Why this Blog ? News articles in the Wide World of Web, quite often disappear with time, when they are relocated as archives with a different url. Archives in this blog serve as a library for those who are interested in doing Research on Aadhaar Related Topics. Articles are published with details of original publication date and the url.
Aadhaar
The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018
When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy
First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi
In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi
“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi
“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.
Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.
Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha
“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh
But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP
“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.
August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"
“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden
In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.
Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.
Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.
UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy
1) Denial
2) Issue fiats and point finger
3) Shoot messenger
4) Bury head in sand.
God Save India
Monday, July 29, 2013
4444 - Virar shocker: Aadhar cards
4443 - Card payment may require biometric check - Financial Express
4442 - Do not rush to enrol for Aadhaar: MLA = The Hindu
4441 - Meghalaya suspends biometric enrolment of people
4440 - Direct Benefits Transfer scheme shifted to Finance Ministry
4439 - Rs 27 per day: India's new rural poverty line
4438 - NPR and Aadhaar - a confused process
4437 - Lessons Learnt From UID Data Loss
4436 - Aadhaar-LPG link costs consumers - Deccan Chronicle
4435 - Benefits scheme battles systemic quagmire
4434 - స్కాలర్షిప్కూ అదే ‘ఆధార్’!
- ఆధార్తో దరఖాస్తు చేసిన విద్యార్థులకే తొలి ప్రాధాన్యం
- ‘నగదు బదిలీ’కి ఎంపికైన 13 జిల్లాల్లో ఆధార్ తప్పనిసరి
- ఆయా కళాశాలల్లో ఆధార్ నమోదు కేంద్రాల ఏర్పాటు
సాక్షి, హైదరాబాద్: ఇంకా ఆధార్ కార్డు రాని విద్యార్థులు స్కాలర్షిప్ పొందాలంటే ఇక వెనుక వరుసలో నిలబడాల్సిందే. ఆధార్ కార్డును దరఖాస్తుతో జత చేసినవారికే మంజూరులో తొలి ప్రాధాన్యం ఇవ్వనున్నారు. వారి తర్వాతే ఆధార్ లేని విద్యార్థులకు ఇవ్వాలని సంక్షేమ శాఖల ఉన్నతాధికారులు ప్రాథమికంగా ఓ నిర్ణయం తీసుకున్నారు. కేంద్ర ప్రభుత్వం ప్రవేశపెట్టిన ప్రత్యక్ష నగదు బదిలీ (డీబీటీ) పథకాన్ని స్కాలర్షిప్లకు వర్తింపజేసే అంశంపై గురువారం సచివాలయంలో సాంఘిక సంక్షేమ శాఖ ముఖ్య కార్యదర్శి రేమండ్ పీటర్ నేతృత్వంలో ఆర్థిక శాఖ, ఇతర సంక్షేమ శాఖల ఉన్నతాధికారులు, లీడ్ బ్యాంకు అధికారులతో సమీక్ష సమావేశం నిర్వహించారు.
నగదు బదిలీ కింద రెండు దశల్లో ఎంపిక చేసిన 13 జిల్లాల్లోని విద్యార్థులకు ఆధార్ పేమెంట్ బ్రిడ్జి ద్వారా ఈ ఏడాది నుంచి స్కాలర్షిప్ ఇచ్చే విషయమై ఈ సమావేశంలో చర్చ జరిగింది. నగదు బదిలీకి ఆధార్ తప్పనిసరి అయినందున ఆధార్ ఉన్న విద్యార్థులకే తొలి ప్రాధాన్యం ఇవ్వాలని అధికారులు అభిప్రాయపడ్డారు. అలాగే ఆయా విద్యార్థులకు ప్రతి నెలా వారి బ్యాంకు ఖాతాల్లో స్కాలర్షిప్ జమ చేయాలని, ఆధార్ లేనివారికి మూడు నెలలకోసారి వచ్చేలా ఏర్పాట్లు చేయాలని ఆర్థిక శాఖ అధికారులను కోరారు. అందుకు వారు కూడా సమ్మతించినట్లు తెలిసింది. ఇక ఆ 13 జిల్లాల్లో ఆధార్ నమోదు వివరాలను పరిశీలించి, కళాశాలల స్థాయిలో ఆధార్ కేంద్రాలు ఏర్పాటు చేయాలని ఈ సమావేశంలో నిర్ణయించారు.
