In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.

On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.

In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.

In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.

In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.

"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi

Ram Krishnaswamy

Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Showing posts with label Gopal Krishna. Show all posts

Thursday, July 12, 2018

13769 - Preliminary Inquiry into Mega Projects of South America and South Asia - Mainstream

Mainstream, VOL LVI No 29 New Delhi July 7, 2018

Preliminary Inquiry into Mega Projects of South America and South Asia

Simile of water flow for data

Monday 9 July 2018

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by Gopal Krishna

Simile of Water

In his Budget speech in July 2009 Pranab Mukherjee (as India’s Finance Minister) announced the setting up of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) as a major step in improving governance with regard to delivery of public services. He underlined that it was part of “projects of vital national importance”.1 (Mukherjee, 2009) He added: “The UIDAI will set up an online data base with identity and biometric details of Indian residents and provide enrolment and verification services across the country.” A document, titled Ana-lytics-Empowering Operations: The UIDAI Experience, states that “[UIDAI] is working to provide residents of India a Unique Identification (UID) number (branded as Aadhaar—Hindi word for foundation).The authority, in a short span, is set to become the largest biometric capture and identification project in the world”.2 (UIDAI, 2012) The document reads: “Data can be considered as the equivalent of water. There are a number of processes involved before the actual consumption of water and data. The journey begins with data, like water, being generated at multiple sources. These are then brought together into one central location.” The simile of water flow for data flow reveals the sensitivity of the controller and owner of the grids—be it water grid, power grid or data grid. Do people know about the forces that seek centralisation of every conceivable resource and its civili-sational cost?

The document goes on to explain how to handle “Big” data. It states that “Over time, data will increase exponentially, fuelled by data coming in from residents, vendors and partners.” Is the legal and political imagination of people in general and informed people in particular so barren that they cannot fathom its far-reaching ramifications despite the colonial experience? One of the key factors for colonisation was information asymmetry between the occupiers and the occupied.

Bioemtric UID/Aadhaar’s Centralised Iden-tities Data Repository (CIDR) is not a project in isolation. A five-year study, Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities, published by the National Research Council of the National Academies, concludes: “Human recognition systems are inherently probabilistic, and hence inherently fallible.”3 (Pato, 2010) It infers that biometric recognition is fallible. The proponents of the CIDR feign ignorance about it.

Because the simile of flow of water has been invoked, it is germane to recollect two of the lessons from natural science—one of the primary functions of free flowing rivers is to build land and the fact that water has memory like data. Drawing on Hernando de Soto’s book, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere, Nandan Nilekani, the first Chairman of the UIDAI, has disclosed the purpose of the UID number in his book, Imagining India, wherein he says that it can help create a national, common land market. And this common land market will lead to poverty alleviation.4 (Nilekani 2008) De Soto contends elsewhere that “the knowledge organised by property and transaction records plays the same role in credit that DNA plays in biology: it stores the long-term, measurable information that governs how the different cells of the body come together”.5 (De Soto, 2011)

What is not disclosed is that a common land market as property market creates a futures market in land disregarding the fact that commodification of land has actually created food riots in 37 countries.6 (Cuesta, 2014)

Land, once commodified, can be used for generating bio-fuels instead of foodgrains. Instead of filling the belly of the poor, for which crocodile tears are being shed, there will be incentives to produce bio-fuels if the price is good. In fact, the priorities of the automobile industry precede priority of any other industry. Instead of land being used to fill the bellies of the poor, it will be diverted for providing cheap fuel substitutes to the elite.

Like land, water and other natural resources, data too can be possessed and controlled. Data is both a tangible and an intangible property. It is being recognised as a new class of property. This realisation has led to the commodification and monetisation of data. The fact is that data has always been a sensitive asset.

Similitude of Mega Projects in South Asia and South America

The Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) is the world’s biggest project that entails rewriting the geography of South Asia which is located in the Himalayan watershed. The claimed objective is to transfer water from surplus to deficit river basins to solve the drought and flood problems forever. India’s National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has proposed 30 major river-link canals involving 37 rivers throughout the country to transfer water from the so-called surplus basins to water-deficit basins as part of the Peninsular and Himalayan components of the ILR project. If one analyses the topography of the country, one can see that there can be no acceptable way of making a water network in the country as it entails diverting the natural course of the rivers, which would lead to several Aral Sea-type disasters and decline in human civilisation.

Interlinking of rivers in South Asia does not mean drawing some mega litres from one river and pouring it into another like one does with containers or even with canals. The ramifications are much wider because a river is not only the water that flows or the channel which holds the flow. A river is the dynamic face of the landscape. In the drama of history, the eco-system is not the stage setting; it is the cast. The river sculpts the terrain and the lives of people by its waters which are always in a dynamic state. Breaking this dynamics would indeed unleash forces of uncontrolled change and invite the Law of Unintended Consequences.

Like the ILR, which was planned in the 1980s unmindful of the cumulative environmental and social impact, the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) was launched during the Summit of South American Presidents in September 2000 in Brazilia. It proposes a series of large-scale mega-projects that entail rewriting the landscapes, hydrology and ecosystems of the region, including dredging of rivers, construction of dozens of dams and diversion of rivers for the linking of rivers. The IIRSA is an initiative of 12 South American governments and three regional banks. It aims at increasing regional competi-tiveness and productivity through a series of steps by physically integrating the South American region and focuses on three sectors: transport, energy markets and telecomuni-cations. The IIRSA’s objective is on a model of growth through the export of natural resources and primary materials. Some 350 projects have been identified as part of the IIRSA, which will cause convergence of the landscape in the entire region.

The IIRSA plan seeks to integrate the region through the construction of inter-oceanic corridors by land along east-west links, manipu-lation of rivers through a complex system of industrial waterways and the building of hydroelectric dams throughout the region. In such an approach rivers are seen merely as a means for monetising wealth through connec-tivity, and rivers, mountains, forests, and wet-lands are seen as impediments to economic growth while rivers become the means for extracting natural resources.

Behind both the ILR project in South Asia and the IIRSA in South America appears to be means to establish free trade area zones of industrial and infrastructural corridors. These projects are akin to China’s One Belt One Road initiative, the mega infrastructure project involving transport and energy, roads, bridges, gas pipelines, ports, railways and power plants in some 65 countries. Banks of all ilk seem to have the blueprint for generating monetary profits in these regions disregarding the destructive impacts of such initiatives. Such impacts have the potential to cause conflicts, owing to increase in flooding of rivers and submergence of land due to disruption of the natural drainage system. Such land use change contributes to climate crisis. It is also a fact that land and water co-exist. Both are mentioned separately because the institutional imagination of these countries has been shaped by colonial thinking. This thinking “treats water as property. Most often it is enjoyed through the ownership of land.”7 (Iyer, 2009)

The richest river basins and ecosystems are under threat from such initiatives from the ongoing replumbing of the planet. The residents of these regions live in vulnerable ecosystems in the sense that interventions of mega projects inevitably have adverse geological impacts. Both the Himalayas and the coastal wetlands of South Asia and the region from the Andes to the Amazon, to the lower basin of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers are ecologically sensitive and fragile. International financial institutions have denied and are denying the natural right of rivers to flow freely because private owner-ship of natural resources gives birth to private rights over it by usurping the rights of communities over them through linguistic and epistemic corruption. A document titled, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, published by the World Bank, contends: “The estimates of total wealth— including produced, natural, and human and institutional capital—suggest that human capital and the value of institutions (as measured by the rule of law) constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually all countries.”8 (Hamilton, 2005)

The inclusion of institutional capital, an intangible capital as wealth appears to be a deliberate exercise in epistemic corruption, commenced in a document, Expanding the Measure of Wealth, published by the Bank. While assessing the wealth of the planet, it has been argued that collective institutions help explain unexpected differences between countries.9 (Bank, 1997)

River basins and mountain watersheds have guaranteed livelihood to millions of human and non-humans for millions of years in the past and if they are not mutilated through myopic structural and financial engineering, they can continue to do so in future as well. Both colonial and financial thinking disregard such possibility in their obsession with ownership of natural resources aimed at monetisation by under-mining community ownership and by denying the legal right to rivers.

