896 - Tata to Raja's Scam - Financial Express

"As FE has argued editorially, protecting the right to privacy gets even more critical as the government starts collecting more and more information about its citizens, through the UIDAI, for instance."

SUNIL JAIN
Posted: Tuesday, Nov 30, 2010 at 0037 hrs IST
     
Ratan Tata has struck all the right notes when he said that the Niira Radia tapes violate the right to privacy and the government has a lot to answer for. While no one questions the government’s rights to tap a citizen’s phones, for an income tax investigation say, the government is honour-bound to protect the data—so, at some point, the I-T department and/or the CBI to whom it gave the tapes to help along with its investigation, has to explain how the information leaked. 

As FE has argued editorially, protecting the right to privacy gets even more critical as the government starts collecting more and more information about its citizens, through the UIDAI, for instance.
 

The problem, however, is in the other things Tata has said, starting from his description of the CAG report as the ‘so-called scam’, and then going on to say the real scam is the ‘out-of-turn allotment of spectrum, hoarding of spectrum by important players (read Sunil Mittal) for free’. Based on all this, Tata has said the government needs to ‘bring (in) an auditor’—what does he think the ‘A’ in CAG stands for? 

Tata has gone on to say the calculation of the loss to the exchequer on the basis of the 3G auction ‘looks somewhat like a hindsight issue’ and concludes by saying ‘what is unclear to me is what really is the scam?’ This is especially ironic since, in 2005, it was Tata who was the only Indian industrialist in the field to say that spectrum should be auctioned—at that time, Sunil Mittal had said that if Tata had so much extra money, he would do well to send it to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund.
 

First, it has to be pointed out, the CAG report has not calculated the loss only on the basis of the bids received in the 3G auction—this, by the way is not incorrect, since Tata’s own company has just come out with tariff plans for its 3G offerings that are comparable to the current 2G tariff offers of most companies. The CAG has three other loss calculations, based on the prices at which various new telcos sold their equity—this ranges from Rs 57,000 crore based on the price Swan got to Rs 70,000 crore based on the price Unitech got.

More important, the Tata group is a big beneficiary of Raja’s policy—of the Rs 1,76,000 crore loss the CAG talks of, Rs 37,154 crore is due to what’s called ‘dual technology’ licences. These are the licences given to firms like the Anil Ambani group and the Tatas, firms that already had CDMA-based mobile phone licences but were now also given GSM-based mobile licences. 

So, if Unitech and Swan got licences at a sixth or less of their actual value, so did the Anil Ambani group and so did the Tatas. Indeed, while the law doesn’t allow any telco to hold more than 10% equity in another telco in the same service area, dual-technology allows this. In that sense, the benefit to the dual-technology firms extends to beyond that given to firms like Unitech and Swan.
 

There is little doubt, as the CAG says, that firms like Bharti and Vodafone that have got spectrum beyond 6.2MHz should pay the market price for it, since there is nothing in their licence conditions that says they should get spectrum without paying for it. There are various figures for losses, ranging from Rs 13,000 crore to Rs 36,993 crore for this, depending on whether you use the Swan figure or the 3G one. But let’s get some perspective on this. 

Firms like Bharti and Vodafone have paid an extra spectrum charge for this every single year, at a rate that’s roughly 25% more than that paid by other firms who don’t have this ‘extra’ spectrum—the spectrum charge is an annual levy based on the revenue a firms earns from the spectrum it holds. This, in the case of Bharti, works out to around Rs 75 crore in the latest quarter, or around Rs 200 crore a year. Given Bharti’s licences are for another 5 years or so, it will end up paying at least another Rs 1,000 crore—the actual figure will be higher, given how telecom revenues are growing, but let’s keep it simple. If Bharti’s paying Rs 1,000 crore, the industry figure will be around Rs 4,000 crore—add to this the Rs 3,500-odd crore of ‘extra’ spectrum fee firms like Bharti have already paid in this manner in the last 3-4 years. Net net, Bharti et al have clearly benefited and Tata is right when he talks of this, but the benefit to them is probably a half what the CAG has estimated.
 

The same probably applies to the issue of ‘hoarding’ spectrum where firms like Bharti are servicing 8.7 lakh subscribers per MHz of spectrum per circle (on an all-India basis, Bharti is servicing 1.9 crore subscribers per MHz of spectrum), 8.2 lakh for Vodafone, 5.8 lakh for Reliance and 5.2 lakh for Tata and next-to-nothing for the new players.

