In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Friday, June 29, 2018

13758 - Another Aadhaar challenge Supreme Court must address: Excessive delegation - The Print



The Aadhaar Act does not provide for any review of UIDAI’s functioning | Manisha Mondal/ThePrint

The issue here is one of procedure: which body has the authority to pass what kinds of rules.

One of the debates about Aadhaar is over the problem of excessive delegation. The legislature often delegates law-making power to the executive, including to regulatory agencies. Such delegation cannot be excessive – Parliament cannot give up its law-making power on fundamental issues, like the balancing of rights.

The doctrine of excessive delegation is closely associated with the rule of law, because the rule of law consists of three components: rule creation, rule application, and rule execution. Excessive delegation bundles these components. The issue here is one of procedure: which body has the authority to pass what kinds of rules.

The excessive delegation challenge to Aadhaar relates to the management and usage of the scheme, especially Sections 7, 8, 23, 28, 32, 50 and 54 of the Aadhaar Act. A reading of these provisions shows that the legislative policy on the management and application of Aadhaar data and safeguards present have been left to the UIDAI, with minimal guidelines. The state’s response to this was straightforward: that the Act had provided enough guidance, both in terms of objectives and principles.
How does one adjudicate such a contest? Delegation is ubiquitous, and excessive delegation is impermissible. But when does delegation become excessive?
In the state’s defence, the Supreme Court has been neither clear nor stringent on this matter in recent years. The threshold that it has set is embarrassingly low. But there are two ways to think about this matter. The first is to closely examine the subject matter at hand. In a case involving fundamental rights, for example, Parliament should perform more rather than less. The second query, as captured by the classic case In re Delhi Laws Act (1951), the question is whether the legislature has sufficiently determined “the legislative policy”.
In this case, the seriousness of the subject matter is incontrovertible. The question is whether the legislative policy has been laid down by Parliament.
Gaps in the policy
In some respects, the policy is clear; for example, Section 7, which specifies services where the expense relates to the Consolidated Fund of India.
In others, however, gaps emerge. For example, Section 23, which empowers the UIDAI to “develop the policy, procedure and systems for issuing Aadhaar numbers to individuals and perform authentication thereof under this Act”. The development rather than implementation of policy by the UIDAI seems like a clear violation. Section 32, covered in our previous piece, too leaves an important policy decision relating to the storage of data with the UIDAI.
These instances are not glaring but matters seem different with Section 28, which leaves the UIDAI with complete direction to determine policy matters relating to security and confidentiality, and Section 54, which seems like a residual provision of sorts. Section 54 has 24 entries, authorising regulating on matters ranging from enrolment to authentication to sharing. As per Section 54(x), “regulations may provide for … any other matter which is required to be, or may be, specified, or in respect of which provision is to be or may be made by regulations”. This provision is, quite simply, self-validating. As such, it is a clear case of excessive delegation. Indeed, it seems to be a case of excessive delegation by definition.
The problem of excessive delegation becomes even more serious if one considers the structure of the UIDAI. The Aadhaar Act does not provide for any review of UIDAI’s functioning (apart from a complete supersession of the body by the Union) and mechanisms for accountability are all internal. Section 47(1), Aadhaar Act, states that “No court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under this Act, save on a complaint made by the authority or any officer or person authorised by it”.
The state’s answer to this was, in part, persuasive. It rightly argued that Indian constitutionalism has been remarkably flexible on the structure of regulatory agencies. SEBI, for example, performs some degree of legislative, executive, and judicial functions.
But the state’s answer only resolves the problem of bundling and external oversight; it does not solve the problem of excessive delegation because the leeway given to regulatory agencies with regard to bundling and oversight takes place in the context of delegation that cannot be excessive. Even though Section 55 of the Act stipulates that regulations must be laid before Parliament, this addresses the issue of accountability to Parliament, but it does not address the issue of delegation from Parliament.
There are thus five different challenges to Aadhaar that the Supreme Court must address: (a) its enactment as a money bill; (b) the validation of pre-2016 enrolments; (c) enrolment errors; (d) constitutional rights; (e) excessive delegation.
This is the third piece in a four-part series covering the legal challenge to Aadhaar. The first two parts can be read here and here.


Madhav Khosla, co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, is a junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. His Twitter handle is @M_Khosla. Ananth Padmanabhan is a Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research. His Twitter handle is @ananth1148.

13757 - Aadhaar linking boosts NREGS: Modi’s JAM trinity fast tracks workers’ payment disbursals - Financial Express


Narendra Modi government’s apparent insistence on mandatory linking with Aadhaar may have drawn criticism from various quarters with people raising eyebrows, but the project has given a big boost to rural employment by aiding assured jobs and quicker disbursals of payments under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).

By: FE Online | New Delhi | Published: June 28, 2018 3:22 PM
28
SHARES




Aadhaar linking boosts NREGS

Narendra Modi government’s apparent insistence on mandatory linking with Aadhaar may have drawn criticism from various quarters with people raising eyebrows, but the project has given a big boost to rural employment by aiding assured jobs and quicker disbursals of payments under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). The NREGS benefitted from faster wage transfers and easier allotment of work due to the biometric Aadhaar identification, which nearly 90% of the country’s population has already received, a study by the Indian School of Business shows.

NREGS, previously known as MNREGA, was floated in 2005 for the rural farming population, mainly to help the people tide over any farm distress due to harsh conditions, such as drought. The scheme mandates the state government to offer minimum 100 days of employment for at least one member of each family that asks for it.

“The interesting part of NREGA is that it does not have the biometric authentication requirement because the job card is directly linked to the Aadhaar and the bank account, the wages are paid directly into the bank, so there is no need for biometric authentication,” said professor Ashwini Chhatre, Executive Director, Indian School of Business.

