2162 - Chidambaram lends support to Aadhaar - Live Mint

Posted: Sat, Dec 31 2011. 1:00 AM IST

Sahil Makkar, sahil.m@livemint.com

The Union government’s ambitious project to provide unique identity numbers to Indian residents received support from an unexpected quarter on Friday with home minister P. Chidambaram​ backing the project known as Aadhaar.

Aadhaar is a 12-digit unique number which the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will issue for all people resident in India.

The fate of the Aadhaar project has been hanging in the balance after Chidambaram’s own ministry raised questions about the security of data collected for it. 

The Parliamentary standing committee on finance too has rejected the project on many grounds, including security-related issues. 

However, on Friday, Chidambaram said he fully supported the UIDAI.

“I do not agree with rejection of UIDAI by the standing committee. I support the UIDAI mandate to issue Aadhaar numbers,”Chidambaram said.

“The only difference was on collecting the biometrics between the Registrar General of India (a wing under the Union home ministry) and UIDAI,” he added. 


Currently, UIDAI has a grant that entitles it to collect biometrics of 200 million people after which the National Population Register, or NPR (which is part of the Registrar General of India), was supposed to take over the task. The home ministry wanted the NPR to collect data for the entire project.

Chidambaram wrote a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 11 November, expressing his unhappiness over the process adopted by UIDAI, which is led by Infosys Ltd co-founder Nandan Nilekani, to capture the biometrics data.

UIDAI has already registered around 120 million people in its system and expects to complete the rest over the next three months. Of the 120 million enrolments, UIDAI has issued Aadhaar numbers to nearly 100 million people and has been issuing one million numbers every day from October. The government has set a target of issuing 600 million Aadhaar numbers by 2014 but has so far allowed enrolment of only 200 million people by UIDAI. NPR is supposed to feed the UIDAI system with biometric data against which Aadhaar numbers will be issued.

Surabhi Agarwal contributed to the story

2161 - Scheme for creation of National Population Register (NPR) for the country - Press Information Bureau - GoI

19-March, 2010 16:31 IST

The Union Cabinet today approved the scheme for creation of National Population Register (NPR) of usual residents of the country. The project would cover an estimated population of 1.2 billion and the total cost of the scheme is Rs.3539.24 crores.

The creation of digital database having identity details of all the individuals along with their photographs and finger biometrics will result in the creation of a biometrics based identity system in the country. The existence of such a database will enhance the efficacy of providing services to the residents under Government schemes / programmes as well as improve security scenario and check identity frauds in the country. The data collection will be undertaken along with House listing and Housing Census starting in April, 2010 and will be completed in a phased manner by September, 2010.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

The collection of particulars of each usual resident will be undertaken by house-to house enumeration. The enumerators canvassing House listing Schedule of Census 2011, will canvass the NPR schedule also. The filled in NPR schedule will be digitized in two languages – English and the official language of every State/UT. This will be followed by capture of photographs and 10 fingerprints of all those who are of age 15 years and above. A printout of certain data fields and photographs will be displayed in villages in rural area/wards in urban areas for inviting objections from the public for corrections in spellings of names, date of birth, residency status etc. These objections will be disposed of through a series of appellate authorities at village, tehsil and district levels. 

The draft database will be placed before the Gram Sabha/Local bodies for authentication of usual residents. 

Once finalized, the NPR database will be sent to Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for biometric de-duplication and assigning of a unique identification number. This UID number will be added to the NPR database.

2160 - Aadhaar Ya Niraadhaar? Bumblebee - Fundamatics - IITBAA

Aadhaar Ya Niraadhaar?

Bumblebee

When Nandan Nilekani took charge of the Unique Identification Authority of India he was feted for his business-like approach, his stewardship of a project to give identity numbers to millions of Indians, an exercise unprecedented in its scale across the globe. While most accept the need for creating a systematic database of our citizenry, the path to be taken for this has become the subject matter of a viral attack from many quarters—cabinet ministers and bureaucrats, policy experts and activists, even a few state governments. 


Everything, from Nilekani’s procedures for data collection and the potential errors therein, to concerns over privacy, is being questioned.


UIDAI is also a subject very close to the IIT Bombay family. Nandan and many of his aides are from within the alumni community as are several detractors who question its “security” and “developmental” dimensions of they scheme. They claim that the former leads to an invasive state; the latter leaves us with a retreating state. 


Bumblebee felt that it was time some of that rumpus in the national stage was brought within the pages of Fundamatics in an unbiased point-counterpoint debate straight from the proverbial horse’s mouth.
Bumblebee

Imagining Aadhaar
Raj Mashruwala

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will celebrate its third anniversary next month. When Nandan Nilekani took office, he defined its mission “to issue a unique identification number that can be verified
and authenticated in an online, cost-effective manner, which is robust enough to eliminate duplicate and fake identities.” 


Hardly a day passes without the press reporting on Nandan or UIDAI, with headings like ‘Declare Aadhaar Illegal’, or, ‘Chidambaram wants Nilekani to log out’. Tabloids and bloggers have a field day speculating, insinuating and dispensing free advice on the matter. Interestingly, the ground-level reality is different. The reality is that Aadhaar has become the largest and fastest growing identity database in the world in less than 14 months. Is Aadhaar the first sign of a brave new world, the next stage of people empowerment?


Before we begin a discussion on the future of Aadhaar, let us first take stock of where it is today.


1. Just the numbers: Over 140M enrolled; 3⁄4 million new enrollments per day; active enrollment camps (16) in every populous state. In short, Aadhaar is growing faster than the mobile phone subscription rate, the most successful private initiative in recent times.


2. The system is working. In a year, it has scaled up to become the world’s largest biometric system, doing 100 trillion biometric comparisons per day while exceeding target accuracy. The reality: Indians will receive a unique ID. Built in the system is a portal for transparency, a toll-free call centre for assistance, an online appointment system, an online enrollment status query, a developer portal and more technical documents than one can read. Let us face it: despite IIT alumni running the show, something real and functional has emerged.

3.Aadhaar was sold to the public to facilitate delivery of public service. Whether this means direct payment for a NREGA recipient, delivery of subsidised LPG cylinders, KYC validation for the SIM card or opening of bank accounts for the unbanked, our babus are discussing, defining, building and testing new apps rapidly. We will see them in 2012.


4- Innovation — new ideas of UID’s uses are in the air. Once you assume a reliable verifiable unique ID, you can dramatically simplify banking and payments, healthcare and education monitoring, and identity fraud detection. People are building such systems right now. Our very own IITB professors are changing their 30-year curriculum and giving assignments to students to envision uses of Aadhaar. Admittedly, one application — the biometric student attendance system — is not in the best interest of junta.