కేంద్రం నిధుల బదిలీపై తర్జనభర్జన..
కేంద్ర ప్రభుత్వం ‘నగదు బదిలీ’ పథకం కింద విద్యార్థుల స్కాలర్షిప్లకు నిధులు ఇవ్వనుంది. ఆ నిధులను విద్యార్థులకు ఎలా బదిలీ చేయాలన్న విషయమై సంక్షేమ శాఖల అధికారులు తర్జనభర్జన పడుతున్నారు. ఎస్సీ, ఎస్టీ విద్యార్థులకు మొత్తంగాను, బీసీ, మైనార్టీ విద్యార్థులకు కొంతమేర కేంద్రం సాయం చేయనుంది. అయితే ఈ మొత్తం కలిపి దాదాపు రూ. వెయ్యి కోట్లు నేరుగా విద్యార్థుల ఖాతాలకే బదిలీ చేస్తామని, వారి వివరాలు పంపాలని కేంద్రం కోరుతోంది. రాష్ట్ర అధికారులు మాత్రం అది సమంజసం కాదని అంటున్నారు. విద్యార్థుల స్కాలర్షిప్లో బీసీ, మైనార్టీ, ఇతర వర్గాలకు కేంద్రం చేసే సాయం గోరంతేనని, దీనికోసం ఎంతమంది విద్యార్థుల వివరాలు పంపాలని ప్రశ్నిస్తున్నారు. కేంద్రం ఇచ్చే నిధులకు సరిపడా లబ్ధిదారుల ఎంపిక ఎలా చేయాలన్న దానిపై ఒక స్పష్టమైన నిర్ణయానికి రాలేకపోతున్నారు. ఎప్పటిలాగే ఆ నిధులన్నీ తమకే ఇస్తే తామే విద్యార్థులకు పంపిణీ చేస్తామని చెబుతున్నారు. కేంద్రం దీనికి అంగీకరించట్లేదని సమాచారం. ఈ నేపథ్యంలో స్కాలర్షిప్ బదిలీ ఎలా చేయాలన్న విషయంలో ఇంతవరకు ఒక స్పష్టత రాలే
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4433 - CPI(M) launches praja ballot for cash transfer and Aadhaar
4432 - LPG consumers to get LPG subsidy through DBT from October 1
4431 - Infy, iGate others in queue for Rs. 1,00,000-cr govt IT contracts
4430 - Ousted dalit worker of UIDAI fears threat to life
4429 - The right to ration cards by Sreelatha Menon
And that means a lot for a poor migrant in a city chawl, with no local address proof, having left all identity cards back in their native village and unable to claim anything in the place he/she lives in.
Add the fact that this migrant cannot read or write or make much of an enquiry to press his/her case for a ration card. So, while people who are much better off might get cheap grains, these poor domestic workers will continue to buy wheat and rice at market rates.
Maybe now their case is not as hopeless as it used to be. The new law gives those without a ration card, the right to fight his/her case in court and demand that they be given the rights in the place where they live.
That is not only a huge victory for the poor migrants in terms of being granted cheap food, but more importantly it would open doors to establish his/her identity in the place where they work and live.
An entire market is laid out right in the middle of several multi-storeyed residential blocks in Indirapuram, Ghaziabad everyday at six in the evening.
