2546 - Aadhaar card fraud exposes registration process errors - TOI

Aadhaar card fraud exposes registration process errors

TNN | Apr 30, 2012, 03.14AM IST

HYDERABAD: The loopholes which surfaced in the Aadhaar card registration process in the city had raised a big question mark on the claims of 100% Unique Identity (UID) enrollment done in the capital and elsewhere in the state.

According to civil supplies department, which is the nodal agency for Aadhaar card enrollment in the state, so far 5.35 crore citizens had enrolled for Aadhaar card in the state against the target of eight crore population. In Hyderabad, the entire 47 lakh population (100%) have been enrolled, civil supplies officials said.

The latest fraud, where Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (IL&FS) staff had enrolled 30,000 people, including 870 people under Biometric Exception category in Old City, has revealed the vulnerability of the Aadhaar registration process.

Activists, who have been protesting against UID since its inception, claim that loopholes in the enrollment process make it necessary to cross check the registrations done so far. "The fraud proves that in a 100% Aadhaar-enrolled city like Hyderabad, 30,000 cards have been registered in a part of the city by exploiting those loopholes. It means similar frauds might have happened in other parts of the city, state and the country. So, how can anyone believe in genuineness of the card?" anti-UID activist Vinay Bhaindur questioned.

Civil supplies department director KRBHN Chakravarthy told TOI that operators working for IL&FS have to take the blame first for the fraud and then officials of the civil supplies department, who are supervising them. "Some enrollments were made at midnight when even the registration centres are not open. Police investigation is on and we have to see what exactly has gone wrong and who has done it and for what purpose," the director said.

Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) deputy director-general Ajay Bhushan Pandey said that the identified loopholes have been fixed and they would cross verify the entire enrollment work done in other parts of the country to find out if similar frauds have occurred there.

As police have intensified probe by sending a long questionnaire to UIDAI officials, scared top representatives of the agency are reportedly putting pressure on investigators to hush up the matter.

Police have not made any arrests in the case so far. They are waiting for response from the UIDAI to proceed further on fixing up responsibility for the fraud.

2545 - UIDAI probing cases of misuse of personal data - Zee News

UIDAI probing cases of misuse of personal data

Last Updated: Sunday, April 29, 2012, 12:54

New Delhi: The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is probing several complaints of misuse of personal data and duplication of cards while issuing 'Aadhaar' numbers to individuals.

"UIDAI has received six complaints regarding errors or complaints regarding use of address documents. Four were received on UIDAI helpline on May 7, 13, 23, 2011 and March 9, 2012 and two by emails on February 27, 2012 and August 10, 2011. The complaints were forwarded to respective authorities," it said in reply to RTI query.

Out of these, four were sent to concerned authorities in Delhi and one each to registrars in Maharashtra and Karnataka.

It said that UIDAI had also received "one complaint of alleged duplication of Aadhaar card. Since it is related to some other residents, it cannot be shared."

The complaints cite the possibility of vulnerability in collection of individual data for the country's ambitious programme.

UIDAI said it had framed information security policy and other guidelines to ensure safety of individual data being collected in the form of security handbook.

The guidelines were framed for authentication of user agencies, data centre service providers, logistic service providers, registrars, UIDAI employees and for enrolment agencies.

It has, however, received "nil complaints of fake Aadhaar numbers or cards".

UIDAI is mandated to issue every citizen a 12-digit unique identification number linked to the resident's demographic and biometric information, which they can use to identify themselves anywhere in India, and to access a host of benefits and services.

The authority, which was set up in January 28, 2009, is facing a manpower crunch as about 45 per cent of its total sanctioned strength of 383 is lying vacant.

"The total sanctioned strength of UIDAI is 383, out of this 204 officers or staff are in place. Appointment for remaining vacancies is in progress," the reply said.

Vacancies exists almost at all the levels including the post of additional directors general, deputy directors, section officers, office assistants and other supporting staff at both its headquarters in Delhi and regional offices.

It said UIDAI had received many suggestions from residents, advocates, associations on addition of other fields for infants, linking Aadhaar with bank accounts, making Aadhaar mandatory, etc and carried out deliberations in this regard with all relevant stakeholders, including Planning Commission, Registrar General of India, Election Commission of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Urban Development and various state governments.

"So far as linking of Aadhaar is concerned, various state governments like Sikkim, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand have already linked Aadhaar with various schemes of their state.

“Department of Telecommunications has recognised Aadhaar as proof of address. Ministry of Finance has also recognised Aadhaar as proof of address for opening of bank account," it said.

According to the reply, the authority was defending two legal cases in courts on suggestion or concern of the UIDAI project.

"Since the information is voluminous it is not possible to provide the same," it added.

The UIDAI, which acts as an attached office of the Planning Commission, has issued over one crore Aadhaar numbers till date.

The reply said that government had made budget estimates of Rs 1,300 crore for UIDAI during 2012-13. The authority has received Rs 120 crore during 2009-10, Rs 1,900 in 2010-11 and Rs 1,470 crore during 2011-12.

PTI

2544 - ‘Subsidies for the corporate sector are eight times that of the food subsidy’ - Business Economics

      ‘Subsidies for the corporate sector are eight times that of the food subsidy’http://www.businesseconomics.in/?p=4210

Posted by admin on Apr 28, 2012 in Agriculture | 0 comments

Biraj Patnaik
Principal Advisor,Office of the Commissioners
to the Supreme Court in the Right to Food Case

Q) In the budget, the FM assured that the government would give all the subsidies related to food security. But on the other hand, he targeted to curb the subsidy bill to less than 2% of the GDP. Do you think that it is contradictory?

A) It is not just contradictory; it is very unrealistic as well. The intent of the government is quite clear, it seeks to further penalise the aam admi, while continuing to subsidise corporations. Remember that the subsidies for the corporate sector are eight times that of the food subsidy. We can find money for industry but not for the poor. That is the unambiguous message from this budget.

There is around 3% rise in food subsidy allocation in Budget 2012-13, taking the amount to INR 75,000 crore. Do you think it will meet the purpose? Or, how much food subsidy is required to secure food?

The provisioning for food subsidy is not even enough to cover the cost of operations this year and like in the previous year, the RE for the food subsidy will be way in excess of the budgeted amount. FCI will not be able to cover the cost of their operations and subsequently will default in payments to the state food corporations. Ultimately, as has been happening in the past few years, it will be the farmer who will bear the brunt of this since the procurement operations will get badly affected.

Q) What is your opinion on the use of ‘Aadhaar’ in the PDS system for more efficient implementation of food security?

A) Aadhaar at its best will help curb duplication and fraud at the household level. But it is neither a substitute for governance, nor political will, nor the problems of targeting. Most states, which have reformed the PDS today, have done so without touching the last mile issues that Aadhaar will best address. It is a welcome step that the government is finally waking up to the need for reforming the PDS. But half measures and an absence of political will are the biggest impediments to the reform of the PDS.

Q) What are the missing links in the budget from the perspective of food security?

A) This budget has not factored in the food security bill, which was the big ticket item for UPA II. There is nothing for agriculture either, other than ticking the right boxes. Take the provisioning for the “green revolution” in the eastern states: while the hike in allocations by a few hundred crore may seem impressive, in reality, it translates to less than INR 1,00,000 of investment per village. What kind of a revolution do you expect with that investment? Similarly, the increase in allocations of agricultural credit means nothing unless the norms are tightened to facilitate credit to small and marginal farmers rather than corporations. The increase in the ICDS budget by ` 5000 crore is welcome. But remember that the total allocation is five times less than what the Women and Child Development Ministry had demanded as part of the ICDS restructuring.

The increase in allocations of mid day meal scheme, barely covers for inflation. In short, there is little on food security in this budget to comment on.

2543 - Aadhaar scam did not stop with kingpin - TOI

Aadhaar scam did not stop with kingpin

Mahesh Buddi, TNN | Apr 29, 2012, 01.58AM IST

HYDERABAD: The Aadhaar scam is turning curiouser. Investigations so far have revealed that Mohammed Ali, the data entry supervisor blamed for the scam, was terminated by Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (IL&FS) in September 2011, but the fraud was perpetuated by data entry operators at 20 enrollment centres in the Old City. Also, more flaws in the enrollment process have come to light. 

