9867 - Aadhaar's Identity Crisis - Business Today

Aadhaar's Identity Crisis

Aadhaar enrolments have crossed a billion. But will the project make the desired impact on the ground?

By Joe C. Mathew   New Delhi     Print Edition: May 8, 2016

Nikhil Dey, a renowned social activist who has been working with peasants in the villages of Rajasthan for decades, is finding more disgruntled poor around him these days. It all began with the decision of Rajasthan government to make Aadhaar-based authentication mandatory for supply of subsidised foodgrains through the public distribution system (PDS), a couple of months ago. While the objective of biometric authentication was to ensure that the subsidised foodgrains (wheat at Rs 2 and rice at Rs 3 a kg) reaches the real beneficiary by avoiding leakages, the process seems to have made life difficult, instead of making it easy, for most beneficiaries in Rajasthan.

"If you see what is happening in ration (PDS) shops in Rajasthan, the POS machines that are meant to identify the people are a complete disaster. Not even 50 per cent of the people are able to validate themselves through these machines," Dey says.

Dey agrees that in a theoretical sense, if his fingerprint is authenticated and if it works seamlessly, it is quite a breakthrough. "But it needs to work with, say, 98 per cent efficacy, because then, for the rest of the people, you can provide subsidised rice or direct cash transfer through manual mode. But when you are identifying only 30 or 40 per cent, and majority of the genuine beneficiaries is failing to make use of the POS system, and will have to be served manually, you are not ending corruption, you are inviting corruption." All three claims made in favour of Aadhaar-linked direct benefit transfer (DBT) are doubtful, he says.

There is this claim of efficiency, stopping corruption, and of inclusion. All three are going in the opposite direction, points out Dey. "When I am going to a ration shop, putting my thumb impression, maybe the Internet is not working or the machine is malfunctioning. I am in a situation where everyone in the village, including the dealer, says I am Nikhil, but my benefit gets delayed or deprived, only because the machine says I am not Nikhil.

Here I am not included, I am excluded." Multiple attempts mean time and frustration. It's costing money, it's costing time, it's costing resources and it is not accurate, asserts Dey. "We have to delink from this theoretical world of everything working perfectly to understandwhat is practically happening." Dey says that all the "song and dance" about DBT has no meaning as it was happening very effectively even without Aadhaar. "NREGA is already a DBT. The money goes into people's post office account or bank accounts. So people are getting the benefits directly. All I am saying is that even without Aadhaar, NREGA was already DBT, and pension was already DBT."

D.K. Mittal, former mission director, DBT Scheme, and ex-secretary, Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, agrees. "There are two aspects to the Aadhaar programme.

One is to identify a person by providing him a unique number, and the other is to provide direct subsidies by using the Aadhaar bridge payment platform." While Aadhaar is a wonderful programme for the purpose of identification, it was a mistake to converge the benefit transfer scheme and the Aadhaar, believes Mittal.

"Why do you mix the two? Fiftysixty per cent of the country's population work using their hands (depend on manual labour). Their fingerprints are subject to wear and tear even within a year. Even if the finger prints remain recognisable, there are connectivity problems, which makes payments through Aadhaar bridge payment system difficult," Mittal adds.

The Elixir

The statutory backing the citizen's unique identification number got with the enactment of The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016, in March and its high rate of enrolment (over 100 crore) has made it convenient for governments - Central and states - to project Aadhaar and biometric identifications as the best solution for all kinds of hurdles that trouble government-citizen interface.

The Central government has already introduced Aadhaar bridge payment system to transfer cooking gas subsidy to LPG customers across the country. Four states - Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Puducherry and Delhi - have attempted Aadhaar-linked PDS system that Rajasthan is busy experimenting with now. Some others are trying Aadhaar-linked scholarships and pension payments to eligible citizens. The government claims that all such attempts resulted in saving public money.

The DBT mission, which is now under the direct administrative control of the Cabinet Secretariat, has identified about 30 schemes where direct cash transfer can be implemented. The scope of the project has been enlarged to cover all Central sector schemes and Centresponsored schemes. Of the Rs 6,031 crore that was disbursed through the DBT mode in January 2016, 37 per cent funds were transferred using the Aadhaar bridge payment system. This includes about 61 per cent of the benefit schemes implemented by the Rural Development Ministry (including NREGA) and 62.5 per cent of cooking gas subsidy payment by the Petroleum Ministry.

Delivering a lecture on 'the new economics of financial inclusion' in Australia on March 31, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said that the Indian financial inclusion model - of which Aadhaar is an integral part - has received international acclaim. "The deployment of JAM trinity of Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar, and mobile telephones is a hugely innovative intervention to carry this (financial inclusion) forward and place government finances at prudent levels," he said.