The sellers are all migrants, from different parts of Uttar Pradesh living in the Delhi suburb. The day the Ordinance was announced, it came as a surprise to these people. "Is it true that rice would be given at Rs 2 a kg?" they ask. While their eyes lit up, they were immediately crestfallen. "But we don't have ration cards," they say and begin talking to each other on how to go about getting one.
They all have cards in their native villages, far away in districts like Shahjahanabad and Bareilly. Their relatives live there but they have no documents here, though they have been here for some time.
National Advisory Council member N C Saxena agrees the failure to establish their local identity is the tragedy of the urban migrant poor. He says there are families in Delhi, who despite being in the same place for 20 years were unable to get even voting rights.
"The only hope for all these people is the 'Aadhaar' which does not insist on local address proof," he says. He feels the Food Ordinance could pave the way for the poor to get ration cards through court. "They can always challenge denial of ration cards in court, once the right to food becomes a legal right. It might be a game-changer for migrants . They can always demand that they be given ration cards on the basis of their Aadhaar cards," says Saxena.
In Chhattisgarh, the government has used technology to make ration cards function like roaming telephone numbers. Their 'smart' cards can get them ration in any shop in the districts where the cards are being used. Food officials in the state love to show off statistics that reveal the number of outsiders who are using a particular ration shop.
However, smartness seems to be exclusive to the Chattisgarh administration as no other state has started seeing merit in freeing the ration card from the constraints of space.
The Chhattisgarh administration had designed its smart cards initially but then it thought it was wiser to use the smart cards of the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, the health insurance scheme. The health insurance smart cards allowed people from any town to claim reimbursement - when they fell ill - since the card is linked to the insurance companies through a central server.
Why the same formula cannot work for foodgrains is a question that the new law will now force governments to address.
4428 - Part XIII - In the name of the poor by Usha Ramanathan - The Statesman
28 Jul 2013
In the beginning, and for some time thereafter, the UID project based its claims of legitimacy on the 'inclusion' of the poor. In marketing the project, phrases such as giving identity to those without an identity, being "recognised in the eyes of the government", the "lack of identity" as "especially detrimental (to) the poor and the underprivileged", and the people who live in India's "social, political and economic periphery" have been used liberally.
The movement away from the promise of inclusion to the threat of exclusion if a person is not enrolled for a UID came later, beginning tentatively in 2011 but becoming aggressive and vocal in 2012. It was January 2013 before the poor were led into panic when UID-linked bank accounts were made mandatory for receiving entitlements by cash transfer into banks. Many of them had IDs that recognised their entitlements, for instance ration cards, NREGA job cards, voter ID, post office accounts - but they were now being told that they could not reach their entitlements if they did not have a UID number.
Enrolling the undefined class of the unidentified poor is a complicated exercise. The N.Vittal headed Demographic Standards Committee recognised this, and suggested an approach where "approved introducers" could introduce a person to the system and "vouch for the validity of residents' information." This idea was borrowed from the account opening procedure in banks; with a significant departure. An introducer must have a UID number; must be easily accessible to the resident; must be above the age of 18 and must not have a criminal record. NGOs were encouraged to act as introducers. But, while an introducer needs to be "approved" by the Registrar, there is no requirement that the introducer must know the person to be enrolled. This might have seemed a pragmatic resolution of the issue of enrolment of the poor and those without identity, but it was bound to raise its own set of problems.
A case in point is the well-documented instance of the homeless in Delhi. In January 2011, I visited the Pul Mithai enrolment centre to understand how the poor were being enrolled. Under the Delhi Government's 'Mission Convergence' in which the government and NGOs share a platform for policy-making and implementation, a survey of the homeless had been carried out using the benignant though inexperienced services of an informal roster of young persons. At that point in the exercise, which had covered about 80,000 people, a "provisional ID card under Homeless Survey" carried the name, gender, age and a photograph along with an ID number which ran like this: 10HP 58/1G. 3042397. 'HP' stood for 'homeless people' and 1G for the place where they had been surveyed as sited on the Eicher map. 1G was Mori gate, 1B was Yamuna Bazaar and so on. On the reverse were a series of caveats and explanations, including this: "This ID card has been issued on the basis of self-reported information by the cardholder." The UID enrolment was done on the basis of this card.
