September 15, 2011
R. S. SHARMA
In his article “Aadhaar: on a platform of myths” (Edit Page, July 18), R. Ramakumar points to the failure of the U.K. National I.D. card project, the non-mandatory nature of the Social Security Number (S.S.N.) of the United States, and the possible failures of the biometric identification system to strengthen his case against Aadhaar. By doing so, he questions the motive of the project and the intentions of the government.
At the onset, it is important to state that while myths are dangerous, half truths are even more damaging. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has consistently allayed misplaced fears by articulating facts. For the benefit of the readers of The Hindu, we wish to clarify the contours of the Aadhaar project.
Firstly, the need for the intervention has to be understood. Millions of residents in India, especially the marginalised, lack nationally valid and reliable proof of identification. Aadhaar — backed by biometric de-duplication — is a secure and robust identification infrastructure that covers two shortcomings in the existing identity databases: fraud and duplication. Importantly, mandating Aadhaar in other databases for improvements in service delivery is the prerogative of the departments concerned. Moreover, UIDAI has consistently held that while it will not mandate Aadhaar, service providers could do the same while ensuring that there have been adequate opportunities for residents to enrol for Aadhaar.
It has to be further clarified that there are no penal consequences if a person does not choose to get an Aadhaar number. The Registrar General of India (RGI) is one of the important registrars of the UIDAI (which follows a multi-registrar approach) having the responsibility of preparing the National Population Register (NPR) under the Citizenship Rules 2003. The UIDAI will issue Aadhaar numbers to residents who enrol for Aadhaar through the RGI.
Secondly, viewing the Aadhaar exercise through the U.K./U.S. prisms is unfair since both those highly developed nations face problems that are dissimilar to those faced by India. Resultantly, the solutions also may need to be different.
The S.S.N. scheme in the U.S. was originally established for the sole purpose of administering the Federal government's social security pension scheme. However, it has evolved from a single-purpose to a multi-purpose identifier and acts as the de-facto identifier for taxation purposes, to open bank accounts, to receive benefits from the state and for private services.
Though the S.S.N. is not mandatory for U.S. residents, it is a requirement for all employed residents and some other categories of individuals.
Service providers (government and private) are allowed to mandate S.S.N. in order to deliver services. Though U.S. privacy law does state that services cannot be denied if an individual does not reveal their S.S.N., it is important to note that the same law also requires that S.S.N. be disclosed if mandated by federal statute. Further, the law only requires that the individual be informed if it is mandatory or voluntary to disclose and under what authority the S.S.N. is being sought and how it will be used. While comparisons between India and the U.S. are not warranted, the fact remains that identifiers are an essential and integral need of an efficient public service delivery system. In India, just as the resident has the option to get an Aadhaar, a service provider may choose to use Aadhaar as an identification framework for delivering their services.
The U.K. also has de-facto identifiers in the form of National Insurance and National Health Service (N.H.S.) numbers. The comparison of the introduction of a mandatory I.D. card in the U.K. in the context of security with a developmental initiative of the Government of India of Aadhaar is misleading and incorrect. Further, equating views on the impact of the U.K. I.D. card project to the Indian scenario is unjustified.
Understanding biometrics
Finally, the manner in which biometrics are being used in the Aadhaar project and the difference between a 1:N (during the time of enrolment) and a 1:1 check for authentication needs to be understood. At the time of enrolment, the resident's biometric data is compared to all other data sets in the UIDAI's CIDR (Central Identities Data Repository) to ensure uniqueness. During authentication, the resident's data is compared to the data linked to her/his Aadhaar number thereby significantly reducing scope for errors. The UIDAI recognises that no single technology is perfect but a combination of technologies can help reduce the possibility of inaccuracy. Therefore, in addition to collecting fingerprints, UIDAI also captures iris scans and a photograph. The Authority is aware of the technological limitations and is therefore using technology as appropriate and as required for the purpose of developing the identity infrastructure for India. Furthermore, since services cannot be denied in cases where residents may not have adequate and/or imperfect biometric attributes, the Authority has put in place an exception handling mechanism which ensures that the technology is reasonably supplemented so that it does not become an impediment between entitlements and beneficiaries.
The Government of India spends a sizeable proportion of the taxpayers' money on hundreds of welfare schemes for the benefit of millions of people. To that effect, it recognises the importance of establishing an effective identification infrastructure for its residents and is committed to creating the same in a cost effective and secure manner. In fact, deliberations with regards to creating such an infrastructure have been taking place within policy circles since 2006. Therefore, to allege that such a critical project has been undertaken without due diligence is in fact a myth. The UIDAI has engaged in a series of consultations with multiple stakeholders and continues to do so as it implements the Aadhaar project,
State-of-the-art technologies used in online railway reservation by the Indian Railways and the telecom revolution have convincingly demonstrated that India is capable of using high-end technology in the service of the common man and that we don't always need to follow the progression of developed nations to solve our unique problems.