Investigating officials grilling 22-year-old data entry supervisor Mohammed Ali of Vattepally in Falaknuma for enrolling 30,000 people in a span of just six months from 20 centres in the Old City discovered that he was actually sacked by his employer, IL&FS, in September last year. So, they started probing how Ali could enroll 30,000 people, including 870 in the physically-disabled category, after termination from service. 

They discovered that after his exit from IL&FS, enrolling agents at the 20 centers in the Old City had been using Mohammed Ali's login and password to carry on enrollments and these agents had committed the fraud. However, to upload the Aadhaar card details of an individual, the agent has to log in using a special ID, password and also authorise the details using his thumb impression in the biometric scanner. 

Ideally, the enrollment through Ali's ID should not have happened as he was not present at these centres to authenticate details using his fingerprints, but a flaw in the registration mechanism allowed them to carry out the fraud, a source said. 

The probe revealed that the operators at the 20 centers managed to upload details of 30,000 people by authorising them with their own fingerprints. "The system has a flaw. When an agent provides wrong authorisation fingerprint, it rejects on two occasions, but at the third instance it automatically takes the default authorisation print and completes the enrollment process," a civil supplies department source said. 

The civil supplies department is the nodal agency for Aadhaar cards, being generated by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) in the state. 

Probe agencies have realised that some IL&FS officials were in the know of things, but for reasons unknown, allowed the fraudulent enrollments to happen. On Saturday, a senior IL&FS official landed in the city to cooperate with the probe agencies. Police are likely to book cases against the firm's staff soon. 

On Friday, police prepared a questionnaire asking UIDAI officers in Delhi about who had authorised the registration of 30,000 Aadhaar cards from the Old City under the name of Mohammed Ali when he was actually sacked. They also sought to know how the system had been accepting details of an individual without biometric authorisation.

2542 - Shubhashis Gangopadhyay: The real meaning of inclusion - Business Standard

Shubhashis Gangopadhyay: The real meaning of inclusion

It's a word that everyone uses, even though its definition is fuzzy
 Shubhashis Gangopadhyay / Apr 28, 2012, 00:01 IST


It is always great to talk to teenagers. The other day I was speaking to two of them who are in their first year of college — articulate, ambitious and not afraid to ask difficult questions. The first thing one notices among this age group is that they know how to push a discussion forward. They never stop you when you are yet to complete what you have started saying and, most importantly, they think about what you have said before they speak. In particular, and this may be because they are just about starting to find their feet as adult Indians, they seldom assume that you must be wrong if they do not understand what you have said.

Our discussion was about inclusion in education. And they started with the following question. There are millions of students finishing school who sit for the Indian Institute of Technology exams, but only a few thousands get in since there are only that many seats in these institutions. These are expected to be the very best, and people know it. The fact that a very small proportion of those who try actually get admitted makes IIT-ians end up being a small and exclusive group. Would inclusion mean that more IITs are created, more seats are generated, and a greater number of students get into these institutions? And, if that happens, and the IIT entrance tests are truly discerning, more seats would mean that we will have to go down the talent ladder, and students with lesser and lesser ability will become IIT-ians. This will dilute the average quality of an IIT-ian, reduce their average pay and, hence, the rush to enter an IIT. They did not stop there but went on to say that, indeed, can this not be said for all levels of education?

Obviously, I was immediately tempted to say that everyone entering an IIT is not “inclusion”. But, before I said that, I started thinking how to define “inclusion”. If inclusion is a concept worth striving for, it is worth defining it in the first place.

To ensure that it is indeed a worthwhile thing to achieve, we must be able to distinguish between what is inclusion and what is not. If everything we want to do is “inclusion”, it is a trivial concept; if we cannot figure out what it is we must do, it is a vacuous concept.

Given that all our leaders and all multi-lateral aid agencies and everyone who wants to make a statement are talking about inclusion, it is a great idea to try and understand what it is and what it is not.

In India, financial inclusion is a common term. We have operationalised it into that of opening a bank account for every adult. Unfortunately, when some of us went to some villages to help the villagers open bank accounts, they were totally unexcited about it. We explained the advantages of opening the account – saving their extra cash and withdrawing from it whenever they wanted to – but they were not impressed. At first we thought it was a lack of “financial literacy”, another buzzword doing the rounds in academic, civil society and policy circles. It was only later that we realised the reason was much simpler. Going to the bank for any purpose was difficult, if not impossible, for these villagers. The bank was a frightful place, and they were treated with disdain by its officers. At least, that was their perception. They were more at ease doing other things with their money than saving it in bank accounts. Oh! They would love to have access to something like bank accounts — but not in the institutions we wanted them to open in. The bank to them was exclusively for others, people who were not like them.
So, if having bank accounts is not financial inclusion, what is? We are back to the original question: what is inclusion? Let us try another oft-repeated objective: inclusive growth. Many suggest that our post-reform experience is not one of inclusive growth. I am yet to understand what exactly this means. Does it mean that everyone’s earnings must increase at the same rate? Or, these rates could be different as long as they are all positive? Should the poor first become non-poor and then others can grow?

The students’ question brought back all these confusions that I have long had and tried to cover up so that I was not excluded from the group of people who knew what inclusion is and, hence, talked about it a lot. I did not want the teenaged students to include me in their group — those who do not know what inclusion in education meant.

So, I racked my brains and came up with the following answer. Inclusive education does not mean that everyone must enter, or pass out from, an IIT. It only means that if you wanted to, you could have a shot at it. The child labourer is excluded because she can never dream of entering an IIT; she may absolutely hate IIT, but not trying to join an IIT should be her decision. Even if there is only one IIT train, every child must have access to the platform where the train comes. Of course, not everyone will get on to the train but everyone knows what to do to have a shot at the train. This is called inclusion in education. Everyone must go to school till class 12; those who work hard, and are willing to work harder still, will join an IIT. Others will, by choice, decide not to work that hard and become economists.

2541 - More than one involved in Aadhaar scam: Cops - TOI

More than one involved in Aadhaar scam: Cops

TNN | Apr 28, 2012, 05.28AM IST

HYDERABAD: Talking to TOI, UIDAI deputy director general Ajay Bhushan Pandey, who landed in the city on Friday evening, said that they stumbled upon the fraud on April 20 when it was noticed that Ali has made 30,000 enrolments in just a span of two months, a feat that would normally take two years. "After a closer verification, we found that the operator has enrolled over 800 people in the physically disabled quota and the state government was immediately alerted," the DDG said.

Even though so far only the cards enrolled by Mohammed under the disabled quota proven to be fake, investigating agencies are suspecting that a major share of the 30,000 cards issued by him could also fall in the same category as no operator can enroll 30,000 genuine people in a span of two months.

The preliminary probe by the investigating agencies has revealed that majority of the 30,000 cards enrolled by the accused have been dispatched to the `individuals' but UID officials say that as per their knowledge none of the cards in the physically disabled quota have been dispatched.

Police officials are tight lipped about the entire episode but according to sources, Ali told them during the interrogation that he executed the fraud along with other associates for money. "Looking at the size of enrolment, there is more than one person involved in the fraud," the Deputy DG said. Police are now trying to crosscheck whether there was a terror angle to the fraud.

In response to the incident, UID has temporarily blocked all the 30,000 cards enrolled by Mohammed and they have stopped enrolment of people under physically disabled quota throughout the nation. Ajay Bhushan Pandey said that once they are through with this probe in Hyderabad, they will check the enrolments of all other regions in the country. In addition to the deputy director general, UIDAI's chairman Nandan Nilekani is also sending another senior staff member to Hyderabad to look into the technical loopholes in the enrolment process.