5.Costs as per government records, all, I will offer my commentary. At the onset, UIDAI has spent I 468.91 crore (ap- prox. $100 million) from its inception till September, 2011. UIDAI strangely seemed to have grossly under-spent its budget, which was reported to be thousands of crores of rupees. Crap, another target missed.

6- Residents— do they want it? At the moment, enrollments lines don’t seem to be getting shorter. We must love standing in lines for no benefits. Wait, maybe people do need verifiable IDs.


7- What is the problem then? The civil society is deeply concerned. Their objections — privacy, reliance on unproven biometric technology, run-away costs and using the information for security instead of development — ought not to be dismissed summarily. Where do we, the armchair democratic activists, go from here? We could:

1. Support the continuation of Aadhaar. This is what the government would want us to do.
   
2. Raise our voice to scrap the programme. This is what some in the civil society would want.
   
3. Find ways to help improve the vision of Aadhaar. This is what the idealist in us would want.
   

Let us examine some of the objections raised by respected civil society leaders such as Ms Usha Ramanathan, Arundhati Roy, Aruna Roy and Justice V. R. Krishna. As a know-it- it is fair to say that a constructive dialogue has not occurred between them and the Government of India. The government has generally ignored them and the civil society has destructively criticised the government in turn.

1. Privacy: Civil society leaders discuss a number of subtopics -


a. Need for a strong personal privacy law that India lacks. Aadhaar is too dangerous without a personal privacy law in place. No one disagrees on the need for such a law. The question is, do we put infrastructure projects on hold until such a law is passed?


b. Use of Aadhaar data for security, including national ID card. National ID card and building the National Population Registry (NPR) are in an act passed by parliament in 2004. Enrollment in NPR is mandatory and would occur regardless of Aadhaar. Would it make sense to build a chinese wall between Aadhaar and NPR?


c. Operational issues, such as data sharing among agencies Privacy is a topic that every country must find its own balance of. It can’t be borrowed from the US or China. Do we put Aadhaar project on hold until we find acceptable answer to privacy? Do we believe we can achieve a national consensus on privacy any time in the near future? 

2.Unproven biometric technology: The three most common objections are 


(a) it is inherently probabilistic and hence fal- lible, 
(b) it can easily be faked, and 
(c) it is not workable with India’s large and diverse population.


I am absolutely amazed at the speed at which India has produced biometric experts (albeit self-proclaimed) in the last two years. You- Tube is now overflowing with these experts. Having spent a considerable amount of time getting entertained by them, I can safely say that

1. These experts have zero understanding of the probability theory. For them, Heisen- berg’s theory of uncertainty would be deeply disturbing. Any verification system has a certain probability of error. We need to characterise it, model it to predict error rates, and include additional verification factors if higher accuracy rates are required. Biometric verification is simply one factor.
   
   
   
2. Faking. A four-digit PIN has 1 in a 10,000 chance of getting faked. Credit cards can be spoofed en masse at a negligible cost. We use both daily. We need to under- stand the cost benefits of each verification method and use whichever method is economically acceptable. Biometric identification has many good uses just like other methods such as tokens and passwords.
   
   
   
3. Self-proclaimed experts conveniently disregard empirical data analysis on Indian population, which concluded that UIDAI can establish individual uniqueness with desired accuracy (> 99%). Current enroll- ment accuracy results seem to validate the original proof of conceptual results.

d. Indian experts have the uncanny talent of quoting real experts out of the context. The fact remains — we could discuss privacy, technology and intentions of the government ad infinitum. 


The crux of the issue is
a. Do we have a severe leakage problem in public benefits schemes due to duplicate and fake identities?
b. Do we want to provide services to people who need them the most, but lack identity proof?
c. Do we want to continue wasting umpteen hours at the bank, at the mobile shop and at the government office, trying to prove our identity over and over again?


Then we need Aadhaar. Aadhaar is necessary, but it may not be sufficient. Scrapping it is definitely not a solution. Can I challenge the IIT community to suggest ways to improve it?


Raj Mashruwala


The author Raj (Mashru) Mashruwala, 1975, Mechanical Engineering, has painstakingly researched the questions. The same thing can’t be claimed for the answers. He refused to provide his bio(metric) to the editors for verification due to privacy reasons.

Imaginary Aadhaar

Samir Kelekar

At a recent debate on UID in Bangalore, UIDAI's Deputy Director General, Mr. Dalwai was asked about the faking of finger prints, which can easily defeat the biometric scanners of UID. A video of how a faked fingerprint can defeat a typical fingerprint scanner has been put up by Mumbai-based biometric consultant, J. T. D’souza, on You- Tube. One expected a sensible answer from Mr. Dalwai, perhaps something on the lines of, ‘our fingerprint scanners can’t be fooled by such faking’.


But instead, he answered saying that if it does happen, it can only happen in small proportions. As a security professional, I don’t really know whether to laugh or cry at such an answer. It is like saying, yes, our backdoor doesn’t have a latch and is open. But there is little chance that anyone will notice it, or for that matter even if someone does notice it, let us hope that they are not tempted to take anything.


To put it bluntly, we are spending — by various estimates — right from Rs5,000 crores to Rs1,50,000 crores on the UIDAI project. The exact estimate of the project is unknown — so much for its transparency.


But it takes just Rs 30 — a little bit of wax and fevicol — to fake a fingerprint and fool a fin- gerprint scanner. It would take a bit more to

identify someone else's fingerprint from say a glass of water, taking a photograph of it, making a transparency, etching it on a PCB and then making a fake fingerprint.


Fraudsters everywhere are a determined lot, and when such a process to steal and fake fingerprints can be scaled to millions and billions, it makes ‘business’-sense for fraudsters to invest their time and money in the scam.


To top it all, there are various news reports which say that banking will be solely based on one's fingerprints after the UID comes in full swing. This is indeed what the fraudsters would want.

The UIDAI project is meant to give an identity to all Indians. However, it is not just the security aspects, but also other aspects that don’t seem to have been thought of thoroughly. For instance, the iris scan was not present in the originally proposed plan. But when it was commonly known that fingerprints by themselves may not be enough for de-duplication —and that they can be faked easily — the iris scan was introduced. 


There is no cost benefit analysis or feasibility study of any kind available in the public domain. No full life-cycle pilot study of any size for this project has been done and results studied, before launching such a huge and costly project nation wide. Privacy considerations haven’t been looked into either.