As for Tata’s complaint of the lack of a level playing field, which is one of the issues Niira Radia was supposed to help address, Tata is right in saying that others like RComm have got spectrum in all service areas while the Tatas haven’t. Indeed, this comes from the fact that RComm paid its licence fee even before the policy was announced. But this doesn’t detract from the fact that, in the circles he got dual-technology spectrum, Tata has benefited. Indeed, in 2001, when Ram Vilas Paswan came up with the fiction of WLL licences, which allowed firms with land-line licences to offer limited mobile services, and in 2003 when this was converted to full-blown mobile licences, the Tatas have benefited each time around.

So let’s listen to Ratan Tata when he raises the issue of the government’s job to protect the privacy of its citizens. But let’s keep the issue of favouritism in issuing telecom licences separate from this debate.

sunil.jain@expressindia.com...

895 - The Cloak Of The Unique Identification Number - Youth Ki Avaaz

November 30, 2010 

By Sakshi Abrol: 

 Let me start by just defining what a ‘Unique identification number’ is. Unique Identification Number (UID) is a recently finalized initiative by the Government of India to create and manage a centralized identification system for all the adult citizens and residents of India, which can be utilized for a variety of identification purposes. Well, this is just a typically bookish definition of the UID and can only satisfy the intellectual needs of a naive risen out of inquisitiveness to be up-to-date with the buzzword hitting the headlines. A more comprehensive look into the matter means to draw the roots of its present day manifestation in a historical perspective. The first phase of today’s UID was initiated in 1999 by the NDA government in the wake of the Kargil war. The NDA government decided to compulsorily register all citizens into a ‘National Population Register’ and issue a ‘Multipurpose National Identity’ (MNIC) card to all its citizens. This move can well be regarded as the base work for the UID of today. A nuanced approach to juxtapose the MNIC with the UID shows that the former was intended to act as watchdog on aliens and unauthorized people whereas the UID is more development-oriented.

In terms of its pragmatic implementation, be prepared to be stalked by somebody knocking at you door to take your fingerprints along with personal characteristics like age, sex, occupation and so on. The rationale behind this exercise is to build a National Population Register. In due course, your UID number or ‘Aadhaar’ will be added to it. This pie-in-the-sky dream will benefit the security agencies the most. Any suspicious person booking tickets or using any public facility requiring the UID no. will be on the radar. Further the benefits of the project in the social sector such as in the PDS further projects it as a boon.

However, the extent of euphoria or hype created by it is completely incompatible with the real-world problems. The promises made seem only rhetorical and allegedly half-true. The first delusion that it creates vis-à-vis the safety and confidentiality of the data can be attributed to the fact that this vast amount of personal data would be available to a number of agencies with fewer restrictions. As Amartya Sen would put it, ‘There is a clear trade-off between privacy and development.(The clauses related to individual privacy in the Citizenship act of 1955 was weakened through an amendment in 2003). Just think of it this way. The police or security forces if allowed access to the biometric database could use it for regular surveillance leading to gross violation of human rights.

Another veiled lie is that Aadhaar is not compulsory. The reason is quite intelligible to anybody with an average level of intelligence. The benefits and the services that are linked to the UID in the form of PDS and NREGA jobs will automatically create a demand for the number. It is like leaving no other options feasible and then claiming that there are options available. Also the concept of the UID is incompatible with the FPS. UID will enable a migrant to buy his PDS quota from anywhere across India but the FPS stores grains only for registered households and the lack of stock will see the workers come back empty-handed. I believe the above mentioned point establishes beyond doubt that the UID is mere eyewash to cloak the ulterior motives of the government tending to become an invasive state marked by the security dimensions of it rather than the developmental aspect.

Technically speaking, the problem of fingerprint quality in India has not been studied in depth. Also the process is not hassle free and is going to be a hit-or-miss affair with the various glitches in the BPL analysis providing glaring examples. There is also no proper mechanism in place to correct erroneous “identity information” by the citizens.

There are people like Nandan Nilekani completely enamoured by this enchanting idea but the reality is far deeper than meets the batting of the eyelids.

894 - U.S. Chases Foreign Leaders’ DNA, WikiLeaks Shows - Wired

Nov 29th 2010

Spencer Ackerman

Foreign potentates and diplomats beware: the United States wants your DNA.