The Aadhaar project has a pro-poor, inclusive agenda which is an enabler for better delivery of services and enhanced transparency in governance. Comparing it to other I.D. projects in the western world without understanding its context is over-simplistic and needs to be countered.
(R.S. Sharma is Director-General and Mission Director, UIDAI.)
________________________________
Iam not sure whether this clarifies much but for me it raises more doubts about the project. It does not address the broad perspective of the questions raised against the project.While the stated objective is 'developmental' there is a serious possibility of misuse in the future.The claims of British gov was also that it would prevent leakages,it would help NHS etc.This has not been discussed in the public sphere before the hasty implementation of the project.The claim that some thinktanks of the gov discussed it in a narrow circle is laughable to say the least.However the statement that only those who enrol for Aadhar through NPR will get the number clarifies something.
Instead of asserting that it is misplaced, unjustified etc the UIDAI should convince by answering the questions raised and not by running away from real questions.
from: Arun
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:00 IST
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:42 IST
Laughable response by R. S. Sharma. UIDAI is the mother of all scams surpassing 3G, CWG by orders of magnitude. Here are reasons why:
I am glad to see this rare instance of an explanation from a power-holder towards the out of option public. Sadly the happiness is short-lived. The article is still NOT able to clearly differentiate why we should not compare the system in US/UK and in here despite emphasizing on it repeatedly. Whereas our population size and development level differ substantially,the failure of the initiative in US/UK was not because of any of them. The failure was due to inability to get away the de-duplication in long terms. Also i fail to find an answer to optional/mandatory issue of Aadhar. If its an integral part of NPR, which is punishable in case of neglect,how come it is optional?
Lastly, i would say though the initiative smells of good-will, expecting all these difficulties it would have been better to initially keep the scheme to Poor(say below poverty line) and expanding it on performance. After all, they are projected to be the real beneficiaries from the scheme.
from: kunal
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 18:24 IST
I post again - Nirmalji has spoken on behalf of millions of defeated citizens. All these voices have only one thing to say - can we first let it be tried out? I for one have worked with systems all my life and am clear that the technology is excellent and on par with that of a Rolls Royce car engine or that of our PSLV.
The success of all systems depends hugely on the people involved. Clearly in this case the government is backing this project, Dr Manmohan Singh and Mrs Sonia Gandhi both went to Nandurbar to launch the project. YS Reddy made MGNREGA a success in Andhra without technology backing him. Thus, when technology is available it will allow many Chief Ministers to bypass their bureaucracy and reach out to the masses. Now why would the political class attempt this? The answer is clear. YSR won his election based on his success with MGNREGA ; other CM's have noted this. Can this data be misused ?Our CONSTITUTION has been subverted.Once again, let us wait and we can fix abuses.Kishoreji has raised a question of cost - this is going to be miniscule compared to the benefits.Our political leaders and Nandan Nilekani would have done this calculation - can they make it public?
I believe that we have subsidies of about Rs 170,000 crore every year - if the maintenance of Aadhar database costs Rs 2500 crore per year(perhaps my estimate on the higher side) and it prevents corruption of say 75% ( Rajiv Gandhi - only about 15 paise per rupee reaches the aam admi) it is worth it.
Bharatji and Thiru Balaji remind us that the government has not made this compulsory - pl remember they can.For political reasons they are waiting for the first success stories and they will come.Then they can legislate,Also,if people themselves like its advantages,the government need not make a new law. The government has introduced PAN No.,it can introduce AadharID.An astute government is however letting people choose it voluntarily!
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 20:44 IST
It has taken the Author a long time of almost two months to respond to the original article that was published in July 2011! As of now, Aadhar web site does not respond to enquiries regarding the status of one's Aadhar application, as it is supposed to.
If a simple issue like a query on a web site cannot be correctly implemented, I wonder how well the "high-end technology", cited by the Author, is actually being put in place to ensure that the data of applicants does not get mixed up. Readers may recall that with Voter ID cards there were implementation problems. Many never received their Voter ID cards, even though they had properly applied along with other members of their family who received theirs. Voter ID Cards sometimes contained wrong photographs, incorrect addresses and even gender errors!! I wonder how Mr. Nandan Nilekani can convince the public that the card which has been issued to them actually contains THEIR biometrics and not those of anyone else.
from: Udhishtir
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 21:00 IST
Data falling into foreign hands- quite funny because you end up providing your bio metrics while you travel abroad anyways. Moreover, the data is securely stored as well as transmitted using advanced 1024 encryption.