All the claimed benefits of this project are mere speculations; they are not based on a systematic study. For instance, one of the claims is that leakages in government- sponsored schemes such as NREGA and PDS will be reduced. There is no substantiation of this claim. Less than 10% of the leakages are due to double-dipping at the last mile. Most leakages take place at the back-end, with the active connivance of politicians and the powers that be, and UIDAI can do nothing about that.


Interestingly, a recent report by a US research entity — the research was commissioned by the US government itself — bursts the myth of the usefulness of biometrics. It recommends that especially in remote areas where no direct supervision is possible, biometrics by itself should not be used for any authentication. If it must be used, there has to be another factor of authentication. Two-factor authentication is not proposed by UIDAI, and cannot be easily introduced in a country like India where due to lack of literacy, things such as passwords cannot be easily used.


Another big problem with biometrics is that unlike a password or a PIN which banks use, biometric information once lost, is irreplaceable. Once you have lost your biometric identity, you have lost it for good. Passwords or PIN numbers on the other hand, can be easily replaced. In a recently reported incident from Mumbai, it was found that fakesters picked up biometrics of people in order to issue them UIDs. These fakesters now have the biometric data of those people, and now, they are forever excluded from the UIDAI project.


Other issues include the fact that the National Identification Authority of India bill has not been passed by the Parliament. Thus, the legality itself of this project is suspicious. Foreign companies have been given control or access to biometric data of our country’s citizens. There is no concept of a security clearance to bid for projects from UIDAI — a fact which puts our national security itself at risk.

All in all, this project is a white elephant in its current form. The earlier it is stopped or at least seriously relooked at, the better it will be for all of us concerned.


Samir has a B.Tech in Electrical Engineering (1983) from IIT Bombay, an MS from Clemson University, South Carolina (1987) and a PhD from Columbia University, New York (1994). He has worked for several companies including Motorola and Alcatel. Currently, he runs a startup called Teknotrends Software Pvt. Ltd. that does cutting-edge work in the area of network security. He is based in Bangalore. 

2159 - निराधार करती आधार और जनसंख्या रजिस्टर परियोजना - Pratirodh

निराधार करती आधार और जनसंख्या रजिस्टर परियोजना - Pratirodh - the resistance
Last Modified: 30 Dec 2011 02:41:17 PM IST

गोपाल कृष्ण
जन-नीति विश्लेषक एवं सामाजिक कार्यकर्ता


दिसम्बर 13 को वित्त की संसदीय समिति की जो रिपोर्ट संसद के दोनों सदनों में पेश की गयी उसने ये जगजाहिर कर दिया की भारत सरकार की शारीरिक हस्ताक्षर या जैवमापन (बायोमेट्रिक्स) आधारित विशिष्ट पहचान अंक (यूआईडी/आधार परियोजना) असंसदीय, गैरकानूनी, दिशाहीन और अस्पष्ट है और राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा और नागरिक अधिकारों के लिए खतरनाक है. बायोमेट्रिक पहचान तकनीक और ख़ुफ़िया तकनीक के बीच के रिश्तो की पड़ताल अभी बाकी है. 

यूआईडी पहचान के नाम पर एक बड़ा छलावा इस देश की जनता के साथ हो रहा है

यह संसदीय रिपोर्ट कहती है की सरकार ने विश्व अनुभव की अनदेखी की है. इस बात पर ध्यान नहीं दिया गया की मौजूदा पहचान प्रणाली को कारगर कैसे बनाया जाए. हैरानी की बात है की जल्दबाजी में ऐसा कोई तुलनात्मक अध्ययन भी नहीं किया गया जिससे यह पता चलता की मौजूदा पहचान प्रणाली कितनी सस्ती है और आधार और जनसँख्या रजिस्टर जैसी योजनाये कितनी खर्चीली है. आजतक किसी को यह नहीं पता है की आधार और जनसँख्या रजिस्टर पर कुल अनुमानित खर्च कितना होगा. 

 

सरकार यह दावा कर रही थी कि यह परियोजना को देशवासियों और नागरिको को सामाजिक सुविधा उपलब्ध कराने की परियोजना है. अब यह पता चला है की इस योजना के पैरोकार गाड़ियो और जानवरों पर भी ऐसी ही योजना लागु करने की सिफारिश कर चुके है, ये बाते परत दर परत सामने आ रही है. यह परियोजना १४ विकासशील देशो में फ्रांस, दक्षिण कोरिया और संयुक्त राष्ट्र अमेरिका की कंपनियों और विश्व बैंक के एक पहल के जरिये लागु किया जा रहा है. दक्षिण एशिया में यह पाकिस्तान में लागु हो चुका है और नेपाल और बंगलादेश में लागु किया जा रहा है. 

 

संसदीय समिति ने कानुनविदों, शिक्षाविदो और मानवाधिकार कार्यकर्ताओ की इस बात को माना है की यह देशवासियों के निजी जीवन पर एक तरह का हमला है जिसे नागरिक स्वतंत्रता और मानवाधिकार के हनन के रूप में ही समझा जा सकता है. समिति ने अपनी रिपोर्ट में ब्रिटेन सरकार द्वारा ऐसे ही पहचानपत्र कानून 2006 को समाप्त करने के फैसले का भी जिक्र किया है जिसका उद्धरण देश के न्यायाधिशो ने दिया था. 

 

भारत में इस बात पर कम ध्यान दिया गया है कि कैसे विराट स्तर पर सूचनाओं को संगठित करने की धारणा चुपचाप सामाजिक नियंत्रण, युद्ध के उपकरण और जातीय समूहों को निशाना बनाने और प्रताड़ित करने के हथियार के रूप में विकसित हुई है. भारत के निर्धनतम लोगों तक पहुंचने में 12 अंकों वाला आधार कार्ड सहायक होने का दावा करने वाले इस विशिष्ट पहचान परियोजना का विश्व इतिहास के सन्दर्भ में नहीं देखा गया.

 

खासतौर पर जर्मनी और आमतौर पर यूरोप के अनुभवों को नजरअंदाज करके, निशानदेही को सही मानकर वित्तमंत्री ने 2010-2011 का बजट संसद में पेश करते हुए फर्माया कि यूआईडी परियोजना वित्तीय योजनाओं को समावेशी बनाने और सरकारी सहायता (सब्सिडी) जरूरतमंदों तक ही पहुंचाने के लिए उनकी निशानदेही करने का मजबूत मंच प्रदान करेगी. जबकि यह बात दिन के उजाले की तरह साफ है कि निशानदेही के यही औज़ार किसी खास धर्मो, जातियों, क्षेत्रों, जातीयताओं या आर्थिक रूप से असंतुष्ट तबकों के खिलाफ भी इस्तेमाल में लाए जा सकता हैं. भारत में राजनीतिक कारणों से समाज के कुछ तबकों का अपवर्जन लक्ष्य करके उन तबकों के जनसंहार का कारण बना- 1947 में, 1984 में और सन् 2002 में. अगर एक समग्र अध्ययन कराया जाए तो उससे साफ हो जाएगा कि किस तरह संवेदनशील निजी जानकारियां और आंकड़े जिन्हें सुरक्षित रखा जाना चाहिए था, वे हमारे देश में दंगाइयों और जनसंहार रचाने वालों को आसानी से उपलब्ध थे.

