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box 3. national Identity Programmes
The “war on terror” gave impetus to the issuance of national identity numbers and/or cards in many countries. National identity programmes typically involve collection and
collation of biometrics and other personal data (residential, educational, professional, health, financial), and proponents often argue that this promotes both security and social welfare objectves on the grounds that ID registration will help individuals to access and governments to design public services. For the same reasons, critics are concerned that ID programmes will enable governments and private institutions to profile citizens, invade privacy and put at risk various freedoms and rights. On these grounds, ID proposals have been rejected in Australia, Canada, the Philippines, the
US and Britain, among others.
collation of biometrics and other personal data (residential, educational, professional, health, financial), and proponents often argue that this promotes both security and social welfare objectves on the grounds that ID registration will help individuals to access and governments to design public services. For the same reasons, critics are concerned that ID programmes will enable governments and private institutions to profile citizens, invade privacy and put at risk various freedoms and rights. On these grounds, ID proposals have been rejected in Australia, Canada, the Philippines, the
US and Britain, among others.
The American Civil Liberties Union concluded that an ID card system will “lead to a slippery slope of surveillance and monitoring of citizens ... [O]nce put in place, it is
exceedingly unlikely that such a system would be restricted to its original purpose.
Social Security numbers, for example, were originally intended to be used only to administer the retirement program. But that limit has been routinely ignored and
steadily abandoned over the past 50 years. A national ID system would threaten the privacy that Americans have always enjoyed and gradually increase the control that
government and business wields over everyday citizens.”1
India’s Programme India is developing perhaps the most ambitious current national identity project. In January 2009, the government established the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to “develop and implement the necessary institutional, technical and legal infrastructure to issue unique identity numbers to Indian residents”. It will collect, collate and organise key personal details, including biometrics, of some 1.5 billion Indians in order to make that information available to various users. In a related exercise, since 2003, a National Population Registry is being set up through household surveys, including biometrics, which will feed information to the UIDAI project.2 The national population registry is not governed by the Census Act 1948, which carries an explicit confidentiality provision.3 It operates under the Citizenship Act of 1955 and the
Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003; as a result, it is not constrained by privacy protections.
steadily abandoned over the past 50 years. A national ID system would threaten the privacy that Americans have always enjoyed and gradually increase the control that
government and business wields over everyday citizens.”1
India’s Programme India is developing perhaps the most ambitious current national identity project. In January 2009, the government established the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to “develop and implement the necessary institutional, technical and legal infrastructure to issue unique identity numbers to Indian residents”. It will collect, collate and organise key personal details, including biometrics, of some 1.5 billion Indians in order to make that information available to various users. In a related exercise, since 2003, a National Population Registry is being set up through household surveys, including biometrics, which will feed information to the UIDAI project.2 The national population registry is not governed by the Census Act 1948, which carries an explicit confidentiality provision.3 It operates under the Citizenship Act of 1955 and the
Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003; as a result, it is not constrained by privacy protections.
The UIDAI is intended to act as a bridge between “silos” of information held separately by various public and private agencies. Such convergence would enable construction
of detailed profiles of individuals and their tracking. A leading multinational operating in India’s health and hospital sector has reportedly already proposed to “link the UID number with health profiles of those provided the ID number, and offered to manage
1 See www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/5-problems-national-id-cards.
2 The UIDAI itself admits a decision was taken “to collate the two schemes – the National Population Register under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Number project of the Department of Information Technology”. See
uidai.gov.in/Historical Background.
uidai.gov.in/Historical Background.
3 Ramanathan (2010a). The Census Act (Section 15) is categorical that information collected by the census agency is “not open to inspection nor admissible in evidence”.
the health records”.4 The apparent rationale for a national ID number is that it will enable citizens, especially the poor, more effective access to public services. However, even the UIDAI acknowledges the “UID number will only guarantee identity, not rights, benefits or entitlements”.
the health records”.4 The apparent rationale for a national ID number is that it will enable citizens, especially the poor, more effective access to public services. However, even the UIDAI acknowledges the “UID number will only guarantee identity, not rights, benefits or entitlements”.
The “technological determinism”5 underlying the project is evident; an information technology entrepreneur heads the UIDAI with the rank of Union Cabinet Minister (superior to the Registrar of Census of India). Moreover, billions of rupees have been allocated to the initiative without an effective cost–benefit analysis, based on the assumption that technology can be used to “fix the ills of social inefficiencies”,
overcome flaws in public policies and structural barriers such as entrenched poverty and discrimination that prevent people from accessing their entitlements.6 Just how
such technologies may be used for the poor is evident from reports that, in an effort to rid New Delhi of beggars in advance of the 2010 Commonwealth Games, the city
considered constructing a biometric database of beggars which would help them identify repeat offenders detained under the Bombay Prevention of Beggars Act 1959
(also applicable in Delhi).7
overcome flaws in public policies and structural barriers such as entrenched poverty and discrimination that prevent people from accessing their entitlements.6 Just how
such technologies may be used for the poor is evident from reports that, in an effort to rid New Delhi of beggars in advance of the 2010 Commonwealth Games, the city
considered constructing a biometric database of beggars which would help them identify repeat offenders detained under the Bombay Prevention of Beggars Act 1959
(also applicable in Delhi).7
4 Ramanathan (2010b).
5 Ramakumar (2010).
6 Ibid.
7 “Removing beggars not enough”, Times of India, 12 April 2009.