Cost of running is high - Nope. if it is popular then authentication services is one of the biggest cash cows of UID. Everyone from banks, cellphone ops, PDS will pay UID for authenticating. Its cheap for the service delivery org to make use of UID to authenticate their customer than have it do it themselves.
from: Murali Krishnan
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 08:16 IST
An interesting debate. Thoughtful points are raised, and in rebuttal, they are attacked as 'half-truths'. Sadly, instead of addressing the doubts, the author tries to deflect and sidetrack the core issues, presenting UIDAI's assumptions (unique biometrics, etc) as rooted in fact. Trading half-truths does not make for responsible discussion. Mr Sharma artfully glosses over the key issue with identity systems in the highly advanced countries he names: USA, UK and Germany; namely, that "the law only requires that the individual be informed ...how it will be used". Such data is sought to be highly protected (with spectacular failures) in those countries, unlike here in India where we already experience the fallout of rampant data leaks, for which the government is only now thinking about how to put safeguards in place. To this, UIDAI would like to add our biometrics (irreplaceable) and financial information (vested property). At the very least, it displays an only too familiar arrogance.
from: Vickram Crishna
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 08:53 IST
Need for identification to provide social welfare need not involve the rigors, expense and hazards of relying on technologically challenging, physically intrusive de-duplication scheme that is promised to us by UIDAI. While there is no penal consequence to being Aadhar-less, it is increasingly becoming a requisite in many places; Maharashtra requires its employees to have UIDAI number to draw their salaries. The situation is much worse for the poor. The enrollment process is arbitrary and necessarily incomplete for the urban destitutes, migratory work force, vast population of the internally displaced persons, and also for the needy in remote and far flung areas. How the UIDAI aims to be an 'aadhar' for the unreachable, non-addressed, mobile sections of the society, who are also its most needy, is unclear. Further, tying up social welfare programs like NREGA and BPL provisions with UIDAI is not only unfair, but also cruel under these circumstances.US and UK provide ample ID and benefits without requiring full(fool-proof techno interventions against fraud or duplication. These examples cannot be ignored since such biometrically reliant UID systems were considered unfeasible (on account of margins of errors, amongst other reasons) even in these more technologically advanced nations, which are dealing with far smaller populations.
The poor in India, the labor class, old and malnourished have severe problems in biometrics measurements and this is well documented and also acknowledged by the authority. Also, while detailed biometric information is acquired at enrollment, the future authentication for use primarily relies on the finger print data. Rigorous and scientific feasibility studies to assess the margins of errors in biometrics have not been conducted and the 'exception handling mechanism', in case of failures, is yet to be disclosed.
Statement relating to online railway reservation is meaningless and irrelevant in the context of an invasive UID. That the middle class of India is increasingly technologically proficient cannot be used to mandate UIDAI with ill defined, unregulated and enormous authority to access, appropriate and utilise highly private, personalised, complex data sets of our entire population (as defined by them). That this data system is also highly complex and susceptible to errors, human and technological, qualifies the program for substantial worry and minute scrutiny.Additional concerns about UIDAI stem from its lack of legal sanction or sanction of law; undisclosed, large and apparently elastic budget funded by taxpayers; its ties to Natgrid; safety, utilisation, and restrictions about sharing the data set. An idea that has recently taken hold of some of our imaginations, in reaction to elaborate UIDAI scheme, is to universalise basic rights to all citizens of this nation including food, water, shelter, education, health and security as a fundamental right garunteed by the constitution - and without getting an iris scan.
from: Arati Chokshi
The technology of biometrics as an unique identifier has no scientific backing, especially in case of large heterogeneous populations such as ours. The pilots that the uidai did were suitably biased to eliminate "corner cases", as per the UIDAI's own admission. It requires not much research to discover that 70% of our population is involved in hard manual labour and actually belong to the excluded corner cases. Even within this study, there was no data disclosed whatsoever on the number of false rejects and false accepts. The claimed rate by UIDAI vendors of theses rates (known as FAR and FRR) is of the order of .0025%. Thus in the de duplication process, which involves (at the minimum) 1.2^9 x 10 comparisons one would end up with 30^6 false accepts and rejects. Not quite unique one might say. Of course the UIDAI officials love to dish around old nannies tales instead of hard facts. Innumerable additional tech and social facts glossed over by UIDAI.
from: JTD
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 15:01 IST
Any computer system is open to abuse as also any manual system abuse if the people behind it choose to compromise the system and get criminal. The technical staff of Railways allows only certain terminals to access the reservation system for Tatkal. This is easily solved by the police - no computer solution is needed. With this flaw, it still remains an excellent system - back to the old system, anyone?
Samir Kelekar has not answered why we can draw money from a bank , running into lakhs , with our fingerprint. Or why we easily give our fingerprints to foreign countries at immigration when we enter. Fingerprints are recognized by law , by banks and if someone can duplicate them it is a crime that only the police can tackle.The law accepts uniqueness of fingerprints.
The ordinary man will get all the benefits of an internal passport and direct transfer of cash subsidies to his bank accounts. Criminals are left to the police. Once again, we have to attempt this and then complain.