JAM session
“We did not expect such a big effect,” Ashwini Chhatre told FE Online when asked if the researchers had expected this result. “What we thought was that expenditure will go up, because of the efficiency improvement — but not that it will be the opposite of what it was before or the change to be this swift. Even we did not expect this magnitude of difference!” he said.
NREGS was launched to increase employment opportunity during the times of distress, thus making it counter-cyclical. But after studying NREGA data of the Financial Years 2011-2017, it has been found that prior to the advent of JAM trinity of Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar and Mobile linking, the employment scheme used to work in a procyclic manner. That is, average employment decreased with the increase of drought and distress.
The possible reason behind this is the long process of payment reimbursement by the government — which included gram panchayat, mandal, district administration and state government, which meant the workers had to work for days, practically without payment. Thus, many used to back out from availing the scheme or used to opt for schemes that would pay much less.
However, since the Jan Dhan Yojana, which covered 90 per cent of the country’s population under the mainstream banking system, and linking of the biometric identity proof of Aadhaar, the payment reimbursement has become faster and easier, and the scenario has changed. Since the introduction of Aadhaar-linked payment the blocks, where the study was conducted, showed a substantial increase of 19.21% in the number of households applying for the scheme during the time of adverse weather conditions or drought. The increase in the years unaffected by drought was 18.9%.
While the total fund dispersed in FY2015 was Rs 92 billion, it jumped to Rs 140 billion in the consecutive year when Aaadhaar was implemented — a significant jump of nearly 50% in a single year, stated the study. Persons and households working also increased by 12 and 17 per cent, stated the report.

The JAM trinity — linking of Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar Card and Mobile phones — has led to the wages reaching the workers’ bank accounts within estimated 15 days of employment as compared to as long as a month previously, the study shows. Further, the direct transfer of wages to the bank accounts also facilitated into removing any caste-based bias that prevails in various parts of the country while it comes to payments, and even the amount of work done by the backward classes also increased subsequently, said the study.

13756 - Aadhaar Articles Dated 29th June 2018



Financial Express
Narendra Modi government's apparent insistence on mandatory linking with Aadhaar may have drawn criticism from various quarters with people ...






ThePrint
Another Aadhaar challenge Supreme Court must address: Excessive ... The excessive delegation challenge to Aadhaar relates to the management ...




Financial Express
However, biometric-based Aadhaar identification and its linking with the 300 million accounts opened under Jan Dhan since 2014 have enabled the ...






Livemint
New Delhi: The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has asked biometric device manufactures to complete integration of face authentication ...






Qrius
By Elton Gomes. After the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) announced the launch of the Aadhaar Virtual ID on April 2, it has now stated ...






Times of India
“AP published Aadhaar numbers of 11,000 government employees working in the endowment department. They have shut down the pages publishing ...






Bar & Bench
In an order passed last week, the Madras High Court directed that Aadhaar card and a photocopy of the same should be produced by prospective ...




Times of India
NEW DELHI: The government plans to take a slew of measures, including linkage with Aadhaar, to strengthen 'TrackChild', a national system to track ...






Moneycontrol.com
For example, with the current market requirement of linking one's Aadhaar card to one's bank accounts, identity verification will become a simpler ...






Elets
From implementing Information Technology to linking Aadhaar during farmers' registration, the Food Department has taken several initiatives for ...






Times of India
... nativity certificate, Aadhaar, community certificate, first graduate certificate and ration card/passport besides proof of relationship between the parent ...






Times of India
On Friday, the Madras high court made Aadhaar card and its photocopy compulsory during counselling for medical admissions in the state while ...






Kaplan Herald
Ghaziabad: Two unauthorised enrolment , operating in Vijay Nagar and Sihani Gate areas, were busted on Tuesday. A team headed by sub-divisional ...






Daily News & Analysis
Aadhaar PAN PNR Passport Seva. This app claims to help you out with the Aadhaar enrollment and PAN card application but the app is not the official ...






MySmartPrice Gear
Most of them reported that they had not even signed up for Airtel Payments Bank, but had only registered for verification of their number with Aadhaar.






Newslaundry
The Aadhaar Bill creates a subsidy delivery mechanism and experts have questioned whether it is legitimate to pass it as a Money Bill -- which is ...






Bristol Herald Courier (press release) (blog)
It will also enable cost-effective verifications for the increasing number of national ID systems such as India's Aadhaar. But that's just the start; we ...






Daily News & Analysis
The contractor was also involved in the Aadhaar card scam, in which cards were issued without taking necessary documents. Around 50,000 cards ...






Times of India
“Nowadays, the Aadhaar-privacy debate seems to be unwittingly becoming part of every discussion — be it at office, home or among friends. While the ...






The Indian Express
Sources also said that Purthy had organised a Patthalgarhi protest at Ghaghra village and supervised the burning of Aadhaar and Voter ID cards.






NewsBytes
Option 3- Forward application documents physically. Choose paperless facility (Option 1) and enter your Aadhaar details. Then, enter the details of ...






Times Now
Also, please note, candidates are required to carry their Aadhaar Cards to the examination centres as well. DSSSB PGT Examinations 2018 would be ...

Thursday, June 28, 2018

13755 - BJP, hold your Emergency outrage, please- Daily O


Modi government's own track record is not much better than Indira Gandhi's 1975 imposition.
 |  12-minute read |   26-06-2018


  • Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi, giving a timeline of the events that led to perhaps one of the darkest chapters of Indian democracy. This was duly tweeted out by the PM himself. The finance minister also questioned if the script for imposing Emergency was inspired by what happened in Nazi Germany in 1933.

Shri @arunjaitley writes about the dark days of the Emergency, the trampling of personal liberties, excesses committed and how the Emergency was a direct attack on our Constitutional ideals. Do read his blogs.

Part 1-

Part 2-

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing a function in Maharashtra to mark a "black day" today, used the opportunity to lash out at the Opposition. The PM attacked the Congress on its dynastic tradition and said that the BJP was not observing "black day" (Emergency) just to criticise the Congress, but rather, the party wants to make the youth of today aware of what happened in Mrs Gandhi's reign. 