The government's financial inclusion policy has three objectives. It aims at providing social security, affordable credit to entrepreneurs and to fix the subsidy leakage problem through targeted DBT programmes. Jaitley claims that the database of 1.2 billion bank accounts when linked with 900 million mobile phones and a billion Aadhaar numbers would effectively ensure that the subsidy flow only happens to those who actually need it.

The importance of JAM trinity has been emphasised in the government's Economic Survey 2015/16 in a dedicated chapter that talks about 'spreading JAM across India's economy'. It clearly states that the project should meet all three objectives - the government must be able to identify beneficiaries; it must be able to transfer money to beneficiaries and the beneficiaries must be able to easily access their money.

The failure of the first category leads to inclusion errors and leakage - benefits intended for the poor flow to rich and 'ghost' households, resulting in fiscal loss. The failure of the other two leads to exclusion errors - genuine beneficiaries being unable to avail benefits. The survey wanted the government to be especially sensitive to exclusion errors, which typically hurt the poorest and can be invoked as reason - and highlighted by leakage beneficiaries - to roll back DBT schemes. The second alert becomes very significant in the backdrop of the Rajasthan experience.

The survey also acknowledges that despite huge improvements in financial inclusion due to Jan Dhan, the JAM preparedness indicators suggest that there is still some way to go before bank-beneficiary linkages are strong enough to pursue DBT without committing exclusion errors. "In that sense, the JAM agenda is currently jammed by the last-mile challenge of getting money from banks into beneficiaries' hands, especially in rural India," it says. The problem highlighted by the survey is not Aadhaar authentication but absence of last-mile connectivity for banking institutions for seamless transfer of cash into the hands of the beneficiary.

P.D.T. Achary, former Secretary General of Lok Sabha

"Aadhaar Bill comes under the category of financial bills, which should have been passed by both Houses of Parliament"

While the government insists that the Aadhaar Act is meant only to facilitate DBT by identifying the genuine beneficiaries and weed out duplication and corruption, it is being proposed for all kinds of authentication purposes, including e-verification of income-tax returns to mobile SIM issuance. And it is not just the governments that are excited about Aadhaar and DBT.

Early this year, an investor note from stock broking firm Ambit Capital Pvt Ltd said that the implementation of DBT for food subsidies can result in Rs 45,500 crore annual rise in disposable incomes of targeted households, which in turn can drive a 14 per cent increase in rural FMCG demand. Hindustan Unilever, Colgate and Dabur are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries, the brokerage said.

While the methodology adopted by Ambit could be questioned, there cannot be any doubt over the business opportunity Aadhaar and DBT linkage offers for another segment - the mobile phone operators and the software companies.

While the JAM Trinity talks about mobile banking, and thereby increase the scope of services and reach of mobile phone-linked payment solutions, the technology companies are getting huge assignments from banking establishments and government agencies to turn their core systems Aadhaar-friendly.

For instance, while the current National Electronic Fund Transfer (NEFT) platform was capable of handling any load of electronic cash transfer, it needed a tweak to handle DBT through Aadhaar-linked authentication. And any change meant business for technology firms. "By compelling banks to enable Aadhaar platform, you have made them change their core banking architecture. The National Payment Corporation of India (NPCA) itself is known to have spent a substantial amount to change its core banking solutions (CBS)," says an ex-bureaucrat, who was associated with the banking sector. In fact, every bank has done, or is doing it. The front-end of all the departments that handle DBT are working on their software to have it handle Aadhaar-linked payment demands. And all this simply means huge, long-term and recurring business opportunities for the IT companies that are facing margin pressures due to the economic lull in their traditional developed country markets.

Technically Sound?

The Aadhaar Bill was introduced as a Money Bill to avoid Rajya Sabha scruitiny, where the ruling NDA government is a minority. Experts, including members of the opposition Congress Party, have expressed doubts over the constitutionality and legitimacy of this action. Some are even moving the Supreme Court, which is already hearing some public interest litigations that were filed against the plans to make Aadhaar mandatory for DBT.

"Subtle attempts have been made to give Aadhaar Bill the appearance of a Money Bill by referring to the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) in certain clauses. But this does not alter the character of the Bill, which does not deal with the CFI," P.D.T. Achary, former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, says. According to him, the Aadhaar Bill comes under the category of financial bills, which should have been passed by both Houses of Parliament.

Gopal Krishna, an activist associated with Delhi-based Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), fears that a universal Aadhaar will have far-reaching implications that go beyond an effective DBT rollout. "There are ownership risks, technology risks and privacy concerns", he says. Krishna also points out that countries like the UK, Australia, France, the Phillippines, Germany, and Europe have rejected UID/Aadhaar-like projects while Asian countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal are moving on similar lines as that of India. "Is it a coincidence that the similar schemes are unfolding in South Asia? Isn't there a design behind persuading and compelling developing countries to biometrically profile their citizens?" he asks.