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 16:35 IST
"Finally, the manner in which biometrics are ......" is the best paragraph I have ever read on on UIDAI..Mr RS Sharma should make sure that it is pasted in all communication, be it website, facebook, marketing collatrals. Truth is there is lot of confusion about media outside.
from: Nitesh Duhan
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 17:31 IST
Aadhar has been conceptualized on the lines of SSN in the US. But the half-hearted approach with which it is being handled, raised questions about its authenticity. The agencies that are enrolling the people do not seem to be serious if the experience is any guide. I have heard many people murmuring that their date of birth mentioned only the year. Moreover, the main proof for various details being considered is the Voter ID card. Its authenticity we well known. The Chief Minister of Delhi's voter ID card was defective what to talk of others. So far only three crore cards have been issued. At this rate it would take more than a decade to complete the job. Moreover, what about the population which is on wheels? How will the people illegally coming from other countries like Bangladesh would be identified. I personally feel that it would be no better than the voter ID card except that there would be a central register to identify the card holder.
from: S L Gera
Posted on: Sep 17, 2011 at 10:30 IST
At the onset, it is important to state that while myths are dangerous, half truths are even more damaging. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has consistently allayed misplaced fears by articulating facts. For the benefit of the readers of The Hindu, we wish to clarify the contours of the Aadhaar project.
Firstly, the need for the intervention has to be understood. Millions of residents in India, especially the marginalised, lack nationally valid and reliable proof of identification. Aadhaar — backed by biometric de-duplication — is a secure and robust identification infrastructure that covers two shortcomings in the existing identity databases: fraud and duplication. Importantly, mandating Aadhaar in other databases for improvements in service delivery is the prerogative of the departments concerned. Moreover, UIDAI has consistently held that while it will not mandate Aadhaar, service providers could do the same while ensuring that there have been adequate opportunities for residents to enrol for Aadhaar.
It has to be further clarified that there are no penal consequences if a person does not choose to get an Aadhaar number. The Registrar General of India (RGI) is one of the important registrars of the UIDAI (which follows a multi-registrar approach) having the responsibility of preparing the National Population Register (NPR) under the Citizenship Rules 2003. The UIDAI will issue Aadhaar numbers to residents who enrol for Aadhaar through the RGI.
Secondly, viewing the Aadhaar exercise through the U.K./U.S. prisms is unfair since both those highly developed nations face problems that are dissimilar to those faced by India. Resultantly, the solutions also may need to be different.
The S.S.N. scheme in the U.S. was originally established for the sole purpose of administering the Federal government's social security pension scheme. However, it has evolved from a single-purpose to a multi-purpose identifier and acts as the de-facto identifier for taxation purposes, to open bank accounts, to receive benefits from the state and for private services.
Though the S.S.N. is not mandatory for U.S. residents, it is a requirement for all employed residents and some other categories of individuals.
Service providers (government and private) are allowed to mandate S.S.N. in order to deliver services. Though U.S. privacy law does state that services cannot be denied if an individual does not reveal their S.S.N., it is important to note that the same law also requires that S.S.N. be disclosed if mandated by federal statute. Further, the law only requires that the individual be informed if it is mandatory or voluntary to disclose and under what authority the S.S.N. is being sought and how it will be used. While comparisons between India and the U.S. are not warranted, the fact remains that identifiers are an essential and integral need of an efficient public service delivery system. In India, just as the resident has the option to get an Aadhaar, a service provider may choose to use Aadhaar as an identification framework for delivering their services.
The U.K. also has de-facto identifiers in the form of National Insurance and National Health Service (N.H.S.) numbers. The comparison of the introduction of a mandatory I.D. card in the U.K. in the context of security with a developmental initiative of the Government of India of Aadhaar is misleading and incorrect. Further, equating views on the impact of the U.K. I.D. card project to the Indian scenario is unjustified.
Understanding biometrics
Finally, the manner in which biometrics are being used in the Aadhaar project and the difference between a 1:N (during the time of enrolment) and a 1:1 check for authentication needs to be understood. At the time of enrolment, the resident's biometric data is compared to all other data sets in the UIDAI's CIDR (Central Identities Data Repository) to ensure uniqueness. During authentication, the resident's data is compared to the data linked to her/his Aadhaar number thereby significantly reducing scope for errors. The UIDAI recognises that no single technology is perfect but a combination of technologies can help reduce the possibility of inaccuracy. Therefore, in addition to collecting fingerprints, UIDAI also captures iris scans and a photograph. The Authority is aware of the technological limitations and is therefore using technology as appropriate and as required for the purpose of developing the identity infrastructure for India. Furthermore, since services cannot be denied in cases where residents may not have adequate and/or imperfect biometric attributes, the Authority has put in place an exception handling mechanism which ensures that the technology is reasonably supplemented so that it does not become an impediment between entitlements and beneficiaries.
The Government of India spends a sizeable proportion of the taxpayers' money on hundreds of welfare schemes for the benefit of millions of people. To that effect, it recognises the importance of establishing an effective identification infrastructure for its residents and is committed to creating the same in a cost effective and secure manner. In fact, deliberations with regards to creating such an infrastructure have been taking place within policy circles since 2006. Therefore, to allege that such a critical project has been undertaken without due diligence is in fact a myth. The UIDAI has engaged in a series of consultations with multiple stakeholders and continues to do so as it implements the Aadhaar project,
State-of-the-art technologies used in online railway reservation by the Indian Railways and the telecom revolution have convincingly demonstrated that India is capable of using high-end technology in the service of the common man and that we don't always need to follow the progression of developed nations to solve our unique problems.
