The writer is the FT’s digital opinion editor and political leader writer


India

To vulnerable people at the fringes of society, a state ID can be life-changing, writes Karuna Nundy. In India, if you’re unable to enrol in the state’s ID programme or if your biometric authentication doesn’t work, you could starve, be denied a job or have your children thrown out of school.

Since the government launched its national unique identity scheme in 2009, it has collected the data (including fingerprints and iris) scans of over 1bn Indians, and stored these in a centralised database. The state claims this will allow it to deliver services and subsidies such as food and fuel more directly, reduce corruption by eliminating fake claims and save taxpayers’ money by reducing transaction costs.

At stake, however, is not only cheaper food rations and school places but even access to justice. For 10 years I have represented in court the survivors of the world’s worst industrial disaster: the 1984 gas leak at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal. Of the half million people exposed to the toxic gas, or poisonous waste, those who are still alive have genetic mutations, cancer, neurotoxicity and other diseases. They were told in April of last year, that to access the paltry damages Carbide has paid out so far they must now produce the unique ID (UID).

Gaining and using a UID number can be fraught with difficulty. Some of Bhopal’s survivors are now old and their fingerprints have faded, so the ID doesn’t work. Others were too ill to go through a new bureaucratic process for an entitlement that has already been established. A small minority simply doesn’t want to hand over data because of fears the government will use it for purposes completely unrelated to the damages.

The Bhopal victims were told that to access the paltry damages that have been paid out so far they must now produce the unique ID
Karuna Nundy

They also don’t want to risk what is known as a “civil death”. The project that is meant to give people an incontrovertible proof of identity can sometimes take it away. Biometrics are easy to hack and, if fingerprints or iris scans are stolen, it is near impossible for a marginalised person to reclaim a lost identity.

To demonstrate the fragility of the system, a reporter from The Tribune newspaper recently bought the data of 1bn Indians in 10 minutes for the equivalent of less than £10. The authority responsible for UID safety filed a criminal complaint against her for this act of public service. The system is a juggernaut, it seeks cover-ups rather than remedies.

Since most people no longer live in tiny self-sufficient communities, states require some form of ID to vote, drink and cross borders. So if the state must supply proof of ID — and the onus is on governments to respect and fulfil rights — what should it look like? At this moment the Indian Supreme Court is weighing this fundamental question.

Some models allow for hope. A smart card to store personal data that the user carries might work better than a centralised database, for example. The user would have a PIN allowing government software to decrypt the data when it is needed, only keeping the data for the time needed to execute the action.

In our increasingly data-hungry economies, governments must ensure that information collected is necessary for the limited purpose it was ostensibly collected for; that it is dealt with lawfully and transparently; that mistakes are easily fixed and users can expect damages against data breaches and other government lapses. Lives and liberties depend on it.

The writer is a lawyer in the Supreme Court of India

Germany

In Germany an identity card is something of a rite of passage, writes Frederick Studemann. From the age of 16 people can apply for an Personalausweis — a card carrying their name, address, picture, details of height and eye colour. As well as providing proof of “grown-up” identity — along with the associated benefits of convincing doubtful merchants or bouncers that the holder is old enough to buy a beer or enter a club — the ID card is a key instrument for active citizenship.

It is also mandatory. The Law on Identity Cards and Electronic Identification states that all Germans are required to possess a form of identity. Failure to carry identification can result in a fine.

As well as carrying that piece of plastic, Germans are required to register their residence at local “citizens’ offices”. This has to be done within a set period of time when you move to a new address or another town. Similarly you are required to de-register from your old address, though in practice this is taken care of when you register your new one, except if you are moving abroad.

Taken at face value, this might all appear to be symptomatic of overly intrusive, and bureaucratic state authority — precisely the thing that opponents of ID cards in the UK warned against when they mounted their (ultimately successful) campaign to stop such a system being introduced in Britain. Yet in Germany it is largely uncontested. It is accepted as part of the “culture and custom” says Stefan Heumann of the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, a think-tank. It is also not quite the horror vision of arbitrary demands by those in authority — “Your papers, please!” — that some might envisage. The police, for instance, must have reasonable cause to ask for identification.