2540 - Aadhaar scam: Top UID official in Hyderabad for probe - TOI

Aadhaar scam: Top UID official in Hyderabad for probe

Mahesh Buddi, TNN | Apr 28, 2012, 05.17AM IST

HYDERABAD: Even as it turns out that most of the 30,000 Aadhaar cards fraudulently processed by a computer operator here have been dispatched to the named individuals, a shaken Unique Identification Authority of India ( UIDAI) on Friday suspended the enrolment of the Aadhaar cards for the physically challenged across the country and dispatched a top official from Mumbai to Hyderabad to jointly probe the scam with the city cops and ascertain whether the scam had wider ramifications including a terror design.

Mohammed Ali, an SSC-qualified data entry supervisor working for Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (ILFSL), who was nabbed by a city police team in Mumbai on Thursday night, was brought to the city on Friday. ILFSL is one of the eight agencies given the task of Aadhaar card enrolment in the state. Ali, it turns out, had enrolled over 30,000 Aadhaar cards including 800 under the physically disabled quota with fake details.

Urging the state government to take serious note of the issue, the IAS officers said that the advocate general or an eminent lawyer should defend the right of the government to take executive decisions. Also to be defended is the right of the government to a judicial scrutiny or validation of such orders before these orders by themselves become a subject or evidence for investigation and prosecution of public servants.

"The principle that all GOs are orders of the government and not acts of individual should be upheld till proven otherwise in a court of law and not in a police station," the eight officers said. The replies are to be sent to the Supreme Court by April 30.

2539 - Andhra Pradesh: Anyone seen Ali? - IBN Live

Andhra Pradesh: Anyone seen Ali?Andhra Pradesh | Updated Apr 28, 2012 at 10:49am IST

HYDERABAD: Intelligence agencies are sitting bolt upright after finding that a data entry operator went on an Aadhar card enrolment spree in the Old City of Hyderabad, enlisting no less than 30,000 residents in a matter of five months.

Such was the man’s hurry that in the column meant for fingerprints and Iris images, he reported that his wards had no hands at all and were blind to boot.

Aadhar cards, issued by the Unique Indentification Authority of India (UIDAI), are given only to genuine citizens of India, and intel agencies say the recent spate of fake card scams has troubling security implications. 

The data entry operator, identified only as Ali, was a representative of the Noida-based firm Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, one of the eight firms contracted by the state government to enrol citizens for Aadhar cards.

Ali’s enrollment of 30,000 residents within five months, including 870 from Charminar, showed up as a blip on the intel radar. An enrolment of 1,500 applicants per month is thought to be average for an operator.

Intrigued by Ali’s quick work, sleuths made random enquiries into 60 of the applications processed by him. Side-stepping the columns for fingerprints and iris images, the operator recorded that his applicants had no hands and were blind as well. 

Also, investigators were shocked to find that the addresses given in the applications did not exist at all. They are now clueless as to where these fake Aadhar card holders are and for what purpose the cards are being used.

The matter has jolted the top brass in the state administration as well as the Civil Supplies Department, which supervises the Aadhar programme. Top officials are contemplating referring the probe to the National Investigating Agency (NIA) or the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

As for Ali, a case has been registered -- citing forgery, cheating and criminal conspiracy -- against him in the Charminar police station, but sources said he has scooted to Mumbai. ‘’He has not been seen around her for two months,’’ sources said.

2538 - TRANSLINE GETS ORDER FROM GUJRAT GOVERNMENT FOR ENROLLMENT FOR UIDAI/AADHAR India PR Wire

TRANSLINE GETS ORDER FROM GUJRAT GOVERNMENT FOR ENROLLMENT FOR UIDAI/AADHAR

New Delhi, India, April 26, 2012 /India PRwire/ -- Transline Technologies has been able to secure orders from the Gujrat government for enrollment for generation of Aadhaar numbers. Transline has been selected for the district of Panchmahal with its district headquarter at Godhra. The total population of this distric is around 24 lacs citizens and it is expected that the same shall be completed within a period of 15 months. Mr. Pankaj Mittal - VP of Transline Technologies projected this as a major win and shared that the company shall try to enroll minimum 10% of the total population under UIDAI. Although this may take a bit of time but he reaffirmed that it just not the manpower deployment but core IT & project management skills which are required for enrollment.

2537 - Aadhaar card scam unearthed in Hyderabad - TOI

Aadhaar card scam unearthed in Hyderabad

Mahesh Buddi, TNN Apr 27, 2012, 03.09AM IST

 HYDERABAD: Raising serious security issues over Aadhaar cards, an enrolment agent has processed 30,000 unique indentity cards (ID) within a span of just six months in the Old City. Also, among them 800 were enrolled under the physically-disabled persons category. However, a probe by investigating agencies revealed that the Aadhaar cards registered under the physically-disabled category were created with fake identities.

The civil supplies department, which is the nodal agency for rolling out Aadhaar cards in the state, had assigned the task of enrolling citizens to eight companies, including Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited. The fraud was committed by infrastructure major IL&FS's data entry supervisor of the Old City, whose first name, according to civil supplies department sources, is Mohammed.


On April 20, the state government authorities became suspicious about the fraud as the agent had registered details of 30,000 people for Aadhaar card in a span of just six months, which would normally take two years. On scrutiny, they found that 800 enrolments were under the physically-disabled quota, where a person is without either fingers or eyes.

The uniqueness of Aadhaar card is inclusion of iris scan and fingerprint details in the card's micro chip. However, to include those without fingers and eyes, an option has been provided in the enrolment process, where it would be declared that the candidate does not have fingers or eyes. As Aadhaar card would not have these details printed on the card, it would become easy for the fake user to utilize the card to get essential identification documents like a passport.

Based on the government's directions, the Charminar police have conducted a probe into these physically-disabled Aadhaar card holders and found out that none of those candidates reside at the given addresses and their other details were also fake. After the probe, the civil supplies authorities were informed and they gave the go ahead to book a case against the supervisor.

On Thursday, police booked cases under sections 468, 471, 419, 420 and 120-B of the IPC against Mohammed. As police began probe into the activity, he fled from the city a few days ago.

However, a special team nabbed him in Mumbai. He would be brought to city soon. "We are looking into the possibility that all the 30,000 Aadhaar card registrations made by him could be fake and the main challenge is to know for whom he did it and what purpose," a police officer said.

Comment:

I've been waiting for some scam like this to come up soon. All the theories about how great the scheme is, how useful getting a unique ID card would be for the development of the nation, how easy it is going to be for poor people to get all that they need with the help of this card.. there are hundreds of other reasons why this card was going to benefit the Indian citizen, according to Nilekani, Rajagopal etc..

While theories look good on paper, we have to consider reality on the ground in India. NOTHING will stay the same as on paper. We do not have the integrity or the will to do anything honestly and properly.. As such, any scheme that even a western, developed nation like the UK didn't implement, will not work here.

Will anybody stop the massive expense of this nonsense and pay attention to basic roti, kapda, makaan for poor people and pay attention to   implementing the various, approved, passed bills to enforce all the laws and schemes that are available? Nothing else is needed. Enforcement just doesn't get done because of our lack of integrity and a sense of honour. That cannot be grown or printed in this country. Which department works well without bribe? Which need of an ordinary citizen gets done without paying somebody some kind of bribe or using some "influence"? UID will not make all those things happen. It is a sheer waste of money.. 

This incident is just the tip of the iceberg that has been unearthed, many more will come out. That is the nature of the beast in India..

Rebecca.

2536 - EG Fair Price Shops to have POS system - HANS India

EG Fair Price Shops to have POS system

Kakinada: Ration distribution system by identifying the beneficiaries based on the thumb impression with the help of Aadhar special number data would be implemented in the public distribution system in East Godavari district for the first time in the country, East Godavari District Collector Neetu Kumari Prasad said.

She along with the Joint Collector Babu A inspected the equipment which would be used for Aadhar-based fingerprint authentication with Infronics Systems limited as per the suggestions made by the state civil supplies commissioner in Kakinada on Tuesday.

This equipment, which is called as PDS-Point of sale (POS), will provide real time confirmation immediately by inspecting the thumb impression of the ration beneficiaries online. This will confirm by matching the thumb impression of the beneficiary with Aadhar number data through GPRS without internet connection.

