The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholarUsha Ramanathandescribes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the#BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Friday, June 23, 2017

11542 - Legislation and legality - The Hindu

JUNE 20, 2017 00:02 IST

In the Aadhaar-PAN case, the Supreme Court has effectively held that policy goals override rights

At one point in its recently delivered judgment, in Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, the Supreme Court described the dispute over Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as falling within a category of what “Ronald Dworkin calls ‘hard cases’”. The petitioners before the court had argued that the provision, which makes it obligatory on individuals filing income tax returns to link their permanent account numbers (PAN) to their Aadhaar, was unconstitutional as it, among other things, infringed a number of fundamental rights.

The court, however, in declaring this case as “hard”, was effectively telling us that its abilities were somehow hamstrung by the nature of the dispute, that despite the strength of the petitioners’ arguments there existed principled reasons why it might be difficult for it to intervene. Unfortunately, this assertion flies in the face of American philosopher-jurist Dworkin’s ideas which the court sought to invoke.

While at first blush, a quibble over this categorisation might seem a largely frivolous concern, seeing as it is made on apparently pedantic grounds, in reality the court’s mistake here goes to the root of why it got its decision in Binoy Viswam as it did, and why it so often fails to uphold critical civil liberties when faced with acts of governmental coercion.

Dworkin’s ‘hard cases’
For Dworkin, “hard cases” are those disputes where “no settled rule dictates a decision either way”, and where, therefore, “it might seem that a proper decision could be generated by either policy or principle.” In other words, they encompass cases where there exists a particularly knotty controversy over deciding what the law really is, where an application of differing value judgments could plausibly result in contradictory identifications of the law.

To illuminate this point, in his book, Law’s Empire, Dworkin cites McLoughlin v. O’Brian, a 1983 House of Lords case involving an automobile accident. Here, Ms. McLoughlin’s husband and four children were injured after their car was hit by a lorry. She only heard about the accident a few hours later, and when she drove to the hospital where the rest of her family was admitted, she was told that one child had died and the others were seriously injured. Ms. McLoughlin, as a result of these revelations, suffered a nervous shock, and she later sued the lorry driver whose negligence had caused the accident.

This case, in Dworkin’s belief, was “hard” because there was no existing precedent where a person was awarded damages despite being absent from the scene of the accident. To decide such a case, Dworkin said, a judge must view “law as integrity”, that “propositions of law are true if they are derived from principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process, which provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.” In other words, a judge deciding such a dispute must test her interpretation by asking whether her decision could form part of a coherent theory that justifies the entire network of political structure and legal doctrine of their community.

The issues in Binoy Viswam, however, called for no such Herculean interpretive exercise. Nor did it require the court to indulge in any lawmaking. The facts were simple enough, and the court, notwithstanding its assertions to the contrary, did not have to decide on the “wisdom of the Legislature in enacting a particular law”, but merely on its constitutionality. To do this, it only had to apply existing precedent to rule on whether Section 139AA violated one or the other of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. Regrettably, the court’s answers to these basic questions are patently misjudged.

Despite keeping arguments over privacy outside the scope of their submissions — given that a larger bench of the Supreme Court has been asked to rule on whether India’s citizens possess a fundamental right to privacy at all — there were a number of acute arguments that were made to show the court that Section 139AA violated the rights to equality, to practise any profession, and to personal liberty of the petitioners. However, each of these arguments was dismissed almost on the singular ground that the state has a legitimate interest in making classifications to effectuate its policy decisions. This might seem like an unexceptionable proposition. But in effectively holding that the government has the power to undermine rights to achieve policy goals (an ironic conclusion given that Dworkin, who the court relies on, championed rights as trumps) the court has accepted, sans reasons, sweeping conclusions drawn by the state.

Casting away concerns
For instance, the court altogether rejected the contention that the Income Tax Act cannot make Aadhaar compulsory when the core legislation, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial & Other Subsidies, Benefits & Services) Act, 2016, makes enrolment in the scheme voluntary. The court did this by accepting as gospel truth the state’s arguments that the linking of Aadhaar and PAN can help eradicate the ills of tax evasion caused by a proliferation of black money. Several significant concerns highlighted by the petitioners, which showed that both biometric details and iris scans can be forged, were also swept aside without so much as a mention. As a result, the state’s argument was allowed to stand, in spite of the fact that almost no rational nexus has been shown to exist between the government’s purported aim of eradicating black money and the classification that Section 139AA makes in compelling individuals alone to secure a unique identity.

The court showed a similar disdain in dismissing arguments made on the arbitrariness that is inherent in Section 139AA. The reasons supplied by the petitioners on why the linking of Aadhaar and PAN is capricious were wholly ignored. For example, the judgment failed to heed to the fact that the consequences of an invalidation of a person’s PAN might result in a virtual “civil death”, as the senior counsel Arvind P. Datar, who represented one of the petitioners, described the provision. Instead the court invoked the proposition that a legislation cannot be struck down on grounds of arbitrariness alone. To do this, it relied on the verdict from 2015 in Rajbala v. State of Haryana, ignoring, in the process, a mountain of earlier precedent where arbitrary state action, including by way of legislation, has been held as antithetical to the guarantee of equality.

Now, it’s plain to see that even if Parliament represents the interests of the people, any legislation made by it is a product of the proclivities of the government in power. To check whether a legislation is arbitrary or not is not to question the wisdom of the legislature, but rather to examine whether the classifications that a law makes are rational and to scrutinise whether Parliament has exercised judgment by responding to reasoned analysis as opposed to the whims of motivated interest groups. Here, the court finds no need for such an inquiry because a legislation, it holds, cannot be subject to judicial review for being purely arbitrary.

Arguments on how Section 139AA violates a person’s right to practise any profession or carry on any trade under Article 19(1)(g) also met with a similar fate. And this cloud has only the thinnest of silver linings — when a Constitution Bench eventually decides on whether Aadhaar as a collective policy infringes the rights to privacy and bodily integrity (if indeed such liberties are deemed as fundamental guarantees), there remains the possibility that Section 139AA may be rendered void.

But, for now, we’re left with a deeply undesirable and unsatisfactory outcome: all those who already possess an Aadhaar card must integrate it with their PAN, regardless of whether they ever imagined having to submit to such a burden at the time of securing the identity, and where any person who files an income tax return after July 1 must have, at the least, applied for a unique identity. As to how this distinction is constitutionally sustainable, the court tells us little. Ultimately, this wasn’t a “hard case” to decide. But by getting its conclusions as it has, the judgment’s consequences are certainly likely to prove difficult, imposing, as they do, an unreasonable burden on our essential civil liberties.

Suhrith Parthasarathy is an advocate practising at the Madras High Court