 

भारत सरकार भविष्य की कोई गारंटी नहीं दे सकती. अगर नाजियों जैसा कोई दल सत्तारूढ़ होता है तो क्या गारंटी है कि यूआईडी के आंकड़े उसे प्राप्त नहीं होंगे और वह बदले की भावना से उनका इस्तेमाल नागरिकों के किसी खास तबके के खिलाफ नहीं करेगा? योजना आयोग की यूआईडी और गृह मंत्रालय की राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर वही सब कुछ दोहराने का मंच है जो जर्मनी, रूमानिया, यूरोप और अन्य जगहों पर हुआ जहां वह जनगणना से लेकर नाजियों को यहूदियों की सूची प्रदान करने का माध्यम बना. यूआईडी का नागरिकता से कोई संबंध नहीं था, वह महज निशानदेही का साधन है. दरअसल यह जनवरी 1933 से जनवरी 2011 तक के ख़ुफ़िया निशानदेही के प्रयासों का सफरनामा है.

 

इस पृष्ठभूमि में, ब्रिटेन की साझा सरकार द्वारा विवादास्पद राष्ट्रीय पहचानपत्र योजना को समाप्त करने का निर्णय वैसे ही स्वागत योग्य है जैसे अपनी संसदीय समिति की अनुसंसा ताकि नागरिकों की निजी जिंदगियों में हस्तक्षेप से उनकी सुरक्षा हो सके. पहचानपत्र कानून 2006 और स्कूलों में बच्चों की उंगलियों के निशान लिए जाने की प्रथा का खात्मा करने के साथ-साथ ब्रिटेन सरकार अपना राष्ट्रीय पहचानपत्र रजिस्टर बंद कर देगी. वहां की सरकार ने घोषणा की है की अगले कदम में (बायोमेट्रिक) जैवसांख्यिकीय पासपोर्ट, सम्पर्क-बिन्दुओं पर इकट्ठा किये जाने वाले आंकड़ों तथा इंटरनेट और ई-मेल के रिकार्ड का भंडारण खत्म किया जाएगा.

 

पिछले साल 18 मई की प्रेस विज्ञप्ति में भारत सरकार ने बताया था कि कैबिनेट कमेटी ने भारतीय विशिष्ट पहचान प्राधिकरण द्वारा निवासियों के जनसांख्यिकीय और बायोमेट्रिक आंकड़ों को इकट्ठा करने की जो पद्धति सुझाई गई है, उसे सिद्धांततः स्वीकार कर लिया है. इसमें चेहरे, नेत्रगोलक (पारितारिका) की तस्वीर लेने और सभी दस उंगलियों के निशान लेने का प्रावधान है. इसमें 5 से 15 आयुवर्ग के बच्चों के नेत्रगोलक के आंकड़े इकट्ठा करना शामिल है. इन्हीं मानकों और प्रक्रियाओं को जनगणना के लिए रजिस्ट्रार जनरल आफ इंडिया और यूआईडी व्यवस्था के अन्य रजिस्ट्रारों को भी अपनाना पड़ेगा. संसदीय समिति ने सरकार के इस कदम को असंवैधानिक और कार्यपालिका के अधिकार से बाहर पाया. 

 

भारत की आधार परियोजना की ही तरह ब्रिटेन में भी इसका कभी कोई उद्देश्य बताया जाता था, कभी कोई. इस परियोजना को गरीबों के नाम पर थोपा जा रहा था. कहा जा रहा था कि पहचान का मसला राशन कार्ड, ड्राइविंग लाइसेंस, पासपोर्ट, बैंक खाता, मोबाइल कनेक्शन आदि लेने में अवरोध उत्पन्न करता है. पहचान अंक पत्र गरीब नागरिकों को शिक्षा, स्वास्थ्य और वित्तीय सेवाओं सहित अनेक संसाधन प्राप्त करने योग्य बनाएगा. ब्रिटेन की बदनाम हो चुकी परियोजना के पदचिन्हों पर चलते हुए यह भी कहा जा रहा था कि पहचान अंकपत्र से बच्चों को स्कूल में दाखिले में मदद मिलेगी. ब्रिटेन सरकार के हाल के निर्णय के बाद कहीं भारत में भी इस परियोजना को तिलांजलि न दे देनी पड़े, इस बात की आशंका के चलते अब सरकार के द्वारा कहा जा रहा था यह वैकल्पिक है अनिवार्य नहीं जबकि हकीकत कुछ और ही थी.

 

योजना मंत्रालय की आधार यानि यूआईडी योजना से गृह मंत्रालय का राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर (एनपीआर) परियोजना शुरू से ही जुडा हुआ था जिसका खुलासा प्रधानमन्त्री द्वारा दिसम्बर 2, 2006 को गठित शक्ति प्राप्त मंत्रिसमूह की घोषणा से होता है जिसकी तरफ कम ध्यान दिया गया है. यह पहली बार है कि जनसंख्या रजिस्टर बनाई जा रही है. इसके जरिए रजिस्ट्रार जनरल आफ इंडिया जो कि सेन्सस कमिश्नर भी है देशवासियों के आंकड़ों का भंडार तैयार करेंगे. यह समझ जरुरी है कि जनगणना और राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर अलग-अलग चीजें हैं. जनगणना जनसंख्या, साक्षरता, शिखा, आवास और घरेलू सुविधाओं, आर्थिक गतिविधि, शहरीकरण, प्रजनन दर, मृत्युदर, भाषा, धर्म और प्रवासन आदि के संबंध में बुनियादी आंकड़ों का सबसे बड़ा स्रोत है जिसके आधार पर केंद्र व राज्य सरकारें योजनाएं बनती हैं और नीतियों का क्रियान्वयन करती हैं, जबकि राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर देशवासियों और नागरिकों के पहचान संबंधी आंकड़ों का समग्र भंडार तैयार करने का काम करेगा. इसके तहत व्यक्ति का नाम, उसके माता, पिता, पति/पत्नी का नाम, लिंग, जन्मस्थान और तारीख, वर्तमान वैवाहिक स्थिति, शिक्षा, राष्टीयता, पेशा, वर्तमान और स्थायी निवास का पता जैसी तमाम सूचनाओं का संग्रह किया जाएगा. इस आंकड़ा-भंडार में 15 साल की उम्र से उपर सभी व्यक्तियों की तस्वीरें और उनकी उंगलियों के निशान भी रखे जाएंगे.