This equipment is having High quality optical sensor, printer, GPRS connectivity along with smart card interface. It will also print two receipts along with the confirmation of thumb impression.

This system will also facilitate portability for the ration beneficiary to take ration from anywhere in the State. It will also make online reconciliation of the information from commissioner allotment in the distribution of civil supplies to the distribution to the beneficiary as well as the closing stock of the shop. There will be no chance for irregularities in the distribution of the ration in this biometric system.

Joint Collector Babu A informed that this system would be implemented in 21 ration depots in the district on an experimental basis. He said that 51 lakh people registered for Aadhar biometric in the district and added that Aadhar identification numbers were generated for 41 lakh people.

He informed that the Aadhar data of these people would be interlinked with civil supplies data and would be utilized in PDS-POS process.

2535 - ‘Biometrics are not as perfect as some politicians and vendors would like you to believe’ - Tehelka

‘Biometrics are not as perfect as some politicians and vendors would like you to believe’

In 2005, when the Labour Party decided to implement the National Identity Project (NIP) in the UK, it drew severe criticism from many quarters, including the Tories, who later scrapped the NIP after coming to power. A report by the London School of Economics (LSE), which stated the project is “unsafe in law” and should be regarded as a “potential danger to public interest”, was instrumental in buttressing the arguments of those who opposed the NIP. The report’s primary author was Dr Edgar A Whitley, a Reader in the Information Systems and Innovation Group at the LSE and an expert in identity, privacy and security issues relating to Internet-based technologies. On a recent visit to Delhi, Whitley told Baba Umar why such projects could be an intrusion of privacy.

ALSO READ The trouble with big brother’s eye ‘Data is secure. Biometrics ensure uniqueness’ Why Nandan wants to tag You

Initially, the UK government was serious about the identity project. Why was it abandoned later?
In May 2010, the Labour Party (which had introduced the ID card in 2005) lost the election. We ended up with a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, both of whom had campaigned against ID cards in their election manifestos. When they decided to form a coalition government, they both reaffirmed their commitment to scrap the scheme. Certainly, the LSE report helped in supporting their stand but the concerns about ID cards also stemmed from the existing political perspectives of both the coalition partners.

What about public opinion?
In terms of public opinion, the support for ID cards dropped markedly when people learnt more about the details of the project: you would have to be enrolled if you chose to renew your passport, there would be a cost associated with obtaining an ID card, you would need to be fingerprinted to enrol, etc. In the UK, fingerprinting has far stronger associations with criminality than other countries where, for e.g., it is used for voter registration.

You said the LSE report helped in buttressing the opinions of the coalition partners. What did the report argue?
The report concluded that the project was too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lacked a foundation of public trust and confidence. The proposals missed key opportunities to establish a secure, trusted and cost-effective identity system and the report considered alternative models for an ID card project that may achieve the goals of the legislation more effectively. The technology envisioned for this scheme was, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. We also estimated the likely cost of the 10-year rollout of the proposed project to be between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion. This figure didn’t include public or private sector integration costs, nor did it take into account possible cost overruns. The report magnified the risk of failure in the proposals to the point where the scheme was insisted to be regarded as a potential danger to public interest and to the legal rights of individuals.

In India, the project was sold on ‘social welfare and development’ arguments. What were the arguments in the UK?
This is one of the areas where the UK and India are more different. There were various justifications given for the scheme and they tended to vary over time. Indeed, for a while, our joke would be: “It is Tuesday, so the justification for identity cards must be to address identity fraud.” There was an element of security associated with the scheme, particularly in relation to making it more difficult/impossible for a UK citizen to obtain more than one passport. This makes it more difficult for them to travel in and out of the country under different identities). However, following the 7 July 2005 attacks in London, Home Secretary Charles Clarke (rightly) admitted that ID cards would not have prevented it (not least because the attackers were all UK citizens and so would have been entitled to an id card). The government also argued that the cards would address benefit fraud, despite the fact that such cases relate to a misrepresentation of circumstances.

What’s your take on India’s Unique Identification (UID) project?
India’s scale (in this as in everything) is so completely different to the UK that I often find it difficult to comprehend. For example, I understand that 200 million people have already enrolled for UID. That is over three times the total population of the UK. However, these scale factors do have ­important consequences. For example, with enrolment, you need to delegate the process to lots of enrolment stations and you need to ensure that the quality (and security) of this process is maintained throughout the country and for all the ­millions of people who are going to be ­enrolled. Similarly, if you are going to do online authentication (i.e. sending Aadhaar number, name/biometric to the UID Central Identity Data Repository) then you will need to have lots of secure terminals (often in geographically remote locations with poor connectivity) and these will need to operate within a reasonable response time.

ID projects are working well in some countries. Then why not in India?
Context is so important that you can’t just take a system that might work in one country and expect it to work in another. Here, issues of scale, levels of documentation — as I understand it, there are huge levels of poor/no documentation for many people — custom and practice: in Germany, you are expected to notify the local council within a few days of moving to a new town. As a result, the new town has a pretty good official record of who lives in their town that can become a source of “proof of ­address”. I suspect the British would never agree to be “managed” in such a way.

You have been critical of the biometrics part of the project. Why?
Not “critical” per se, rather we have raised concerns and claims that biometrics are not as perfect as some politicians and biometric vendors would like you to believe. We just want to make sure that any decisions taken about biometrics are based on an understanding of all the viewpoints, not just a subset of them. By definition, biometrics are never error-free. They all ­operate within particular performance ­levels and there is evidence (including from UID) about the problems of enrolment and verification of various forms of biometrics, for e.g. manual workers whose fingerprints might become worn over time.

The government says UID isn’t compulsory and it’s primarily meant to plug pilferage in welfare schemes. Isn’t there a worry that it will be used for surveillance?
This question of compulsion is often tricky. It wasn’t compulsory to enrol for an ID card in the UK but if you (voluntarily) chose to renew your passport, you would be ­enrolled. The only way it was not compulsory was if you excluded yourself from travel by turning down a passport. In terms of pilferage in PDS, again this is a situation where the detailed evidence needs to be presented. Is most of the pilferage because of identity-related fraud — where a formal use of UID might address it — or does most of the pilferage happen at an earlier stage, i.e. before the food gets to the distribution point, whereby UID would have no effect? 

I’m not an expert on PDS, so can’t provide the evidence on this. To some extent, the same ID number may be found in ­various systems tracking the individual, so this might be an issue (see, for e.g., webcast.gov.in/witfor opening plenary where Kapil Sibal (minutes 56-58) talks about tracking someone using Aadhaar but “not intruding his privacy”).

Some critics tie the UID project to UN Security Council Resolution 1373. They say these are UN-backed projects that also include the formation of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre in all countries (US and now India have it) to which information will be fed by UID projects.
I don’t know enough about the details of this for a sensible comment, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the UID policy was completely unrelated to other ongoing policy issues such as counter-terrorism. That said, it is unclear how much direct benefit there would be in terms of counter-terrorism for collecting biometrics, names and ­addresses of large numbers of relatively poorly-documented individuals.

Baba Umar is a Correspondent with Tehelka.
babaumar@tehelka.com

2534 - UIDAI: Banking on biometrics to give you a unique identity - Economic Times

UIDAI: Banking on biometrics to give you a unique identity

Shelley Singh, ET Bureau Apr 26, 2012, 02.42AM IST

 At the end of its enrolment drive, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will collect about 12 billion fingerprints and 2.4 billion irises, besides 1.2 billion photographs - the largest human biometric data ever collected.

At almost a quarter of the population already enrolled for Aadhaar and the unique identity project surpasses the US human database. Aadhaar also promises to be the panacea for e-governance in India - no duplicates, no frauds and one that an individual need not remember, like a password.


 As pilots --using Aadhaar to authenticate people -- convert to actual rollout, people will be able to use fingerprints to avail of government subsidies, insurance policies, buy fertiliser or open bank accounts.