The Aadhaar project has a pro-poor, inclusive agenda which is an enabler for better delivery of services and enhanced transparency in governance. Comparing it to other I.D. projects in the western world without understanding its context is over-simplistic and needs to be countered.
(R.S. Sharma is Director-General and Mission Director, UIDAI.)
________________________________
COMMENTS:
Iam not sure whether this clarifies much but for me it raises more doubts about the project. It does not address the broad perspective of the questions raised against the project.While the stated objective is 'developmental' there is a serious possibility of misuse in the future.The claims of British gov was also that it would prevent leakages,it would help NHS etc.This has not been discussed in the public sphere before the hasty implementation of the project.The claim that some thinktanks of the gov discussed it in a narrow circle is laughable to say the least.However the statement that only those who enrol for Aadhar through NPR will get the number clarifies something.
Instead of asserting that it is misplaced, unjustified etc the UIDAI should convince by answering the questions raised and not by running away from real questions.
from: Arun
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:00 IST
Very Good Article. Hope it is also translated into various Indian languages and carried in mother tongue language newspapers. AADHAAR is the most important initiative after NREGA.
from: Amit
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:09 IST
from: Amit
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:09 IST
The failure of UK and USA to have an identification document for all its citizens should not detract us from attempting the same. We may and in my opinion will succeed where they have failed. This is primarily because our motivation levels are different and our management process is backed by political will. It should be noted that the Germans have a concept of Personalausweiss i.e a personal identity card. This is issued by the government and is used by citizens for a variety of services. This identity card is a success. Why has R Ramakumar not pointed this out ? Fingerprints are recognized in law as being unique. If India wishes to capture this data for all its citizens and identify them based on this , success is guaranteed. In addition capture of iris scans and a photo make this almost foolproof. Doubts on the uniqueness of this combination are far fetched. These doubts appear an attempt to criticize for the sake of criticism. Let us wish Aadhar luck ; it is badly needed.
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:14 IST
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 08:14 IST
Kudos to Sharma Ji for a very simple answer to the doubts posted in the earlier article regarding the validity/feasibility of biometric data capture. It was an eye opener. But in a country where the PDS system itself is so flawed, will this endeavor which comes with a great cost to exchequer benefit the poor for which the scheme is made?
Even though the UID is not mandatory, if all the necessary service providers starts asking for it, then those who do not wish to enroll for UID will have no alternate, but to enroll. The cost involved in procuring the data, keeping it, and then updating it with the ever increasing population always involve huge amount of sums. This won't be a one time investment There will be huge running cost for maintaining the data centers which will always come out of the tax payers money. Once the UID gets accepted ad de facto identity card there is no turning back and the govt will have to bear with the running cost forever.
from: Kishore R
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 10:17 IST
Even though the UID is not mandatory, if all the necessary service providers starts asking for it, then those who do not wish to enroll for UID will have no alternate, but to enroll. The cost involved in procuring the data, keeping it, and then updating it with the ever increasing population always involve huge amount of sums. This won't be a one time investment There will be huge running cost for maintaining the data centers which will always come out of the tax payers money. Once the UID gets accepted ad de facto identity card there is no turning back and the govt will have to bear with the running cost forever.
from: Kishore R
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 10:17 IST
Finally, an authoritative voice to challenge the baseless smear campaign against UIDAI by self styled guardians of privacy.An advise to all those who are opposing UIDAI without valid reasons - please campaign for good privacy and data protection law in India which will cover personal information collected not only by UIDAI but all other private and public agencies.Way to go Mr. Sharma.
from: Jasjit Singh
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 10:20 IST
from: Jasjit Singh
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 10:20 IST
The article is addressing the fact that Aadhar does not mandate its UID but it cannot stop the departments to mandate the same. It is critical to understand this here, true that using a combination of technologies helps in mitigating erroneous data and tackling inaccuracy of the same but the article does not talk about the safety of the data collected, efficient data storage and safe data storage are two very different things. It would be really helpful if Aadhar or the competent authority comes forward and assures the nation that the data collected will not be misused to any extent as it involves sensitive information of millions of people which, if it falls in the hands of anti-nationals could spell doom for us all.
from: bharath
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 11:20 IST
from: bharath
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 11:20 IST
"Moreover, UIDAI has consistently held that while it will not mandate Aadhaar, service providers could do the same while ensuring that there have been adequate opportunities for residents to enrol for Aadhaar.". So, it is like weapon manufacturers suggesting that they don't "mandate" their users to use those weapons. If anyone is likely to be affected by those weapons, it is their responsibility to protect themselves!