Ownership implies control which includes not just the ability to access, modify, package, derive benefit from, sell or remove property (data, land, water and other natural resources) but also the right to assign these rights to others. Before the colonisation of countries in Asia, America and Africa, the data related to these regions were colonised through a mapping exercise that provided data to measure, manage and conquer native populations and the ecosystem. The history of the defeated regions of the world provides ample evidence that the mapping exercise generated huge quantities of data which opened new avenues for capturing natural wealth. In the 21st century, a data market is beginning to shape the landscape of the earth through monetisation of land and water. It is shaping and is being shaped by the futures market promoted by undemocratic economic institutions which have dwarfed democratic institutions to the detriment of communities and ecosystem.

Who all are behind Projects like ILR, IIRSA and Universal Database?

It is common knowledge that that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and their national and regional clones will have us accept that it is a natural law that “the share of natural capital in total wealth tends to fall with income, while the share of intangible capital rises”. Its apparent implication is that the wealth of rich countries lies in their institutions owned by puppet masters but in poor countries the wealth lies in their natural resources which can be monetised by the former. In such a backdrop, monetary and non-monetary interventions of these institutions merit rigorous scrutiny to safeguard the essence of human life, water cycle and the life cycle of Mother Earth. Institutions like UIDAI incarnate themselves as “intangible capital” which owns centralised personal data and data related to natural resources like land and water.

One adviser to India’s Prime Minister, Sam Pitroda, said: “Once you tag people, places, and programmes, then it is easier to really organise information for delivering public services....The starting point for this nationwide network of fiber optics, wireless systems is to connect 0.25 million village councils all over the country....”.10 (Ramanthan, 2011) Such convergence of data and integration of landscapes through ILR, IIRSA and One Belt One Road Initiative of China paves the way for a global economy run by commercial czars and the end of people’s economy and government’s economy. It seems to be laying the foundation of property-based democracy for all times to come through measures like the World Bank’s e-Transform Initiative which is unfolding in 14 developing countries in its first phase.11 In the subsequent phase it will engulf the entire world population. The role of the BRICs Bank and Asia Infrastructure Bank also merits attention given the fact that surveillance is the central pillar of such IFIs.. It is also known that large telecommunications companies are in the middle of a bitter dispute over their role assisting in government wiretapping, and whether they can be sued or be given legal immunity.

The UID programme of India is part of a universal project that intends to document every resident and every entity on the planet and give them a unique identification (UID) number. Such a situation is fraught with both unintended and intended consequences impacting monetary, non-monetary aspects of people’s life and their civil liberties. This gives birth to an unprece-dented information asymmetry which can make inequality eternal.

All the data being accumulated is getting technologically concentrated in the hands of a few ‘trustworthy’ people in the government and few select companies of anonymous beneficial owners. By the time the people will come to know of the inhuman nature of the technological-institutional system, it might be too late and too hard to reverse the trend. A global technology-based social and natural resource control regime seems to be emerging at the behest of the beneficial owners of IFIs, corporations and new institutions with dehuma-nising ramifications and consequences.

Endnotes

1. Mukherjee, Pranab, 2009 (July). Available at https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2009-10/bs/speecha.htm consulted on March 19, 2018.

2. 2012, Analytics—Empowering Operations: The UIDAI Experience, Report by Unique Identification of India, Government of India. Available at https://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/uid_doc_30012012.pdf consulted on March 19, 2018.

3. Pato, Joseph N. et al., 2010, Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities, National Research Council of the National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC. Available at https://dataprivacylab.org/TIP/2011sept/Biometric.pdf consulted on March 17, 2018.

4. Nilekani, Nandan, 2008, Imagining India: Ideas for the New Century, The Penguin Books India (377).

5. De Soto, Hernando, 2011, ‘Who Owns This Mess?’, The International Herald Tribune, December 2. Available at https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/opinion/magazine-global-agenda-who-owns-this-mess.html, consulted on April 14th, 2018.

6. Cuesta, Jose, 2014. No Food, No Peace, May 29, World Bank. Available on https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/no-food-no-peace, consulted on March 13, 2018.

7. Iyer, Ramaswamy R., 2009. Water and the Laws in India, SAGE Publications India (247).

8. Hamilton, Kirk et al, 2005, ‘Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital for the 21st century’, World Bank, Washington DC. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2871714 68323724180/Where-is-the-wealth-of-nations-measuring-capital-for-the-21st-century, consulted on March 13, 2018.

9. Expanding the measure of wealth: indicators of environmentally sustainable development, 1997. Environmentally sustainable development studies and monographs series; no. 17*ESSD Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Development Work in Progress. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/5715214681 81494326/Expanding-the-measure-of-wealth-indicators-of-environmentally-sustainable-development, consulted on March 13, 2018.

10. Ramanthan, Usha, 2011, ‘The myth of the technology fix’, Seminar. Available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2011/617/617_usha_ramanathan.htm, consulted on March 13, 2018.

11. Miller, Josh, 2010, World Bank and Partners Launch eTransform Initiative to Maximise Technology’s Potential for Development. Available at https://www.devex.com/news/world-bank-and-partners-launch-etransform-initiative-to-maximize-technology-s-potential-for-development-66455, consulted on March 13, 2018.

Dr Gopal Krishna, a public policy and law researcher, is with the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Patna Centre. He is also the editor of ToxicsWatch (www.toxicswatch.org)

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Wednesday, June 20, 2018

13683 - Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act -Part III BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA - Live Law

Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act -Part III

BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA JUNE

13, 2018 1:35 PM

FacebookTwitterWhatsAppLinkedInMore Change Font Size Citizens would face an unprecedented onslaught from the provisions of Aadhaar Act and Human DNA Pro...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/why-aadhaar-act-is-a-black-act-part-iii/

Saturday, June 2, 2018

13630 - Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act? Part I BY: DR. GOPAL KRISHNA - Live Law

Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act? Part I BY: DR. GOPAL KRISHNA MAY 31, 2018 9:42 AM 156 SHARES

Ever wondered as to why bankers are immensely interested in biometric identification and verification...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/why-aadhaar-act-is-a-black-act-part-i/

Thursday, May 31, 2018

13625 - Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act? Part I bu Gopal Krishna - Live Law

Why Aadhaar Act is a Black Act? Part I

BY: DR. GOPAL KRISHNA MAY 31, 2018 9:42 AM 42 SHARES

Ever wondered as to why bankers are immensely interested in biometric identification and verification ...