Behind this mega project and an aspect responsible for its most essential feature - uniqueness that can't be duplicated - lies biometrics or mathematical calculation of a human feature - eyes, face, palm, toes, fingers, veins and so on. Fingerprints change the least over time and are relied upon the most for biometric authentication followed by iris (see graphics -- Basics of Biometrics).

When UIDAI spearheaded by technology titan Nandan Nilekani was entrusted with the task of giving each Indian an unique identity that will transform delivery of services, this new e-governance initiative fell upon an ancient idea, biometrics -- specifically fingerprints and iris -- to create uniqueness.

Biometrics have been around since 29000 BC when cavemen would sign their drawings with handprints. In 500BC, Babylonian business transactions were signed in clay tablets with fingerprints.

The earliest cataloguing of fingerprints dates back to 1881 when Juan Vucetich, an anthropologist and police officer who started collecting fingerprints of criminals in Argentina. All governments, notably the police departments, use fingerprints and in more than 100 years of database available, no two fingerprints, have been found to be identical. Hence a fingerprint uniquely identifies an individual.

In the case of Aadhaar, biometrics will also translate into a huge business for iris and fingerprint device makers, besides network services providers. Each iris scanner costs about Rs 10,000 and fingerprint scanner almost double that rate.

Of Ridges & Valleys

Fingerprint comprises 'ridges' and 'valleys' which form the basis for the loops, arches, and contours seen on fingertips. The ridges and valleys have different kinds of breaks and discontinuities. These are called 'minutiae'. From these minutiae, the unique features are located and determined.

Each finger has four to half-a-dozen minutiae points and there are in turn, two types of minutiae: ridge endings -- the location where the ridge actually ends -- and bifurcations, the location where a single ridge becomes two ridges.
Based upon the unique features found in the minutiae - the location, position, as well as the type and quality of the minutiae -a `template' is created. Template is smaller in size than a raw image and is based on ISO 197942-2 standard.

This standard specifies formats on how minutiae points are determined and collected. The templates thus formed are saved into a database, which in case of Aadhaar, is located at the Bangalore technology hub of UIDAI. To use fingerprints for authentication, Aadhaar uses algorithms certified by the US-based National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST).

Says Ankur Saluja, co-founder SmartID, "The thumb and the next two fingers (index and middle) have the maximum information and best suited for fingerprint identification." SmartID, a 2008 start-up which has partnered with the US-based Cross Match Technologies to provide biometric solutions in India.


 The other biometric, iris essentially implies capturing the pattern of the iris. Iris recognition uses camera technology with subtle infrared illumination to acquire images of the detail-rich, intricate structures of the iris. Digital templates encoded from these patterns by mathematical and statistical algorithms allow unique identification of an individual.
Both irises are captured to form an iris template, which ranges from type 1 to 7-capturing high-resolution images of irides of the eye.


Unique, But Can't Authenticate

While biometric twins have not been found so far, making them the best means to identify and authenticate individuals, field trials of Aadhaar have revealed gaps in authentication. All the people given Aadhaar numbers could not be authenticated by merely putting a finger on a scanner. All scanned prints did not match with ones stored in Bangalore database.


 For instance in the first attempt to authenticate, a high 40% of the farm workers, could not be verified though this improved to more than 90% in three attempts -- one person trying different fingers to authenticate. That's because while fingerprints are unique, authentication accuracy depends on multiple of factors, ranging from cleanliness of fingers to size of fingerprint scanners, leading to mixed results.


  Explains Anil K Jain, professor in the department of computer science at the Michigan State University and a holder of six patents on fingerprinting technology: the first is condition of the finger itself. That is whether the finger have cuts, abrasions, wet, too dry, dirty, and so on.



Second, he says, is the quality of the fingerprint image acquired by the fingerprint scanner. The quality of the acquired image will depend on the first factor, namely the condition of the finger, but it also depends on how the user is interacting with the sensor (finger placement on the sensor and the applied pressure) and the condition of the sensor platen or surface (could be dirty), and third, robustness of the fingerprint matcher.

Says Jain: "Given these confounding factors, we cannot guarantee that fingerprint authentication will be 100% accurate. However, for a reasonable quality fingerprint image and a high grade fingerprint matcher, we can be assured that authentication accuracy will be very close to 100% (say, over 99%). Field deployments and testing support this."

Age also play a role in fingerprint matching. Says SmartID's Saluja, "after age 60, fingerprints are too dry. Moist fingers reveal better patterns. And a 15 year old, will need to give fresh prints at age 40 to ensure scanners don't reject him."
To ensure higher accuracy, wherever biometrics is needed, UIDAI is now looking at iris as well. To begin with iris was being used only to ensure there are no duplicates for the Aadhaar numbers.

Says Saluja,"Iris is more stable and remains unchanged after two years of age, compared to other biometrics, including fingerprints that can change over time." Perhaps a combination of two, will work best to ensure each of the 1.2 billion individuals is unique.    

Comments:

Karthik (Chennai)
26 Apr, 2012 01:09 PM
I believe that fingerprint does not change with age. We have to use the right technology to enroll. Rural India, most of the fingerprint are not clear. I have studied that each finger has three layers which is exactly the same. Radio frequency technology will exactly solve the problem for enrollment and authenticate. RF Scanners takes the inner layer i.e. Corium layer of the finger to enroll and authenticate. RF scanners are successful in financial inclusion which again is implemented only for rural India. I believe that we have to prefer RF technology for enroll and authenticate, as Optical imaging technology is failing everywhere.

Vickram (Mumbai)
26 Apr, 2012 08:54 AM
The article does not comment on the fact that fingerprints often change with age, more so with manual labor, making this method even more expensive to deploy for authentication in rural India, said to be the principal target for beneficiaries of social solutions employing Aadhaar. Of course, most of your readers will already be aware that 1% of the population exceeds 12 Lac people who will face unprecedentedly huge problems - exclusion from banking and receipt of subsidies - in establishing their identities if UIDAI fails them.

patnaikt (Goa) replies to Vickram
26 Apr, 2012 12:58 PM
one percent exceeds 120 lacs not just 12 lacs and that is a huge number!

vinu (Chennai) replies to Vickram

26 Apr, 2012 12:53 PM
I believe fingerprint does not change with age. Each finger is unique and permanent. We are not able to capture the fingerprint is because we are using optical imaging technology. Each finger has three layers, so if we can capture the inner layer, which is called the corium (inner layer) layer, then it is easy to authenticate any finger. Radio frequency based finger print scanners is able to do this.

2533 - 3.86 crore Aadhaar cards in process of being delivered: Government - Economic Times

3.86 crore Aadhaar cards in process of being delivered: Government

25 APR, 2012, 05.08PM IST, PTI 

NEW DELHI: The government today said as many as 3.86 crore Aadhaar letters are in the process of being dispatched while 6.46 lakh cards could not be delivered by the postal department due various reasons such as incomplete address. 

As on April 20, 2012 a total of 17 crore Aadhaar numbers had been generated and 10.44 crore have been dispatched, Minister of State for Planning Ashwani Kumar said in a written reply in the Lok Sabha. 

"Out of these (10.44 crore letters), 6.58 crore Aadhaar letters have been delivered as reported by India Post and the remaining 3.86 crore letters are in transit," Kumar, who is also Minister of State for Science and Technology and Earth Science said. 

He further said that as per the portal of the Department of Posts, the total returned letters as on April 20, 2012, stood at 6.46 lakh. This is 0.98 per cent of total Aadhaar letters delivered. 

"There are five reasons for returned letters -- refused, deceased, insufficient address, addressee cannot be located and unclaimed," he said adding there was no bogus Aadhaar registrations. 

"The letter being returned are having clear remarks of the concerned postman of the area and they are one of the five mentioned reasons...," he said. 

Mandate of UIDAI is to issue Aadhaar numbers to all residents of India. 

Aadhaar aims to provide a identity infrastructure which can be used to improve delivery of public services.