from: Balaji
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:11 IST
from: Balaji
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:11 IST
whenever we as Nation start doing good things some of us start doubting on the technology aspect...start giving the negagtive feedback.....better we stick to plan and then move forward. Mr. Sharma has clarified all the doubts over UIDAI. We are nation of 1.2 billion population and we need some systematic change to fine tune our system delivery model and make it transparent using ICT intervention. UIDAI initiation by Govt. of India is the welcome step toward cearting transparency in governance and delivery of services to last mile stone.It is time to stick with this project rather than creating doubts.
from: Nirmal Prakash
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:42 IST
from: Nirmal Prakash
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:42 IST
The rejoinder by Mr. R.S. Sharma (“UIDAI clarifies on Aadhaar,” Sept. 15) justifying the UIDAI project was interesting. We need to have a UID for every citizen, but there needs to be accountability. Mr. Sharma himself accepts that no biometric system is foolproof. Previously, the government undertook a pilot project for 30 lakh citizens, but what was the outcome? There must be a district-level database which can be used by all agencies with laws to ensure privacy.
S. Ramachandran, Chennai
The rejoinder deserves a rebuttal. Here are a few reasons: was an adequate study of the current identity solutions made before coming up with this expensive project called the UID? What happens when the biometric data is stolen/faked? It is possible to fake data for as low a sum as Rs.30 and get past biometric scanners. Facts on whether deduplication is possible at the scales needed by the UIDAI are unknown, something admitted by the UIDAI's biometric committee. There are no answers on issues of handing out personal information to foreign companies whose ownership itself is unknown to the UIDAI — a fact admitted by the UIDAI in an RTI response, a lack of a cost-benefit analysis or privacy issues.
Samir Kelekar, Bangalore
The title of the article was misleading as the writer has hardly clarified how the problems of imperfect biometrics of individuals are being overcome. Nor has there been any concrete reasons on why Aadhar should not be compared with the U.K.'s ID project. The replies were nothing but bureaucratic beating around the bush.
Abishek Lunia, Coimbatore
S. Ramachandran, Chennai
The rejoinder deserves a rebuttal. Here are a few reasons: was an adequate study of the current identity solutions made before coming up with this expensive project called the UID? What happens when the biometric data is stolen/faked? It is possible to fake data for as low a sum as Rs.30 and get past biometric scanners. Facts on whether deduplication is possible at the scales needed by the UIDAI are unknown, something admitted by the UIDAI's biometric committee. There are no answers on issues of handing out personal information to foreign companies whose ownership itself is unknown to the UIDAI — a fact admitted by the UIDAI in an RTI response, a lack of a cost-benefit analysis or privacy issues.
Samir Kelekar, Bangalore
The title of the article was misleading as the writer has hardly clarified how the problems of imperfect biometrics of individuals are being overcome. Nor has there been any concrete reasons on why Aadhar should not be compared with the U.K.'s ID project. The replies were nothing but bureaucratic beating around the bush.
Abishek Lunia, Coimbatore
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 14:42 IST
Laughable response by R. S. Sharma. UIDAI is the mother of all scams surpassing 3G, CWG by orders of magnitude. Here are reasons why:
1) no cost benefit analysis;
2) biometrics does not work; fingerprints fakable in 30 rupees of material; biometrics easily stolen.
3) de-duplication not known to work beyond 50 million; admitted by UIDAI's own biometric committee.
4) contracts given to unknown foreign parties; ownership of vendors not known and is admitted by UIDAI in its RTI response; Indians' personal information given to foreigners; no concept of security clearance to be a vendor for this critical project.
5) people's biometric data already stolen by fakers; they have lost their identity for good. UIDAI has no fall back. 6) Benefits claimed by UIDAI unproven. No study of any kind done. Leakages in schmes like PDS are known to happen with connivance with politicians; UIDAI cant fix them 7) No study done of current identity schemes; and why another white elephant is needed.
from: Samir Kelekar
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 16:34 IST
5) people's biometric data already stolen by fakers; they have lost their identity for good. UIDAI has no fall back. 6) Benefits claimed by UIDAI unproven. No study of any kind done. Leakages in schmes like PDS are known to happen with connivance with politicians; UIDAI cant fix them 7) No study done of current identity schemes; and why another white elephant is needed.
from: Samir Kelekar
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 16:34 IST
I am glad to see this rare instance of an explanation from a power-holder towards the out of option public. Sadly the happiness is short-lived. The article is still NOT able to clearly differentiate why we should not compare the system in US/UK and in here despite emphasizing on it repeatedly. Whereas our population size and development level differ substantially,the failure of the initiative in US/UK was not because of any of them. The failure was due to inability to get away the de-duplication in long terms. Also i fail to find an answer to optional/mandatory issue of Aadhar. If its an integral part of NPR, which is punishable in case of neglect,how come it is optional?
Lastly, i would say though the initiative smells of good-will, expecting all these difficulties it would have been better to initially keep the scheme to Poor(say below poverty line) and expanding it on performance. After all, they are projected to be the real beneficiaries from the scheme.
from: kunal
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 18:24 IST
I post again - Nirmalji has spoken on behalf of millions of defeated citizens. All these voices have only one thing to say - can we first let it be tried out? I for one have worked with systems all my life and am clear that the technology is excellent and on par with that of a Rolls Royce car engine or that of our PSLV.