Wednesday, March 7, 2018

12948 - Aadhaar Authentication In India’s Defence Production Units: Chinese, Us Companies Can “Steal” Data From Cloud - Defence Aviation Post

Aadhaar Authentication In India’s Defence Production Units: Chinese, Us Companies Can “Steal” Data From Cloud

ON MARCH 5, 2018

By:Counterview.net

Even as the Punjab and Haryana High Court has said that linking aadhaar number to direct recruitment should not be a mandatory condition as it violates the “equal opportunity clause in Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India”, an internal Government of India circular wants the introduction of aadhaar-enabled biometric attendance System in the department of defence production, Government of India (GoI).

The circular, which went form the Secretary, Union ministry of communication and information Technology to his counterpart in the department of defence production, wants that the aadhaar enabled biometric attendance system in the department of defence production be made mandatory.

Considering this as a clear violation of the judicial orders, including the latest one by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, advocacy group Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) has sent a legal notice to Government of India’s (GoI’s) department of electronics and information technology, to which the GoI department has responded, stating, “aadhaar is being used for biometric attendance system and this does not form part of defence application”.

Pointing towards how the system would work, CFCL says, “A web based application software system will enable online recording of attendance and that the dash board relating to real time attendance and related statistics can be viewed by everyone.”

Prepared by Gopal Krishna of the CFCL, the note says, “The fact is that the application of biometric UID/aadhaar was restricted to ‘civilian application’ and was not meant for defence application. The Central government’s Biometrics Standards Committee had categorically stated that UID/aadhaar is meant only for “civilian application” but the order on aadhaar enabled biometric attendance system has been extended to defence employees as well.”

Krishna says, “UID was first adopted by USA’s Department of Defence, later by NATO. It has subsequently been pushed through World Bank’s etransform Initiative in partnership with France, South Korea, Gemalto, IBM, L1, Microsoft, Intel and Pfizer.”

Pointing out that L1 was a US a company when it got a contract from UIDAI, but it got purchased by French Conglomerate Safran Group after security clearance by the US government, the note insists, “This constitutes breach of national security as no such clearance was granted by Government of India. Some of these companies have partnership with Chinese government as well.”

According to Krishna, “Across the globe very stringent data privacy law has been framed wherein one’s personal data cannot be used by anyone including the government without your specific consent. But in India there is no data protection law.”

He adds, “Aadhaar is akin to a piece of collar which the transnational powers want to tie on the neck of Indian citizens. Government has allowed itself to be misled and it has failed to protect personal sensitive information which has already gone to foreign companies and continues to flow in their direction.”

Krishna believes, “The entire information of the employees working in the department of defence production, which will include related statistics, will be stored online and on cloud will be available to everybody.”

He adds, “Besides, application of UID in the department of defence production not being in national interest making it available to everyone and on the cloud, including to the foreign companies like Safran Group, its L1 Solutions, Accenture and Ernst & Young will violate the order of Hon’ble Court.”

“It is evident that the coverage of defence employees under aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System does establish conclusively that it aadhaar is being put to defence application contrary to the claim of the government”, Krishna says.

Friday, February 16, 2018

12811 - Impact Of Cyber Technology On Foreign Policy: An Inquiry Into The Implications Of 12- Digit Biometric Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Number For Indian Residents - Live Law

Impact Of Cyber Technology On Foreign Policy: An Inquiry Into The Implications Of 12- Digit Biometric Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Number For Indian Residents
BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA
FEBRUARY 14, 2018 9:25 PM

Read at Live Law
Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/impact-cyber-technology-foreign-policy-inquiry-implications-12-digit-biometric-unique-identification-uid-aadhaar-number-indian-residents/

Saturday, February 10, 2018

12910 - An exercise in puffery - Deccan Herald

An exercise in puffery

By Gopalakrishna Feb 9 2018, 1:46 IST

One must accept a continuing divergence between approved and conditioned belief and the reality. In the end, it is the reality that counts. - John Kenneth Galbraith in The Economics of Innocent Fraud.

If you think IT is the solution to your problem, then you don't understand IT, and you don't understand your problem either." - Roger Needham, British computer scientist.

At the recent Global Conference on Cyberspace, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, "I am sure most of you are already aware of Aadhaar, which is the unique biometric identity of a personâ€¦Through better targeting of subsidies, the JAM (Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile) trinity has prevented leakages to the tune of nearly $10 billion so far."

Sometime back, former head of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), Nandan Nilekani, had claimed in Washington that the government had saved about $9 billion by eliminating fraud in beneficiary lists, thanks to the 12-digit biometric Unique Identification (UID) or Aadhaar numbers being fed into a Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR).

These questionable claims about savings from Aadhaar have been widely reported. Such claims have been disseminated without asking the government to provide the break-up of the savings obtained. Most publications publish this sort of claims without verifying the source of the data. Such routine claims are part of the job of a salesman, but it is the duty of journalists to ascertain truth before serving it up to the people at large.

Given the fact that these claims are based on reports of the World Bank, it is relevant to recall the veracity of the Bank's own claims. A World Bank report of 2016 claimed that Aadhaar can save Rs 70, 000 crore annually once it is applied to all social programmes and welfare systems in India. This has been submitted as part of the central government's reply to a writ petition before the Supreme Court.

The affidavit of April 27, 2017, by the government enclosed the relevant portions of the 359-page long World Bank report on 'digital dividends' (at page 195) to underline the imminent savings "through reduce(d) leakage and efficiency gains".

This data of $11 billion refers to page 197 of the Bank's report that is itself based on a 4-page-long 2015 study titled From Cash to Digital Transfers in India: The Story So Far, by one Shweta S Banerjee, who works on the Microfinance Gateway, which is housed at the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). At page no. 1 of this study, it is stated "The value of these transfers is estimated to be Rs 70,000 crore ($11.3 billion) per annum."

It is apparent from the Bank's report itself that it is making a claim about the total value of the money that has been transferred, and not about savings as a result of adopting a direct cash transfer model. The source of data which she has cited in this study has conclusively been established to be questionable, in fact a major goof up. Such claims have been debunked by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) as well. If the World Bank's own data has been found to be 'puffery', how can its volunteer's claims inspire any trust?

The Bank has since admitted in writing its blunder. Therefore, it's high time that the Indian government, too, admitted that the claimed savings aren't true. All the ministers, agencies and publications of the government that are reproducing the Bank's faulty claim are guilty, or at least complicit, in this not so "innocent fraud".

Such claims about savings from the Aadhaar project have been insincere from the very outset. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, in its Sixty-Ninth Report on the 'Demands for Grants (2013-14)' observed, "A provision of Rs 2,620 crore has been allocated in Budget Estimate (2013-14) for UIDAI and a major part of the budget provision for Rs 1,040 crore is earmarked for 'Enrolment Authentication and Updation', out of which an amount of Rs 1,000 crore has been earmarked under the head 'other charges'."

A hazy picture

The total budgetary allocations made for UIDAI since its inception up to March 31, 2014, was Rs 5440.30 crore. As of February 2017, UIDAI had incurred a total cumulative expenditure of Rs 8536.83 crore. This includes undefined "other charges" as pointed out by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. Shouldn't the UIDAI provide the details of the expenses incurred under "other charges"?

Take the case of the year 2009-10, when the budget estimate was Rs 120 crore. The final expenditure was Rs 26.21 crore. In the year 2015-16, the budget estimate was Rs 2,000 crore, but the final expenditure was Rs 1,679 crore; In 2016-17, when budget estimate (BE) was Rs 990 crore, the final expenditure was Rs 877.16 crore up to February 2017. These are details of expenditures so far. Besides this, the Parliamentary Standing Committee wondered in its report as to why inflated targets were consistently being given. It is apparent that there is more to it than meets the eye.