 

राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर के आंकड़ो-भंडार को अंतिम रूप देने के बाद, अगला कार्यभार होगा हर नागरिक को विशिष्ट पहचान पत्र प्रदान करना. प्रस्तावित यह था कि पहचानपत्र एक तरह का स्मार्ट-कार्ड होगा जिसके उपर आधार पहचान अंक के साथ व्यक्ति का नाम, उसके माता, पिता, पति/पत्नी का नाम, लिंग, जन्मस्थान और तारीख, फोटो आदि बुनियादी जानकारियां छपी होंगी. सम्पूर्ण विवरण का भंडारण चिप में होगा.

 

ब्रिटेन की ही तरह यहां भी 1.2 अरब लोगों को विशिष्ट पहचान अंक देने की कवायद को रोके जाने की जरूरत थी, क्योंकि मानवाधिकार उलंघन की दृष्टि से इसके खतरे कल्पनातीत है इसे संसदीय समिति ने समझा है. बिना संसदीय सहमती के 13वें वित्त आयोग ने प्रति व्यक्ति 100 रूपए और प्रति परिवार 400-500 रूपए गरीब परिवारों को विशिष्ट पहचान अंक के लिए आवेदन करने हेतु प्रोत्साहन के बतौर दिए जाने का प्रावधान किया था. यह गरीबों को एक किस्म की रिश्वत ही है. इस उद्देश्य के लिए आयोग ने राज्य सरकारों को 2989.10 करोड़ की राशि मुहैया कराने की संस्तुति की है.

 

सवाल यह है की सरकार ने नागरिकों के अंगुलियों के निशान, नेत्रगोलक की छवि जैसे जैवमापक आंकड़ों का संग्रह करने के बारे में विधानसभाओं और संसद की मंजूरी क्यों नहीं ली और इस बात को क्यों नज़र अंदाज़ किया की ऐसी ही परियोजना को ब्रिटेन में समाप्त कर दिया गया है किया है.? 

 

प्राधिकरण की ही जैवमापन मानक समिति (बायोमेट्रिक्स स्टैंडर्डस कमिटि) यह खुलासा किया कि जैवमापन सेवाओं के निष्पादन के समय सरकारी विभागों और वाणिज्यिक संस्थाओं द्वारा प्रामाणिकता स्थापित करने के लिए किया जाएगा. यहां वाणिज्यिक संस्थाओं को परिभाषित नहीं किया गया. जैवमापन मानक समिति जैवमापन में अमेरिका और यूरोप के पिछले अनुभवों का भी हवाला दिया और कहा कि जैवमापक आंकड़े राष्ट्रीय निधि हैं और उन्हें उनके मौलिक रूप में संरक्षित किया जाना चाहिए. समिति नागरिकों के आंकड़ाकोष को राष्ट्रीय निधि बताती है. यह निधि कब कंपनियों की निधि बन जाएगी कहा नहीं जा सकता. 

 

संसदीय समिति ने यह समझा की ऐसी योजनाये सरकार आम नागरिक समाज के खिलाफ हथियार के रूप में इस्तेमाल हो सकते है. समिति इसे संसद के विशेषाधिकार का हनन का मामला मानती है कि विधेयक के पारित हुए बिना ही ३ करोड़ ७३ लाख यूनिक आइडेन्टटी नंबर/आधार संख्या बना लिए. 

 

विशिष्ट पहचान अंक और राष्ट्रीय जनसंख्या रजिस्टर सरकार द्वारा नागरिकों पर नजर रखने के उपकरण हैं. ये परियोजनाएं न तो अपनी संरचना में और न ही अमल में निर्दोष हैं. विशिष्ट पहचान अंक प्राधिकरण के कार्य योजना प्रपत्र में कहा गया है कि विशिष्ट पहचान अंक सिर्फ पहचान की गारंटी है, अधिकारों, सेवाओं या हकदारी की गारंटी नहीं. आगे यह भी कहा गया है कि यह पहचान की भी गारंटी नहीं है, बल्कि पहचान नियत करने में सहयोगी है.

 

एक गहरे अर्थ में यशवंत सिन्हा की अध्यक्षता वाली संसद की स्थायी समिति विशिष्ट पहचान अंक जैसे ख़ुफ़िया उपकरणों द्वारा नागरिकों पर सतत नजर रखने और उनके जैवमापक रिकार्ड तैयार करने पर आधारित तकनीकी शासन की पुरजोर मुखालफत करने वाले व्यक्तियों, जनसंगठनों, जन आंदोलनों, संस्थाओं के अभियान का समर्थन करती है. समिति यह अनुसंसा करती है की संसद बायोमेट्रिक डाटा को इकठ्ठा करने के कृत्य की जांच करे. जनसंगठनों की मांग है की सीएजी विशिष्ट पहचान अंक प्राधिकरण की कारगुजारियों की जांच करे और इसके और जनसँख्या रजिस्टर द्वारा किये जा रहे कारनामो को तत्काल रोका जाये. देशवासियों के पास अपनी संप्रभुता को बचाने के लिए आधार अंक योजना और जनसँख्या रजिस्टर का बहिष्कार ही एक मात्र रास्ता है.

 

गौरतलब है की कैदी पहचान कानून, 1920 के तहत किसी भी कैदी के उंगलियों के निशान को सिर्फ मजिस्ट्रेट की अनुमति से लिया जाता है और उनकी रिहाई पर उंगलियों के निशान के रिकॉर्ड को नष्ट करना होता है. कैदियों के ऊपर होने वाले जुल्म की अनदेखी की यह सजा की अब हर देशवासी को उंगलियों के निशान देने होंगे और कैदियों के मामले में तो उनके रिहाई के वक्त नष्ट करने का प्रावधान रहा है, इन योजनाओं के द्वारा देशवासियों के पूरे शारीरिक हस्ताक्षर का रिकॉर्ड रखा जा रहा है. यह एक ऐसे निजाम के कदमताल की गूंज है जो नागरिको को कैदी सरीखा मानता है. बायोमेट्रिक डाटाबेस आधारित राजसत्ता का आगाज हो रहा है बावजूद इसके जानकारी के अभाव में कुछ व्यस्त देशवासियों को बायोमेट्रिक तकनीक वाली कंपनियों के प्रति प्रचार माध्यम द्वारा तैयार आस्था चौकानेवाली है. मगर लाजवाब बात तो यह है की उन कर्मचारियों से यह आशा कैसे की जा सकती है की वो बायोमेट्रिक निशानदेही की मुखालफत करेंगे जो अपने दफ्तरों में बायोमेट्रिक हस्ताक्षर करके अन्दर जाते है. ऐसे में संसदीय समिति की सिफारिशों में एक उम्मीद की किरण दिखती है. कुछ राज्यों ने भी केंद्र सरकार को ऐसी परियोजनायो के संबध में आगाह किया है. संसद और राज्य की विधान सभाओ को संसदीय समिति के सिफारिशों को सरकार से अमल में लाने के लिए तत्काल निर्णय लेने होंगे.