The actual enrolment was a parody. The names were not complicated, but there were some discrepancies; for instance, where a card recorded a woman as Pooja Devi, she insisted that she was just Pooja. Gender was the easy part. Age was less certain. It often went by approximations and in some cases, the age recorded in the survey was plainly in error - a lady whose daughter had married recently couldn't be 26! We did a 'panchayat' to help her arrive at her age.
The columns for the name of the father, and of the mother were left blank. The young lads doing the enrolment explained: "Yeh log NGO ke hain" or these people belong to the NGO, a new version of mai-baap. Where fingerprints did not work, and iris did, the system 'accepted' the fingerprints after the fourth try - in what is called 'forced capture'. Those enrolled had no idea of the consequences.
The address posed a problem. What is the address of a homeless person? The street where they are when surveyed? A pavement they occupy until a 'clean-up drive' chases them away?
On the UID form, another option was used. The homeless were given the address of an NGO that out of benevolence was willing to lend its name. Except the NGOs are in places in South Delhi while Pul Mithai is near Old Delhi railway station and the address for delivering the UID letter, and for the UID linked bank account, would be that of the NGO. The two "introducers" at the enrolment centre were young and motivated but had no idea where those they were helping to enrol could be reached.
So, many UID letters stayed undelivered - where the name and photograph did not help locate persons; or where, as in Geeta Colony, there was a 'clean up' drive between the enrolment and the UID letter reaching the NGO; or in Nizamuddin, where labourers engaged on works for the Commonwealth Games had moved to another site and could not be traced. Later, the Homeless Resources Centre became the address. But the problems are generic and won't vanish; and the HRCs are linked to projects with a limited shelf life after which they may cease to exist, or may morph into an altered entity.
This may have "enrolled" the homeless, but not in ways that gets them into an identity system that will help them.
Those in poverty live in a twilight zone of (il)legality. To them, an identity document is an especially valued possession. That is one reason that the voter ID was so sought after although not having a voter ID was no disqualification for voting; one among a plethora of ID documents would serve for the purposes of voting. The casualness with which the identity of the poor is being trifled with by the UID, and piggybacking on the poor in carrying on an experiment is, to use a euphemism, less than fair.
NILEKANI'S ELLIS ISLAND
The dependence on an introducer who doesn't know the person being enrolled holds the potential to actually distort identity. At his World Bank talk in April 2013, Mr. Nandan Nilekani gave a description that has the virtue of simplicity but not quite of accuracy. An introducer, he said, "will say 'I know this person, he's Ram Singh approximately born in 1977, so, we give a date of birth. He has a home, he has a home; otherwise, if he is a homeless person, we'll give him an address c/o Homeless Shelter or whatever. Basically, then, the introducer stands as some sort of guarantee in some sense for that person. Then that person's data is entered, and he gets an ID. So, that's how these people get into the system… Remember, fundamentally you get only one ID in the system. So the ID that you give at the time of your enrolment is your name in this system for the rest of your life…which is why I refer to this as a 21st-century Ellis Island…what happened at Ellis Island, let's say in the 19th century or Nova Scotia in Canada in the 19th century?
“You had all the boatloads of people coming from Europe, Eastern Europe, Croatia, Poland, wherever, Ireland, Italy, all that. And they would land at Ellis Island and they would have very complicated names. And the immigration officer would say, ah, no, I think from now on you be Sam David. And, from that day onwards, in the New World, he would be Sam David, no matter what his name was in the Old World. So, we do the same thing, you know. This person was out of the system, except physically he is in the same place, but virtually he is outside. He comes in and gets a name and that's his name in our system for the rest of his life. So think of it as a 21st-century version of the Ellis Island."