We will include the whole story of Emergency in the curriculum. Children should know the reality of that time. That is why the Emergency period is considered to be the second freedom struggle: Prakash Javadekar, Union Minister

The PM attacked the Congress on its dynastic tradition.
At a press conference, Union minister Prakash Javadekar went a step further and said his party will include the whole story of the Emergency in school curriculums. Children should know the reality of that time and why the Emergency period is considered to be the second freedom struggle.

While the BJP is right in criticising the Congress for the Emergency, its own track record of ensuring the fundamental rights of citizens is far from stellar.

Accusing the Congress of having no internal democracy, the PM said it cannot be expected to follow the ideals of a democracy. But the PM forgets that the BJP has itself apparently become a personality cult. All powers are reportedly concentrated in the hands of just a few people, which, in itself, is detrimental to democratic values. If the people's representatives have no say in decision-making, this goes against the spirit of our Constitution.

While the PM accused the Opposition of fear-mongering, the sad part is that a large part of our population — especially the minorities and Dalits — do live in fear.

They live in fear for their lives, for the consequences of sporting a skull cap, something that Junaid had on when he was brutally lynched while on his way back from Eid shopping last year, for their food choices, for what they store in their refrigerators, fear of a mob storming their house at night and beating them to death over a rumour, fear over growing a moustache in a higher caste-dominated village, fear of being flogged brutally for skinning a dead cow.

Junaid was brutally lynched while on his way back from Eid shopping last year.

While Indira Gandhi apologised to the nation for imposing Emergency, we are yet to see Modi even speak on these gross violations of fundamental and human rights.
Instead, the PM's critics point out, he blissfully follows vitriolic trolls on Twitter who openly threaten people with murder, violence or rape if they do not toe their line. Despite her being one of the most active members of his government on social media, the PM still hasn't found time to denounce those who abused his own MEA, Sushma Swaraj, just because her ministry issued passports to an inter-faith couple. 

Amid the stoic silence of their PM, and emboldened by apparent state patronage, the ruling party's ministers are openly threatening journalists and the press. People who celebrated the gruesome murder of Gauri Lankesh are still followed by the PM online. And recently, senior BJP leader Lal Singh in Jammu issued a warning to journalists, saying journalists should “draw a line”, or “be prepared to meet the fate” of Shujaat Bukhari, the editor of Rising Kashmir, gunned down in Srinagar on June 14. The party's Jammu and Kashmir president Ravindra Raina went on record to say that no action would be taken against Singh for his statements. Media, long considered the fourth pillar of democracy, is itself under apparent threat.

Aadhaar debate: Right to privacy
While the Aadhaar project was piloted by the UPA regime, its ambit was vastly increased under the current BJP government.
During the Budget presentation on 29 February, 2016, finance minister Arun Jaitley announced that a Bill would be introduced to provide legislative support to the Aadhaar project. On March 3, 2016, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016, was introduced in Parliament as a money bill by Jaitley. The decision to introduce it as a money bill was criticised by Opposition parties on the grounds that the government was trying to bypass the Rajya Sabha as they did not have majority in the upper house. 

Amid opposition, the Aadhaar Act 2016 was passed on March 11, 2016.

The Finance Bill, 2017, passed in the Lok Sabha on March 22, made Aadhaar, the card with the specific number issued by the UIDAI – Unique Identification Authority of India, mandatory for filing of income tax returns as well as for obtaining and retaining the PAN or permanent account number.

The Bill dealt with one primary focus — whoever gets benefits from the Consolidated Fund of India, either state or Centre and other institutions, is entitled to have an Aadhaar Card. This vital piece of legislation was added to the Finance Bill, 2017 as a last-minute amendment on March 21.

This indirectly bought everything required for day-to-day existence and availing of civic and public/private amenities under its ambit.

Children will need to have Aadhaar to get mid-day meals in school, in contravention of the Right to Education Act. Pregnant women will need Aadhaar card to obtain maternity benefits.

Koyli Devi, mother of girl who died allegedly of starvation in Simdega, Jharkhand. (Photo: @ANI)
This was also in violation of the Supreme Court order of August 2015, which stated explicitly that the Aadhaar card would not be mandatory for availing benefits, and would only serve as a voluntary identity proof.

Finally, it took the Supreme Court to rein in the government. A nine-judge Constitution bench upheld privacy as a fundamental right emanating from the right to life under the Indian Constitution. In a unanimous verdict, the SC rejected all arguments of the Union government that privacy has limited scope in countries like India.

Law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad welcomed the SC verdict and said that the government supports right to privacy as a fundamental right. Interestingly, Prasad's ministry had put forth arguments of the Centre in these past four years, where the Centre had questioned the status of privacy and its existence, argued that citizens don't have an absolute right over their own bodies and even told the Supreme Court that in countries like India, with mass poverty challenges, privacy can be given a go-by.

Cow politics
The Centre on May 26, 2017, banned the sale of cattle — including cows, buffaloes, calves, heifers, bulls, bullocks and even camels — in animal markets which sold these intended for slaughter. It also imposed fresh restrictions on the sale on animals and ruled that animal markets cannot be set up within 50km of the international border and 25km of the state borders, as per the gazetted notification.

According to the new rule, brought in under the ambit of the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests, and as part of the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals Act, 1960, cattle can only be sold to a person who has documents to prove he’s an “agriculturalist”.

In addition, young and infirm animals cannot be sold in animal markets intended for slaughter.
This notification directly affected the livelihoods of farmers, cattle traders/beef traders and the leather industry which had already been reeling under the dreadful impact of demonetisation. Farmers opposed the move to restrict trade in markets only to animals meant for agricultural use, saying they cannot directly access slaughterhouses. Farmers normally brought their redundant animals to livestock markets, from where traders purchase and transport cattle to abattoirs. While the farmer now had no way to sell his ageing or ailing cattle, the administration also provided no clarity on whether slaughterhouses could procure cattle for slaughter directly from farmers. Although no rule prohibited this and slaughterhouses had all rights to continue their business, they were curbed from buying the cattle from animal markets.