 

(गोपाल कृष्ण सिटिज़न फोरम फॉर सिविल लिबर्टीज़ के सदस्य हैं. लंबे समय से पर्यावरण एवं रासायनिक प्रदूषण के मुद्दे पर काम कर रहे हैं)

2158 - Policy Brief for Parliamentarians - UID or Aadhaar: Unresolved Questions and Concerns - CLRA

Policy Brief for Parliamentarians
UID or Aadhaar: Unresolved Questions and Concerns 

INTRODUCTION
The Government of India has embarked upon an ambitious exercise to provide a “unique identification” (or UID) number to every resident of the country. Each number is to be connected with three types of biometric data: iris scans, fingerprints (all ten fingers) and a picture of the face. UID or Aadhaar, it is claimed, will act as a useful identification facility and help the government root out corruption from social programmes. The project was flagged off with lightening speed in September 2010, when the first residents were “enrolled” under UID in Tembhali village, Maharashtra. Since then, no effort has been spared to attract people to enrolment centres.


Meanwhile, the UID project has raised many questions related, for instance, to privacy, civil liberties, financial costs, and even technical feasibility. The authorities have not been able to clarify these misconceptions because their attention is focused on meeting the enrolment targets. Even the Planning Commission is concerned that disquieting “test results” of the UID project have been ignored. Tall claims that UID will enable better management of welfare schemes like NREGA and the PDS have been challenged. Despite these major concerns, there has been scarce public discussion about key aspects of the UID project. This inadequate probing and questioning has led to a lack of understanding within the general population about UID. With that thought, this policy brief seeks to shed some light on certain aspects of this project to encourage Parliamentarians to ask some tough questions and initiate deeper discussions on this important issue.

Basics of UID 
UID is a “unique identification” number that is to be assigned to every resident of India – one person, one number. Since it will be issued to every resident, including children above the age of five, it is not a proof of citizenship. 
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Spotlight - Uidai (The Unique Identification Authority of India)

UIDAI is the authority that has been established to issue UID numbers. Chaired by Mr. Nanadan Nilekani (with a cabinet minister rank in the Indian Government), the authority was set up in January 2009, under Planning Commission, by an executive order, not through a legislative measure such as an Act of Parliament.

There is no law governing the functioning of UIDAI. The National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 (“NIAI Bill”) seeks to create a legal framework for UID. Meanwhile, the UID process is already in full swing, without any legal framework.

(Image- Ranjana Sonawane received India's First Biometric – AADHAAR UID Number 782474317884)

UIDAI has relied on 209 registrars as part of its “outsourced service oriented” infrastructure. Concerns have been raised about private enrolment agencies handling personal data such as bank account details as some of them have a stake in the healthcare and insurance sectors.


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The numbers will be issued through various agencies authorized by the UIDAI across the country, called “Registrars”. Registrars include government, public sector and private sector organizations. Enrolment also entails collection of biometric data such as fingerprints and iris scan. This number, being unique for each person, can be verified from his or her fingerprints.

Documents required for registration: The “Handbook for Registrars”, prepared by the UIDAI, lists valid identity documents for UID enrolment, such as the ration card, PAN Card, Voter ID, etc. Those who do not have any of these documents can also apply for a UID number (Aadhaar). In such cases, authorized individuals (introducers), who already have an Aadhaar, can introduce residents who don’t possess any of the requisite documents and certify their identity. Getting a UID number does not entail getting a legit card with the number on it. However, various government agencies may or may not, subsequently, issue smart cards using the UID data.

The UID project was initiated on the apparent premise that the poor faced great hurdles in accessing benefits and subsidies due to the inability to provide proof of their identity. As a result, every time an individual tries to access a benefit or service, they must undergo a full cycle of identity verification. Essentially:


1. UID is supposed to act as an all-purpose, fool-proof identification device. This could help in facilitating all processes that require identifying oneself – such as opening a bank account or applying for a passport.


2. Will help fight corruption in welfare programmes, enhance inclusiveness in government schemes, and so on. Specific areas where the benefits of UID are supposed to flow are NREGA, PDS and public health, among others.
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National ID Systems Across the World

Germany

Beginning in November 2010, German ID cards contained chips with personally identifiable information including a biometric photo and, if desired, two fingerprints. The German government’s new national ID card was publicly hacked on TV. The hackers cracked the PIN system on the cards, which then allowed them to impersonate the cardholder online.


United Kingdom
The government’s attempts to impose compulsory ID cards were abandoned after the Home Affairs committee criticized it for infringing civil liberties and for being too expensive (an estimated £4.5 bn).


United States of America
The Social Security programme number is used as the national identification number, but attempts at introducing biometric national cards (REAL ID) came under fire from rights groups. After 25 states approved resolutions not to participate in the programme, the Obama administration introduced Pass ID. It does not collect personal information of individuals and store it in a centralized database, accessible by any state authority.


People’s Republic of China
The Chinese government had implemented a system of ID cards containing very basic information to every citizen since 1985. By 2004, government introduced the “second generation” mandatory ID cards, involving contactless chips containing a small storage capacity (restricting information to name, gender, ethnicity, residence and date of birth). They deliberated on incorporating fingerprints but decided against it as they found the system to be very challenging to handle for a large population and had reservations about its reliability.


Australia
Australia witnessed the most forceful protests and campaigns against the proposal of a national ID. The idea was eventually withdrawn.


Pakistan

Established in the year 2000, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is Pakistan’s state-owned IT services company, specializing in implementing multi-biometric national identity cards, but it is plagued with fake ID card allegations. Another sticky issue is that of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and the consequence of giving them Pakistani nationality. 

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Concerns of UID and Welfare Schemes: 


NREGA


Claim: Once each citizen with a job card provides his UID number before claiming employment, the potential for ghost or fictitious beneficiaries is eliminated.
Clarification: Elimination of ghost beneficiaries would require compulsory and universal enrolment. Yet public statements convey that UID enrolment will be voluntary.