The author is an academic activist. She has been researching the UID and its ramifications since 2009.
Saturday, July 27, 2013
4427 - Part XII - Card or number? Crow or cuckoo? by Usha Ramanathan - The Statesman
26 Jul 2013
There has been much perplexed questioning in these four years.
Despite the opacity of the project, its encounter with Parliament being disastrous, and many questions being raised about it, the project has surged ahead. How did that happen?
Mr Nandan Nilekani answered that in his April talk at the Centre for Global Development in Washington. “Our view was that there was bound to be opposition,” he said. “That is a given. So, how do we address that?
Quickly. It was announced very early in the project that the numbers would begin to roll out between August 2010 and February 2011. Enrolment actually began on 29 September 2010, well within target. This was a demonstration of efficiency which was to show up the difference between the UID project and any other such task undertaken by the government. The problem, of course, was that this haste left no time for field testing, or to verify the feasibility of the project or its details. Details such as, biometrics as unique identifiers across the swathe of population and across time; introducers who do not know the persons they are introducing to the system but who are “approved introducers” because they are known to the Registrar; “biometric exceptions”, that is persons for whom neither fingerprints nor iris work to enrol or to authenticate; the errors that rampant outsourcing was introducing into the system; the leakage that One Time Passwords has made likely, and the faked and spoofed fingerprint and the ease of identity fraud.
These were still in the realm of the little known or unknown, but decisions to adopt biometrics had been made even before the experiment was to begin. Haste has meant that an untested system has been imposed on an entire population, and whether it will work or not will be known after a passage of time. The problem is compounded by the fervour with which the UIDAI, and Mr Nilekani, have been working to have the number seeded in all databases, and to have systems re-engineered to accommodate the UID.
Quietly. There has, in fact, been no public debate on the project. The government has not spoken except to make the UID mandatory. Mr Nilekani and his team have been hard selling the UID to individuals and institutions, so that their adoption of the UID number would push up enrolment. The quiet on the consequences of the project is especially deafening, and no amount of questioning has produced more than a sullen silence. That explains why Aruna Roy has been speaking out against the project as being disrespectful of the poor and imposing on them a project about which they have been told nothing, the implications of which are unknown to them, and where they have been informed - after being initially told that this is an inclusive project - that they will lose their entitlements if they do not enrol and get themselves a number.
The silence has been used effectively in the non-provision of information. When information was requested on the “full name, address and websites of the foreign companies which are of US and non-US origin or control”, there was something brazen about the response that “there are no means to verify whether the said companies/organisations are of US origin or not”. These companies were Sagem Morpho, L1 Identity Solutions and Accenture Services - with close ties with foreign intelligence agencies such as the CIA and Homeland Security! RTI activist Rakesh Dubbudu asked for the Detailed Project Report which Ernst and Young produced for the UIDAI, but it was denied to him, citing breach of privilege of Parliament as the reason - presumably because the UIDAI had made it part of its submissions to the Standing Committee of Finance. When the contracts with companies that are holding our data were asked to be disclosed, commercial and competitive interest was cited while refusing to give information.
Creating a positive coalition to overwhelm opposition: state governments, central ministries and departments, banks, oil companies, the medical establishment, schools ... the list continues to grow of those who are being encouraged to demand the UID as a prerequisite to services. On 29 June, Mr Nilekani reportedly said in a speech at the IIM Bangalore that they were in preliminary discussions with embassies to use the UID number to “simplify visa application procedures”. The passport, it would seem, is not sovereign document enough!
In May 2010, a team of corporate heads including the leadership from Chlorophyl, Pidilite, Future Brands, and Procter and Gamble with a few others put together a document for the UIDAI titled “Aadhaar: Communicating to a Billion”.
Mr Nilekani says to “think of this (the UID) as an app that answers the question ‘who am I?’ and then you can build all kinds of applications on it.”
This is how the business model is being currently marketed.