If that chief of mission seemed a bit too friendly at the last embassy party, it might be because the State Department recently instructed U.S. diplomats to collect biometric identification on their foreign interlocutors. The search for the most personal information of all is contained in WikiLeaks’ latest publication of tens of thousands of sensitive diplomatic cables.

A missive from the Secretary of State’s office in April 2009 asked diplomats in Africa to step up their assistance to U.S. intelligence. Not only should diplomats in Burundi, Rwanda and Congo collect basic biographical information on the people they talk to — a routine diplomatic function — but they should also gather “fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.”

There’s no guidance listed on how exactly diplomats are supposed to collect the unique identifiers of “key civilian and military officials.” In recent years, the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan has built storehouses of biometric data to understand who’s an insurgent and who isn’t, all using small, portable eye and thumb scanners. But the State Department’s foray into bio-info collection hasn’t previously been disclosed.

It wasn’t just in Africa. As part of an expansion of the State Department into intelligence gathering, the secretary’s office in October 2008 asked Mideast-based diplos focused on the Palestinians to get “[b]iographical, financial and biometric information” on”key [Palestinian Authority] and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.” And it asked diplomats at the United Nations to start sweeping up thumb prints and facial features. The July 2009 memo targeted U.N. representatives of countries including “China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria” for the treatment, as are “ranking North Korean diplomats.”

The stated rationale of that biometric effort is to get information from “regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly.” But it’s far from clear how the swirl of a diplomat’s fingerprint reveals anything about voting strategy. And that appears to be part of a recent pattern. Senior foreign service officers in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal are asked to acquire “health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information on leaders” of those countries, all in the name of keeping tabs on “separatist, insurgent or radical opposition groups.”

And U.S. diplomats aren’t just supposed to collect biometric identification themselves. Some cables instruct them to collect information on how other countries are using biometrics to keep tabs on local extremists. A March 2008 cable to the U.S. embassy in the Paraguayan capitol of Asuncion asked after “[g]overnment plans and efforts to deploy biometric systems” to understand a “Government Counterterrorist Response.” Apparently, the government had questions about the reach of “Hizballah, Hamas, al-Gama’at al-Islamiya, al-Qa’ida, jihadist media organizations, Iranian state agents or surrogates” into South America.

State Department representatives didn’t immediately respond to questions about why diplomats need to acquire DNA and other biometric data on foreigners; what State does with any biometric information it gets; or how long the department retains it. “Fingerprints and photographs are collected as part of embassies’ consular and visa operations,” a baffled Guardian story notes, “but it is harder to see how diplomats could justify obtaining DNA samples and iris scans.”

893 - SEMINAR ON UNIQUE ID PROJECT (ADHAR)

SEMINAR ON UNIQUE ID PROJECT (ADHAR)

EMS Co-operative Library & Democratic Alliance For Knowledge Freedom, Jointly Organise Seminar on
Government of India's Unique ID Project ( ADHAR)

In less than 2 years from now, you are going to be identified in the society through a Number. Your correspondence with any institution, be it Government, quasi-government or private, will be using this Number. This Number will be your Unique Identification Number, not just in your village
or town, but in the State and the whole Country as well.

Sounds interesting, is it ? Well, it is not just interesting to the ears, but the implementation of the idea has wide implications in our daily life. The Central Government is already on the job of giving all citizens of India, the Unique ID Number. This project is named AADHAR ( meaning IDENTITY).

Who will give me this Unique Identity Number ? Where are all the details pertaining to me going to be stored ? Would this be secure ? Will this  Number ensure that I will be a fair recipient of all benefits eligible to me? Is there a chance where my Number would be made use of by anti-social elements, like in cases of mobile telephone number and credit card number where frauds are common ? Are there any in-built methods of verification to ensure that I am the only person who use my Number ? All these are our genuine concerns.

The Keratin society has always welcomed initiatives to usher in social changes which benefit the masses. But as a prelude, the intellect society goes through hair-splitting thoughts, discussions and debates across the  spectrum. All of these beckon the AADHAR project as well.

Ernakulam EMS Co-operative Library, Kakkanad and Democratic Alliance for Knowledge Freedom (DAKF) jointly organise a seminar which would be launch pad to initiate the much need social debate based on AADHAR.

