Business Standard Editorial Comment | New Delhi
April 26, 2016 Last Updated at 21:40 IST
In the Westminster system of government, the Speaker of the legislature has considerable power and independence. This is a cherished product of a long process to secure the legislature's independence and fairness. However, as recent events in this country show, this important independence depends crucially on the occupants of the office staying carefully within their traditionally highly circumscribed role. The considerable discretion they enjoy comes with the assumption that it will be used sparingly or wisely.
However, there are at least two recent instances in which Speakers of the legislature have used this discretion to take debatable decisions. The first instance is from the state of Uttarakhand, which was thrown into crisis when the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly refused to allow a division - the counting of legislators' votes - on the state budget. The Congress-led government of the state had reportedly lost the confidence of several members of the legislative party; it was possible that the Appropriations Bill would have been defeated had votes been counted, and the government would thus have had to resign since it was a money Bill. By refusing to grant a division, the Uttarakhand Speaker in effect declared the budget passed and insulated the government from a key test of democratic legitimacy. The second instance is at the Centre, where the Speaker of the Lok Sabha has permitted a proposed law, the Aadhaar Bill, to be introduced in the House as a money Bill. Whether regulatory legislation such as Aadhaar meets the definition of a money Bill - traditionally reserved for proposals that alter taxation, borrowing, or affect the Consolidated Fund of India - is doubtful. But, just as it is a Speaker's traditional right and duty to determine when a division is needed, her decision on whether a bill is a money Bill has also traditionally been considered to be the last word. It is worth noting that the two major national parties are on opposite sides of the fence in terms of the debate at the state and the Centre - in Uttarakhand, the Congress is defending the rights of the Speaker, while in Delhi it is questioning them - indicating that this is possibly a problem of institutional weakness that transcends political parties.
Unfortunately, India now faces a situation where the decisions of the traditionally independent Speaker of the House are being discussed by another branch of government, namely the judiciary. The Supreme Court has stayed an Uttarakhand High Court judgment that rescinded President's Rule imposed on the state after the Speaker's controversial ruling. Meanwhile, it has asked the Union attorney general for his views on a petition filed by a Congress leader questioning the introduction of the Aadhaar Bill as a money Bill. So the judiciary and the executive will now discuss a decision that has traditionally been the sole prerogative of the Speaker of the legislature. The elements of a full-blown constitutional crisis are visible. What is needed is to get ahead of the problem. Perhaps the tradition of the Speaker being notionally completely independent of the other branches needs to be revisited. Rather than letting things deteriorate and forcing the judiciary to get involved, the legislature itself should consider what checks and balances can be imposed on the Speaker's discretion in order to ensure such situations are not repeated.
However, there are at least two recent instances in which Speakers of the legislature have used this discretion to take debatable decisions. The first instance is from the state of Uttarakhand, which was thrown into crisis when the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly refused to allow a division - the counting of legislators' votes - on the state budget. The Congress-led government of the state had reportedly lost the confidence of several members of the legislative party; it was possible that the Appropriations Bill would have been defeated had votes been counted, and the government would thus have had to resign since it was a money Bill. By refusing to grant a division, the Uttarakhand Speaker in effect declared the budget passed and insulated the government from a key test of democratic legitimacy. The second instance is at the Centre, where the Speaker of the Lok Sabha has permitted a proposed law, the Aadhaar Bill, to be introduced in the House as a money Bill. Whether regulatory legislation such as Aadhaar meets the definition of a money Bill - traditionally reserved for proposals that alter taxation, borrowing, or affect the Consolidated Fund of India - is doubtful. But, just as it is a Speaker's traditional right and duty to determine when a division is needed, her decision on whether a bill is a money Bill has also traditionally been considered to be the last word. It is worth noting that the two major national parties are on opposite sides of the fence in terms of the debate at the state and the Centre - in Uttarakhand, the Congress is defending the rights of the Speaker, while in Delhi it is questioning them - indicating that this is possibly a problem of institutional weakness that transcends political parties.
Unfortunately, India now faces a situation where the decisions of the traditionally independent Speaker of the House are being discussed by another branch of government, namely the judiciary. The Supreme Court has stayed an Uttarakhand High Court judgment that rescinded President's Rule imposed on the state after the Speaker's controversial ruling. Meanwhile, it has asked the Union attorney general for his views on a petition filed by a Congress leader questioning the introduction of the Aadhaar Bill as a money Bill. So the judiciary and the executive will now discuss a decision that has traditionally been the sole prerogative of the Speaker of the legislature. The elements of a full-blown constitutional crisis are visible. What is needed is to get ahead of the problem. Perhaps the tradition of the Speaker being notionally completely independent of the other branches needs to be revisited. Rather than letting things deteriorate and forcing the judiciary to get involved, the legislature itself should consider what checks and balances can be imposed on the Speaker's discretion in order to ensure such situations are not repeated.