The author is an academic activist. She has researched the UID and its ramifications since 2009
Sunday, July 21, 2013
4426 - Part XI - What is the cost? And who benefits? by Usha Ramanathan - Statesman
The Statesman
21 Jul 2013
In August 2010, a year and a half after the project was set up, there was a question in the Lok Sabha: "whether any pre-feasibility study or cost benefit analysis was done before the notification for creation of UIDAI was issued on 28-01-2009; if so, the details thereof." Mr Narayanaswamy, in his capacity as Minister of Planning, responded, on 18 August 2010: "An Empowered Group of Ministers which was constituted in December 2006 .... decided that a Unique Identification Authority of India be constituted under the Planning Commission and be made responsible for implementing the project which would aim at better targeting of welfare services, improving efficiency of the services and better governance.
The benefits accruing out of the project should far outweigh the cost of the project."
That was it.
In September 2010, a "statement of concern" signed by Justice VR Krishna Iyer, Romila Thapar, Justice AP Shah, SR Sankaran, Aruna Roy and 12 others expressed reservations about the project proceeding without either a feasibility study or a cost-benefit analysis. "Before it (the project) goes any further," they said, "we consider it imperative that the following be done - Do a feasibility study:
There are claims made in relation to the project, about what it can do for PDS and NREGA, for instance, which does not reflect any understanding of the situation on the ground. The project documents do not say what other effects the project may have, including its potential to be intrusive and violative of privacy, who may handle the data (there will be multiple persons involved in entering, maintaining and using the data), who may be able to have access to the data and similar other questions." And: "Do a cost-benefit analysis:..."
In an interview in April 2010, Mr Nandan Nilekani was saying: "I think the savings will be fairly substantial. I can't put a number around it but it will be substantial." In later interviews, when the challenge to the project was more audible, he was saying: "Now every year India spends 3000 crores on entitlements and subsidies (which) will keep going up in future. And if you can bring in using aadhaar numbers, you make sure that you eliminate ghosts and duplicate numbers among beneficiaries."
These were aspirational and hypothetical. No formal figure emerged from any deliberations. Perceptions of inefficiencies in governmental functioning, leakages in service delivery, and endemic corruption offered a credible basis for assertions that the UID would clean up the system; but these were untested and unqualified assertions. As for surveillance, Mr Nilekani would only say, "no comment".
When the Standing Committee on Finance, in its report rejecting the National Identification Authority of India Bill, commented adversely on there not having been a cost-benefit analysis of the project, that became difficult to ignore.
It was November 2012 when a paper emerged from the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy on "A cost-benefit analysis of aadhaar". The paper did an "estimate of benefits" in PDS, NREGA, education, fertiliser subsidy, LPG subsidy, Indira Awas Yojana, scholarships, pensions and Janani Suraksha Yojana, ASHA and ICDS. The paper, which was characterised as a `study', was then `presented' to the Deputy Chairperson of the Planning Commission. It was hosted on the Planning Commission website. It was widely reported, as the PIB release said, that "after taking into account all the costs, and making modest assumptions about leakages, the study finds that the aadhaar project would yield an internal rate of return of 52.85 percent to the government." A remarkable figure, that. Except...
In February 2013, Reetika Khera, an economist who works on the PDS and NREGA and who has been challenging the claims of the UIDAI on what its project will achieve in cleaning up the system, published a critique of the NIPFP paper in the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW). In March, the EPW carried a response from the authors of the paper, who had remained unnamed so far, and Reetika Khera's counter.
The problem with the `study' is that it is based on no, or outdated, data. It falls back on assumptions.
The NIPFP authors do not deny this, claiming that they have been "elaborately careful in pointing out its limitations", which includes not having adequate data. It also does not consider alternative technologies that "could achieve same or similar savings, possibly at lower cost", to quote Khera. But, the authors protest, "the primary objective of the study: its central question was to ask whether the expected benefits of aadhaar outweighed its total expected costs", so they did not concern themselves with considering alternative means of problem solving, even the ones that are already in place in states such as Chhatisgarh and Tamil Nadu!