Venue - EMS Co-operative Library Hall, Kakkanad
( Near Ernakulam District Co-operative Bank Head Office, Kakkanad )

Date - 5th December 2010
Time 2 pm

Speakers: 

Shri P Rajeeve MP, 

Adv M M Monayee MLA, 

Shri C P Narayanan, 

Prof M K Prasad, IKM, 

Prof P K Ravindran, 

Shri Ramkumar, Tata Institute of Social Science,

Followed by discussions where each one of you ought to participate

JOBY JOHN

892 - Now, SEBI jumps on the UID bandwagon- Money Life Digital Team

November 29, 2010 05:46 PM | 
Moneylife Digital Team
The stock market regulator is working on a new concept based on the UID, which is being issued to 60 crore ‘poor’ Indians. This new proposal is somewhat surprising, as not so long ago the SEBI chief was lecturing mutual funds not to target the poor

Nandan Nilekani, the head of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), has continuously maintained that obtaining the biometrics-based unique identification (UID) would be voluntary for Indians. This promise of 'voluntary enrolment' silenced most privacy advocates who argued that UID is a serious breach of privacy and that the biometric databases are unsafe.

Now it seems that the UIDAI may be trying some backdoor methods to make the identification registration mandatory. At the weekend, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) chief CB Bhave said in a speech that the market regulator is working on a new concept of operations based on the unique identification number (UIDN). UIDN, or Aadhaar, is the ambitious project of the UIDAI which, it is estimated, will cost the public exchequer about Rs45,000 crore over five years.

But this is not the first time that SEBI has tried to enforce some identification for investors. The market regulator discontinued it's much-touted 'market participant identification number' (MAPIN) scheme in June-July 2005 after a six-member committee, appointed to re-examine the use, structure and feasibility of the MAPIN database-bowing to popular opinion-recommended an end to biometric identification for investors. Mr Bhave was then heading the National Securities Depository Ltd (NSDL) and was one of the members who left the committee before it could draft and submit a report. Mr Bhave was a big supporter of MAPIN and NSDL would have been a big beneficiary.

MAPIN registered fingerprints along with a photograph. Many retail investors believed that the use of fingerprints and photographs (used worldwide for identification of criminals) would be a punishment for honest investors, as no trickster would be so stupid as to undertake fraudulent transactions on his own ID. The other factor was that actual trading, at the time, did not involve biometrics and there was no way of verifying the fingerprints and photograph of an investor.
Besides, there were other avenues like depository accounts, brokers, permanent account number (PAN) and bank account numbers, available to the regulators to track an investor and his investments.

In the first round of MAPIN, the stock market regulator issued about 4,00,000 UIDs, mostly to senior officials of various companies, institutions and brokerages, at a charge of Rs300 per ID.

Today, it's the same story with Aadhaar, or UIDN, which is to be issued to about 60 crore residents in India. Everyone, whether it is Nandan Nilekani or even the prime minister, believe that this will help improve the public distribution system (PDS) and that the UID will help to ensure that the poor would be able to receive food grain, which otherwise gets diverted in transit from government warehouses to PDS shops. (Read:  http://www.moneylife.in/article/78/8567.html). This would mean that the poor would be given the Aadhaar number in order to get regular food and other social security benefits. Now if, as Mr Nilekani says, Aadhaar is not mandatory, about half of the country's population would be left out of the UID process. (Read: UID = more 'consumers', admits Nilekani http://www.moneylife.in/article/78/11574.html)

But SEBI wants to work out a solution based on the UID, so that the poor can also turn retail participant in the markets. Indeed, a noble idea. Unfortunately, the SEBI chief doesn't really believe so.

In June, addressing a mutual fund summit, Mr Bhave said, "Financial inclusion is a noble goal and everyone should be working towards achieving it, but one must keep in mind the target customer. A person whose lifetime savings is a mere Rs50,000 can't afford to invest in mutual funds. If the market crashes tomorrow, he cannot take that kind of risk. You will only give him what the net asset value (NAV) is at that particular time."

What applies to mutual funds must also be true for the stock market. Still, the SEBI chief is proposing to use the UID database, expecting the 'poor' to turn investors.

According to an activist, Aadhaar is a blind endorsement of Professor Coimbatore Krishnarao (CK) Prahalad's 'Theory of Marketing to the Bottom of the Pyramid', which in India's case is 60 crore people living below the poverty line; would-be consumers who corporations wish to target in order to improve their bottom line. "It's an idea in conflict, because the target population for this mega-marketing adventure are consumers who cannot afford three square meals a day, let alone avail of goods and services aimed at them by corporations," the activist said.