This notification directly affected the livelihoods of farmers.
In May-end, the Madras High Court granted an interim stay on the implementation of the rules, specifically Rule 22(b)(iii) that required a person bringing cattle for sale to the market to furnish a written declaration that it would not be sold for slaughter.
In July, the Supreme Court extended the stay to the entire country. 
Coming under severe criticism for attempting to impose the nationwide ban on ideological grounds, the Centre decided to withdraw its controversial plan in November 2017.
Although the notification was withdrawn, perhaps emboldened by state sanction, several cases of assault by 'cow protection groups' were reported from various parts of the country.

Rising crimes against minorities and Dalits
While communal polarisation and clashes are not new to this country, the targeting of minorities and Dalits has seen a dramatic rise under the current establishment.
Incidents like Una to the recent clashes in Bhima-Koregaon have given rise to severe insecurity among the Dalit community. While the police has shown great alacrity in arresting six activists reportedly linked to Bhima Koregaon, who have been accused of having Maoist links and fomenting trouble during the clashes, other leaders like Sambhaji Bhide and Milind Ekbote have been treated with kid gloves. While Ekbote is out on bail in both the cases registered against him, the administration has not even been able to muster courage to arrest Bhide “guruji”. While Ekbote and Bhide have both been close to the BJP, the PM himself had hailed Bhide in 2015, saying he came to Sangli on “guruji’s call”. 


Modi with Sambhaji Bhide. This diminutive man was responsible 4 organising violence against Dalits. #MaharashtraBandh
With such rampant state sanction, it is no surprise we are seeing more discontentment among Dalits against the ruling establishment.
Muslims have not fared much better under the current regime.
With increasing incidents of lynching and cow vigilantism, the community is finding itself far more under attack. The ruling BJP, instead of carrying out its constitutionally mandated duty of providing free and fair administration, without any prejudice, has maintained a stoic silence on these atrocities. When Pehlu Khan was brutally lynched, the BJP-ruled Rajasthan government actually filed a case against his son who had also endured life-threatening injuries during the attack. When PM Modi finally broke his silence on the issue, he chose to distinguish between good gau rakshaks and bad gau rakshaks.

Pehlu Khan was lynched by 'gau rakshaks' in April 2017. Ten months after his murder, the police named him in its charge sheet for cow smuggling.
No wonder the crimes only increased further.
Another recent phenomena is the sudden rise of the "Go To Pakistan" catchline. Senior BJP MP Vinay Katiyar on February 7, 2018, said that "Muslims should not even be living in this country, they should go to Pakistan or Bangladesh". Katiyar, who founded the Vishwa Hindu Parishad's (VHP) youth wing, Bajrang Dal, further said a bill should be introduced in Parliament that frames a punishment for those "who do not respect Vande Mataram, (and) those who insult the national flag, or hoist the Pakistani flag." "Muslims shouldn't even be living in this country, they're the ones who partitioned this country based on their population, so why do they need to live here? They were given separate territory, they should go to Pakistan or Bangladesh, what business do they have here," said Katiyar.
Conveniently using Muslims as their political punching bags, the ruling BJP deliberately tries to conflate cross-border terrorism to the minorities and would have you believe their loyalties lie across the border. A narrative is deliberately made about how Muslims apparently support the neighbouring country, especially when soldiers are dying on the border. Rumour-mongering and WhatsApp forwards of "Pakistan zindabad" slogans are used to add further fuel to the fire.
"Jinnah" and "Pakistan" have become the buzzwords to target the Muslim population of the country. While making fiery speeches targeting the Opposition for minority appeasement, the BJP conveniently forgets that the community still figures at the bottom of the development indices, something that the Srikrishna Committee report — that is still to be tabled — also states.
If indeed "appeasement" had happened, the community would not have been in dire straits today.
While the state may not be directly sanctioning these crimes, the constant venom spewed against minorities, labelling them as "anti-nationals", has only added to an overall environment of bigotry and hate.
While PM Modi is a great orator, enthralling his audiences with speeches full of lofty words, he chooses to maintain a silence on the multiple transgressions on such citizens' fundamental rights.
Though it may fit perfectly within the right-wing politics of the ruling establishment, this instills a feeling of alienation among the country's minorities and further drives a wedge between the Hindu majority and the minorities, causing frequent clashes along communal lines.
Having sold us the dreams of "Achhe Din" and "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas" in the run-up to the 2014 General Elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have you believe that Congress, and especially the Gandhis, are the reason for all that is wrong with the country. He may be true on more than one count, but the reality is, the BJP has been in power for the past four years. His government's own track record on issues like undermining Parliament, stonewalling RTI pleas, abusing agencies or growing crimes against minorities and Dalits is nothing to be very proud of.
Modi may have used the Emergency to score a political brownie point against the Congress today, while sounding the poll bugle for 2019. However, how several of his government's actions are hurting the secular fabric of our country is also something to note. When the BJP talks big about how the Constitution of India was once completely disregarded and democracy crushed when Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency, irony dies, yet again.

Also read: Why lampooning Indira Gandhi and Emergency is not enough to uphold democracy


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of DailyO.in or the India Today Group. The writers are solely responsible for any claims arising out of the contents of this article.

Writer


Deputy editor, DailyO

13754 - SIM card distributor forges fingerprints for commission - TNN

SIM card distributor forges fingerprints for commission

TNN | Jun 27, 2018, 13:35 IST

HYDERABAD: A mobile SIM card distributor from Peddapally district was arrested by SR Nagar police for forging fingerprints through an ingenious way to activate over 6,000 SIM cards through eKYC system. Police said P Santosh Kumar was a distributor of Vodafone prepaid SIM cards in Dharmaram area. 

On June 20, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), regional office, Hyderabad, deputy director MVR Anand lodged a complaint with SR Nagar police alleging that P Santosh Kumar of M/s Dhanalakshmi Communications in Dharamaram, Peddapally district was involved in illegal Aadhaar linking (eKYC). 