The total estimated budget of the biometric UID/Aadhaar number project has not been disclosed till date despite repeated demands for it while seeking cost-benefit analysis. In any case, unless the total estimated budget of the project is revealed, all claims of benefits are suspect and untrustworthy. How can one know about total savings unless the total cost is disclosed?

(The writer is a public policy and law researcher and Convener, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties)

Thursday, February 8, 2018

12886 - Facts belie Jaitley’s Aadhaar claims - The Tribune

Posted at: Feb 6, 2018, 12:04 AM; last updated: Feb 6, 2018, 12:04 AM (IST)

Facts belie Jaitley’s Aadhaar claims

Gopal Krishna

Unlike what is being claimed now, then FM Pranab Mukherjee said nothing about Aadhaar providing identity to Indians when he announced the setting up of UIDAIGopal Krishna

Identity fuss: Aadhaar, its uses and scope have invited much speculation and debate.

Convener of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties

At paragraph 118 of his Budget Speech, Arun Jaitely, Finance Minister made three claims in four sentences: ``Aadhaar has provided an identity to every Indian. Aadhar has eased the delivery of so many public services to our people. Every enterprise, major or small, also needs a unique ID. The Government will evolve a Scheme to assign every individual enterprise in India a unique ID.''

They do not present a factual picture.

Claim No.1: Aadhaar has provided an identity to every Indian

Fact: Every Indian except 0.03 per cent of the population admittedly had an identity already. This was disclosed in a RTI reply dated April 28, 2015 that only 2.19 lakh residents (0.03 per cent) were given Aadhaar numbers based on the introduction by the introducer system because they did not have a pre-existing identity.

The UIDAI issued the first Aadhaar number to Ranjna Sadashiv Sonwane, a tribal woman from Maharashtra on September 29, 2010. The UIDAI press note had claimed, "Today there are a large number of residents, face challenges in accessing various public benefit programs due to the lack of a clear identity proof. The Aadhaar number will ease these difficulties by providing a nationally valid and verifiable single source of identity proof."

The RTI reply reveals that the claim made by government in its press note of September 2010 and in the Budget speech of 2018-19 remains misleading and glaringly untrue.

While presenting the Union Budget 2009-10, then Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the UIDAI was set up to ``establish an online data base with identity and biometric details of Indian residence and provide enrolment and verification services across the country.'' Unlike what is being claimed now, no claim was made about providing identity because Indians already had pre-existing identity.

In the Budget speech of 2010-11 it is admitted that "CIDR will be handed over to the Managed Service Provider (MSP) on a long term contract basis." CIDR refers to Central Identities Data Repository of biometric UID/Aadhaar numbers. British firm Ernst & Young was given the contract for setting up the CIDR and selection of MSP. The Economic Survey 2011-12 observed, "The Aadhaar project is set to become the largest biometric capture and identification project in the world" even as the UIDAI was "discharging its functions without any legal basis" as per the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance. This has been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court's five-judge Constitution Bench hearing the petitions challenging the constitutionality of Aadhaar.

Claim No.2: Aadhaar has eased the delivery of so many public services to our people.

Fact: The RTI reply proves that that 'an inability to prove identity" was not a major barrier to access benefits and subsidies. The death of several citizens including Aadhaar holders due to denial of public services shows that it has made life difficult for citizens who are facing the cruel denial of their citizens' entitlements due to Aadhaar, a proof of having resided in India for at least 182 days. This is despite the fact that it is not a proof of citizenship. If this trend continues, citizens may be denied the right to vote.

Claim No.3: Every enterprise, major or small, also needs a unique ID. The Government will evolve a Scheme to assign every individual enterprise in India a unique ID.

Fact: The minister did not inform Parliament and the citizens about the conceptual, structural and functional link between UIDAI and goods and services tax network (GSTN) from the very outset. Notably, chief executive officer of UIDAI, A.B. Pandey is also the chairman of GSTN since September 8, 2017. The Aadhaar Act came into force in toto from September 12, 2016 and Central GST Act came into effect on July 1, 2017. The fact is that the Unique ID to which the minister is referring to is mentioned nine times in the Central GST Act, 2017. Its Section 25 deals with the procedure for registration wherein it is stated that "any other person or class of persons, as may be notified by the Commissioner, shall be granted a Unique Identity Number in such manner and for such purposes, including refund of taxes on the notified supplies of goods or services or both received by them, as may be prescribed. Section 150 (1) (o) also deals with it.

The marriage between biometric surveillance and financial surveillance of citizens seems to be breaching the social contract by making citizens subordinate to alien commercial interests of all shades amidst blitzkrieg of advertisements and misinformation campaigns.

Sunday, January 21, 2018

12700 - UIDAI’s post-dated cheque Gopal Krishna - The Tribune

Posted at: Jan 20, 2018, 12:42 AM; last updated: Jan 20, 2018, 2:33 AM (IST)

UIDAI’s post-dated cheque

Gopal Krishna

Addition of new Aadhaar safety features is admission that it may have erred

ENCORE: After nine years of Aadhaar’s existence, the UIDAI seeks to introduce ‘VID’.

Gopal Krishna

THE Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) wishes to add more safety features to Aadhaar from March 1. By then, the Supreme Court will either be hearing or would have completed the hearing in the Aadhaar case. Ahead of the hearing of the Aadhaar case by the Constitution Bench, the UIDAI had issued two circulars on the subject of implementation of face authentication and limited KYC for enhancing privacy of UID/Aadhaar holders.

Both the circulars were issued after it was established beyond any reasonable doubt that Aadhaar, “the permanent ID for life”, has been compromised. The UIDAI has admitted that “there is need to provide a mechanism to ensure its continued use by the Aadhaar number holder while optimally protecting the collection and storage of Aadhaar number itself in many databases”. The fact is that its sub-optimal performance has become part of folklore by now.

That both the circulars were issued almost nine years after the establishment of the UIDAI amounts to a confession about security of the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR).

The penultimate paragraph of the circular on the implementation of face authentication states that the UIDAI will release necessary application programming interfaces from March 1. All Authenticated User Agencies (AUAs)/e-KYC User Agencies (KUAs) are required to make the necessary changes in their authentication system for use of Virtual ID, UID Token and Limited KYC so as to start using it from March 1. By June 1, all AUAS/KUAs are required to fully migrate to the new system, failing which their authentication services may be discontinued and financial disincentives may be imposed.

The circular makes a reference to “Virtual ID” (VID) of 16 digits, which can be used as a substitute for the UID/Aadhaar number. The fact remains that UID/Aadhaar is also a 16-digit number like the VID, but in case of the former, four digits are hidden from public view. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance found that the UIDAI did not go for any comparison with the pre-existing identification systems in India, like the well prevalent 10-digit voter ID (VID) number. Instead of burdening Indians with one more VID, it makes eminent sense to undertake a comparison between UID/Aadhaar and the old VID (voter ID) that gives legitimacy to all elected legislators and governments.

It is apparent that all these changes are proposed to happen either through the hearing or after the hearing in the UID/Aadhaar case. The issuance of this circular ahead of the upcoming hearing is akin to the issuance of a post-dated cheque aimed at persuading the court that the UIDAI may have erred in claiming the CIDR to be safe and secure in the past; but now it proposes to do some damage control. This step is just a hollow post-disaster activity, wherein it wishes to be seen to be doing something to secure all those Indian residents who are not yet part of the CIDR database of 119 crore people.