Unique ID

Even if one dismisses the conspiracy theory, the fact remains that your unique number, once included in all official documents, leaves a trail that can be traced easily even when your biometric data remains protected. It has also a positive role to play.

Aadhaar authentication can be of unexpected help, too, as was evident when floods ravaged Chennai city recently. For dozens of hapless flood victims, whose entire belongings and identification documents got washed away, fingerprint or iris authentication was more than enough to avail the official relief. The biometric identification also helped them trace back their other identities.

In a bid to get the Aadhaar Bill passed at any cost, the government has deliberately framed it as a piece of legislation meant for the targeted delivery of financial and other subsidies, benefits and services, but in essence it is a law that provides statutory backing to an authority that issues a unique number as your national identity. In that sense, the original title of the Bill, the 'National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010', is very much relevant.

Unless the Supreme Court decides on the contrary, the enrolment and seeding of Aadhaar numbers for multiple purposes will only increase in the coming days. While it will definitely enhance the business opportunities of several stakeholders, one will have to wait till the next elections to understand its success, as that is the only time the real beneficiaries get to cast their feedback as votes.

If Rajasthan is an indication, the government needs to be more cautious in its approach.

9704 - People of South Asian countries are subjected to slavery by mass biometric surveillance like Aadhaar’ - Two Circles

‘People of South Asian countries are subjected to slavery by mass biometric surveillance like Aadhaar’

Submitted by TwoCircles.net on 31 March 2016 - 10:56am

By TCN News,

New Delhi: In order to ponder light on various aspects of mass biometric identification projects in South Asian countries, a Press Conference on “Are Aadhaar like biometric identification projects in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan legitimate?” was organized here at The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia, New Delhi.

On Wednesday many eminent personalities shared their views with the media included P D T Achary, former Secretary General, Lok Sabha, Dr Usha Ramanathan, noted jurist, Dr. M Vijayanunni, former Registrar General and Census Commissioner and Dr Gopal Krishna of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL).

The Press Conference was held even as the order of Chief Justice of India headed by 5 Judge Bench in the Aadhaar matter awaits compliance and High Court Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court is also seized with a matter related to biometric identification project. In a related development a Panel of Nepal’s Public Accounts Committee is examining the issues related to biometric data based Voter ID project.

In the matter of Aadhaar Act, 2006, P D T Achary, former Secretary General, Lok Sabha said that it “comes under the category of financial bills under Article 117” and not under the category of Money Bill. He said, “Article 110(3) confirms finality on the speaker’s decision on the question of whether a bill is a money bill. But this constitutional provision cannot be seen as a convenient tool to deal with an inconvenient second chamber.”

He said that Supreme Court will have to examine whether Lok Sabha has the competence and power to expose people to grave risks. Speakers’ power is not absolute under the Constitution of India. It can be challenged in a Court of law.

In his statement Dr. M Vijayanunni, former Registrar General and Census Commissioner and former Chief Secretary of Government of West Bengal said, “China, which is comparable to India in terms of size and diversity of population, abandoned its universal ID system midway in the face of insurmountable problems encountered during its implementation, despite the supposed advantage of their totalitarian system in pushing through such a humongous but ill-advised project.”

He also stated, “The real pressure for continuance of the scheme will be from the police and secret surveillance systems to pry into the privacy of everyone which gives them unlimited powers over the lives of helpless individuals and enjoy unchallenged supremacy in the days to come. That will sound the death-knell of freedom and democracy.”

Dr Usha Ramanathan, a jurist said, “Biometrics, unlike passwords or pin numbers, cannot be replaced. What is a person supposed to do if their biometrics get compromised? This is a risk that is being foisted on the people, and no one else is willing to accept liability for the harm and loss that this may cause.” She also said, “in making biometrics compulsory for the poor, the poor are being told that they do not have any interest in privacy, and that they should only care about the money they may get from the government or the food that may be provided. This reduction of citizenship of the poor person to a rightless welfare recipient is itself unconstitutional.”

She further stated, “This project has made it necessary to remind the governments that the Constitution is not about the power of the state over the people. It is about the limits of state power.”

Col. Mathew Thomas, a defense scientist and a petitioner before the Supreme Court of India against Aadhaar said, “Putting the biometric and demographic data of all Armed Forces personnel into a database, which is accessed by foreign private companies, hands over the entire deployment of the Nations Defenses to foreigners. I think that UID is more dangerous than Masood Azhar. He can at best try a terror strike. UID makes our nation subservient to a foreign power. It takes away our freedom. Is there anti-nationalism that is worse than handing over the entire biometric and demographic data of the Nation to private foreign contractors and hiding the fact from us?”