He alleged thatSantosh Kumar had fraudulently downloaded Aadhaar credentials of people from Telangana government’s registration and stamps department (website http://registration.telangana.gov.in) and misused those through eKYC mechanism for activating SIM cards. 

Based on the complaint, SR Nagar police had registered a case under Sections 36, 39 & 42 of the Aadhaar Act 2016, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC & 66 (C) and 66(D) of IT Act.

“We have arrested Santosh Kumar on June 22 and produced him before court. He was sent to judicial remand,” SR Nagar inspector Md Waheeduddins said.

On interrogation, Santosh Kumar confessed he resorted to the fraud to get maximum commission from the telecom service provider for activating SIM cards. To forge fingerprints, the accused downloaded property registration documents from the website http://registration.telangana.gov.in. 

Using these details, he activated over 6,000 SIM cards within a month to get handsome commission from the telecom company. However, due to the excess usage from a single machine, the UIDAI authorities felt that something was wrong and, therefore, initiated a probe, leading to his arrest.

The accused, who dropped out of graduation, learnt about the fingerprint manufacturing technique by watching videos online, police said. 


13753 - Emperor’s new clothes: By grafting welfare measures on rickety Raj structures, our leaders guarantee failure - TOI


June 27, 2018, 2:00 AM IST Ravi Shanker Kapoor in TOI Edit Page | Edit Page, India | TOI


The ongoing Aadhaar imbroglio is symptomatic of not only the rot within India’s welfarism but also its systemic entropy. In fact, if there is one country in which the worst fears of classical liberals as well as contemporary libertarians about the welfare state have been realised, it is India.

Even if we skirt the philosophical and moral critiques of the welfare state made by Western conservatives and other rightwing thinkers, we will find inherent inconsistencies in welfarism as it is practised in India. Right from the beginning, policy and decision makers of independent India have ignored a fundamental reality: that the welfare state is, first and foremost, a state. They have spent most of their energy and resources on introducing and expanding welfarist measures rather than, what was and is urgently needed, strengthening the institutions of the state – even for the success of welfarism.

For the British had framed laws and formulated policies to largely further their own ends. They set up institutions to perpetuate the Empire; they promoted the extortionist land revenue system to bolster the exchequer; they framed economic policy that bolstered the manufacturers of Manchester and Lancashire rather than those of Kanpur and Bombay; they created an administration to suppress and repress the natives rather than ‘organise liberty with order’; they established the police that had least regard for human rights; in almost everything they did, the interests of mother country preceded those of the colony. (Well, they also brought modernity and the ennobling Enlightenment ideas and ideals to India, something no Indian ruler at the time did, but that’s another story.)


                          Illustration: Chad Crowe

Not much has been done to alter that situation by way of state capacity augmentation. On top of that, the Indian state took upon itself a variety of responsibilities: becoming the prime mover of development, overseeing infrastructure projects, setting up dams and public sector undertakings, regulating (usually heavily) the economy, taking care of health and education, trying to achieve a socialistic pattern of society, in short doing everything under the sun.
Unsurprisingly things have gone from bad to worse, with mounting inefficiencies, ineptitude and corruption in government functioning. This is the statism of a weak state, but it is still statism.
Our leaders love it; in their scheme of things, the cure for statism is not small government or less statism; the solution is more or, at best, a different kind of statism. For instance, when public distribution system (PDS) proved less than effective, a targeted public distribution system (TDPS) was devised. TDPS was implemented except in a handful of states and Union territories with effect from 1997.
How did it go? In the foreword of its performance evaluation report, erstwhile Planning Commission deputy chair Montek Singh Ahluwalia wrote in April 2005: “About 58% of the subsidised food grains issued from the central pool do not reach the below poverty line families because of identification errors, non-transparent operation and unethical practices in the implementation of TPDS. The cost of handling of food grains by public agencies is also very high.” Ten years later, the Comptroller & Auditor General’s report said, “After a lapse of two years from the stipulated date of completion, most of the states were yet to computerise their TPDS operations.”
Einstein is said to have defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”. Insane or not, this is how our system works. So, our political masters stayed focussed on making the state largesse more targeted.
Aadhaar was conceptualised, but it has also run into all manner of trouble – linking Aadhaar to ration cards, privacy matters, data theft, even alleged starvation deaths, litigations. But the government is still adamant regarding the implementation of Aadhaar.
The attitude is typical. Without diagnosing the ailment, our politicians keep trying a range of inefficacious therapies – even when the diagnosis is obvious. Everybody knew that inadequate state capacity plagued PDS, but little was done to address the real issue; instead something new, TPDS, was tried.
Similarly, the implementation of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana has proved to be less than satisfactory, but the government aims at an even more ambitious National Health Protection Scheme. And, of course, we are also told that Aadhaar will redeem the poor.
More than stubbornness, this is dogmatism: our rulers are loath to, as Ayn Rand would say, check their premises. The premise in this case is that a welfare state can be built regardless of state capacity. It is putting the cart before the horse, but they are convinced that this will work. Which means that the state can take limitless burden without improvement in its institutions, without administrative reforms.
There was something called the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, headed by Congress leader M Veerappa Moily. It prepared as many as 15 reports, the last of which came out in April 2009. Nobody has heard about administrative reforms – or, for that matter, movement on police and judicial reforms – since then.
It says something about the obtuseness of our politicians that neither the government nor the opposition is bothered about administrative, judicial and police reforms; they are happy with cows, name changing, symbolism and other emotive issues. The engine bequeathed by the Raj was rickety; instead of repairing it, politicians have burdened it with a myriad of welfare measures.
The denouement is the mess that is India.


DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author's own.

13752 - The Aadhaar challenge: 3 features that put constitutional rights at risk - The Print


Thursday, 28 June, 2018
The Aadhaar challenge: 3 features that put constitutional rights at risk


Even if the state can interfere with a constitutional right based on some legitimate state interest, the intrusion can’t be arbitrary.