891 - Would Ratan Tata Challenge Aadhar And UIDAI Also?

Posted on 29th Nov 2010 by Pritesh Munjal

Privacy violations in India is rampant in the absence of any legal framework and unconstitutional projects. For instance, Aadhar project of India or UID Project has been in controversies since the time it has been launched. This happened due to the faulty planning, shoddy management, absence of any legal framework and the suspicious manner in which the project has been imposed upon Indian citizens.

Aadhar project is managed by Nandan Nilekani as the head of unique identification authority of India (UIDAI). The main purpose of Aadhar project is to facilitate the e-surveillance exercise of India. It has nothing to do with improvement and reforms of public distribution (PDS) system of India. Even the National Food Security Bill 2010 has no mention of the Aadhar project or similar project as a tool to reform PDS and effectuate right to food in India.

Meanwhile in an important development, that has far reaching consequences, Ratan Tata has shown his displeasure over phone tapping and surveillance exercises of Indian authorities. He is going to file a writ petition under article 32 of Constitution of India at the Supreme Court of India for violation of his right to privacy.

This is a “Golden Opportunity for the Supreme Court of India to “Reaffirm” what it has specified in the PUCL Case regarding Right to Privacy and Prohibition against Illegal Phone Tapping, says Praveen Dalal a Supreme Court Lawyers and leading Techno Legal Expert of India.

According to Praveen Dalal, the Indian Government conferred upon itself Vast, Unregulated and Unconstitutional E-Surveillance Powers and Internet Censorship Powers through the Information Technology Amendment Act 2008 (IT Act 2008). The way E-Surveillance and Internet Censorship Powers have been given to Indian Government and Its Instrumentalities and Agencies under the IT Act 2008 is simply “Unconstitutional” and is going to “Violate” the Civil Liberties of Indians in the future, informs Dalal.

Now is the right occasion for the Supreme Court of India to test the “constitutionality” of Aadhar project/UIDAI, national intelligence grid (Natgrid), crime and criminal tracking network and systems (CCTNS), etc.

Similarly, it would be a good idea if the scope of writ petition by Tata is widened from privacy violation to e-surveillance and internet censorship issues as well. Similarly, the “constitutionality” of the IT Act 2008 and Indian Telegraph Act must also be challenged by the lawyers of Tata.

Supreme Court of India has always protected the Civil Liberties of Indians and if this case is filed by Mr. Ratan Tata we can witness a “Historical Moment” in the realm of Civil Liberties Protection in Indian Cyberspace, opines Praveen Dalal. Let us hope for the best and wish all the best to Tata for his case as in his case lies our own fate regarding civil liberties protection in Indian cyberspace.

890 - ADC: Citizens fail to make use of ‘Aadhaar’ - Deccan Herald

Mysore, November 28, DH News Service

Additional deputy commissioner (ADC), Dr C J Betsurmutt regretted that people who were enjoying various benefits of the government were not coming forward to give information to obtain the UID cards under the ‘Aadhaar’ scheme.

Speaking after opening a counter here on Saturday, he said the citizens were hesitating to furnish information such as pension, bank account, gas connection, irrigation and bhagyalakhsmi.

Facility

The purpose of gathering information was to know what facility that every individual has been enjoying. The names would be deleted from the list if the beneficiaries failed to share information.

The additional deputy commissioner said in district, as many as 205 centres are opened at 51 places and some of them are permanent. Out of the total population of 34 lakh, 90,241 persons have been given UID.

It was true that there was some delay initially due to non-arrival of equipment.

However, the media has opened the eyes of the district administration and helped the latter to set right the system.

889 - Solving The Identity Problem

27 Nov, 2010 0000hrs IST [ Vijay Kelkar ]

Since the early part of this decade, our governments have emphasised the problems of poverty and unequal growth as important challenges. Economic policies are built on political foundations, and this focus of our leaders and governments on inclusive growth has been, therefore, a critical first step. With this shift in our developmental priorities, there are now broad-ranging efforts which have the potential to permanently change how we fight poverty and inequality in this country.

I have spoken for some years in favour of a national ID system, and how it can be a powerful means to bring better access for the poor. It can help address the causes that lie at the root of poverty and exclusion, and address the basic challenges surrounding what many of us refer to as the 'last mile'. It is a foundational infrastructure that - like the social security number in the US and the welfare number in Europe - can make both governments and markets function better.