2532 - Global Identity Policies and Technology: Do we Understand the Question? Edgar A. Whitley and Gus Hosein

Global Policy Volume 1. Issue 2 . May 2010

Global Identity Policies and Technology: Do we Understand the Question?
Edgar A. Whitley and Gus Hosein


London School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract
Why do we get technology policy so wrong, so often? As governments rush to develop new identity policies they fail too often in answering essential questions: are identity policies capable of addressing a diverse range of policy goals? Are the techniques we imagine to be necessary in fact helpful? Instead, policy makers remain fixated on expensive and sexy ‘biometrics’ and vast new centralised databases to solve problems they do not understand. This survey seeks to resolve why policy makers repeatedly commission identity schemes based on obsolete knowledge of modern technological capabilities. We argue that policy making requires an understanding of technological issues as well as more traditional political and organisational concerns, and a little less bravado. As a result, policy makers can set about developing effective solutions that are citizen friendly and actually address pressing policy goals.

When faced with global migration, terrorism and crime, fraud and the modernisation of public services, govern- ments are nearly unanimous in their silver bullet: identity policy. For example, the Indian government is planning to implement a Unique Identification Number for its billion- plus citizens backed up by biometric authentication in order to regulate access to government services (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2009); in the fight against terrorism, countries as diverse as Greece, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain have introduced requirements on mobile phone providers to ensure that ‘prepay’ mobile phones are linked to an identification document (Haines, 2009); for the management of borders and the movement of people, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is trialling the use of fingerprint bio- metrics to manage refugee populations, and recently Rwanda has announced that all refugees will be issued with identity cards (Asiimwe, 2009). Less than a decade ago these policies would have been unthinkable, not least because of a lack of political will and because ‘identity tech- nologies’ were not as commonplace as they are now. Iden- tity policies now encompass a broad range of policy activity in practically every country in the world.

Without a clear understanding of this complex area, potential benefits of identity policies will be quickly out- weighed by the political, social and technological risks (Whitley and Hosein, 2010). As the Australian and British governments have discovered, an ill-thought-out identity policy can become a political and even electoral liability. As other countries have recognised, identity policy can also become a financial and technological albatross. In fact, it remains unclear how policy makers see identity policies: are they imagining identity policy as the traditional issuance of identity cards using new and exciting techniques? Do they see only great opportunities behind new technologies, often without seeing the risks? In our experiences and research, we are worried that policy makers too often believe that there is no limit to what an identity policy can achieve.


As with all modern policy domains an understanding of the technological details is necessary. Reading manuals and scientific articles may not be a politician’s idea of prepara- tion for a parliamentary debate but effective deliberation of modern policy issues, particularly identity policy, hinges on a careful understanding of the technologies implicated in making a policy a reality. All too often, however, terms like ‘biometrics’, ‘contactless chips’ and ‘smart cards’ are per- ceived by politicians and policy makers as panaceas for all the complexities associated with identification when in practice they are a shorthand representation of complex and diverse technological issues. As a result, a government’s strategy on identity policy tends to focus on the notion of the state issuing ‘biometric identity cards’ to its population. We argue that such an approach may actually undermine many of the useful benefits of an effective identity policy.


The purpose of this article is therefore to unpack some of the choices that underlie existing and future policies. The policy challenge, accordingly, is to agree on the requirements of a policy that includes effective consider- ation of technological issues and choices. We do so by reviewing the key challenges faced by governments and their identity policies in a global environment. The next Global Policy (2010) 1:2 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00028.x Ó 2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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section therefore introduces the challenges of implementing an effective identity policy and some of the key concepts underlying identity policies before examining critically some of the most commonly claimed drivers for identity policies and the policy processes that are currently driving identity policy. The article ends with specific recommendations for policy makers in this area.


Key concepts in identity policies
Too often the complexity of implementing an identity pol- icy is concealed through the undefined and indeterminate use of concepts including identification, biometrics, enrolment and verification. Despite commonly held beliefs, not all transactions require identification. Aspirations aside, the performance issues relating to biometrics may limit their applicability for some kinds of transactions, environments and populations. Counter to the ambitions of some govern- ment departments and vendors, identity schemes do not have to be based on the storage of biometrics on centralised databases. Finally, decisions about how to enrol and verify individual identities directly influence the effectiveness of the policy in addressing particular policy objectives.


The challenge of implementation
Policy implementation is always challenging but identity policies raise particular challenges as they require explicit consideration of scientific and technological issues, the ‘missing’ elements of much social theory (Latour, 1992). Our political and legal systems of deliberation are set up to consider economic, financial, social and legal issues, but are poorer at considering and evaluating ‘things’. When policy makers consider these ‘things’, they often take a ‘thing- centric’ approach, which often results in ‘identity cards’, ‘DNA databases’ and ‘biometrics’. 


Without an understand- ing of the inherent complexities of the things as we described above and an equivalent understanding of how these ‘things’ integrate into existing policies and practices, the policies are, in our experience, very likely to fail.


Sometimes these policies may not be reliant strictly on sci- ence and technology, but on equally hard issues like available infrastructure and systems. Common problems of coordinat- ing systems across government departments can result in inconsistent identity policies being applied. For example, an immigration department may wish to limit student visas to those studying on recognised courses but this requires that the education department has proactive oversight of ‘regis- tered’ institutions which ensures that they are not used as fronts for illegal immigration and that there is an effective network of biometric enrolment centres for prospective students (BBC News, 2009; Manifesto Club, 2010).


Similarly, a decision to base identification on documents that are intended for other purposes might result in unin- tended consequences. For example, plans for US states to issue enhanced driving licences as an identity card (the ‘REAL ID’ programme) have been criticised for simply creating an underclass of individuals who are driving with- out driving licences. 


Alternatively, issuing ‘driving licences’ to all would mean that decisions over who is a legitimate citizen are suddenly delegated to the driver’s licence authority (Rotenberg, 2006).

Technological implementation decisions also include choices of how and where to store the underlying identity information. For example, the political decision to base an identity policy around a single, centralised database might offer the prospect of being able to focus security protections on the database, but it also means that the database becomes increasingly vulnerable as a natural target for hack- ers (Fishenden, 2005). A centralised database also raises the risk of catastrophic data breaches, as all the data are held in one place (cf. Perrow, 1984). Finally, a single error in a central database will permeate an entire society as other institutions grow to rely on the data held therein: a failure to register an individual will result in that individual being excluded from society, while a successful but fraudulent reg- istration could result in irrevocable abuse (Berghel, 2006).


Identification and authentication
Although most policies are described in terms of identifica- tion, in practice many identity transactions are more accu- rately described in terms of authentication (Smith and Clarke, 2000). Identification is taken as a process whereby someone’s identity is revealed (‘This is Jo Bloggs’), while authentication is a process that results in a person being accepted as authorised to engage in or perform some activity (‘I am allowed to withdraw money from this bank machine’ or ‘I am a citizen and may enter the country’ or ‘I am allowed to drive a car’).


In each case, the ‘relying party’ in a transaction (which might be a commercial organisation or the ‘service’ side of government) needs to know that the ‘individual’ presenting him- or herself is who or what they claim to be. They also need to know the basis of this claim, that is, who is the ‘identity service provider’ that supports the claim? In the examples above, this could be the individual’s bank, pass- port office and driver’s licence authority, respectively. These transactions in turn may depend on the appearance of the individual, the quality of the credential (e.g. the card or passport), the dangers of letting the wrong person gain access, the insurance schemes supporting failures and other considerations that often get enveloped in the concept of trust. The decision of whether to rely on the claimed infor- mation is therefore an exercise in risk evaluation (Crosby, 2008).