The Indian Constitution, like several others, guarantees a set of rights against the state. The nature of rights is not that they are absolute, but that intrusions must satisfy certain conditions – and these conditions and intrusions are being tested in the debate over Aadhaar.
One important condition is that even if the state can interfere with a right based on some legitimate state interest, the intrusion cannot be arbitrary. The reason is simple enough: if the state can violate my right at any time, then what is the point of that right?
Arbitrary intrusions may take many forms. One kind of arbitrary intrusion is the absence of checks and balances on state power, because such absence allows the state to intrude upon a right without clear and effective boundaries.
A major set of legal concerns relating to Aadhaar involve this argument. The concerns may be borne out by three features of the scheme:
1. UIDAI only stores information about the use of Aadhaar for authentication, but not the reason for the authentication. For example, it knows Arun used his Aadhaar number at an Airtel store without knowing why he used it, what his call records are, etc. (Section 32 of the Aadhaar Act).
2. The linking of Aadhaar with various schemes and services, both public and private (Sections 7, 8, and 57 of the Aadhaar Act).
3. The fact that as a result of such linking, there are several more end points in the system. That is, there are several more devices through which one authenticates one’s Aadhaar number, and there are also several intermediaries who provide such devices and connect them with the central server.
Inviting trouble?
The argument offered by the petitioners is that these three features invite trouble.
In the first instance, even though the UIDAI may not know why an individual used her/his Aadhaar number at an Airtel store, the very fact of authentication itself provides sufficient information. After all, one could reasonably presume that the individual wanted a new connection, and one would know the kinds of services to which an individual subscribes.
In this respect, Kapil Sibal’s submissions quite rightly underlined the dangers of even simply the “meta-data”. A further point brings this out. In practice, the UIDAI enters into agreements with requesting entities (say, Airtel), under which it issues letters of appointment specifying the purposes for which the entity is using Aadhaar authentication. From this itself, it is evident that UIDAI knows the purpose for which authentication occurs.
In the second and third instances, the problem is two-fold.
First, if the data is linked to several services, and the details of the services to which it is linked are public, then a person could potentially try to access an individual’s records from the different services and put them together to form a somewhat complete picture of the individual. It is true that this could already be done in a non-Aadhaar world by various identifiers, but Aadhaar makes it easy to find an individual’s records; I don’t need to access the main UIDAI server if I can match records across different services.
The second problem is that the greater the number of end points and intermediaries, the greater is the risk of technical penetration of the system. The chances for data breaches go up substantially.
State response misses the point
The state offered two kinds of responses to this. The first was simply that these imagined scenarios were violations of the Aadhaar Act, and that any law can suffer violations. This is, however, a poor argument. Any law, it is true, can suffer violations, and this is precisely why state action must have checks and guidelines to see that violations are limited, and arbitrary state power is prevented. Precisely this reasoning has led to courts providing checks and guidelines in cases involving police powers.
The real question, then, is whether the Aadhaar Act sufficiently mitigates against the risks of the three features mentioned above. That it does so was the state’s second kind of response, exemplified by the presentation that the UIDAI CEO made before the Supreme Court. The CEO argued that Aadhaar involves one-way linking (“optimal ignorance”), a federated database, and the collection of only minimal data.
This response is fair, but it misses the point — that in practice, getting around the existing guidelines seems easy enough, especially in the case of the first point. The UIDAI may be, in theory, “ignorant”, but it does not take very much for it or for an external party to become knowledgeable. This means that the constitutional rights in question are, as Shyam Divan argued, hollowed out.
Which rights are affected?
The rights in question here – of the state gaining access to my private activities and storing my information without sufficient security – are not only the right to privacy (now firmly accepted as implicit in Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution) but also the right to equality in Article 14 (because any potential use of the data through aggregation can result in unlawful differential treatment of individuals).
We can see that the argument that privacy is not absolute relates to a different issue. The question, here, isn’t whether the state’s intrusion into privacy is per se allowed. As the court recently noted in the privacy judgment (Puttaswamy), the question is also whether the intrusion is arbitrary.
Here, moreover, the intrusion seems vulnerable on another ground, namely it is overbroad. Sections 7 and 8 of the Aadhaar Act specify that the scheme is for authentication. But Section 32 allows the preservation of authentication records. As Meenakshi Arora noted in her submissions, the reason for this retention of data is not specified.
Why not require that there is erasure of records? Some dynamic data may need brief storage for technical reasons (like a computer cookie), but Section 32’s broad wording (allowing the UIDAI to “maintain authentication records in such manner and for such period as may be specified by regulations”) seems troublesome.
If Aadhaar is about authentication at any given time, why is the storage of one’s authentication history necessary? This feature, moreover, suffers from a further and different legal problem – excessive delegation – to which our next piece shall turn.

This is the second piece in a four-part series covering the legal challenge to Aadhaar. Read the first and the third part here and here.


Madhav Khosla, co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, is a junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. His Twitter handle is @M_Khosla. Ananth Padmanabhan is a Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research. His Twitter handle is @ananth1148.

13751 - Aadhaar linking cuts NREGS wage delays, fund transfers double too - TNN


Rajeev Deshpande | TNN | Updated: Jun 27, 2018, 07:08 IST
  • On a broad scale, irrespective of distress conditions, there was an increase of over Rs 2 crore in amount disbursed in banks after Aadhaar-linked payment
  • In the post-ALP period, the average of individuals and households allotted work increased by 12,597 and 7,579
NEW DELHI: Linkage of MGNREGS accounts with an Aadhaar-linked payment (ALP) system significantly boosted efficiency of wage transfers, doubling funds transferred and increasing work allotted in times of distress as compared to previous years when demand actually dropped during economic stress due to leakage and delays in payments. 

An Indian School of Business study that examined annual data for blocks which had drought conditions in financial years 2012-2017 showed clear changes in the pre- and post-ALP system with regard to work generated, individuals and households benefited and the speed and volume of bank transfers that point to an increased uptake of the workfare programme. 

