In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Tuesday, October 1, 2013

4740 - Undercutting Aadhaar - Indian Express


Tue Oct 01 2013, 02:53 hrs

M.H. Suryanarayana
How the court's order has complicated the UPA's cash transfer plans.

The Supreme Court interim ruling against the UPA's biometrics-based identity scheme, Aadhaar, touched on two aspects of the project: enforcement and eligibility. It has ruled that enrolment for the Aadhaar card should be voluntary; it cannot be made mandatory to claim public services and subsidies. With regard to eligibility, it has declared that the card cannot be issued to illegal migrants; it can only be issued after verifying citizenship.

Since Aadhaar is considered critical to targeting public services and subsidies, to ensure comprehensive coverage of the poor at minimum cost by reducing corruption and improving transparency, the court's order will have major implications for these objectives. To examine the possible implications, we need to know how Aadhaar was conceived and how it works.

It is a multipurpose national identity card project, a 12-digit unique identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) on behalf of the government of India. Enrolment is not mandatory. The number is linked to demographic and biometric information — photograph, 10 fingerprints and iris recognition — about each individual. This serves as evidence of identity and address for an Indian resident. Such information would establish individual identity and eliminate duplication.

Such foolproof identification is imperative today because there is an urgent need to contain the fiscal deficit by reducing excessive public expenditure due to leakages and inefficiencies in the implementation of safety nets. For instance, according to Census 2011, there are 21 million households in Andhra Pradesh, but the number of ration cards in circulation is 24.5 million. This is due to "duplicates" (where the same individual benefits multiple times) and "ghosts" (non-existent beneficiaries).

To address these issues, the government has created what is called the Direct Benefit Transfer System (DBTS). The DBTS aims to credit funds for scholarships, pensions and wages under public works directly to the bank accounts of the beneficiaries identified, using their Aadhaar numbers. This would eliminate duplicates and ghosts and therefore minimise leakages or undue public expenditure.

Thus, the very design of the DBTS is such that the benefits of various welfare programmes would be conditional on Aadhaar enrolment. This is what has motivated the public to pursue enrolment despite the inconvenience. The UIDAI has already issued more than 400 million cards.

The government launched the DBTS on January 1 this year. To begin with, it covered seven welfare schemes in 20 districts, spread over 16 states. The schemes include scholarships, pension for widows and unemployment allowances. In the long run, it is proposed to cover food, fertilisers, and fuel subsidies by working out their cash equivalents and transferring them directly to the beneficiary accounts. The DBTS for LPG has already benefited three million households in 18 districts since its launch in June.

Now, what are the implications of the Supreme Court's order for the relevance of Aadhaar in claiming welfare benefits? One immediate fallout will be that citizens will have limited incentive to pursue Aadhaar enrolment. This is particularly so for those who already possess other identification documents and were enrolling for Aadhaar only because it was made mandatory for access to certain government schemes. If Aadhaar enrolment is delinked from various welfare programmes, only those who need it as a proof of identity and address will seek it out.

What are the likely implications for the targeting and efficient implementation of public welfare programmes? A singular advantage of the Aadhaar scheme, as planned, is that it can be the one thing that verifies the credentials and eligibility of claimants for multiple public welfare programmes. However, the benefits of targeting would accrue only if and when the rules for identification of the beneficiaries are valid and the identification is undertaken efficiently.

To achieve efficiency in the implementation of welfare programmes, the government could explore alternative options, such as the conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin American countries. Brazil and Mexico have implemented conditional cash transfer programmes that provide financial assistance to poor households, subject to certain specifications on children's healthcare and education. However, their successful implementation presupposes a well-developed infrastructure for the provision of health and education. In fact, even the MGNREGA requires some degree of self-targeting and involves DBTS without the Aadhaar link. Delinking the DBTS from Aadhaar would call for a programme-specific targeting design, which would be cumbersome and costly in a scenario where there are multiple welfare programmes and schemes.

The court's order raises a couple of questions that call for a policy response: What will happen to the millions, including illegal migrants, who have already been enrolled into Aadhaar with perfunctory verification of their proof of identity? How will the government verify the nationality claims of the poorest of the poor, who do not have identification documents? These are issues that call for a serious rethink on the design and implementation of the DBTS.

The writer is professor at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai
express@expressindia.com