In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Thursday, September 10, 2015

8676 - EU Court of Justice rules on Regulation regarding standards for collecting and using biometric data in passport production



…But side-steps the bigger issue about the compatibility of possible secondary use and storage of such biometric data with privacy and data protection law

With the development of biometric technology and its expanding use in the public and the private sector, privacy and security concerns are increasingly growing and formal guidance correspondingly sought on the legal rules that govern them. On 16 April, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its preliminary ruling in Willems and Others v Burgemeester van Nuth and Others C-446-12 to C-449/12 in this area. The case concerned the interpretation of an EU Regulation (2252/2004, ‘the Regulation’) on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States (subsequently amended by Regulation (EC) No 444/2009). More details about the Regulation, and why it was introduced as a counter-terrorism measure, can be found here.

The referral request to the CJEU in this case was made by a Dutch court adjudicating on similar claims by Dutch nationals who had made passport or identity card applications. In each case, the individual in question has refused to provide biometrics (digital fingerprints and a facial image) and the Dutch authority had refused their applications as a result. The claims alleged that the creation and storing of their biometric data by the authority constituted a breach of the individuals’ physical integrity and right to privacy. In particular, the claimants alleged that there are no provisions clearly identifying the persons who will have access to biometric data and, in the future, the authorities might use biometric data for purposes other than those for which it was provided to them (e.g. for use by the intelligence and security services). This likelihood was portrayed in the context of concern that the biometric data would be stored on a centralised, and potentially non-secure, database.

The first question referred related to Article 1(3) of the Regulation, which states that the Regulation “applies to passports and travel documents issued by Member States” but not to “identity cards issued by Member States to their nationals or to temporary passports and travel documents having a validity of 12 months or less”. It was asked whether Article 1(3) must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply to identity cards, such as the Netherlands identity cards, issued by Member States to their nationals, regardless of their period of validity and regardless of the possibilities of using them as travel documents? (In other words, the point here is that such identity cards may be used as passports for travel within the EU.) The CJEU responded by confirming that the Regulation does not apply to identity cards.

The second, more contentious, question asks about the interpretation Member States should give to Article 4(3) of the Regulation. This states as follows: “For the purposes of the Regulation, the biometric features in passports and travel documents should only be used for verifying (a) the authenticity of the document; and (b) the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the passport or other travel documents are required to be produced by law”. In particular, the CJEU was asked to consider whether Article 4(3) must be interpreted as meaning that, when the Member States give effect to the Regulation, there should be a statutory guarantee that the biometric data collected and stored pursuant to that regulation may not be collected, processed and used for any purposes other than the issuing of the document concerned? The added twist was that this question was framed from the perspective that Article 4(3) be read in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’, Articles 7 and 8), the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’, Article 8(2)), and the Data Protection Directive (‘the DP Directive’, Articles 6(1)(b) and 7(f) read in conjunction).

The CJEU ruled that the Regulation only governs the use of data for its specified purposes. Thus, it answered that that the Regulation does not require Member States to legislate to provide guarantees that biometric data could not be used for purposes other than those set out within it. In other words, the setting up or maintaining storage of biometric data by national institutions is a matter of domestic law (albeit that it might fall within the scope of EU law privacy and data protection if such rights are triggered for consideration by national courts).
In explaining its decision, the CJEU refers first to its 2013 decision in Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum [2013] EUECJ C-291/12 in response to a preliminary referral from a German court concerning the application of the Directive to the Regulation. In that judgement, the CJEU held that the requirement of a passport-issuing national authority for fingerprints to be submitted and stored on passports (in addition to photographs) was compatible with the Charter and the DP Directive. In particular, interference with privacy rights and the processing of personal data involved was justified on the basis that it was for a legitimate (security-related) public interest and the storage/use measures were proportionate to this interest. For example, the CJEU referred to the fact that the Regulation provided that the fingerprints could only be used to verify identity and that there would be no centralised database storing fingerprints. The CJEU also elucidated that, although fingerprint technology may be subject to fraud, this risk is justified because the technology is sufficiently effective and the taking of fingerprints is less invasive than an iris scan (and no more intrusive than having an official photograph taken).
What is most interesting about this decision is its omission. The CJEU found that there was no need to rule on the applicability or otherwise of the Charter, the ECHR, or the DP Directive to domestic law on the storage and use of biometric data for secondary purposes. Yet, this was exactly the issue that it appears the referring court was asking for guidance on!
This decision seems like a wasted opportunity by the Court to provide guidance on a crucial area of legal dispute and concern by citizens worried about state infringement of civil liberties. As there was no CJEU Advocate General’s Opinion in this case, outstanding questions on this topic to formally guide national courts may only be addressed fully upon another preliminary reference to the CJEU in the future.

In the meantime, provisions within the draft General Data Protection Regulation (the final text of which is currently under negotiation between the European Council and the European Parliament) underline the importance of the law’s role in ensuring the proportionate storage and use of biometric data, and its effective protection from misuse. These are the inclusion of a definition for “biometric data” (Article 4(11)) and recognition that processing such data presents “specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes” in respect of which the controller or the processor must carry out a data protection impact assessment (Article 33).

The EU Article 29 Working party has also produced a working document on biometrics (12168/02/EN) which raises particular concerns about systems using biometric data that can be collected without the data subject’s awareness, as well as an opinion on facial recognition in online and mobile services (WP192). A useful summary of the impact of data protection legislation on biometric data and systems is contained within a new white paper, entitled ‘The Impact of Privacy and Data Protection Legislation on Biometric Authentication’ published by market research firm, Goode Intelligence. It can be found here.
Even without the CJEU’s guidance, it is clear that those using biometric data must consider carefully their data protection obligations and put in place safeguards to ensure that biometrics are not used for non-legitimate purposes. Let’s hope EU case law catches up soon…


Alison Knight