The signatory to both the circulars was Assistant Director General under Finance and Authentication and Updation Process Division, when Nandan Nilekani was the UIDAI Chairman. In this role, he used a private email which is still available on the blog of the UIDAI. Someone entrusted with personal sensitive information of present and future generation of India should have abstained from using a private email. The controversy surrounding the use of private email account by Hillary Clinton as “a matter of a convenience” disregarding the advice of technology experts is salutary. In fact, US’ Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act permits the exchange of electronic information between Internet Service Providers and the US government.

The last paragraph of the January 10 circular refers to Regulation 14 (n) and 17 (g) of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016. The relevant provisions have made compliance with contractual terms issued by the UIDAI mandatory as part of obligation on the part of requesting authorities in relation to the use of identity information.

But the factual position is that transnational companies like L-1 Identity Solutions Operating Company of Safran Group, Accenture Services, Ernst & Young and others can keep the data of Indian residents for at least seven years “as per Retention Policy of Government of India or any other policy that UIDAI may adopt in future”. These agreements are part of efforts by the UIDAI to implement UID/Aadhaar number scheme and related schemes. Thus, it is quite clear that these regulations framed under the Aadhaar Act are subservient to the contractual agreements, whereby law has been made subordinate to commercial contracts with impunity.

These circulars are aimed at diverting the attention of the judges whose pronouncement can undermine the UID/Aadhaar project. It is apparent that the circulars of January 10, January 15 and the office memorandum of July 31, 2017, that set up an expert committee on data protection are part of the efforts to influence the proceedings in the court. Such efforts failed in the right to privacy case, this endeavour too is likely to meet the same fate.

The writer is convener of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties and editor of www.toxicswatch. org

Saturday, January 20, 2018

12682 - Defying Fundamental Rights With Impunity Under The Gaze Of Constitution Benches BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA - Live Law

Defying Fundamental Rights With Impunity Under The Gaze Of Constitution Benches BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA JANUARY 15, 2018 10:32 AM...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/defying-fundamental-rights-impunity-gaze-constitution-benches/

Only the original 3-Judge Bench or a 11-Judge Bench should hear the UID/Aadhaar case after the 9 Judge Bench verdict Ahead of hearing in the case related to world’s biggest Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of 12 –digit biometric Unique Id...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/defying-fundamental-rights-impunity-gaze-constitution-benches/

Monday, January 8, 2018

12635 - No Aadhaar, no cashless treatment, woman told - TNN

No Aadhaar, no cashless treatment, woman told

TNN | Jan 6, 2018, 10:30 IST

HIGHLIGHTS

On Thursday night, a Chennai resident faced hurdles in getting cashless treatment at Fortis Malar
One health insurer apparently told her that she could not avail of cashless treatment as she did not have an Aadhaar card

Agencies are insisting on the production of Aadhaar cards despite the government extending the deadline.

CHENNAI: From hospital treatment to birth certificates, agencies are insisting on the production of Aadhaar cards despite the government extending the deadline till March 31.

On Thursday night, Chennai resident Jayashree faced hurdles in getting cashless treatment at Fortis Malar. Health insurer Cigna TTK Health Insurance apparently told her that she could not avail of cashless treatment as she did not have an Aadhaar card. Her case created a Twitter storm — with more than 1,300 retweets — and well known figures like Supreme Court lawyer Karuna Nandy and others stepped in to say that the insurer was leaving itself open to civil and criminal litigation as services could not be denied in view of the March 31extension agreed to in the Supreme Court by the government.

Cigna TTK processed the claim late on Thursday night. The company's CEO, Sandeep Patel, said on Friday, "We were following procedural requirements for mandatory updation of Aadhaar card details. From March 31, 2018, we will not be able to process any claims without Aadhaar. I think there was some miscommunication. The issue has now been resolved."

But there are other policyholders like N Rajkumar of Bengaluru who allege that their insurance firms have refused to process their claims if Aadhaar details were not provided. "I had to make multiple calls before they accepted my claim for reimbursement. Aadhaar is becoming an instrument to deny services and rights," Rajkumar said.

TOP COMMENT

It was supposed to be a requirement for getting govt subsidies in your account. Instead, it has become a useless requirement to prove your identity for everything despite you having already done KYC, and having linked your bank account to PAN and Aadhar. Govt is happily misusing Aadhar for something it wasn''t legally approved in the Aadhar act for. Stop this nonsense, it''s making life difficult everywhere.

rajat shukla

Abhishek Baxi, editor, AndroidAuthority.com said he had a baby in November but the Gurugram municipal authorities have so far refused to issue a birth certificate without first enrolling the baby for Aadhaar. "I filed RTIs and in response I got letters from the offices of Haryana CM Manohar Lal and Union IT minister Ravi Shankar Prasad to the local body that asks for enrollment for Aadhaar, but nowhere does it mention that it is mandatory for birth certificate," he said.

"Linking Aadhaar to highvalue real estate transactions, corporate NPA accounts and funding for political parties would be a real gamechanger. Instead, the government is making things difficult for the common man by asking for Aadhaar proof for a Rs 50 SIM cards or a Rs 750 LPG connection," said Gopal Krishnan, activist, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties.

Friday, December 29, 2017

12564 - Why Biometric Aadhaar Database Project Should Be Abandoned

Why Biometric Aadhaar Database Project Should Be Abandoned BY: DR GOPAL KRISHNA DECEMBER 26, 2017 10:10 AM...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/biometric-aadhaar-database-project-abandoned/

Biometric databases have given birth to gnawing present and future civil liberties and civil rights concerns. Biometric identification exercise has been in use at least since 19th century. History of biometric profiling is a history of violence and r...

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/biometric-aadhaar-database-project-abandoned/

Tuesday, December 12, 2017

12483 - Stop this project for 'unlimited government' now! - Deccan Herald

Stop this project for 'unlimited government' now!

Gopal Krishna Dec 9 2017, 23:47 IST

Gopal Krishna

Stop this project for 'unlimited government' now!

Gopal Krishna

Biometric databases have given birth to gnawing present and future civil liberties and civil rights concerns. The history of biometric profiling, going back to at least the 19th century, is a history of violence and repression. A stolen password can be changed, stolen fingerprints cannot be.

Biometric identification is an invitation to violence. A motorist in Germany had a finger chopped off by thieves seeking to steal his exotic car, which used a fingerprint reader instead of a door-lock. As The Economist noted in 2010 in an article on the fallibility of biometric identification, "Keeping evildoers out is no simple screening matter", contrary to the belief of the proponents of the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) for the Aadhaar numbers.

As per Section 2(g) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, "biometric information means photograph, fingerprint, iris scan, or such other biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations." The reference to "such other biological attributes" makes it clear that voice sample and DNA profiling may come under its ambit in the future. It is noteworthy that the Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2015, aimed at regulating the use of DNA analysis and to establish a National DNA Data Bank. The definition of biometric information in the Aadhaar Act seems to make the proposed Human DNA Profiling Bill redundant.