Claim: In many areas the wages continue to be paid in the form of cash.
Clarification: Payment of NREGA wages through banks and post offices have been made mandatory since 2008. About 83% of NREGA job card holders have an account. Even though the introduction of payments through bank or post office accounts has reduced corruption; three ways of siphoning off money still remain - extortion, collusion and fraud. 


Extortion means that when “inflated” wages are withdrawn by labourers from their account, the middleman turns extortionist and takes a share. Collusion occurs when the labourer and the middleman agree to share the inflated wages that are credited to the labourer’s account. Fraud means that middlemen open and operate accounts on behalf of labourers, and pay them in cash.


Biometric-enabled UID to authenticate identity can only help to prevent “fraud”, but is of little use in preventing collusion or extortion. UID can address the wage-related fraud in NREGA; it can do little about material-related corruption. Also, delivery of service will depend on beneficiary verification. This means that all NREGA worksites (600,000) will have to be equipped with a biometric reader and any technological glitch will disrupt service.


PDS


Claim: Many poor people do not benefit from government welfare schemes such as the PDS because they do not have proper identification proof.
Clarification: In the case of PDS, two main reasons for the poor being excluded are (a) low coverage because the government is willing to provide subsidized food to very few people and (b) exclusion of many poor families because the government’s criteria for identifying the poor and the implementation of these guidelines are problematic. One of the major problems with the existing targeted PDS is that of classification errors; 
UID can do nothing about such problems.

Claim: UID will help in elimination of “bogus” cards.
Clarification: UID can help deal with “ghost cards” and duplicates, but not where ineligible households or persons have claimed benefits.


Claim: With UID, beneficiaries can claim their benefits wherever they are.
Clarification: UID is portable; benefits are not, because the latter implies operational issues that cannot be solved by the UID.


A common problem facing PDS is that dealers give people less than their entitlement, and make them “sign” for the full amount. Again, UID will be of little help here because if customers can be duped into signing (or giving their thumbprint) for more than what they are given, they can surely be convinced to give their UID number for the same purpose. A large part of PDS leakages happen before the food grains reach the PDS dealer and UID is not designed to deal with such upstream leakages.


Technology Concerns


Security Risk: 
Since the UID database has to be accessible over networks in real time, it involves major operational and security risks. The identification system may collapse before network failure.and hacking. There is also a significant risk of transmitting biometric data over networks where they may be intercepted, copied, and actually tampered with, often without any detection.


Reliability: 
Another concern is the reliability of biometrics. Worn-out fingers of farmers and manual labourers will be difficult to scan, and an iris scan can’t be done on people with corneal blindness or corneal scars. There were recent reports of elderly citizens being turned away from enrolment centres for failure in meeting biometric requirements. Besides the financial costs and time and effort to enrol individuals and collect their biometric data, 100% reliability in authentication can still never be guaranteed. Diverse conditions will throw up more challenges to such a system.


The UID number will be fed into a database to be shared with NATGRID, which includes 11 security and intelligence agencies (Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, CBI, Central Boards of Excise and Direct Taxes, etc). These databases would be integrated with information available not just with government agencies and public sector, but also private organizations such as banks, insurance companies, airlines, railways, telecom service providers, etc. This would give security agencies the power to access sensitive personal information such as bank account details, market transactions, websites visited, credit card transactions, etc. and enable them “to detect patterns, trace sources for monies and support, track travellers, and identify those who must be watched, investigated, disabled and neutralized”.

Civil Liberties
The proposed NIAI Bill seeks to establish the National Identification Authority of India (NIAI) as a statutory authority and lay down rules, processes and safeguards concerning Aadhaar. Under Clause 33 (b), the NIAI is required to disclose identity information in the interest of national security, if so directed by an authorized officer of the rank of Joint Secretary or above in the central government.


The right to privacy by the Supreme Court has been defined in its scope to be qualified by national interest. The Supreme Court in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India held that, in context of infringement of right to privacy via telephone tapping, is justified if done under compelling public interest or to protect public health or morality. While information gathered by UID can be shared in the interest of national security, however, no review mechanism has been offered. In case of misuse, NIAI Bill does not allow prosecution to be launched except on a complaint made by the authority or someone authorized by it.

Key Concerns to be Addressed by Parliament


Resolution of concerns regarding security and privacy of information

• -  The definitions of the information to be collected leave a wide ambit for additions that can be made by UIDAI. The danger here lies in allowing a statutory rather than a democratic body to make choices about the privacy of individuals. 
• 
  -  Although the bill excludes and prohibits the collection of certain information, even basic personal information can be used by any ‘authorized person’ for profiling of individuals and there exists no protection under this bill. 
• 
  -  Since private agencies that have stakes in healthcare and insurance sectors are involved in the registration process; access to this information by private entities poses a grave danger to privacy of people. 
• 
  -  The information should be revealed after the consent of the individual whose information is in question.
  
  Appointment of Registar and Voluntary Registration
  
  - A ‘Registrar’ is anyone authorized by UIDAI for enrolling individuals. However
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  Cost Benefit Analysis
  Since its introduction in 2009, the cumulative revised budget estimate of the UID project is Rs. 1660 crore for 2010-11 and 2011-12 put together. The Union Government has already pumped more than Rs. 556 crore and issued more than 5.75 million UID cards. Apart from this, the Government of India is expected to spend as much as $250 billion over five years on programmes aimed at the poor, including subsidies for food, diesel, fertilizer and jobs.

  
  

  Also, a recent report advanced by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance put the NIAI Bill on hold. Keeping all the constraints in mind the parliamentarians can review the cost and propose a sound financial plan for the project.

  
  

  The committee responsible for the implementation of the UID scheme, headed by Mr. Nandan Nilekani, has been criticized by various sections of the society including governmental and non-governmental organizations. The best possible stance that could be adopted by the parliamentarians in this respect would be to analyze the huge cost and effort that the plan calls for. The bid could at least be based on approximation, since the estimation of actual outflow of funds is subject to change.

  
  

  Better coordination between the implementing agency and the government could help resolve this concern and consequently facilitate effective utilization of resources. There is an immediate need for a white paper on usage and cost-benefit analysis of UID if we want to prevent wasteful expenditure of taxpayer’s money 

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  who these registrars would be, should be made clear in the enabling process itself to avoid conflicts at a later stage.
  
  
  - When institutions such as banks are given the responsibility to enrol in an effort to further a social welfare scheme, chances are that in order to increase registration demand a UID number becomes a necessity to claim scheme benefits. A person could be denied benefits for mere lack of UID number and hence the basis of voluntary registration is lost.
  