On a broad scale, irrespective of distress conditions, there was an increase of over Rs 2 crore in amount disbursed in banks after ALP. There was a manifold rise in direct transfer beneficiaries with funds transferred in FY 2015 totalling over Rs 9 crore and the figure rising to Rs 14 crore in FY 2016, a 50% jump in a year. 

In the post-ALP period, the average of individuals and households allotted work increased by 12,597 and 7,579. In the pre-ALP period, households and persons demanding work declined across blocks facing drought — delayed payments and leakages made those seeking succour look for more immediate, even if less paying, options to tide over the bad times. 

“We have looked at the annual data and analysed distress in terms of a 75% or 50% deficiency of rainfall and also in terms of high temperatures. These can be seen to be conditions that cause rural distress,” said ISB’s Prof Ashwini Chhatre, who said ALP made the scheme “counter cyclical” — higher demand in times of economic distress. 

This was in contrast to the scheme being “cyclical” (demand dropping when economic activity shrinks) which defeated the purpose of MGNREGS. The target population seemed to have learned of quicker payments with the provision of jobs becoming counter cyclical, with an increase of 625.62 (households) and 2,492.84 (persons) allotted work. When compared to an average of 7,477 households and 12,433 individuals, there was an increase of 8.5% and 20%. 

The study, ‘A Friend Indeed: Does the Use of Biometric Digital Identity Make Welfare Programmes Counter-Cyclical’, was authored by Shradhey Parijat Prasad, Nishka Sharma and Prasanna Tantri. “The magnitude of increased work in distressed blocks is higher in post-ALP. We also find that the total muster rolls filled and total persons worked increases in distressed block years only after implementation of ALP,” they wrote. 

Chhatre said the paper did not examine exclusions and there were reports of delays in terms of transfers between the Centre, states and banks. But on the whole, the volume and speed of transfers, as seen by annual data, had gone up, aided by rules requiring fund transfer orders to be prepared within 15 days of work done. 

The policy implications are significant as with MGNREGS becoming counter-cyclical, any increase in demand could well indicate signs of stress. These need not be related to deficient rainfall, that can be mapped through meteorological means, but also point to specific and localised reasons that can prompt governments to launch closer investigations.

The big difference in ALP is that it does away with the cumbersome old payment system that was multi-layered — gram panchayats notified mandal offices which passed on the payment demand to state offices which then crosschecked and released funds that travelled down from district to mandal offices and were transferred to gram panchayat accounts for final distribution to beneficiaries.

The government’s drive to generate bank accounts through the Jan Dhan Yojana that also sought linkage with mobile phones and Aadhaar made verification of identity and the poor beneficiary’s access to her account a much more efficient and foolproof process while eliminating a host of intermediaries.

TOP COMMENT
Surprising to see no comments on this whereas the other way around if petrol prices are increased by 10 paise people will jump and start abusing the govt.
Kailash Nair

Post-ALP, the increase in average number of muster rolls filled was 5,727 and the average of households that reached 100 days went up to 621 households. The average person days worked was 3,26,019 days. On an average, amount disbursed to bank accounts was Rs 2.7 crore.

13750 - UIDAI says Aadhaar Act prohibits police use of its biometric database - Biometric Update

Jun 26, 2018 | Stephen Mayhew

The Unique Identity Authority of India (UIDAI) has responded to a pitch from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) for limited Aadhaar access as a potential tool to aid police investigations, saying that the Aadhaar Act does not allow law enforcement use of the biometric database, and that it has never shared data with any law enforcement agency, The Times of India reports.

NCRB Director Ish Kumar said that gaining limited access to the Aadhaar database could help police catch first-time offenders and identify bodies.

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  • “There is need for access to Aadhaar data to police for the purpose of investigation,” Kumar said. “This is essential because 80 to 85 per cent of the criminals every year are first time offenders with no records (of them available) with the police. But, they also leave their fingerprints while committing crime, there is need for limited access to Aadhaar, so that we can catch them.”
    The UIDAI answered that Section 29 of the Aadhaar Act of 2016 prohibits access to Aadhaar for criminal investigation purposes. Section 33 of the Act allows very limited exceptions in cases of national security, but only after authorization by an oversight committee.
    “It may be underlined here that when Mumbai high court gave orders to share biometric data with an investigating agency in a particular case, the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court which stayed that order,” the UIDAI said in a statement.
    The UIDAI also pointed out that this position is part of the defence of Aadhaar before India’s Supreme Court, on which a ruling is expected soon, and that the Act only authorizes biometric data to be used to generate Aadhaar numbers and authenticate people 1-to-1.


    Facial recognition is expected to be added to the Aadhaar program on August 1, which could also increase resistance to providing police access to the database, based on reactions to similar uses of biometrics in other countries.

    13749 - Twisting the Truth Around Aadhaar in the Land of Luddites - The Wire


    The pugilistic UIDAI chief Ajay Bhushan Pandey attempts to draw a disingenuous distinction between 'secrecy' and 'privacy'. He is wrong on the law as well as on the underlying concept.


    A man goes through the process of eye scanning for the Unique Identification (UID) database system, also known as Aadhaar, at a registration centre in New Delhi, India, January 17, 2018. Picture taken January 17, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Saumya Khandelwal - RC1F67907F80

    TECH27/JUN/2018

    Joseph Goebbels, the famed guru of Nazi propaganda, is supposed to have once said: “If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth.”

    Goebbels appears to have found a devoted disciple in the UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) and its head honcho, Ajay Bhushan Pandey, who’ve been relentlessly arguing that Aadhaar is one of the most secure systems ever. And that there’ve been no data breaches till date.

    Nothing could be further from the truth. Even since its inception, the Aadhaar ecosystem has been characterised by some of the most egregious breaches ever. An undercover investigation by The Tribune demonstrated how Aadhaar details of more than a billion Indians could be accessed for a paltry sum of Rs 500! All thanks to the carelessly cultured regime of Aadhaar enrollment agencies (comprising village-level operators and the like) who were offered wanton access to the database by the “authority”.

