In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Thursday, May 3, 2018

13429 - Aadhaar — A Self Certified ID - Medium.Com


https://medium.com/karana/aadhaar-a-self-certified-id-a63e299b36f5

Aadhaar — A Self Certified ID

Public availability of cracked Enrollment software makes Aadhaar information equivalent to a Self Certified ID

The biggest question that the Asia Times news story raises about the compromised enrollment software is — Why UIDAI cannot fix it? This post answers this question and the implication of this compromise.

India's ambitious digital ID project faces new security nightmare

A slew of complaints and alerts to UIDAI reveal that operators can bypass biometric and geo-location safeguards to…
www.atimes.com

The Offline Problem
The Enrollment Client Multi-Platform (ECMP) software is a JAVA client software available for public download and installation. Instead of a fully online model (Like a Software as a Service hosted only on uidai.gov.in), the client model was chosen because of the lack of reliable internet connectivity in most parts of rural india.

The ECMP software can be used to enroll people in a remote location without the need for internet connectivity. It generates enrollment packets, which are then uploaded to the CIDR for De-duplication. Until that happens, the enrollment packets are stored in the laptop in which the enrollment software is installed.

This design, which optimizes for enrollment, however is a security loophole that has been exploited differently for quite a while and the Asia Times story, above, is only a logical progression of a trend.

Can a client be truly tamper proof?
The steps required to convert any laptop connected with hardware kits the into a fully functional authorized enrollment station are listed below:
Step 4 will only succeed if their Aadhaar ID is associated with the enrollment agency and if their bio-metrics matches with the one stored in the CIDR.

So in effect, the only thing that stands between a valid enrollment station and an illegal one, is the bio-metrics of the operator/supervisor.

The first set of attempts to hijack the ECMP software hence were based on forging the fingerprints via artificial molds (Source).

While these are primitive, a better form of exploit emerged over time. The cracking of the enrollment software itself.

Thick Clients are reversable and patchable.
Analyzing the ECMP software is quite simple and can be accomplished by the following steps:
  • Download the Official software from any of the public locations (AISECT).
  • Install it on any windows laptop.
  • Reverse the Java libraries present in C:\UID Authority of India\Aadhaar Enrolment Client\lib\in.gov.uidai.*.jar, using standard tools like Java Disassembler.
A few things stand out
  • There is no obfuscation. (Face Palm #1)
  • There is code to detect tampering of the software, but the programming in that module is quite poor, and can be tampered/bypassed very easily.
  • All security checks are concentrated in one single module, which also ships with instructions on how to rebuild that module, thus making it very patch friendly. (Multiple repeated face palms)
It is a well known axiom in software engineering that in a client — server architecture, the client can never be trusted to be tamper-proof. However the above defects makes it very easy to tamper the enrollment software and create multiple versions, which patch and bypass various security checks.

Chronology of Security checks and their exploits
  • 2009 — The first few versions of ECMP Software did not even encrypt enrollment packets nor did it have GPS for tracking the enrollment locations. (Source)
  • 2012 — The software shipped with GPS modules and introduced encryption of data packets for the first time with 1024 bit RSA Keys. (Version 2.2).
  • April 2012 — The ILF&S scam happened because the enrollment software allowed anyone to use their own fingerprint to become an Aadhaar operator using a vulnerability (Source).
The system has a flaw. When an agent provides wrong authorisation fingerprint, it rejects on two occasions, but at the third instance it automatically takes the default authorisation print and completes the enrollment process,
  • Feb, 8 2016 — First sightings of unauthorized Aadhaar enrollment centers, possibly using a cracked ECMP software (Source)
  • May 2016 — Version 3.2.0.0 shipped with IRIS authentication for the operators, since artificial fingerprints have become mainstream.
  • May 2017 — UIDAI releases Version 3.3.3.0 which contains code to detect tampering of the enrollment software.
  • August 2017 — UP Aadhaar hack case, which reported that IRIS authentication has been bypassed. (See FIR copies here).
  • Feb 2018 — IRIS authentication still remains bypassed, GPS has been bypassed, but Artificial fingerprints are in use (Chandigarh FIR)
  • April 2018 — GPS and Fingerprint checks bypassed (Asia Times story)
Conclusion
The implication of the above is quite clear — The quality of demographic data in the Aadhaar database (CIDR) is whatever the enrollment operators want them to be and residents can directly influence the operators, by paying them a bribe.

The only defense had always been bio-metric de-duplication, but as the UP Aadhaar case indicated, bio-metrics can be injected by operators.


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