“The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance has repeatedly said that UID is a threat to national security. The danger to national security is not only from illegal immigrants entering UID database, but from the foreign private companies who are providing biometric technology to UIDAI. These foreign firms were founded by former CIA and FBI officials and are contractors to US intelligence agents. Clauses 15.1 of Annexure ‘A’ and 3.1 ‘B’ of the contract of UIDAI with M/s L 1 Identity Solutions Operating Company, a foreign company, provide it access to ALL personal data in the UID database and the use, transfer, processing and linking of the data with personal data of specific individuals”, he added.

“India and Pakistan are two countries which are using the same foreign private companies for biometric technology for setting national databases – UID in India and NADRA in Pakistan. No greater stupidity can ever be imagined. With this India will not just be “re-booted”, it will be booted (kicked) into a vassal state of a foreign power along with its neighbor, Pakistan,” he strongly contended.

Dr Gopal Krishna of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) said, following the footprints of Pakistan, Government of India set up Unique Identification Authority (UIDAI) of India in January 2009 for biometric identification of Indian residents. The transnational companies like Ernst & Young. L1 Identities Solution, Safran and Accenture are involved in it. Ironically, these companies are taking the personal sensitive information for “seven years” and Government is paying for it. 

Government’s ambitious Digital India project seeks to link mobile SIM cards with the unique identity number (UID) or Aadhaar. The development comes close on the heels of the Cabinet approving the blueprint for the Digital India project.”

The conference held that the section of political class which has resisted the Faustian bargain so far must examine following questions and put these biometric agencies to rigorous scrutiny to make them subservient to people’s will:

Is it a coincidence that the similar schemes are unfolding in South Asia? Isn’t there a design behind persuading and compelling developing countries to biometrically profile their citizens? Is it too early to infer that international bankers, UN agencies and western military alliances wish to create profiles in their biometric and electronic database for coercive use of social control measures? Is it not true that uninformed citizens, parliamentarians and gullible government agencies are too eager to be profiled and tracked through an online database? Would freedom fighters have approved of mass surveillance by any national or transnational agency? Is it not clear that UN agencies, World Bank Group, transnational intelligence companies and military alliances are working in tandem to create the bio-electronic database of Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshi as per their pre-determined design? Is this design structured to safeguard the interest of present and future generation?

It also added that the citizens must compel these national governments to explain how national security of US, France and their allies converge with the national interest of India, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

There is evidence in public domain that indicates that under the influence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and World Bank, Governments of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been compelled to adopt biometric identification for its residents. In the aftermath of disclosures by Wikileaks, Edward Snowden, Citizen Four, Glenn Greenwald and the surveillance by unaccountable institutions, now that the fearful ramifications are visible on the horizon, the question is who is stopping, the political class in the region to desist from allowing subjugation of their fellow citizens to be subjugated by transnational imperial powers.

Now that Aadhaar Act, 2016 has been notified in the Gazette after it received the President’s assent, the press conference tried to examine the constitutionality and legitimacy of such initiatives in a global and South Asian context. Supreme Court of India is seized with the matter. Election Commission of India has refused to link Aadhaar with Voter ID in compliance with Court’s order. Governments of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal appear to have been compelled to adopt biometric identification for its residents ignoring the fact that countries like UK, USA, China, Australia, and France have abandoned either their identity projects or indiscriminate use of biometrics. But the same has been bulldozed in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal. Mass surveillance is harming democracy, the conference opined.

How it is working in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal

One of the most successful examples of implementation of biometric identification is Pakistan. Even SIM card for mobile in Pakistan is done based on biometric identification. Pakistani authorities May 16, 2015 said they have authenticated 75.5 million SIM cards through biometric verification. In an interview, Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks informed Imran Khan about the grave act of omission and commission. Assange said, “…we discovered a cable in 2009 from the Islamabad Embassy. Prime Minister Gilani and interior minister Malik went into the (US) embassy and offered to share National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) – and NADRA is the national data and registration agency database. The system is currently connected through passport data but the government of Pakistan is adding voice and facial recognition capability and has installed a pilot biometric system as the Chenaai border crossing, where 30,000 to 35,000 people cross each day. This NADRA system is the voting record system for all voters in Pakistan. A front company was set up in the United Kingdom – International Identity Services, which was hired as the consultants for NADRA to squirrel out the NADRA data for all of Pakistan. What do you think about that? Is that a…? It seems to me that that is a theft of some national treasure of Pakistan, the entire Pakistani database registry of its people.” The interview was conducted on June 19, 2012.

