In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

2494 - As Aadhaar debuts in Jharkhand, doubts arise - Business Standard



UIDAI will have to assail concerns over authentication and connectivity that have emerged in the Jharkhand pilot projects
Devjyot Ghoshal / Dohakatu Apr 04, 2012, 00:32 IST

On a torrid March afternoon, Charka Pahan walks into a small, pink room on the first floor of the Panchayat building at Tarup, a village some 45 kilometres from Jharkhand’s capital city, holding on to a piece of paper. Morpant Chowdhury, a banking correspondent, is waiting there with an internet-connected computer and a micro ATM, along with a wad of money, ready to make payments.


For the next few minutes, Chowdhury takes each of Pahan’s fingers and presses them into the biometric scanner built into the white and yellow rectangular ATM device, which the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) believes will be the route to salvation for millions of Indians who, for a multitude of reasons, are so far unable to receive thousands of crores of social welfare payments and subsidies every year.

After each digit is scanned carefully and numbers on the paper slip cross-checked, Chowdhury nods resignedly and informs Pahan that it’s not going to happen, yet again — that the Rs 8,814 crore Unique Identification Device (UID) programme is again unable to deliver Pahan’s Rs 120 daily wage for levelling land under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA).

Pahan’s case is unusual, admittedly, for the UIDAI’s Aadhaar — a 12-digit individual identification number — is already showing results in the handful of pilot projects for UID-linked MNREGA payments that have been rolled out across Jharkhand.

A close look at these UID pilots reveal two bitter truths about this massive, technology-driven exercise: that Aadhaar by itself is not a system devoid of flaws, and that the UID is certainly no panacea to plug leaks in India’s massive social welfare schemes.

Dodgy digits
Like millions of others registered with UIDAI, Pahan is a farm worker, and of all his body, it is probably his hands that take the brunt of what he does for a living.
Despite the tough protocol that UIDAI put in place during enrollment, the quality of his fingerprints have repeatedly failed him during the biometric authentication required before any UID-linked transaction. Unsurprisingly, for many in Tarup, the real fear resides in their fingers.

“During the paddy harvests, our hands chafe badly. What will be the use of UID then? How will we be able to get our money?” asks a worried Hatti Mahato.
UIDAI, in a recent report, points out that the ‘Failure to Enrol’ (FTE) rate of UIDAI Biometric system is 0.14 per cent, or that 99.86 per cent of the population can be uniquely identified by the biometric system. But it is unwilling to provide any numbers on the failure to authenticate after enrolment, a critical barometer of the scheme’s success.

UIDAI officials believe that in a rush to reach their targets, the enrolment agencies involved in the first phase may not have accurately followed the prescribed guidelines, and this has added to the problem of deteriorating fingerprint quality among farm workers.

In Seraikela-Kharsawan district’s Kasidi village, more than 10 out of 247 MNREGA workers who have had their job cards linked with Aadhaar cannot take advantage of the UID scheme because of authentication-related problems; many of these are women who work with sharp sickles to weave bamboo baskets.
Some seven out of 57 pensioners at Ramgarh’s Dohakatu village, another pilot project venue, have been unable to receive old-age benefits as their fingerprints cannot be read by the micro ATMs, district officials attest.

On the face of it, these numbers might seem insignificant. But as the Aadhaar programme grows in size, adding millions more to its rolls, and beneficiaries mature, if the pilot projects are anything to go by, dodgy digits could emerge as a significant worry.

While, apart from fingerprints, the UIDAI also took iris scans of each registered beneficiary, officials say that there are no immediate plans to introduce iris-based authentication as it currently is not economically viable.

Connectivity conundrum
Located diagonally opposite the ostentatiously named but barebones amusement park, Fun Castle, on the outskirts of Ranchi, the Ratu branch of the Bank of India (BoI), headed by Mayank Dhar Tiwari, is one of the first banking outlets from where the UID-linked Aadhaar payment system was rolled out in December last year.

From across his glass-topped desk, the soft-spoken Tiwari explains the route which every transaction made by a banking correspondent’s micro ATM anywhere in Ratu block takes: it is first routed to his branch, then to the BoI server in Mumbai, from where it passes through the National Payment 
Corporation of India (NPCI) server and to UIDAI’s database for authentication, and finally all the way back to the micro ATM device, hooked to a GPRS network.

Connectivity is critical for this hi-tech system to work well, especially the micro ATM’s GPRS link, which is usually through a mobile network. And banking correspondents using the device maintain that at least 70 per cent connectivity is required for a successful transaction.

At Ratu, among the first places to witness UID-linked payments in the entire country, Tiwari maintains that connectivity hasn’t been a problem, so far. But at Kasidi village — located in Jharkhand chief minister Arjun Munda’s home constituency, Chandil — the lack of connectivity forces Aadhaar beneficiaries to walk a couple of kilometres to the Panchayat office.

For villages further away from the Panchayat office, it is a longer walk, a situation that partly erodes one of the primary objectives for putting in place this billion dollar technology: the convenience of door-step payments.
With UID’s reach expected to expand substantially — Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee hopes that Aadhaar-enabled payments will be rolled out to at least 50 districts over the next six months — the UIDAI will have to assail concerns over connectivity that have emerged in the Jharkhand pilot projects.
With Infosys’ Finacle core-banking solution open before him, BoI’s Tiwari explains how he can track every transaction that Morpant Chowdhury, his banking correspondent, makes across Ratu block. The system, which has integrated every Aadhaar beneficiary’s 12-digit number with a BoI bank account, can keep a tab on what Chowdhury pays to which Aadhaar card holder and at what time. But the final delivery of the payment still hinges on the integrity of the banking correspondent.

Though a rigorous process of verification for the appointment of banking correspondents has been prescribed, bank and UID officials as well as district administrators remain apprehensive, particularly with the scheme likely to be scaled up in the coming months.

Aadhaar can do much, but unfortunately ensuring human integrity is beyond its much-vaunted capabilities.