The success of all systems depends hugely on the people involved. Clearly in this case the government is backing this project, Dr Manmohan Singh and Mrs Sonia Gandhi both went to Nandurbar to launch the project. YS Reddy made MGNREGA a success in Andhra without technology backing him. Thus, when technology is available it will allow many Chief Ministers to bypass their bureaucracy and reach out to the masses. Now why would the political class attempt this? The answer is clear. YSR won his election based on his success with MGNREGA ; other CM's have noted this. Can this data be misused ?Our CONSTITUTION has been subverted.Once again, let us wait and we can fix abuses.Kishoreji has raised a question of cost - this is going to be miniscule compared to the benefits.Our political leaders and Nandan Nilekani would have done this calculation - can they make it public?
I believe that we have subsidies of about Rs 170,000 crore every year - if the maintenance of Aadhar database costs Rs 2500 crore per year(perhaps my estimate on the higher side) and it prevents corruption of say 75% ( Rajiv Gandhi - only about 15 paise per rupee reaches the aam admi) it is worth it.
Bharatji and Thiru Balaji remind us that the government has not made this compulsory - pl remember they can.For political reasons they are waiting for the first success stories and they will come.Then they can legislate,Also,if people themselves like its advantages,the government need not make a new law. The government has introduced PAN No.,it can introduce AadharID.An astute government is however letting people choose it voluntarily!
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 20:44 IST
It has taken the Author a long time of almost two months to respond to the original article that was published in July 2011! As of now, Aadhar web site does not respond to enquiries regarding the status of one's Aadhar application, as it is supposed to.
If a simple issue like a query on a web site cannot be correctly implemented, I wonder how well the "high-end technology", cited by the Author, is actually being put in place to ensure that the data of applicants does not get mixed up. Readers may recall that with Voter ID cards there were implementation problems. Many never received their Voter ID cards, even though they had properly applied along with other members of their family who received theirs. Voter ID Cards sometimes contained wrong photographs, incorrect addresses and even gender errors!! I wonder how Mr. Nandan Nilekani can convince the public that the card which has been issued to them actually contains THEIR biometrics and not those of anyone else.
from: Udhishtir
Posted on: Sep 15, 2011 at 21:00 IST
UIDIA is conceived with good intentions.Unfortunately some state governments are seeking information which is not part of the data needed for the ID card. In Karnataka there was an additional form that was attached. This naturally evokes apprehension UIDIA should make it clear that the citizens need not fill any additional forms that the local authorities may wish to add.
from: H.N.Ramakrishna
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 02:00 IST
from: H.N.Ramakrishna
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 02:00 IST
Data falling into foreign hands- quite funny because you end up providing your bio metrics while you travel abroad anyways. Moreover, the data is securely stored as well as transmitted using advanced 1024 encryption.
Cost of running is high - Nope. if it is popular then authentication services is one of the biggest cash cows of UID. Everyone from banks, cellphone ops, PDS will pay UID for authenticating. Its cheap for the service delivery org to make use of UID to authenticate their customer than have it do it themselves.
from: Murali Krishnan
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 08:16 IST
An interesting debate. Thoughtful points are raised, and in rebuttal, they are attacked as 'half-truths'. Sadly, instead of addressing the doubts, the author tries to deflect and sidetrack the core issues, presenting UIDAI's assumptions (unique biometrics, etc) as rooted in fact. Trading half-truths does not make for responsible discussion. Mr Sharma artfully glosses over the key issue with identity systems in the highly advanced countries he names: USA, UK and Germany; namely, that "the law only requires that the individual be informed ...how it will be used". Such data is sought to be highly protected (with spectacular failures) in those countries, unlike here in India where we already experience the fallout of rampant data leaks, for which the government is only now thinking about how to put safeguards in place. To this, UIDAI would like to add our biometrics (irreplaceable) and financial information (vested property). At the very least, it displays an only too familiar arrogance.
from: Vickram Crishna
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 08:53 IST
The two uses of technology which are pointed out for effective use of technology in India is the IRCTC (railways ) and telecom.Both of these technology are blatantly misused.The railways has not been able to curb the menace of middlemen in ticket booking system.The common man is still not able to get tatkal tickets if there is an urgency in travel. The telecom revolution is party to one of the biggest frauds in the history of this country.The 2G scam namely is still under investigation.If all was well then why did we get into such a murky situation.The next generation 3G network is also not without its share of problems.There has not been effective video calling facility even after 1 year of introduction of the technology.The myth that technology would help the UID solve problems at the bottom of the pyramid is also purely baseless.For a laborer working for 100 days the Gov would spend equivalent money on the infrastructure to control him.Is he/she a criminal or a crook to validate ??