In a related development, on December 16, 2015 Bangladesh introduced: mandatory biometric registration for all SIM card owners. With this new system in place, every mobile phone SIM card will be associated with its user's identity as it appears in the national identity card database of the Election Commission. Every SIM card owner will be asked to verify their identity by providing their fingerprint, which will be checked against the fingerprint data associated with their national identification. Each person will be allowed to register a maximum of twenty mobile phone SIM cards to their national identity card. This scheme connects communications data together with individual, government-assigned identities. By implication it allows the government to have unprecedented oversight on daily lives of Bangladeshi citizens.

Responding to a complaint Nepal's Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) raised a national security concern over the contract to be awarded to Morpho Safran, a French company working in India, for preparing the national identity card on January 4, 2016. Its members argued that any firm belonging to, or working in India or China, should not be awarded such a sensitive project as preparing the national identity card that contains all vital information on Nepali citizens. The National Identity Management Centre (NIDMC) has chosen Morpho Safran to print the national IDs, the same firm that had been disqualified earlier for a conflict of interests. Only Morpho Safran was deemed “technically eligible” to set up infrastructure and print the ID cards. While the selection has to be approved by the funding agency, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the fact that only one firm was found to be technically eligible has raised many an eyebrow. PAC members claimed that Morpho’s subsidiary firm is involved in many projects in India including in preparing a similar kind of national identity card (Aadhaar).

The NIDMC of Nepal's Home Ministry qualified Morpho Safran technically among five other bidders namely, Gemalto (France), IRIS Corporation (Malaysia), Informatics (Sri Lanka), Dermalog and Arjowiggins (France). Nepal’s PAC formed a panel to see if there are irregularities in picking only one firm. In June, 2015 the Nepal Government had called a global tender for procurement and installation of hardware at its offices and all project sites. The Asian Development Bank extended an $8 million loan for the project while the rest is to be financed by the World Bank. The report is yet to see the light of the day.

It is evident that governments of Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India are following the footprints of an experiment which was tried, tested and failed in the developed countries.

For instance, has NADRA been made accountable for this theft of national treasure of Pakistan? Will these governments be made accountable if “rich data assets” are stolen or sold? Has anyone been made accountable till date in such situations?

9703 - Illegitimate Biometric Identification Projects Compromise Sovereignty Of Nations In South Asia - Counter Currents

Illegitimate Biometric Identification Projects Compromise Sovereignty Of Nations In South Asia

By Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties

31 March, 2016
Countercurrents.org

New Delhi: Even as the urgent order of Chief Justice of India headed 5 Judge bench in the Aadhaar matter awaits compliance, a Press Conference on “Are Aadhaar like biometric identification projects in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan legitimate?” was organized on 30th March, 2016 at The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia, New Delhi. High Court Division of Supreme Court of Bangladesh is also seized with a matter related to biometric identification project. In a related development a Panel of Nepal’s Public Accounts Committee is examining the issues related to their biometric data based Voter ID project.

in the matter of Aadhaar Act, 2006, P D T Achary, former Secretary General, Lok Sabha said that it “comes under the category of financial bills under Article 117” and not under the category of Money Bill. He said, “Article 110(3) confirms finality on the speaker’s decision on the question of whether a bill is a money bill. But this constitutional provision cannot be seen as a convenient tool to deal with an inconvenient second chamber. 

 The Constitution reposes faith in the speaker’s fairness and objectivity. Article 110(1) provides the touchstone of the decision to be taken by the speaker under Article 110(3). Any decision actuated by extraneous considerations can’t be a proper decision under Article 110(3). The speaker’s decision needs to be in conformity with the constitutional provisions. If not, it is no decision under the Constitution.” He underlined that Aadhaar legislation which dressed up as Money Bill on a fake ground because Aadhaar is incidental to the subsidy. He stated that tomorrow even if ‘subsidy’ can be abolished Aadhaar will continue to be there. He said that Supreme Court will have to examine whether Lok Sabha has the competence and power to expose people to grave risks. Speakers’ power is not absolute under the Constitution of India. It can be challenged in a Court of law.

In a statement for the Press conference Dr. M Vijayanunni, former Registrar General and Census Commissioner and former Chief Secretary of Government of West Bengal said, “China, which is the other country in the world comparable to India in terms of size and diversity of population, abandoned its universal ID system midway in the face of insurmountable problems encountered during its implementation, despite the supposed advantage of their totalitarian system in pushing through such a humongous but ill-advised project.” He states, “While the USA has the social security number for all residents, it does not intrude into the privacy of the individuals and is so liberally implemented that it does not block or stand in the way of getting any deserved benefits from the state or from availing of any services from other agencies.”