In Germany it is largely uncontested. It is accepted as part of the culture and custom

The importance of registration and identification within the German system has been highlighted by the administrative challenges brought by the arrival of around 1m refugees. “Registration chaos” quickly became a popular term in media accounts of the challenges facing state authorities and agencies as they were confronted with scores of people without the paperwork — a situation the government is now slowly addressing in the form of emergency or provisional documentation.

Beyond that what concerns Germans far more, says Mr Heumann, are the issues of data protection and surveillance through closed circuit television cameras (which is relatively widespread in Britain where it is, ironically in German eyes, largely accepted). “People are more angry about the way social media companies such as Facebook use and share personal data,” says Mr Heumann. Germany has toughened up its laws about the sharing of personal data. A case brought before the constitutional court challenging the collection of personal data for a national census found that the state was allowed to collect the information, but placed limits on what it could then do with it.

This has had consequences for the development of digital identity systems. Germany is a laggard in this area, says Mr Heumann. The technology and processes required for active e-citizenship is cumbersome and difficult to master — specialist journalists have taken a delight in exposing just how fiddly it is to execute pretty basic transactions, such as de-registering a car. The grand coalition government that took office in March has pledged to develop e-government, but given the issues around data protection, decentralised federal administrative structures and public scepticism, there are doubts as to how swiftly this will progress.

The writer is the FT’s literary editor

Hong Kong

There might be resistance to ID cards in the UK, but it was the British colonial government that introduced them in Hong Kong, writes Tammy Lai-Ming Ho. Identity cards were first implemented in 1949, following an influx of refugees from post-revolutionary China and, since 1980, it has been obligatory to carry ID at all times.

This has never been a matter of resentment for Hongkongers. Whatever concerns there might be about the government having access to one’s data are vastly outweighed by the conveniences, particularly in dealings with bureaucracy, healthcare suppliers and other institutions. ID cards are part and parcel of everyday life here. It is customary for banks, telecoms operators and suppliers of electricity and other utilities to request one’s ID card when processing paperwork. Citizens are only legally obliged to provide it on request to police and government offices.

Only once in my life, when taking a Test of English as a Foreign Language exam, has the Hong Kong ID card proved insufficient for my identification purposes; that day I was forced to return home, befuddled, to retrieve my passport. It was, strangely enough, the nearest to a Kafkaesque experience I have ever had with the Hong Kong bureaucracy, precisely because the ID was not accepted.

Hongkongers’ serenity regarding ID cards hasn’t been upset since the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, even among those who deplore the erosion of the democratic system under pressure from Beijing.

The day my ID was not accepted was the nearest to a Kafkaesque experience I have ever had with the Hong Kong bureaucracy
Tammy Lai-Ming Ho

There have been some alarming developments across the border in China recently, such as the inauguration of a social credit system, whereby people who have been convicted of misdemeanours and other minor offences are listed on a central database and barred from travel and access to other services.

For the time being, at least, Hong Kong is sheltered from such plans. Under the “ one country, two systems ” framework, the territory continues to have a separate legal and government system to the mainland so Hongkongers still seem confident that their ID cards will not become an instrument of social repression.

The cards were digitised in the 1980s and the current microchipped smart cards, manufactured by the Dutch company Gemalto, were introduced in 2003. A new generation card that facilitates a greater integration with public services such as libraries and the health service will start to be rolled out later this year.

Unlike national identity cards within the EU, there are no particular travel benefits to the ID card, other than allowing permanent residents to travel without passports to neighbouring Macau. They do, however, allow the bearer to skip immigration queues via automated gates when returning to Hong Kong from abroad. Foreigners working on visas are also issued cards, which, like those held by native Hongkongers, have fingerprint identification.

For younger people, ID cards are a rite of passage when they receive their first, at the age of 11. Until that age, school handbooks serve as makeshift identity proof. Getting your ID cards is considered the first step on the way to being a grown-up.

The writer is assistant professor at the Department of English of Hong Kong Baptist University, and the vice-president of PEN Hong Kong


This article has been republished to clarify the law in Germany on identity documents.