In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Friday, February 9, 2018

12894 - Aadhaar’s $11-bn question: The numbers being touted by govt have no solid basis - Economic Times

ET CONTRIBUTORS|
Feb 08, 2018, 10.12 AM IST

By Jean Dreze & Reetika Khera 

Savings estimates do not pertain to Aadhaar as such but to the use of digital technology in subsidy transfers. Indeed, the smart cards study invoked in the said footnote does not involve Aadhaar at all 

Word has it that World Bank economists use "obviously fabricated" data from time to time. These are not Sitaram Yechury or Medha Patkar's words, but those of Paul Romer, former chief economist of the World Bank, in a recent email exchange reported by Financial Times. Romer retracted them later, but this "may not end the controversy", as The Economist mildly put it. 

This not the first time that World Bank economists skate on thin ice. Another recent example concerns the widely-quoted estimate of $11 billion annual savings (or potential savings) due to Aadhaar. The original source of this estimate is the Bank's World Development Report 2016. On page 195, the report mentions that many subsidies in India "are being converted to direct transfers using digital ID, potentially saving over $11 billion per year in government expenditures through reduced leakage and and efficiency gains".

By way of source, a footnote cites a brief of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, prepared by Shweta Banerjee. But the $11 billion figure cited in that brief is not a savings figure at all. It is just an estimate of GoI's total annual expenditure on "major cash transfers". 

After we drew attention to this error, others pursued the matter and the World Bank arranged for soft copies of WDR 2016 to carry a correction. The correction, however, is most intriguing, as the sentence quoted earlier remains unchanged. It is merely the note referring to Banerjee's work that's now replaced with a much longer footnote. 

The latter invokes two studies, one suggesting that biometric smart cards helped to reduce the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) leakages by 10.8% in Andhra Pradesh, and another showing that the 2013-14 experiment with direct benefit transfer of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) subsidies (DBT-L) reduced the purchase of subsidised LPG cylinders by 11-14%, "suggesting a reduction in subsidy diversion". In both cases, technical hurdles "abounded", to quote the first study. 

Answer Before the Question 
But the footnote soldiers on, "Extrapolating these leakage reduction rates to all government of India welfare programmes — amounting to roughly $70 billion to $100 billion government expenditures — yields savings in the range of $8 billion to $14 billion, or an average of $11 billion potential less spending." Voila! 

The authors, in short, managed to return exactly where they were after along somersault. 

But there is a catch: how come GoI is now spending "$70 billion to $100 billion" on "welfare programmes" when Banerjee had placed the relevant total at $11 billion? The World Bank graciously responded to a request for clarification. 

It turns out that the grand total of $100 billion (more than 4% of India's GDP in 2015-16, the reference year) is a capacious amalgam of multiple expenditure heads: half of all "central sector schemes and project", all centrally sponsored schemes, Finance Commission grants, etc. This would include expenditure on roads, bridges, horticulture, cattle, dairy and even wildlife. 

The lower total of $70 billion is similarly bloated by including fertiliser and petroleum subsidies. Could it be that this imaginative definition of welfare programmes was retrofitted —so to speak — to the pre-determined "estimate" of $11 billion savings? All in all, the revised footnote looks more like an attempt to paper over the cracks than a piece of serious research. Two further observations are due. 

First, the savings estimates do not pertain to Aadhaar as such but to the use of digital technology in subsidy transfers. Indeed, the smart cards study invoked in the said footnote does not involve Aadhaar at all. Even in the DBT-L experiment, Aadhaar is only one component of the project, and "a direct bank transfer can itself increase enforcement, irrespective of UID". The $11 billion figure is routinely construed as an estimate of 'Aadhaar-enabled savings'. But that is not what it is. 

Second, the literature on evidence-based policy emphasises the need for caution with the "external validity" of quantitative analysis — what has been found to apply in one context may or may not apply in another. 

To illustrate, a biometric system may help to plug NREGA leakages in Andhra Pradesh, but not public distribution system (PDS) leakages in Jharkhand. 

Indeed, there is evidence that Aadhaar-based biometric authentication led not only to severe exclusion problems, but also to a revival of corruption when it was imposed on the PDS in Jharkhand last year. 

Aadhaar Card With Holes 
If one were to extrapolate from the Jharkhand experience without attention to external validity, as the World Bank did from the Andhra Pradesh study, one would 'estimate' that Aadhaar is all set to cause billions of dollars of additional leakages in welfare programmes. The World Bank's extrapolations break all the rules of external validity. 

The footnote mentioned earlier redeems itself with a salutary warning at the end, "It should be noted that realising these potential savings for all government transfers is conditional on accountable institutions to complement the investment in digital technology." If only this sentence were widely quoted, instead of the shaky estimates that precede it. 

(Dreze and Khera are development economists with Ranchi University and IIT-Delhi respectively) 

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