Submitted by Kalyani Ramnath on Sun, 08/14/2011 - 00:32
The Identity Project, chronicling the United Kingdom’s national identity card scheme initiated in 2006, has extensive documentation on the country’s previous experiences. A brief summary here: In the past, national identification documents have been introduced in the United Kingdom for a variety of reasons. During both world wars, a population register as well as a national identity document was created in aid of military conscription and workforce planning. “Peacetime” efforts at a national identity number were crime-fighting devices. In 1988 – ’89, legislation for a national identity card stated that prevention of football hooliganism as a possible benefit. The idea of a National Entitlements Card was introduced in 2002. Both efforts failed in Parliament. By 2004, a six month trial of a biometric smart card was proposed and introduced. Soon after, the Identity Cards Act of 2006 introduced the idea of a national identity register. The register was reportedly to be used to aid “the provision of a convenient method for individuals to prove their identity and to provide a secure and reliable means of identifying individuals where it is considered to be in the public interest”. There was a very vocal public campaign against this scheme, documented by the Identity Project, which resulted in it being scrapped in December 2010. All the ID cards were to be cancelled within one month and the National Identity Register was to be destroyed.
It is useful at this juncture to record some of the issues that were associated with the last identity card scheme. Some of these concerns, once again, resonate with those voiced about Aadhar:
In 2002, the Home Office produced a consultation document addressing the question of Entitlements Card and Identity Cards. While providing all people lawfully resident in the United Kingdom with proof of identity, it also provided a means for people to get access to products and services to both public and private sectors and for their identity to be validated. It is this last aspect that of interest to a comparativist. Jon Agar, who has studied the wartime identity registers notes that the primary reason why the second succeeded was because it became practically impossible for people to claim rations without it. What was in reality an aid to military conscription thus was linked to welfare functions, thereby gaining greater public legitimacy. Outside its function as an entitlement card, Agar notes, the need for an identity was built upon professing to solve problems which did not exist in the first place. Indeed, in some cases, it was impossible to do so although grand claims are made. Like the Australia Card’s claim that it would deter people from defaulting child support payments, the national identity register claimed to stop instances of bigamy. In the first case, the card did not address the last mile problem, while in the second case, there was no great instances of bigamy in the UK at the time to begin with!
The identity card was also to contain biometric information – iris scans, thumbprints and / or an image. To refer to Agar’s arguments again, the simplicity of the 1939 card was the secret to its success. Authenticating a person’s identity is easier when the card itself does not contain as much information as is available with the government, on its registers. While acknowledging the falliability of biometric information, it is still pertinent to ask if the biometric information will be almost impossible to “forge”. Indeed, the technical grandeur of the Aadhar project is targeted at inspiring a sense of trust in people. A simple question-and-answer session would be sufficient instead of utilizing resources to create biometric authentication. But more importantly, it is necessary to look into how much of identity-related fraud a biometric card can solve. For example, the Identity Project at LSE records, based on government estimates, that identity fraud crimes may cost up to £1.3 billion a year, but only £35 million of this amount can be prevented using a more reliable identity card. De-duplication of records is one of Aadhar’s stated aims, but to what extent will a biometric card solve the problem? Here, the fallibility of technology is not the only issue, but also the economics of the same.
Finally, it was clear that the question of public confidence in these cards, particularly in relation to the security of personal data was something that the UK schemes were unable to address. Particularly interesting to read is the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s Second Report on Surveillance: Citizens and the State published in January 2009. In paragraph 339, the report states:
“Technological solutions, if not pursued within a wider design framework, may help to limit surveillance and protect privacy, but they should not be seen as a stand-alone solution. This is because the specific rules, norms and values - for example, data minimisation, access controls, and the means of anonymity - that may be built into technological systems must come from outside those systems themselves. We believe it is important to avoid assuming that a “technological fix” or “silver bullet” can be applied to what are essentially social and human rights issues.
The Committee recommended that there be greater safeguards on surveillance and data handling. In this context, it is important to flag an associated issue – that of the nature of regulatory oversight over delegated legislation, rulemaking powers or administrative orders passed by the functionaries in the system. In paragraph 359, the Committee notes that some level of secondary “lawmaking” would have been inevitable and perhaps, even desirable. In order to ensure that there is no “function creep” however, procedures for parliamentary oversight would have to be put in place. In the case of Aadhar, while the KYR information is standard, individual registrars are reportedly free to collect the KYR+ information in any manner they see fit without being subject to any kind of regulatory oversight. The KYR+ is only subject to the terms of the memorandum of understanding with the individual governments. The lack of a robust constitutional approach to these issues erodes public confidence in such issues, even in the face of professed technological dexterity.