For example, if a prospective employer is presented with a work permit ‘credential’ such as an identity card which claims that an individual is entitled to work in the country, the employer needs to know the basis for this claim before

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employing that person: is the credential a legitimate one? Does it belong to the person presenting it? Has it been issued by a recognised immigration authority? It is an increasingly common requirement in immigration laws around the world for the employer to be able to assure, upon audit or investigation by the relevant authorities, that the employer had diligently assessed the validity of the cre- dential, yet standard methods for this final operation have yet to be developed (Crosby, 2008).
Even in this case the transaction is actually one of authentication rather than identification. As long as the cre- dential is linked to the potential employee, the employer does not necessarily care ‘who’ the person is (they may claim to be called ‘Elvis Presley’) just so long as the identity ser- vice provider provides the required level of confidence that the individual has the attributes they claim – in this case the right to work in the country. Thus we must keep on questioning the nature of the essential task: identification or authentication? Too often policies focus on identification and this results not only in overly burdensome and complex systems but also systems that are not fit for purpose.
Biometrics


Linking credentials to individuals can be achieved by using something they have (e.g. a token of some form like a card) or something they know (e.g. a secret password or PIN). If the transaction is a high-risk one (cf. Cabinet Office, 2006), a third option that is increasing in popularity is linking the credential to something that the individual ‘is’, for example their biometrics – literally measures of the body (Kabatoff and Daugman, 2008). Commonly used bio- metrics include signatures, images of the face, fingerprints and iris scans (Jain et al., 2006). Although biometrics are based on images (of the face, of the fingerprint, of the iris, etc.), in operation they are typically converted into compu- tational representations or templates that can be compared against other representations of the biometric (see, for example, Science and Technology Select Committee, 2006, p. 13). For example, a person may present their (live) fin- gerprint and the template obtained from it is compared with the template of their fingerprint stored on their iden- tity credential; a match between the two provides increased confidence that the credential is theirs (Mansfield and Rejman-Greene, 2003).


Although biometric systems are often believed to provide perfect matches to a person’s identity, in practice each bio- metric system has a known and measurable operating range. That is, each form of biometric has a measurable, non-zero rate of failing to match when there should be a match, or reporting a match when there is none. Similarly, each form of biometric has a known failure-to-acquire rate (for example, it is difficult to collect fingerprints from someone with no fingers; manual workers and refugees often have less clear fingerprints than other parts of the

population). Other biometrics, such as iris, have better per- formance profiles but these come at increased cost as iris biometric equipment is an expensive, complex technology. Many biometric systems are designed to work under con- trolled and ideal circumstances, including under controlled lighting conditions. As a result, when these systems are installed, they are fine-tuned for an acceptable error rate for that context, not for perfection. There is also evidence that ‘template ageing’ affects the performance of the bio- metric system. For example, Bowyer et al. (2009) report that users of an iris biometric system ‘will experience an increase in the false non-match rate with increasing time lapse from enrolment’. Ageing is likely to affect finger- printing and facial scans even more significantly.


The choice of biometric and the resulting system imple- mentation, therefore, should be based on consideration of the risk level involved. Is the level of risk in the transaction such that biometric matching is required at all? Does the choice of biometric take into consideration characteristics of the population from whom the biometrics will be taken? Is the performance offered by a particular biometric suffi- cient to warrant the expenditure on biometric readers required to implement it?


Enrolment and verification
Use of identity credentials typically involves two stages: enrolment and verification. Enrolment is the process by which an individual is brought within the identity policy and the resulting systems and is eventually issued with the credential. While this might be done simply by sending credentials to all individuals known to the state, as is com- mon for tax filing numbers for instance, it typically involves some form of application process. Enrolment might be based on consideration of an individual’s biographical (or life history) footprint, their biometric footprint or a combi- nation of both (see, for example, UKIPS, 2008).


Verification is the means by which an identity credential presented by an individual is checked. At its simplest, this might simply involve looking at a card and accepting it if it appears genuine. Alternatively, various checks on the valid- ity of the credential may be undertaken. These can include considering specialised security markings on the credential or telephoning a hotline to check that the credential is still valid and has not been listed as stolen or expired. In some cases, the verification process may be against information held on the credential; in others the check may be against data held by the identity service provider. In the context of biometric verification, there is evidence that using different versions of the technology for enrolment and verification can also affect performance markedly (Bowyer et al., 2009).


A decision to identify individuals using particular bio- metrics requires that identity verification uses those same biometrics. This can mean that verification points need to invest in similar biometric readers to those used in Global Policy (2010) 1:2 Ó 2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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enrolment and if the verification is intended to compare the biometric data with those held by the identity service provider, fast, secure communications links between the verification location and the service provider are required. Alternatively a failure to require biometric verifications calls into question the very need for biometrics at all, particu- larly as enrolling an entire nation’s biometrics is resource intensive and costly.


The choice of enrolment methods is also not obvious, clear or even intuitive. For example, passports may be applied for by post or in person depending on the state’s requirements and yet most passports today are only verified offline by looking out for any signs of tampering. Credit card transactions take place both offline (integrity checks of the card and signature) and online (checking with card provider that it is valid). In contrast, credit cards are often issued without requiring an individual to show up to be registered.


Drivers of identity policies in the modern state
Rather than reviewing specific national identity policies, this section critically examines some common examples of drivers for identity policies. It uses the concepts introduced above to highlight the consequences of some of the techno- logical choices that underpin the policies.


Authentication and managing restricted services
Discerning between individuals and classes of individuals is essential for managing privileges. With a growing diversity of state-related services and service providers, or normative and economic policies that require structuring services (Raab, 2009), states are seeking to categorise individuals and groups who may gain access to specific services.


A common requirement of identity credentials is to pro- vide access to age-restricted services and products. For example, laws may restrict access to nightclubs to individu- als over a certain age, or older members of society may be entitled to discounts when they reach a certain age. Age- related transactions are based around authentication rather than identification. Nightclub staff members only need to know if the person before them is old enough to enter the premises. They do not need to know that person’s name or even their date of birth. Similarly, the service provider pro- viding discounts to pensioners does not need to know their age but simply whether or not their age means that they are entitled to the discount.


Ensuring uniqueness of citizens
Often seen as the foundation of government management, the ability of a government to recognise its citizens is often perceived as essential in order to endow individuals with rights. The modern welfare state must therefore be able to recognise who may benefit from the privileges of citizen- ship and through additional information processing the state may actually provide efficient and tailored services. With state-issued identity credentials being seen to drive many identity transactions, it is becoming increasingly important that each citizen has only one official identity (Crosby, 2008). Historically, the task of ensuring unique- ness has been executed by administrative consideration of an individual’s ‘biographical footprint’. For example, an identity credential might only be issued if a trusted mem- ber of society countersigns a citizen’s application. The citi- zen’s claimed biographical footprint might be combined with checks made against existing identity documents as well as against government and private sector databases. For example, does the citizen have an existing identity doc- ument, are their details stored in the government’s health, education and employment records and do financial institu- tions also have matching records for the citizen?

Such an approach is not without its limitations, not least given the numbers of errors that exist in many official data- bases. Moreover, decisions about those citizens with ‘com- plex’ lifestyles such as the homeless, students or knowledge workers who move around frequently may prove to be dif- ficult to automate. The problems of enrolment are exacer- bated when dealing with countries with large populations that have limited public records for biographical checks (cf. Blakely, 2009).


In these circumstances, countries are beginning to consider using biometric checks as a basis for determining uniqueness rather than basing enrolment on the uniqueness of the bio- graphical footprint. Enrolment is therefore predicated on determining that the presented biometric has not already been used to issue an identity credential. The technological challenges here are significant and increase dramatically with the size of the population as the biometric matching is no longer a one-to-one match between the individual and their credential but is instead a one-to-many match between the individual and all previously recorded biometrics. For large populations, the consequences of too many false matches may undermine the proposal to use biometrics to guarantee uniqueness in the population (Spiller, 2007).


Ensuring uniqueness of foreign nationals
Responding to a variety of drivers including concerns around terrorism, global migration, the management of the welfare state and even employment policy, governments have also used identity policies to counteract the trend that globalisa- tion involves the free movement of people around the world. In the case of identity policies for addressing refugees and other foreign nationals, the issue is again one of authentica- tion rather than identification. The relying party (the state) is often unable or unwilling to trust the identity assertions made by the migrant, particularly if they do not have any identity documents from the country they claim to be

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coming from (cf. Sadiq, 2009). In such cases the ‘identifica- tion’ decision may be limited to checking whether the per- son has applied for a visa to enter the country on a previous occasion (perhaps using a different name) and here one-to- many biometric matches are again being used.
The state can then determine the rights that such an individual has: entry into the country, entitlement to work or to claim benefits and health services. The state can then issue its own credentials which can then be relied upon by others in the country (as the identity assertions are now backed by the national government).
Biometrics rather than identity data are also being used by countries such as the US to manage immigration. This is achieved by checking that all foreign nationals who enter a country (and register their fingerprints at immigration) then also leave the country (which is checked by collecting finger- prints on departure). The effectiveness of such a policy is limited by a number of challenges: the consequences that arise if not all departure points are collecting fingerprints and the ease with which departing biometric records are matched to arrival records. In turn, it is still unclear what the implica- tions are for individuals who departed through a non- biometric border point – are they recorded as not having left the country?


