8 OCT, 2011, 04.44AM IST,
M RAJSHEKHAR,
ET BUREAU
Biometrics are the latest craze in Delhi's crumbling corridors of power. The census department is capturing them. So is the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). As are a myriad others - banking correspondents, state governments, government programmes like the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, the ministry of rural development for NREGA workers, the home ministry in India's coastal areas, etc.
Further, state government and central ministries are starting to integrate biometrics into their programmes. Madhya Pradesh, for instance, is integrating UID backed food coupons into its PDS programme. Bihar and Andhra Pradesh make NREGA payments after biometric authentication. In Delhi, the government is planning to link Aadhaar to LPG distribution. So is Punjab. It seems safe to say that, sooner or later, we will all share our fingerprints, iris scans, what have you, with one or more institutions.
Sadly, even as opinion has converged inside government about the desirability of using biometrics, there has been little discussion about the safeguards that need to accompany this transition to biometrics. Think about it. Till now, privacy asserted our rights over our thoughts and interactions with others. Biometrics, on the other hand, capture and share information about our bodies.
As such, they create fresh vulnerabilities. What if biometrics get stolen or leaked into the public domain? Can they be misused? This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. Way back in 1993, it was found that a New York State policeman had lifted fingerprints from items a suspect had touched while in custody, attached them to evidence cards and claimed to have found the prints at the crime scene.
There are other concerns. Biometrics, unique for every individual, are used to generate unique numbers. In the years to come, banks, taxmen, telecom providers and others will add this number to their databases. At which point, the UID number will become a common link between discrete databases, allowing them to be compared. This is a stated objective. The website of the Ministry of Home Affairs says: "(The UID project) envisages provision of linking of existing databases, as well as providing for future additions, by the user agencies."
This has pros and cons. For instance, the agriculture ministry and the rural ministry can compare databases to see how many farmers availing tractor loans also collected Indira Awas Yojana payments - meant only for BPL households. But, if two ministeries can compare databases, so can, say, hospitals and insurance companies. This is a risk that goes beyond intrusive marketing.
In India, people are not afraid to speak out against the government. But, if the country becomes a giant panopticon where the state can monitor citizens' actions, could that end up muting dissent? At this time, these issues are not being taken seriously. Some say privacy is not important for the poor. But civil liberties are an universal right. Others dismiss these concerns over privacy. A Planning Commission member told ET he doesn't care if his phone gets tapped. That he has nothing to hide. But that is to miss the point entirely.
Further, state government and central ministries are starting to integrate biometrics into their programmes. Madhya Pradesh, for instance, is integrating UID backed food coupons into its PDS programme. Bihar and Andhra Pradesh make NREGA payments after biometric authentication. In Delhi, the government is planning to link Aadhaar to LPG distribution. So is Punjab. It seems safe to say that, sooner or later, we will all share our fingerprints, iris scans, what have you, with one or more institutions.
Sadly, even as opinion has converged inside government about the desirability of using biometrics, there has been little discussion about the safeguards that need to accompany this transition to biometrics. Think about it. Till now, privacy asserted our rights over our thoughts and interactions with others. Biometrics, on the other hand, capture and share information about our bodies.
As such, they create fresh vulnerabilities. What if biometrics get stolen or leaked into the public domain? Can they be misused? This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. Way back in 1993, it was found that a New York State policeman had lifted fingerprints from items a suspect had touched while in custody, attached them to evidence cards and claimed to have found the prints at the crime scene.
There are other concerns. Biometrics, unique for every individual, are used to generate unique numbers. In the years to come, banks, taxmen, telecom providers and others will add this number to their databases. At which point, the UID number will become a common link between discrete databases, allowing them to be compared. This is a stated objective. The website of the Ministry of Home Affairs says: "(The UID project) envisages provision of linking of existing databases, as well as providing for future additions, by the user agencies."
This has pros and cons. For instance, the agriculture ministry and the rural ministry can compare databases to see how many farmers availing tractor loans also collected Indira Awas Yojana payments - meant only for BPL households. But, if two ministeries can compare databases, so can, say, hospitals and insurance companies. This is a risk that goes beyond intrusive marketing.
In India, people are not afraid to speak out against the government. But, if the country becomes a giant panopticon where the state can monitor citizens' actions, could that end up muting dissent? At this time, these issues are not being taken seriously. Some say privacy is not important for the poor. But civil liberties are an universal right. Others dismiss these concerns over privacy. A Planning Commission member told ET he doesn't care if his phone gets tapped. That he has nothing to hide. But that is to miss the point entirely.