    A later breach involving an entrepreneurial engineer, Abhinav Srivastava, demonstrated how unauthorised private parties (such as Srivastava) could conduct Aadhaar authentications on their own. All thanks to the sheer callousness of government agencies such as National Informatics Centre (NIC)  in opening up their applications (in this case, “e-hospitals”) to surreptitious spoofing. Till date, there has been no known action taken against NIC.

    More recently, two cybersecurity experts, Srinivas Kodali and Karan Saini found that a government website effectively permitted unauthorised third parties to access Aadhaar style authentication services. There are countless other horror stories doing the rounds.

    And yet, the authority and its creative chairman continually claim that there has been no “breach”. They even go to the extent of branding those that complain against Aadhaar as tech “luddites”.

    So consistent has been their stand that that they repeated the same claim in the Supreme Court… on oath! Funnily enough, they even contended that a five-feet thick wall would ensure the perpetual security of Aadhaar data. One wonders who the Luddites really are.

    The claims of UIDAI are nothing more than a deliberate attempt to obfuscate and mislead. Worryingly, they also demonstrate an irksome ignorance of basic privacy tenets; not to mention the express provisions of the Aadhaar Act, under whose benevolent umbrella, the chairman and others at UIDAI draw their authority.

                A woman registers for Aadhaar. Credit: Reuters

    Section 28 of the Aadhaar Act makes clear that the UIDAI has to ensure the security and confidentiality of all “identity information” held by it, either directly or through its various partners/affiliates. In fact, so strict is the obligation that the authority has to even protect against the “accidental destruction or loss” of data.

    Importantly, protectable data under the Act has been defined to include not only “biometric” data, but also an individual’s Aadhaar number and demographic information (address, telephone number etc).

    The Tribune breach more than amply demonstrated that all of the above was compromised: for a paltry Rs 500, one could enter any Aadhaar number and get access to the corresponding demographic information and even biometric data (defined under the Act to include a “photograph”).

    I have recounted all of this meticulously in a writ petition filed before the Delhi court, where I’ve sought to make the government accountable for these various breaches; and claimed damages from them for violating my right to privacy.
    A right that has now been affirmed by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in the Puttuswamy case to merit the highest level of protection under the law of our land; namely as a “fundamental” constitutional right.

    Unfortunately however, the Aadhaar Act engenders a classic conflict of interest-type situation, in that it relies on the “authority” to take action against itself! As John Perry Barlow, the founding father of internet freedom,  famously said: “Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a peeping tom to install your window blinds.”
    Fortunately, however, not all is lost. The Information Technology (IT) Act as well as common law doctrines enable the common man to directly sue the authority and its various affiliates and hold them accountable for privacy lapses. Unfortunately, while the remedy under section 43 of the IT Act for a privacy breach is constitutionally suspect, in that it permits a government-appointed person to unilaterally adjudicate upon what is essentially a legal dispute, the various common law doctrines to protect privacy (deriving from an area of law called tort law) are more robust.

    I have highlighted all of this in the writ petition mentioned earlier and requested the court to appoint an expert committee that would investigate these various breaches and the level of compliance with reasonable security/privacy policies by the Aadhaar authority. Given the obfuscatory claims around the breaches, such a neutral investigative report would go a long way in helping us understand the true extent of the breaches and the damage(s) caused to privacy interests.

    Interestingly, in The Indian Express piece referred to earlier, the pugilistic Pandey attempts to draw a disingenuous distinction between “secrecy” and “privacy”; claiming that Aadhaar numbers are not “secret” and, therefore, need not be protected.
    He is wrong on the law, and wrong on the underlying concept. While privacy and secrecy are no doubt inter-related, the right to privacy does not depend on something being an absolute “secret”. Rather, privacy is about the level of control that one has over information pertaining to oneself. I decide how much information I want to give out and to whom. Merely because I dole out my Aadhaar number to a couple of service providers does not mean that other service providers are entitled to access this number without my permission.  

    The same with my telephone number, email ID and so on. Privacy ultimately is about self-determination and my ability to control my public persona.  Even otherwise, the terms of the Aadhaar Act and the IT Act make amply clear that one’s Aadhaar number operates as a “password” and is to be protected as such.

    It bears noting that the “Aadhaar” project was never designed with privacy in mind. Much like a number of other programmes in India, it began with one set of objectives, namely to eliminate identity fraud whilst providing for government benefits. This quickly morphed into another set of objectives once its potential for private gain was realised. Indeed, at the heart of the Aadhaar debate today is not just government control over data subjects. But the ability of private corporations to exploit our data (the new “oil”) for their own commercial gain.

    Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act enables such private enterprises to ride on the backbone of Aadhaar authentication architecture. Little wonder then that an entire ecosystem of private enterprises have developed around Aadhaar. One such enterprise is iSPIRT, that has the blessings of Nandan Nilekani, the technocratic mastermind behind Aadhaar.

    In a now deleted tweet, a colleague of Nilekani’s recounted a dinner conversation where he allegedly quipped that the best way to roll out new projects in India is to “Make it too big to reverse”.

    "Too big to reverse" – confessions of intentions are easier over a nice dinner in friendly company. https://t.co/szXbmJzhnu
    — Salil Tripathi (@saliltripathi) May 26, 2018

    The Aadhaar enterprise is no doubt a “big” one today. But bigger things have been reversed by our courts in the past.
    Indeed, the “bigness” of an enterprise should be no consideration for courts that adjudicate on critical issues of civil liberties. Liberties that foster our autonomy and help us blossom to our fullest potential. For in the end, these are what define us as humans and distinguish us from machines, artificially intelligent or otherwise.


    Shamnad Basheer is the Founder and Managing Trustee of IDIA, an initiative to empower underprivileged communities through legal education.