It is germane to recall that the Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management under the National e-Governance Programme (NeGP), which submitted a report in April 2007 that revealed Project Unique ID (UID) "to create a central database of resident information and assign a Unique Identification number to each such residents in the country, was already under implementation long before the arrival of Nandan Nilekani in July 2009 as chairman of the UIDAI. This report defined biometrics and made one of the earliest references to "biometric authentication".

Biometric identification and authentication is the foundation on which the entire CIDR of Aadhaar project has been erected. But proponents of the project feign ignorance about a five-year study, Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities, published in September 2010 by the National Research Council in Washington, DC, which concluded that biometric identification and recognition is "inherently fallible" like the discredited science of Eugenics.

Indians under US surveillance

Former electronics and IT secretary J Satyanarayana, currently part-time chairman of UIDAI, was a member of the Task Force, which included 34 other members, including 11 technology solutions providers, mostly giant US corporations.

Asked about surveillance by the US National Security Agency on Indians by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology, Satyanarayana said, "We have been assured that whatever data has been gathered by them for surveillance relates only to metadata which is, the origin of the message and the receiving point, the destination and the route through which it has gone, but not the actual content itself we expressed that any incursion into the content will not be tolerated..."

In effect, the Government of India has formally told the US government that India has no problem if American agencies conduct surveillance of Indian citizens for metadata. It must be remembered that the idea of UID was incubated in Satyanarayana's very department. Contract agreements accessed through RTI reveal unequivocally that sensitive personal data of Indians have been handed over to transnational private companies like Accenture, Safran Group and Ernst & Young.

No recourse for individuals

The powers of the UIDAI include the power of "omitting and deactivating an Aadhaar number and information relating thereto..." Read with the government's directives to make Aadhaar mandatory for any and every government service or benefit, in effect, the Aadhaar Act has empowered the central government to cause "civil death" or the loss of all civil rights -- of anyone for any reason.

Worse, as per Section 47(1) of the Aadhaar Act, "No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act, save on a complaint made by the Authority or any officer or person authorised by it." This takes away the right of citizens to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. In effect, individuals have no recourse to the law on matters relating to the misuse or abuse of one's Aadhaar by the UIDAI or any other agency, unless the UIDAI itself lodges a complaint!

Such provisions were forced on citizens illegally, of course only during Emergency, when a Presidential Order declared that "the right of any person (including a foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended "

That order came in handy for Sanjay Gandhi to assault Indian citizens, using State machinery and authority to forcibly sterilise thousands of men during Emergency. The Indian resident is once again under attack through indiscriminate biometric profiling. Such a project, which is aimed at creating an unlimited government, not limited by the Constitution, must be abandoned forthwith in the supreme public interest.

(The writer is a public policy and law
researcher and convener of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties)

Saturday, November 25, 2017

12429 - Why right to privacy is an absolute fundamental right by Gopal Krishna - Business Today

Why right to privacy is an absolute fundamental right

Gopal Krishna New Delhi Last Updated: November 24, 2017 | 14:13 IST

If once people become inattentive to the public affairs, "you and I, Congress and Assemblies, judges and Governors shall become wolves." - Thomas Jefferson, author of Declaration of Independence and the third President of the US, in a letter dated January 16, 1787.

From the verdict recognising the right to privacy as a fundamental right, it emerges that the case about Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of 12-digit Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar numbers is deeply linked with the Supreme Court's infamous verdict in ADM Jabalpur versus Shivkant Shukla (1976) case.

Recalling the latter case, Justice Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, as part of the nine-judge Constitution Bench in the CIDR case, noted how in the I.R. Coelho versus State of Tamil Nadu (2007) case, the nine-judge Constitution Bench took the view that the majority verdict of the court in ADM Jabalpur was flawed as it was based on "restrictive reading of right to life and liberty" and observed that it "stood impliedly overruled by various subsequent decisions". Taking these decisions into account, in his decision in the CIDR case, Justice Chandrachud observed, "We now expressly do so," adding "ADM Jabalpur must be and is accordingly overruled" on August 24. This view has the approval of the nine-judge Constitution Bench, set up in the CIDR case.

From a careful reading of the 547-page long verdict, it becomes apparent that although the verdict in the ADM Jabalpur case has been expressly overruled 41 years later after it was impliedly overruled 31 years ago, it is yet to be sufficiently overruled. Whether or not it has been overruled will become visible from the court's verdict in the CIDR project that entails linking of UID/Aadhaar with essential services and citizens' entitlements, benefits, and services, making the right to have rights, including the right to life and personal liberty, dependent on biometric identification-based UID/Aadhaar as per Section 2 of the Aadhaar Act 2016.

Prior to this Act, biometric identification was required only for prisoners under Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, whose object "is to provide legal authority for the taking of measurements of finger impression, footprints and photographs of persons convicted of or arrested in connection with certain offences". Aadhaar makes citizens worse than prisoners.

In the opening paragraph of his order, Justice R.F. Nariman states that one of the grounds of attack on the said scheme is that the very collection of such data is violative of the Right to Privacy referring to Aadhaar scheme, akin to the 21st-century version of the panopticon called CIDR.

The first verdict in the CIDR of UID/Aadhaar case has recognised the right to privacy as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty. In the context of CIDR of UID/Aadhaar numbers, the violation of privacy primarily concerns personal sensitive information such as "biological attributes" of the whole nation comprising present and future generations of citizens, including present and future soldiers, Presidents, Prime Ministers, National Security Advisors, Chief Ministers, legislators, security officials and judges. Therefore, it is deeply connected with national security. The verdict is significant because UID/Aadhaar-related schemes and the Aadhaar Act exist on the assumption that right to privacy is not a fundamental right.

In the ADM Jabalpur case, a majority of four judges of the court (with Justice H.R. Khanna dissenting) shocked the world by pronouncing that liberty is not an absolute freedom. In the now discredited verdict, the four judges (Chief Justice A.N. Ray and Justices Mirza Hameedullah Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati) held: "Liberty is confined and controlled by law... It is not an abstract or absolute freedom," incorrectly assuming that right to liberty is not an absolute right.

The court in CIDR case has observed that the verdict in ADM Jabalpur case needs to be buried "ten fathom deep, with no chance of resurrection" while overruling it. It follows from the overruled verdict that it cannot be inferred that right to privacy as part of the right to life and personal liberty is not an absolute right.

In his order as part of the right to privacy verdict, Justice Nariman cited John Stuart Mill's thesis "On Liberty" (1859) and said, "In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Despite citing Mill's thesis that underlines the existence of individuals' "absolute freedom" and that "his independence is, of right, absolute", the court observes, "But this is not to say that such a right is absolute." The court may have to revisit this proposition in the light of the authorities they have cited and in its own decisions.

Justice Nariman recalled the decision in the Peter Semayne versus Richard Gresham (1604) case in the UK to underline that "the King of England cannot enter - all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement" of citizen's frail and shaky house, which is his castle. It is clear from this verdict that the right to privacy has been held to be an absolute right.

It implies that no government has the right to enter the tenements of the Indians in any disguise. If it is not allowed to enter even the huts of the Indians, how can it be allowed to intrude into their body through biometric identification based on "biometric information" meaning photograph, fingerprint, iris scan or such other biological attributes as per Section 2(g) of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.

Widely held views do not necessarily capture the truth. If the right to privacy is not deemed an absolute right, it would be tantamount to the restrictive reading of the right to life and liberty, akin to the blunder in the ADM Jabalpur case.