In addition, of course, the biometrics reports were out by then, and the implications of biometrics that may not authenticate, one-time passwords, re-enrolment of biometrics and the range of problems in the last mile are not anywhere in the paper.
And, since this is about cost and benefit, it does not take within its ambit matters relating to surveillance, tracking, convergence, tagging, violations of privacy and matters of personal safety and of identity fraud.
There is a further charge that is placed at the door of the authors of this paper - conflict of interest, and non-disclosure of the relationship of the group of authors with the UIDAI. There is a "NIPFP-UIDAI programme on financial inclusion", revealing collaborative activity between the two institutions.
Non-disclosure of this relationship is explained away by the authors as something that "should preferably have been made in the study itself. "At the same time," they say, "the group's affiliations are public knowledge on its website."
What may these affiliations be, apart from the UIDAI- Macro/finance group working together? The Chairperson of the NIPFP is Dr C.Rangarajan, who is the Chair of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council. The Governing Body has a representative of the Planning Commission, and a representative of the NCAER and that is officially termed a `collaborative institution'. The UIDAI is located in the Planning Commission, and the Prime Minister and the Deputy Chairperson of the Planning Commission are its strongest proponents. The Chairperson of NCAER is Mr Nandan Nilekani.
The NIPFP paper is being projected as an authoritative study, and the press has been given the figure of over 50 per cent savings as if it were a fact. One of its authors, writing in a national daily, even said, in December 2012:
"When these estimates are put together into a formal cost-benefit analysis, they demonstrate that the internal rate of return on building UIDAI is around 50 per cent in real terms," a position of certainty from which the authors quickly backtracked when challenged. Mr Nilekani, in his talk at the Centre for Global Development in Washington in April this year, told his audience:
"There's a study, by the way, by NIPFP, which is an independent study on what is the return on this investment." This may, mildly stated, be called a misrepresentation. There is still no study on the implications of the project for the citizen/resident, nor any cost benefit analysis.
(The author is an academic activist. She has researched the UID and its ramifications
since 2009)
Saturday, July 20, 2013
4425 - Part X - Aadhaar Unmasked ~ Making a business out of government data by Usha Ramanathan - The Statesman
The Statesman
19 Jul 2013
Nandan Nilekani was appointed as Chairperson of the UIDAI on 2 July 2009. In an extraordinary gesture, he was simultaneously, and in addition, given the rank of Cabinet Minister. This gave him the status, protocol and privileges of a minister, without having to meet the constitutional requirement that a minister has to be a Member of Parliament: "A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a Member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister," it says in Article 75(5) of the Constitution. In any event, since the Chairperson of the UIDAI is an office of profit, Nandan Nilekani could not have been both the Chairperson and a minister. This device, by which he was given the rank of Cabinet Minister without the constraints of the position, was used to facilitate lateral introduction of corporate leadership into the government.
Then, having been given the dual status of Chairperson and a person with the rank of Cabinet Minister, he was appointed the head of several committees in which capacity he would be able to steer state policy towards the adoption of the UID, while pushing the Prime Minister's agenda of cash transfer and the phasing out of subsidies along with advancing corporate business agenda. The committees included the Task Force on direct transfer of subsidies which produced an interim report in June 2011 on kerosene, LPG and fertilizer, and a final report in October 2011 by which time the Task Force was reporting on an "IT strategy for PDS and an implementable solution for the direct transfer of subsidy for food and kerosene". This was quickly followed up, in February 2012, with the report of a Task Force on "an aadhaar-enabled unified payment infrastructure" for the direct transfer of subsidies on kerosene, LPG and fertiliser, of which Mr Nilekani was the Chair, pushing the agenda of UID ubiquity and revamping the subsidy structure. Then there was the Technology Advisory Group of Unique Projects (TAG-UP) which turned in its report in January 2011; and the IT Strategy for Goods and Services Tax Network which, it seems, has resulted in a company being set up to take control over governmental data and to make a business out of it along the lines of the TAG-UP report. There have been other reports, too, such as the report of the Apex Committee for Electronic Toll Collection Implementation in which RFID and the "unique identification" of vehicles are part of the recommendations, but this does not directly impact the UID or subsidies, even if it could have a bearing on tracking, for instance.