  
  - With the focus being only towards increasing enrolment, multiple registrars have been appointed leading to duplication of work.
  
  
  Verification and Authenticity of Information collected.
  

  • -  The bill does not clearly address the issue of verification of information recorded / collected.
    
  • -  The UIDAI delegates the responsibility to registrars and other enrolling agencies, but the possibility of flaws in recording information even by negligence remains unaddressed.
    
    Adoption of a direct approach
    
    The government should clearly state whether the procurement of UID number is optional or mandatory. The UIDAI claims that UID is a “voluntary facility” – no one is obliged to enrol. However, government agencies are free to make UID compulsory for their own purposes. If opening a bank account requires one to hold a UID number, then the enrolment in the UID scheme should be made compulsory by the government. Parliamentarians should more diligently resolve the ambiguity surrounding the eligibility of the UID scheme.
    

  
  
  - As categorically stated by Mr. Nandan Nilekani, UID is not a proof of citizenship, it is meant for all residents of India. It could be the case that those who aren’t legal citizens (e.g. illegal migrants) might claim to be lawful residents and assert their privileges on account of holding a UID number. In its report the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance stated that “while the country is on one hand facing a serious problem of illegal immigrants and infiltration from across the borders, the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010, proposes to entitle every resident to obtain an Aadhaar number”. This will, they apprehend, make even illegal immigrants entitled for an Aadhaar number.
  
  
  Privacy Law
  
  - Law enforcement is one of the areas that
  need to be critically considered upon by the

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  Standing Committee Rejects UID Bill

  
  

  On 8 December 2011, the Standing Committee on Finance chaired by Yashwant Sinha suggested the government reconsider and review the UID scheme. The committee in its report rejected the UID Bill citing that the concept lacked clarity and structure in execution. The panel is of the view that the project has been implemented in a ‘hasty’ manner and is directionless in its approach.
  

  
  
  The committee also voiced concerns over the misuse of data by private players after taking note of the failure of similar initiative in other countries. The same rejection comes as no surprise ever since opposition to the scheme was voiced by the not only the Finance Ministry but also the Home Ministry and the Planning Commission, the comments of which were noted by the committee. The report suggested that the ‘Empowered Group of Ministers’, set up for collating the UID and National Population Register (NPR), had “failed to take concrete decision on important issues”. These include:
  

  1. (a)  Identifying the focused purpose of the resident identity database
     
  2. (b)  Methodology of data collection
     
  3. (c)  Removing overlapping between UID scheme and NPR
     
  4. (d)  Conferring of statutory authority to the UIDAI since its inception
     
  5. (e)  Structure and functioning of the UIDAI
     
  6. (f)  Entrusting data collection and issue of unique identity number and national identification number to a single authority instead of the present UIDAI and its reconciliation with National Registration Authority 
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     government before coming out with any verdict on the UID scheme. In the absence of any statutory law in the area of privacy rights, the enforcement of such a scheme directly involves a huge risk to confidentiality of personal information.
     lOverlapping between UID scheme and NPR.
     

     • -  While UID was an initiative with National Population Register via Census, yet UIDAI has proceeded on its own accord to record information leading to duplication of work.
       
     • 
       -  The existence of two parallel schemes has lead to confusion between the two, among state officials and also discrepancy in the data record. For instance, in Secunderabad the Census recorded 13000 people whereas Aadhaar counted over 37000 people. This raises questions on the authenticity of the data and the procedure employed in the collection.
       
     • 
       
     • Use of simpler technology in welfare programmes 
     • 
       - Parliamentarians need to question how reliable and useful such a technology will be in a vast country like India where a large population is still illiterate and not accustomed to such complex technologies.
       

     
     
     - Many model states such as Tamil Nadu have made vast improvements in the functioning of welfare programmes by using simpler technologies, such as GPS trackers on trucks leaving food procurement centres and SMS systems which alert people. Such measures do not necessitate a massive investment on part of the government, nor do they rely on complicated technology.

     
     

     References
     

     “Cost-benefit analysis of UID necessary”, The Hindu Businessline, June 6, 2011.

     “House panel rejects UID authority Bill”, The Statesman, December 13, 2011.

     “Standing panel’s rejection of UID Bill is no surprise”, India Today, December 9, 2011.

     “UID: doubts, concerns and confusions”, The Hindu, June 25, 2011.

     “Unique Identity: The boon and the bane”, The Hindu, March 20, 2011.

     Kak, Amba Uttara Kak and Swati Malik, “Privacy and the National Identification Authority of India Bill: Leaving Much to Imagination”, 3 NUJS L. REV.485 (2010).

     Khera, Reetika, “Not all that unique”, Hindustan Times, August 30, 2010.

     Krishnakumar, N.V., “Need for a white paper on hidden costs and hyped benefits”, Deccan Herald, 15 December, 2011.

     Kumar, Rohit and Kaushiki Sanyal, “Legislative Brief: The National Identification Authority of India Bill: 2010”, PRS Legislative Research, June 2, 2011.

     Ramakumar, R., Ramakumar, The Unique ID Project in India: A Skeptical Note, Springer Verglag, 2010.

     Ramanathan, Usha, “Eyeing IDs”, Indian Express, May 1, 2010.

     Ramanathan, Usha, “A Unique Identity Bill”, EPW, Vol. XLV, No. 30, July 24, 2010.

     Sharma, R.S., “Sharma, Identity and the UIDAI: A Response”, EPW, Vol. XLV, No. 35, August 28, 2010.

     
     

     Policy brief series: No. 13; 2011 November-December
     UID or Aadhaar: Unresolved Questions and Concerns
     
     
     Authors:
     Pratiksha Khanduri* & Simi Chacko**
     Research & Editorial Inputs:
     Ritika Shori‡ & Megha N Katheria† 
     __________________________________
     
     
     For private circulation only

For more information, contact: Centre for Legislative Research and Advocacy (CLRA), F-29, B.K. Dutt Colony, Jorbagh, New
Delhi-110003, Tel: 91-11-24640756, E-mail: info@clraindia.org, website: www.clraindia.org
* Ms. Pratiksha Khanduri (Dept. of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics), **Ms. Simi Chacko (School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University).
‡Ms. Ritika Shori (London School of Economics and Political Science), †Ms. Megha Katheria (4th year student, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad), are Research Interns with CLRA, New Delhi.
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Published by:
Vinod Bhanu, Executive Director, CLRA, F-29, B.K. Dutt Colony, Jorbagh, New Delhi-110003. Centre for Legislative Research and Advocacy (CLRA), an organisation of expertise in parliamentary development, political party management and legislative advocacy, is the hosting/implementing organisation of the IMPF and PG-MDGs.