In his last address to India's Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, Dr B.R. Ambedkar said, "I do not say that Fundamental Rights can never be absolute and the limitations set upon them can never be lifted." Absolute rights cannot be suspended or restricted, even during a declared state of emergency. History is replete with instances wherein a 'ticking bomb' or a 'weapon of mass destruction' situation is engineered to make public institutions blind in the face of infringement of absolute fundamental rights.

As part of the Constitution Bench, Justice Nariman concludes his order saying, "These cases are, therefore, sent back for adjudication on merits to the original Bench of three honourable Judges of this Court in light of the judgement just delivered by us." The original Bench is now seized with the CIDR of UID/Aadhaar number-related petitions and will hear them soon to determine whether the treatment of Indians and Indian residents with the provisions of Identification of Prisoners Act safeguards or violates their constitutional rights.

Notably, the first petition against the CIDR project was filed on October 18, 2012, after almost two years of the launch of the project. After that, over two dozen cases are pending in the court, seeking scrapping of Aadhaar Act and the CIDR scheme. Rarely does it happen that public institutions do not pretend to be surprised in situations where "fundamental rights" of citizens go to the dogs "on account of some ill-conceived" delay in judgements.

Human life is a gift of privacy of our ancestors, our mother and father. Will "individuals clothed with the powers of the state" dare say to their parents that they do not have an absolute right to privacy? Can Mother India be told that she does not have the right to privacy as an absolute right? Will Mother India tell her children that they must be exposed to the public at large like animals? Who will have the heart to tell their children and grandchildren that they do not have the right to privacy as an absolute right?

The verdict in the reference case of the right of privacy follows the footprints of stalwarts like Justice Louis Brandeis, Justice Radhabinod Pal, Justice Fazl Ali, Justice Subba Rao, Justice Jagmohan Lal Sinha and Justice H R Khanna. The second verdict on the constitutionality of CIDR of UID/Aadhaar is awaited by the fourth Constitution Bench in the case that is all set to be constituted by Justice Dipal Misra, the new Chief Justice of India. The Bench will have the choice to either adopt the path of illustrious judges or to traverse the path of infamous ones.

If life and personal liberty are inalienable to human existence, it follows that the right to privacy being an intrinsic part of it is an absolute right.

The author is a public policy and legal researcher, convenor of Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties and editor of www.toxicswatch.org

Thursday, November 9, 2017

12348 - How Aadhaar promotes a digital caste system - Rediff Mail

How Aadhaar promotes a digital caste system

October 04, 2017 09:10 IST

The linking of biometric UID/Aadhaar number to all public services makes “We, the People of India” worse than slaves, says Dr Gopal Krishna.

The second in a 7-part series.

Illustration: Dominic Xavier/Rediff.com.

While adding some 24-page-long words of concurrence with the opinions of Justices Chelameswar, SA Bobde, Rohinton Fali Nariman and Dr DY Chandrachud in the verdict of August 24, 2017, on the right to privacy, Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre refers to 'We, the People of India' in the Preamble of the Constitution, to the “attack on the legality and correctness of Aadhar scheme” and to the “dignity of the individual”.

The original case pertains to the Central Identities Data Repository of Unique Identity/Aadhaar numbers of Indian residents.

The verdict came as a consequence of a reference made to the Constitution bench to decide the existence of right to privacy as a Fundamental Right.

Justice Sapre observed, “The most important place of pride was given to the People of India by using the expression, We, The People of India, in the beginning of the Preamble. The Constitution was accordingly adopted, enacted and then given to ourselves.”

His pointed reference to the presence of 'We, the People of India' assumed great significance if it is read with the definition of ‘resident’ in the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.

As per Section 2 (v) "resident" means an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to 182 days or more in the 12 months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment.

First in the series: Right to Privacy and the Bhagavad Gita

Notably, the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010, which was withdrawn from Rajya Sabha till March 3, 2016 for the introduction of Aadhaar Bill 2016 referred to “We, the People of India” as the ‘resident’ under Section 2(q) as an individual usually residing in a village, rural area, town, ward, demarcated area (demarcated by the Registrar General of Citizen Registration) within a ward in a town or urban area in India.

Interestingly, "We the People" is also the opening phrase of the preamble to the constitution of United States.

In fact this phrase finds place in the constitutions of some 50 countries.

It is “We, the People” who have constituted the Constitution of India.

It emanates from “We, the People” who are parochially being defined by Aadhaar Act as “residents”.

The conclusive assumption about “We” being the first brick of the basic structure cannot be tested or questioned in any court, but Aadhaar Act does the unthinkable by narrowcasting its meaning since September 12, 2016, when the act came into force after more than 100 crore Indians were coerced and enticed to enroll for Aadhaar numbers.

Based on an inquiry into the human condition, renowned psychiatrist Thomas Szasz wrote in The Second Sin that in the animal kingdom, the rule is, eat or be eaten; in the human kingdom, it is define or be defined.

It is clear that “We the People” are being defined in the bill as “residents” in a manner that makes our republic deficit in democracy for some visible and invisible purposes. The legitimacy of this exercise is the subject matter before the court.

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The reference made by Justice Sapre to the “attack on legality and correctness of Aadhaar scheme” is reminiscent of the orders of the Punjab and Haryana high court.

In its order dated February 19, 2013, the bench of Chief Justice AK Sikri (currently judge of the Supreme Court), and Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain had noted that the petition against UID/Aadhaar “raises a pure question of law.”

Responding to the direction issued to the Union of India and Union territory of Chandigarh by the Punjab and Haryana high court in the matter of Civil Writ Petition 569 of 2013 filed in the high court against Union of India and others, the executive order for making Unique Identification/Aadhaar was withdrawn.

The HC order dated March 2, 2013, observes, “In this writ petition filed as a public interest litigation, the petitioner has challenged the vires of notification issued by the Union of India for making it compulsory to have UID cards.”

It further observed that “second issue raised in this petition is that vide order dated December 5, 2012, respondent No 3, ie, Deputy Commissioner, UT, Chandigarh has given directions to the Branch In charge Registration-cum-Accountant, office of Registering & Licensing Authority, Chandigarh not to accept any application for registration of vehicle and grant of learner/ regular driving license without UID card” referring to the UID/Aadhaar numbers.

The petition in the Punjab and Haryana high court included the following prayers:

i) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash executive order dated December 5, 2012, passed by respondent No.3 passed in violation of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 vide which UID has been mandatory for the registration of vehicles and grant of learner/ regular driving licence.

ii) A writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Union of India to accept other proofs of identity and address, ie, voter I-card issued by the Election Commission of India, the constitutional body and passport issued by the ministry of foreign affairs, the Government of India and other proofs of address, age prescribed under Rule 4 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 for issuance of learning/ regular driving license and for registration of vehicle;

iii) Further it sought direction for the Union territory of Chandigarh and the Union of India not to make mandatory the UID for essential public utility services and accept other documents as proof of identity and address as per the Rules;

The writ petition had emphasised that during the pendency of the petition, executive order dated December 5, 2012, and other similar executive orders vide which UID/Aadhaar have been made compulsory for essential public utility services may kindly be stayed.

In its concluding paragraph the March 2, 2013, order of the high court reads, “Today, short affidavit of M Shayin, IAS, deputy commissioner, UT, Chandigarh is filed stating that the aforesaid instructions have been reviewed and now the insistence of UID card is no longer treated as mandatory.”

It noted in its order that since “this issue is pending before the Supreme Court” it chose not pass any observation on the remaining prayers.