Dr. M Vijayanunni stated that “The government's attraction to the project is the supposed reduction achieved in disbursal of subsidies through avoidance of duplicate and bogus claims. This has to be achieved through other administrative modalities in each individual scheme rather than by steamrolling it through an uncaring denial of thousands of claims based merely on faults in the biometric and data retrieval systems. The real pressure for continuance of the scheme will be from the police and secret surveillance systems to pry into the privacy of everyone which gives them unlimited powers over the lives of helpless individuals and enjoy unchallenged supremacy in the days to come. That will sound the death-knell of freedom and democracy.”

He said, “There have been umpteen complaints from the affected citizens in the actual collection and collation of the biometric and personal data in the field so far and the project is engulfed in the tears and curses of lakhs of people of all social strata up against the uncaring ways of the officials doing the aadhaar exercise. It is pulling wool over one's eyes if it were to be claimed that it has been perfectly implemented so far.”

Dr Usha Ramanathan, a jurist said, “Biometrics, unlike passwords or pin numbers, cannot be replaced. What is a person supposed to do if their biometrics get compromised? We know now that fingerprints, for instance, can be faked, that they can be `lost’ because someone `stole’ them, that they can become unusable because of a range of reasons, including that their work wears out their fingerprints or that working in the sun affects iris recognition. This is a risk that is being foisted on the people, and no one else is willing to accept liability for the harm and loss that this may cause.” She said, “in making biometrics compulsory for the poor, the poor are being told that they do not have any interest in privacy, and that they should only care about the money they may get from the government or the food that may be provided. This reduction of citizenship of the poor person to a rightless welfare recipient is itself unconstitutional.” She stated, “This project has made it necessary to remind the governments that the Constitution is not about the power of the state over the people. It is about the limits of state power.”

In a statement for the Press Conference Col. Mathew Thomas, a defense scientist and a petitioner before the Supreme Court of India against Aadhaar said, “Putting the biometric and demographic data of all Armed Forces personnel into a database, which is accessed by foreign private companies, hands over the entire deployment of the Nations Defenses to foreigners. I think that UID is more dangerous than Masood Azhar. He can at best try a terror strike. UID makes our nation subservient to a foreign power. It takes away our freedom. Is there anti-nationalism that is worse than handing over the entire biometric and demographic data of the Nation to private foreign contractors and hiding the fact from its people?”

He said, “The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance has repeatedly said that UID is a threat to national security. The present National Security Adviser and a cabinet minister are on record on camera saying that UID is a threat to national security. The danger to national security is not only from illegal immigrants entering UID database, but from the foreign private companies who are providing biometric technology to UIDAI. These foreign firms were founded by former CIA and FBI officials and are contractors to US intelligence agents. Clauses 15.1 of Annexure ‘A’ and 3.1 ‘B’ of the contract of UIDAI with M/s L 1 Identity Solutions Operating Company, a foreign company, provide it access to ALL personal data in the UID database and the use, transfer, processing and linking of the data with personal data of specific individuals.

Putting the biometric and demographic data of all Armed Forces personnel into a database, which is accessed by foreign private companies, hands over the entire deployment of the Nations Defenses to foreigners. The biggest threat is NOT just the UID database, but linking it through “seeding” of the UID Number to all other databases of the Nation, like, PDS, LPG, salaries, scholarships, health records, pensions, SEBI, voter lists etc. India and Pakistan are two countries which are using the same foreign private companies for biometric technology for setting national databases – UID in India and NADRA in Pakistan. No greater stupidity can ever be imagined. With this India will not just be “re-booted”, it will be booted (kicked) into a vassal state of a foreign power along with its neighbor, Pakistan.”

Dr Gopal Krishna of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) said, following the footprints of Pakistan, Government of India set up Unique Identification Authority (UIDAI) of India in January 2009 for biometric identification of Indian residents. The biometric data based Unique Identification (UID) Number branded as Aadhaar is being made structurally irreversible. The transnational companies like Ernst & Young. L1 Identities Solution, Safran and Accenture are involved in it. Ironically, these companies are taking the personal sensitive information for “seven years” and Government is paying for it. At no stage was the political class briefed about the far reaching implications for right to privacy, national security and national sovereignty. Government’s ambitious Digital India project seeks to link mobile SIM cards with the unique identity number (UID) or Aadhaar. The development comes close on the heels of the Cabinet approving the blueprint for the Digital India project. It will also provide "high-speed internet as a core utility" down to the gram panchayat level and a ‘cradle-to-grave digital identity - unique, lifelong, online and authenticable’.”