In January 2009, when the UIDAI was set up by executive notification, it was described as "an attached office under the aegis of the Planning Commission." The "initial core team" was to comprise 115 officials and staff, with the officials drawn from Central and State bureaucracies. The Director General and Mission Director, for instance, was to be from the level of the Additional Secretary, Government of India. Nandan Nilekani's appointment in July 2009, and the overlap of project head, cabinet ministerial rank and chair of multiple committees changed the nature, and ambitions, of the enterprise. Yet, even in January 2009, the notification said that the UIDAI "shall own and operate UID database…" This signalled a shift from when the state held data in a fiduciary capacity, and limited to the purposes for which the data was being collected. This was an open claim that data was emerging as the new property.
The National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 in its draft form, and as introduced in Parliament in December 2010, gave the first indications of the structure intended for the UIDAI. It bears a remarkable resemblance to what was the being worked into the TAG-UP report. After its rejection by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance in December 2011, however, the NIAI Bill went into deep freeze.
There had been no enthusiasm for a statutory framework anyway, and once the Standing Committee sent the Bill back to the drawing board, it just vanished from the agenda.
In the meantime, in January 2011, the TAG-UP Committee chaired by Nandan Nilekani gave its report. It described a framework for the handing over of data that is with the government to private companies set up for that purpose. This is no longer a hypothetical model. In the 2012 budget, Mr Pranab Mukherjee announced that the "GSTN (Goods and Sales Tax Network) will be set up as a National Information Utility", and it seems it has already been established in March this year, with no public discussion or disclosure, and with private banks and insurance companies as shareholders.
The entities to be created are called `National Information Utilities' (NIU). NIUs will be a "class of institutions" that will be "private companies with a public purpose: profit-making, but not profit maximizing."
Government projects involve two major tasks at the top: policy making and implementation. Government should make policy, but leave implementation to NIUs. NIUs should have at least 51% private ownership, and government at least 26%. The advisory group had been tasked to deal specifically with five areas in the customs and tax arenas, but the report expands the reach of the report "also (to) other projects that may be launched in the future". Repeatedly, the report draws on the UIDAI as the model to be followed, and the elements of an NIU have been derived from how the UIDAI is structured. The UIDAI to be formally designated as an NIU is merely a half step away.
The congruence of the UIDAI and the NIU is further in evidence. NIUs, the report says, are "essentially set up as natural monopolies". And then, in a salute to the free market vocabulary of choice, it says, that "as a paying customer, the government would be free to take its business to another NIU, if necessary", although `natural monopolies' that have governmental data as their property are less than unlikely to have competitors.
As with the UIDAI, "the project should be rolled out as soon as possible, and iterated rapidly, rather than waiting to roll out a perfect system". And, in a statement that should have produced a great deal of public debate but which has so far met with a stodgy silence: "Once the rollout is completed, the government's role shifts largely to that of a customer." And: "On the one hand, governments by virtue of their shareholding are owners. On the other hand, the same governments are customers."
To ensure a buy in into the project, officers from the bureaucracy are to work on deputation and be paid an additional 30% as `IT professional allowance'.
Again, as with the UIDAI, the government is to provide what it takes - in funds, buildings, credibility and coercive power and what the UIDAI notification mentions as `logistics' and `planning'-- for the project to reach `steady state', after which it will become an NIU and take off as a business venture -- dealing with data as property, and with the government as its primary customer.