It is evident from this outcome that the moment the court raised the “questions of law” in the matter of UID/Aadhaar scheme, the Union of India realised that its position was not legally defensible and it submitted that “the insistence of UID card is no longer treated as mandatory”.

This case demonstrates that UID/Aadhaar scheme is legally questionable.

Against such a judicial backdrop, Justice Sapre recollected the significance of the Preamble to the Constitution in the UID/Aadhaar case.

“Perusal of the words in the Preamble would go to show that every word used therein was cautiously chosen by the founding fathers and then these words were arranged and accordingly placed in a proper order. Every word incorporated in the Preamble has significance and proper meaning," observed Sapre.

He noted, “The incorporation of expression Dignity of the individual in the Preamble was aimed essentially to show explicit repudiation of what people of this country had inherited from the past.”

It is clearly a reference to the inhuman caste-related practices which undermined human dignity.

This observation is significant because UID/Aadhaar fixes caste identities through time even after people are dead.

The information held about caste will be fixed to people by the UID/Aadhaar number. Changing an identity will become impossible.

While there are efforts underway for the eradication of the practice of manual scavenging, for rehabilitation of those and then leaving behind the tag of manual scavenger, there can be no justification for making people accept a system that does not allow them to shed their identity and move on.

A number that links up databases of caste identity through convergence with existing databases cannot be good for “repudiation of what people of this country had inherited from the past”.

Jacob Appelbaum, computer security researcher, hacker, activist, and a spokesperson for WikiLeaks, has warned that biometric Aadhaar/UID will create a digital caste system.

He said, "Going by the way it is now being implemented, if you choose not to be part of the system, you will be the modern-day equivalent of an outcast. In theory, you are supposed to have the freedom to choose but in reality, the choice will only be whether to be left out and left behind".

The promoters of biometric UID/Aadhaar number are promoting digital and biometric caste system and digital and biometric racism.

Notably, Aadhaar Act, 2016 lists breaking into CIDR as an offence but this law criminalises a technological impossibility.

In a bizarre act, it provides that only Unique Identification Authority of India can file a complaint when the data of a resident of India is misused or abused, instead of the victim of abuse.

As per Section 47, “Courts will take cognizance of offences under this act only upon complaint being made by the UIDAI or any officer authorised by it.”

This deprives the victim of a right to file complaint and also undermines the dignity of the individuals although Section 34 of the act states that “Impersonating or attempting to impersonate another person by providing false demographic or biometric information will punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, and/or fine of up to ten thousand rupees.”

Victims cannot file complaint even when someone changes or attempts to change any demographic or biometric information of an Aadhaar number holder by impersonating another person (or attempting to do so), with the intent of i) causing harm or mischief to an Aadhaar number holder, or ii) appropriating the identity of an Aadhaar number holder although it is punishable under Section 35.

Victims of abuse cannot file complaint in cases wherein collection of identity information is done by one not authorised by this act, by way of pretending otherwise despite the fact that the act makes it punishable under Section 36.

Unless authorised by UIDAI or any officer authorised by it, victims cannot file complaint even when there is “Intentional disclosure or dissemination of identity information, to any person not authorised under this act, or in violation of any agreement entered into under this act” under Section 37 although it is punishable.

Unless authorised by the UIDAI -- the intentional acts like accessing or securing access to the CIDR; downloading, copying or extracting any data from the CIDR; introducing or causing any virus or other contaminant into the CIDR; damaging or causing damage to the data in the CIDR; disrupting or causing disruption to access to CIDR; causing denial of access to an authorised to the CIDR; revealing information in breach of (D) in Section 28, or Section 29; destruction, deletion or alteration of any files in the CIDR; stealing, destruction, concealment or alteration of any source code used by the UIDAI, will be punishable under Section 38 -- victims cannot file a complaint.

Section 39 of the act reads, “Tampering of data in the CIDR or removable storage medium, with the intention to modify or discover information relating to Aadhaar number holder will be punishable”. Thus, it admits that such acts are possible and imminent but the act does not empower the victims of such tampering or removal instead it empowers the UIDAI.

If these provisions made in Aadhaar Act are accepted as the law, the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly the right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality.

It marks the beginning of the end of right to human dignity recognised and promised by the Constitution.

Citizens’ opposition to the CIDR of UID/Aadhaar numbers of Indian residents can be linked to more than a century old world famous Satyagraha of Mahatma Gandhi in order to oppose the identification scheme of the government in South Africa.

On August 22, 1906, the South African government published a draft Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance. It required all Indians in the Transvaal region of South Africa, eight years and above, to report to, a certificate which would then have to be produced upon demand.

The move proposed stiff penalties, including deportation, for Indians who failed to comply with the terms of the ordinance.

Knowing the impact of the ordinance and effective criminalisation of the entire community, Mahatma Gandhi then decided to challenge as it undermined human dignity.

Calling the ordinance a 'Black Act' he mobilised around 3,000 Indians in Johannesburg who took an oath not to submit to a degrading and discriminatory piece of legislation.

The UID/Aadhaar case demonstrates how 'those who forget history are condemned to repeat it'.

The linking of biometric UID/Aadhaar number to all public services is making “We, the People of India” worse than slaves.

This amounts to normalisation of cruelty towards Indian residents, which creates a compelling logic for scrapping this biometric identification exercise.

Now that the Constitution bench has recognised the right to privacy, the original three-judge bench of the Supreme Court which is to pronounce its verdict on UID/Aadhaar should also ponder over following questions:

Will foreign companies like Ernst & Young, Safran, L1 Identities Solution and Accenture that admittedly work with United States security and intelligence agencies who were awarded contracts on July 30, 2010, for implementation of Aadhaar number protect US national interest or India's national interest in the aftermath of Patriot Act taking cognisance of disclosures by whistleblower Edward Snowden and Wikileaks?

The manifesto titled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence brought out by Norwegian gunman and neo-Crusader, Anders Behring Breivik who carried out the heinous attacks on his fellow citizens is actually a unique identity manifesto as well.

This manifesto refers to the word "identity" over 100 times, "unique" over 40 times and "identification" over 10 times. There is reference to "state-issued identity cards", "converts’ identity cards", "identification card", "fingerprints", "DNA" etc.

Is it not true that only a misanthrope can approve of it?

The deluge of advertising and public relations efforts by biometric identification and surveillance technology vendors have attempted to cloud the minds of judicial, political and media fraternity.

The dangers of trusting such technological advances for determining social policies will consequent in a situation where “[A] warrant requirement will not make much difference to a society that, under the sway of a naive and discredited theory of genetic determinism, is willing to lock people away on the basis of their genes” among other adverse effects. We submit that this entire issue is about denial of Fundamental Rights by the emergence of an unlimited government."

This constitutes an open declaration of war against citizens’ sensitive personal information like biometric data by transnational entities and governments captured by them paves way for the enslavement of present and future generations through biometric Aadhaar database that lies on cloud beyond Indian jurisdiction.

Can there be any legitimate constitutional or statutory authority which can be empowered to indiscriminately prepare a database based on biometric and electronic profiling of present and future generation of “We, the People of India” for all time to come? Will such Centralized Identities Data Repository safeguard, enhance or undermine the dignity of “We, the People”?

Such initiatives must be stopped and boycotted, else it will spread its tentacles in every sphere of life and mobility in the country before it is too late.