One of the most successful examples of implementation of biometric identification is Pakistan. Even SIM card for mobile in Pakistan is done based on biometric identification. Pakistani authorities May 16, 2015 said they have authenticated 75.5 million SIM cards through biometric verification. In an interview, Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks informed Imran Khan about the grave act of omission and commission. Assange said, “…we discovered a cable in 2009 from the Islamabad Embassy. Prime minister Gilani and interior minister Malik went into the (US) embassy and offered to share National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) – and NADRA is the national data and registration agency database. The system is currently connected through passport data but the government of Pakistan is adding voice and facial recognition capability and has installed a pilot biometric system as the Chennai border crossing, where 30,000 to 35,000 people cross each day. This NADRA system is the voting record system for all voters in Pakistan. A front company was set up in the United Kingdom – International Identity Services, which was hired as the consultants for NADRA to squirrel out the NADRA data for all of Pakistan. What do you think about that? Is that a…? It seems to me that that is a theft of some national treasure of Pakistan, the entire Pakistani database registry of its people.” The interview was conducted on June 19, 2012.

In a related development, on December 16, 2015 Bangladesh introduced: mandatory biometric registration for all SIM card owners. With this new system in place, every mobile phone SIM card will be associated with its user's identity as it appears in the national identity card database of the Election Commission. Every SIM card owner will be asked to verify their identity by providing their fingerprint, which will be checked against the fingerprint data associated with their national identification. Each person will be allowed to register a maximum of twenty mobile phone SIM cards to their national identity card. This scheme connects communications data together with individual, government-assigned identities. By implication it allows the government to have unprecedented oversight on daily lives of Bangladeshi citizens. In an email communication dated March 30, 2016, Aneek R Haque, lead lawyer from Dhaka, Bangladesh informed, “Although the hearing was to take place today, but the Govt. today wasted the day by arguing question of maintainability. Ultimately the High Court ruled their objection out and fixed sunday for hearing.” Like in India the biometric project faces legal challenge before the High Court Division of Bangladesh Supreme Court.

Responding to a complaint Nepal's Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) raised a national security concern over the contract to be awarded to Morpho Safran, a French company working in India, for preparing the national identity card on 4th January, 2016. Its members argued that any firm belonging to, or working in India or China, should not be awarded such a sensitive project as preparing the national identity card that contains all vital information on Nepali citizens. The National Identity Management Centre (NIDMC) has chosen Morpho Safran to print the national IDs, the same firm that had been disqualified earlier for a conflict of interests. Only Morpho Safran was deemed “technically eligible” to set up infrastructure and print the ID cards. While the selection has to be approved by the funding agency, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the fact that only one firm was found to be technically eligible has raised many an eyebrow. PAC members claimed that Morpho’s subsidiary firm is involved in many projects in India including in preparing a similar kind of national identity card (Aadhaar).

The NIDMC of Nepal's Home Ministry qualified Morpho Safran technically among five other bidders namely, Gemalto (France), IRIS Corporation (Malaysia), Informatics (Sri Lanka), Dermalog and Arjowiggins (France). Nepal’s PAC formed a panel to see if there are irregularities in picking only one firm. In June, 2015 the Nepal Government had called a global tender for procurement and installation of hardware at its offices and all project sites. The Asian Development Bank extended an $8 million loan for the project while the rest is to be financed by the World Bank. The report is yet to see the light of the day.

It is evident that governments of Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India are following the footprints of an experiment which has tried, tested and failed in the developed countries.

For instance, has NADRA been made accountable for this theft of national treasure of Pakistan? Will these governments be made accountable if “rich data assets” are stolen or sold? Has anyone been made accountable till date in such situations?

It may be recalled that on 23rd April 2010, the World Bank had launched its eTransform Initiative by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with France and South Korea besides transnational companies like L-1 Identity Solutions, IBM, Gemalto, Pfizer and others. It was launched in the presence of Ministers of Finance and Communications from many developing countries. The World Bank is currently funding 14 projects related to e-government and e-ID around the world. These projects are unfolding under the influence of international finance and not because there was a domestic need for it.

Let us ponder over few questions:-

Is it a coincidence that the similar schemes are unfolding in South Asia? Isn’t there a design behind persuading and compelling developing countries to biometrically profile their citizens? Is it too early to infer that international bankers, UN agencies and western military alliances wish to create profiles in their biometric and electronic database for coercive use of social control measures? Is it not true that uninformed citizens, parliamentarians and gullible government agencies are too eager to be profiled and tracked through an online database? Would freedom fighters have approved of mass surveillance by any national or transnational agency? Is it not clear that UN agencies, World Bank Group, transnational intelligence companies and military alliances are working in tandem to create the bio-electronic database of Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshi as per their pre-determined design? Is this design structured to safeguard the interest of present and future generation?