from: Kanti
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 12:29 IST
from: Kanti
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 12:29 IST
Need for identification to provide social welfare need not involve the rigors, expense and hazards of relying on technologically challenging, physically intrusive de-duplication scheme that is promised to us by UIDAI. While there is no penal consequence to being Aadhar-less, it is increasingly becoming a requisite in many places; Maharashtra requires its employees to have UIDAI number to draw their salaries. The situation is much worse for the poor. The enrollment process is arbitrary and necessarily incomplete for the urban destitutes, migratory work force, vast population of the internally displaced persons, and also for the needy in remote and far flung areas. How the UIDAI aims to be an 'aadhar' for the unreachable, non-addressed, mobile sections of the society, who are also its most needy, is unclear. Further, tying up social welfare programs like NREGA and BPL provisions with UIDAI is not only unfair, but also cruel under these circumstances.US and UK provide ample ID and benefits without requiring full(fool-proof techno interventions against fraud or duplication. These examples cannot be ignored since such biometrically reliant UID systems were considered unfeasible (on account of margins of errors, amongst other reasons) even in these more technologically advanced nations, which are dealing with far smaller populations.
The poor in India, the labor class, old and malnourished have severe problems in biometrics measurements and this is well documented and also acknowledged by the authority. Also, while detailed biometric information is acquired at enrollment, the future authentication for use primarily relies on the finger print data. Rigorous and scientific feasibility studies to assess the margins of errors in biometrics have not been conducted and the 'exception handling mechanism', in case of failures, is yet to be disclosed.
Statement relating to online railway reservation is meaningless and irrelevant in the context of an invasive UID. That the middle class of India is increasingly technologically proficient cannot be used to mandate UIDAI with ill defined, unregulated and enormous authority to access, appropriate and utilise highly private, personalised, complex data sets of our entire population (as defined by them). That this data system is also highly complex and susceptible to errors, human and technological, qualifies the program for substantial worry and minute scrutiny.Additional concerns about UIDAI stem from its lack of legal sanction or sanction of law; undisclosed, large and apparently elastic budget funded by taxpayers; its ties to Natgrid; safety, utilisation, and restrictions about sharing the data set. An idea that has recently taken hold of some of our imaginations, in reaction to elaborate UIDAI scheme, is to universalise basic rights to all citizens of this nation including food, water, shelter, education, health and security as a fundamental right garunteed by the constitution - and without getting an iris scan.
from: Arati Chokshi
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 13:42 IST
The technology of biometrics as an unique identifier has no scientific backing, especially in case of large heterogeneous populations such as ours. The pilots that the uidai did were suitably biased to eliminate "corner cases", as per the UIDAI's own admission. It requires not much research to discover that 70% of our population is involved in hard manual labour and actually belong to the excluded corner cases. Even within this study, there was no data disclosed whatsoever on the number of false rejects and false accepts. The claimed rate by UIDAI vendors of theses rates (known as FAR and FRR) is of the order of .0025%. Thus in the de duplication process, which involves (at the minimum) 1.2^9 x 10 comparisons one would end up with 30^6 false accepts and rejects. Not quite unique one might say. Of course the UIDAI officials love to dish around old nannies tales instead of hard facts. Innumerable additional tech and social facts glossed over by UIDAI.
from: JTD
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 15:01 IST
Any computer system is open to abuse as also any manual system abuse if the people behind it choose to compromise the system and get criminal. The technical staff of Railways allows only certain terminals to access the reservation system for Tatkal. This is easily solved by the police - no computer solution is needed. With this flaw, it still remains an excellent system - back to the old system, anyone?
Samir Kelekar has not answered why we can draw money from a bank , running into lakhs , with our fingerprint. Or why we easily give our fingerprints to foreign countries at immigration when we enter. Fingerprints are recognized by law , by banks and if someone can duplicate them it is a crime that only the police can tackle.The law accepts uniqueness of fingerprints.
The ordinary man will get all the benefits of an internal passport and direct transfer of cash subsidies to his bank accounts. Criminals are left to the police. Once again, we have to attempt this and then complain.
from: Saurabh Sharma
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 16:35 IST
"Finally, the manner in which biometrics are ......" is the best paragraph I have ever read on on UIDAI..Mr RS Sharma should make sure that it is pasted in all communication, be it website, facebook, marketing collatrals. Truth is there is lot of confusion about media outside.
from: Nitesh Duhan
Posted on: Sep 16, 2011 at 17:31 IST
Aadhar has been conceptualized on the lines of SSN in the US. But the half-hearted approach with which it is being handled, raised questions about its authenticity. The agencies that are enrolling the people do not seem to be serious if the experience is any guide. I have heard many people murmuring that their date of birth mentioned only the year. Moreover, the main proof for various details being considered is the Voter ID card. Its authenticity we well known. The Chief Minister of Delhi's voter ID card was defective what to talk of others. So far only three crore cards have been issued. At this rate it would take more than a decade to complete the job. Moreover, what about the population which is on wheels? How will the people illegally coming from other countries like Bangladesh would be identified. I personally feel that it would be no better than the voter ID card except that there would be a central register to identify the card holder.
from: S L Gera
Posted on: Sep 17, 2011 at 10:30 IST