A national identity number does not exist in the United Kingdom, although there is a taxpayer identification number that is widely used. It is also interesting to note that the numbers used for the second national population register during 1939 – 1952 became the template for the National Health Services number, which is widely used by citizens.
References:
Jon Agar, Identity cards in Britain: past experience and policy implications, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-33.html (2005)
LSE Identity Project, http://www.identityproject.lse.ac.uk/#LSE_Identity_Project_Reports
House of Lords Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (2009), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18...
It is useful at this juncture to record some of the issues that were associated with the last identity card scheme. Some of these concerns, once again, resonate with those voiced about Aadhar:
In 2002, the Home Office produced a consultation document addressing the question of Entitlements Card and Identity Cards. While providing all people lawfully resident in the United Kingdom with proof of identity, it also provided a means for people to get access to products and services to both public and private sectors and for their identity to be validated. It is this last aspect that of interest to a comparativist. Jon Agar, who has studied the wartime identity registers notes that the primary reason why the second succeeded was because it became practically impossible for people to claim rations without it. What was in reality an aid to military conscription thus was linked to welfare functions, thereby gaining greater public legitimacy. Outside its function as an entitlement card, Agar notes, the need for an identity was built upon professing to solve problems which did not exist in the first place. Indeed, in some cases, it was impossible to do so although grand claims are made. Like the Australia Card’s claim that it would deter people from defaulting child support payments, the national identity register claimed to stop instances of bigamy. In the first case, the card did not address the last mile problem, while in the second case, there was no great instances of bigamy in the UK at the time to begin with!
The identity card was also to contain biometric information – iris scans, thumbprints and / or an image. To refer to Agar’s arguments again, the simplicity of the 1939 card was the secret to its success. Authenticating a person’s identity is easier when the card itself does not contain as much information as is available with the government, on its registers. While acknowledging the falliability of biometric information, it is still pertinent to ask if the biometric information will be almost impossible to “forge”. Indeed, the technical grandeur of the Aadhar project is targeted at inspiring a sense of trust in people. A simple question-and-answer session would be sufficient instead of utilizing resources to create biometric authentication. But more importantly, it is necessary to look into how much of identity-related fraud a biometric card can solve. For example, the Identity Project at LSE records, based on government estimates, that identity fraud crimes may cost up to £1.3 billion a year, but only £35 million of this amount can be prevented using a more reliable identity card. De-duplication of records is one of Aadhar’s stated aims, but to what extent will a biometric card solve the problem? Here, the fallibility of technology is not the only issue, but also the economics of the same.
Finally, it was clear that the question of public confidence in these cards, particularly in relation to the security of personal data was something that the UK schemes were unable to address. Particularly interesting to read is the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s Second Report on Surveillance: Citizens and the State published in January 2009. In paragraph 339, the report states:
“Technological solutions, if not pursued within a wider design framework, may help to limit surveillance and protect privacy, but they should not be seen as a stand-alone solution. This is because the specific rules, norms and values - for example, data minimisation, access controls, and the means of anonymity - that may be built into technological systems must come from outside those systems themselves. We believe it is important to avoid assuming that a “technological fix” or “silver bullet” can be applied to what are essentially social and human rights issues.
The Committee recommended that there be greater safeguards on surveillance and data handling. In this context, it is important to flag an associated issue – that of the nature of regulatory oversight over delegated legislation, rulemaking powers or administrative orders passed by the functionaries in the system. In paragraph 359, the Committee notes that some level of secondary “lawmaking” would have been inevitable and perhaps, even desirable. In order to ensure that there is no “function creep” however, procedures for parliamentary oversight would have to be put in place. In the case of Aadhar, while the KYR information is standard, individual registrars are reportedly free to collect the KYR+ information in any manner they see fit without being subject to any kind of regulatory oversight. The KYR+ is only subject to the terms of the memorandum of understanding with the individual governments. The lack of a robust constitutional approach to these issues erodes public confidence in such issues, even in the face of professed technological dexterity.
A national identity number does not exist in the United Kingdom, although there is a taxpayer identification number that is widely used. It is also interesting to note that the numbers used for the second national population register during 1939 – 1952 became the template for the National Health Services number, which is widely used by citizens.
References:
Jon Agar, Identity cards in Britain: past experience and policy implications, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-33.html (2005)
LSE Identity Project, http://www.identityproject.lse.ac.uk/#LSE_Identity_Project_Reports
House of Lords Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (2009), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18...