Being the first to move on ‘biometric’ borders with its US-VISIT programme, the US has encountered significant institutional and structural challenges in implementing this policy effectively, for example system failures and logistical problems including airport design and large land and sea borders that make exit checks resource intensive if not infea- sible. Yet the fanfare in establishing the laws and showcasing the first ‘biometric border’ system is never matched by open reviews of the hard work in implementing and auditing the systems that reveal the weaknesses and holes in the policy (e.g. Government Accountability Office, 2008). Regardless of this, officials in dozens of other countries are keen to implement similar VISIT systems, with such systems already in place in Japan and the UAE and under development in the European Union, Iran, Kuwait, Russia and South Korea.


The opportunities for identity policies
Sensing that globalisation poses new challenges for govern- ments, there is a convergence in drivers for identity policy change around the world. Technological developments mean that countries and enterprises have the opportunity to refresh their identity policies to address the particular policy goals that they face. What we are seeing, however, is policy makers reaching out for technologies and systems developers to implement schemes that exist in their imagi- nations and sales material rather than policies founded upon sound risk assessments and comprehensive technology evaluations.


As governments mimic the actions of others, buy standar- dised systems from global suppliers (Lyon, 2009, ch. 3) and point to global agreements and international conventions, we are seeing solutions applied to problems that have not yet been identified correctly. Failing to identify the problem that needs to be dealt with may result in a poor consider- ation of the variety of technology policy alternatives that exist. For instance, although many countries are using the requirements for biometric travel documents to update their identity policies in order to create massive centralised data- bases of multiple biometrics, there are many other ways in which this can be done. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the UN agency that developed the international standards for biometric travel documents (Stanton, 2008) requires only that states implement face biometrics in new ‘e-passports’ (cf. LSE Identity Project, 2005, ch. 7). Nation states are not under any ‘international obligation’ to introduce fingerprint or iris biometrics into their travel documents (ICAO, 2003, 2004). Nor are states under any international obligation to establish biometric databases to implement the ICAO standards; in fact ICAO’s standards point out that there are many risks asso- ciated with implementing biometric databases. Regardless of this, governments around the world are keen to imple- ment fingerprints in passports and into national databases of biometrics, believing that they are obliged to do so by ICAO (Whitley and Hosein, 2010, ch. 5). It becomes prac- tically impossible to separate out policy objectives from pol- icy argumentation, as technology choices conceal agendas.

If the driver of the identity policy is to address identity fraud, a key design choice might be to minimise the amount of data that is disclosed in an authentication trans- action. However, many current credentials used for identity purposes, such as identity cards and driving licences, actu- ally disclose far more personal data than the authentication transaction requires. In many cases, this arises because the credential serves multiple purposes. These other purposes may require these data about the person to be displayed on the face of the credential in human readable form, as is the case with many travel documents and driving licences.


For example, in the case of the age-restricted transac- tions described above, the nightclub owner only needs to know that the person is old enough to enter the bar and does not need to know the person’s name or date or place of birth. An identity credential based around a travel docu- ment or driver’s licence, however, displays this information on the face of the document. In the UK, knowing some- one’s full name, place and date of birth is usually sufficient data to obtain a copy of that person’s birth certificate. The birth certificate can then be used in the process of opening a bank account and can increase the likelihood of that person’s identity being used fraudulently (Birch, 2009b).


Ironically, while policy makers may argue that they are making use of ‘cutting edge’ technology to overwhelm any opposition to their plans, they are in fact not making full use of the technologies that are available to advance effec- tive identity policies. Technological solutions based around

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well-established cryptographic techniques can automatically indicate whether or not a person satisfies the age-related condition being requested without disclosing unnecessary data, for example by displaying a photograph of the indi- vidual if they are old enough and not displaying their pho- tograph if they are not (Birch, 2009a). These techniques permit the enhancement of service provision while safe- guarding personal information and maintaining high-level security by avoiding centralised databases and disclosing only minimal information.


Innovative identity policies such as these offer intriguing possibilities as they do not rely on carrying a card but can be embedded in technological devices such as mobile phones. It is also possible to ensure that control over what informa- tion is disclosed remains with the individual (Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2009). New services may be created and new economies realised, creating systems that are proportionate and relevant to multiple stakeholders, sectors and institutions (Crosby, 2008). We are therefore surprised that the imagination of governments is applied only to the vast amounts of information that may now be made available to them through an identity policy, rather than the new markets and services that are possible through interesting applications of truly innovative techniques.


Policy implications
At one level, identity policies can be seen as an example of a complex policy area where design and implementation choices can have a significant impact on the eventual effec- tiveness of the policy. As with any policy, a key consideration is a clear statement of what objectives the policy is intended to achieve as this will influence key design choices that underlie the policy: an identity policy that is driven by con- cerns about identity fraud will have a very different shape from one that is seeking to introduce machine-readable tra- vel documents; a policy that seeks to enhance online access to government services should be quite different from one that is concerned with cross-border security.


What differentiates identity policies from many other policies, however, is the key role that technological issues play in determining the scope and significance of the pro- posals. Enlightened policy makers can draw upon the opportunities offered by developments in technologies like advanced cryptography and biometrics to provide effective policies that address the particular needs of their citizens. They can do this without compromising the rights of their citizens, without increasing the risk of identity fraud and without spending vast sums of money on high-profile but ineffective initiatives.


Alternatively, national policies can be driven by global technology firms, by misunderstood obligations on travel documents, a ‘rear view mirror’ understanding of technology and a desire to be doing something – anything – in response to global policy challenges such as terrorism and migration.

Achieving effective policy making therefore requires a process that explicitly includes consideration of technologi- cal issues in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the artificial science ⁄ society distinction still drives too much of the policy-making process (Callon et al., 2009). If policy makers do not have sufficient expertise to evaluate techno- logical matters, they need to call upon informed advocates who are able to enumerate the various technological choices that are open to them and advise them of the benefits and risks of each choice (Whitley and Hosein, 2008).


As well as fundamental choices about the kinds of tech- nologies to use, identity policies raise important questions about the role of the private sector and about the relation- ships between the rights and concerns of the citizen and those of government. For example, if personal information held by the private sector is increasingly used in the enrol- ment stage for identity credentials, why not take this a step further and allow for a market of private sector authentica- tion providers to exist, offering differing levels of authenti- cation assurance? Those individuals who simply require the ability to confirm that they are able to access age-restricted services do not necessarily need this functionality to be pro- vided by a state-based identification scheme based around the use of biometrics. Instead age verification can be based on details held by a mobile phone company, bank or even education provider (school or university). This pushes the responsibility for confirming the date of birth of the indi- vidual, for example, on to these other organisations, but, given the relatively low level of risk associated with age- verification services, this is a manageable risk that these companies might be prepared to take (Whitley, 2009).


Limiting the scope of state-issued credentials can also speed up the rollout of identity credentials. For example, banks could issue basic credentials to their customers fairly quickly and once they are issued citizens could choose to add state-based assertions to the credential as and when required (Crosby, 2008).
We must all open up our minds to new innovations in identity policy. Given the technological challenges these policies raise, policy makers must be informed and imagi- native rather than just opportunistic.


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Author Information
Dr Edgar A. Whitley, Reader in Information Systems, Information Systems and Innovation Group, Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK.
Dr Gus Hosein, Visiting Senior Fellow, Information Systems and Innovation Group, Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK.

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