The section of political class which has resisted the Faustian bargain so far must examine these questions and put these biometric agencies to rigorous scrutiny to make them subservient to people’s will. Citizens must compel these national governments to explain how national security of US, France and their allies converge with the national interest of India, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

There is evidence in public domain that indicates that under the influence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and World Bank, Governments of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been compelled to adopt biometric identification for its residents. In the aftermath of disclosures by Wikileaks, Edward Snowden, Citizen Four, Glenn Greenwald and the surveillance by unaccountable institutions, now that the fearful ramifications are visible on the horizon, the question is who is stopping, the political class in the region to desist from allowing subjugation of their fellow citizens to be subjugated by transnational imperial powers.

Now that Aadhaar Act, 2016 has been notified in the Gazette after it received the President’s assent, the press conference is aimed at examining the constitutionality and legitimacy of such initiatives in a global and South Asian context. Supreme Court of India is seized with the matter. Election Commission of India has refused to link Aadhaar with Voter ID in compliance with Court’s order. Governments of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal appear to have been compelled to adopt biometric identification for its residents ignoring the fact that countries like UK, USA, China, Australia, and France have abandoned either their identity projects or indiscriminate use of biometrics. But the same has been bulldozed in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal. It is evident that illegitimate advances of transnational entities are being legalized. Mass surveillance is harming democracy. It is silencing minorities of all ilk.

Those who shared their views with the media included P D T Achary, former Secretary General, Lok Sabha, Dr Usha Ramanathan, noted jurist, Dr. M Vijayanunni, former Registrar General and Census Commissioner and Dr Gopal Krishna of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL). Other eminent citizens also shared their views.

Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) has been working on the issue of biometric identification and related issues since 2010. It had submitted testimony before India's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance that examined the Aadhaar Bill, 2010 that was meant to legitimize Unique Identification Authority (UIDAI) of India. The statements of the panelists are attached as well along with a Press Release in Hindi.

For Details: Gopal Krishna, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), Mb: 09818089660, 08227816731, E-mail-1715krishna@gmail.com, Ramesh, Indian Social Action Forum, Mb: 9818111562 Email: rameshinsaf@gmail.com

9701 - Worst Is Yet to Come With Aadhaar, Warn Activists - Out Look

Worst Is Yet to Come With Aadhaar, Warn Activists

FILE PHOTO - NILOTPAL BARUAH

With the dust yet to settle on the dramatic passing of the UIDAI (Aadhaar) Bill in the Lok Sabha, anti-Aadhar activists had a press conference in Delhi to articulate their concerns about the unexpected development. The bill is expected to face a stiff challenge in the Supreme Court. Aadhaar is India’s largest identification project, covering vast swathes of the population.

PDT Achary, former secretary general of the Lok Sabha, argued that the passing of the bill as a money bill is unconstitutional. He said, “Article 110(3) confirms finality on the speaker’s decision on the question of whether a bill is a money bill. But this constitutional provision cannot be seen as a convenient tool to deal with an inconvenient second chamber,” referring to the Rajya Sabha which does not have a say in whether a money bill is passed or not.

Apart from the route used to clear the Aadhaar bill, activists raised privacy concerns. Nandan Nilekani, considered the pioneer of Aadhaar, recently said that the Aadhaar scheme worked as it was cashless, paperless and presence-less. Yet, these have emerged as the biggest problems with the bill. “The UID scheme has ensured that the person providing the data has no say in who utilises the data for what,” says Usha Ramanathan, an eminent jurist. “This was always supposed to be an identification project, not an identity project and the fact that the bill is touted to be cashless will only add to more last-mile problems,” she adds.

The technology being used for the collection of the data has also come under scrutiny. The government has specified that it will use  Studies though suggest that these parameters may change in the long run, rendering a person’s only link to the UID number unidentifiable.

Says Ramanathan, “In making biometrics compulsory for the poor, the poor are being told that they do not have any interest in privacy, and that they should only care about the money they may get from the government or the food that may be provided. This reduction of citizenship of the poor person to a rightless welfare recipient is itself unconstitutional.” Another concern is that mobile registrations have been mandated by the government which could lead to surveillance by both government as well as private companies which could be given access to the data.

The present government’s stand on the issues raised by Aadhar is still seen with apprehension by many because of the stand it took when the UPA government was in power. One of the major campaign points of the current NDA government in the 2014 assembly elections was to scrap the scheme. “One cannot but question the intent behind the NDA governments changed stance on the UIDAI scheme in the past few months. The sudden change from scrapping to passing a money bill to implement the scheme can only lead us to believe that it has something to do with the contract agreements the government signed with companies such as Accenture, E&Y and Safran group,” says Dr Gopal Krishna of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties.
The issue of right to privacy with regards to the collection of Biometric data by governments has become a global one now as countries such as Philippines as well as the United States and United Kingdom have passed resolutions to conserve the privacy of its citizens. Closer to home, Bangladesh is currently fighting a legal battle in its high court to protect the right to privacy against a similar biometric system that was mandated by the government.

Report by Arushi Bedi, Outlook