To acknowledge the role that the Aadhaar number can play in our development efforts, we must consider what lies at the root of our challenges today. The poor across the country have much fewer choices than the rest of us due to the scarcities of their environment, and the limitations they face in educational and employment opportunities. As a result, their incomes grow slower, steady work is difficult to find, and they often risk losing what little they have due to sudden calamities in health and environment. To work up the ladder of income and achievement, it is necessary to first get on it, but the poor, the 'left behind', often find it difficult to get their hands on the bottom rung. Our approach must focus on giving the poor the tools to get on the ladder, and access the resources they need to move up and out of poverty.

The unique identification initiative emphasises precisely these kinds of tools. The number brings with it powerful features, and an important one is the unique identification of an individual. In a country where fake and duplicate identities are used across systems to divert benefits en route to the poor, an individual's unique, real-time identification can help do away with the bogus identities that are used to channel funds away from real beneficiaries.

Another great advantage of the Aadhaar number is its universal application, and the opportunity it gives us to do away with multiple, criss-crossing schemes. Chief minister Sheila Dikshit has noted that in Delhi alone, there are 48 programmes for different categories of poor in the city, and defined for different income levels. The Aadhaar number would be applicable across these databases, clearly verifying the person across benefit schemes and services. This gives governments a chance to streamline their social programmes, and target them more effectively to the individual.

The Aadhaar number also enables the poor to fulfil the Know Your Customer (KYC) norms that, today, often limit them from using basic services proof of identity and proof of address requirements that they must fulfil in order to use services such as banking and telecom.

This is an initiative that is particularly valuable to migrants. India is increasingly a highly mobile country. A large proportion of Indians are self-employed, and they move often. Many of these migrants, particularly the poor, find that they descend into anonymity when they move. The identification and address documents the poor depend on - ration cards and land records - are usually local proofs, and lose their value when people cross the village, district or state. As a result, poor migrants find themselves denied services and marginalised once they leave their villages. The Aadhaar number, since it's a portable identification/proof of address that can be regularly updated by the individual and used nationally, is a powerful tool for migrants to access services and benefits.

The Aadhaar feature with perhaps the widest applicability is how it makes the confirmation of service delivery possible. Governments and service providers today have little oversight over the transfer of benefits to the poor or the quality of the final delivery point, where the person receives the service. As a result, people across the supply chain often act as independent agents, who may divert funds en route, deny service at the point of delivery, or demand bribes from the beneficiary.

Aadhaar brings accountability to these actors, and makes the last mile in delivering benefits less opaque. Real-time verification of identity through Aadhaar enables individuals to confirm to service providers and governments instantly whether they have received a particular service, or a benefit.

I venture to say that Aadhaar will enable us to put in place a well functioning social safety net for our citizens by unifying all subsidies into cash-based transfers. For example, Aadhaar offers a better alternative to promote food security for our citizens than many other proposals that are being presently discussed as Aadhaar will help the government to save enormous costs while improving transparency and accountability. In other words Aadhaar-based transfers will pave a way to secure lasting improvement of governance in our country.

The writer is chairman, India Development Foundation .

888 - Understanding the UID with Nandan Nilekani - The Economic Times

28 NOV, 2010, 04.33AM IST, 

SHANTANU NANDAN SHARMA, ET BUREAU 

For Nandan Nilekani , the chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India , the challenge now is not just to roll out one lakh or more Aadhaar numbers a day, but to create an ecosystem for players to build applications on top of this identity infrastructure. Now, Nilekani has been negotiating with the Reserve Bank of India to allow banks to treat Aadhaar number as the only document for opening an account. In a free-wheeling interview with Shantanu Nandan Sharma, Nilekani talks about life after Aadhaar when a villager would be able to use a micro-ATM in his locality, or a migrant from Bihar would be able to flash out his number in Mumbai as an identity proof. Excerpts:

You will issue only a number and not a card. That means even after I get my UID number, I will have to carry separate ID proofs?

Nilekani : Whether it’s a passport, a ration card or a PAN card—each one of these has a purpose. Whether they will continue to remain as it is, or merge in the future, it’s a matter of future direction. Fundamentally, what we are giving is an identity infrastructure.

What does the number mean for a citizen?

Nilekani : Broadly, Aadhaar, as it is called, addresses several things. It addresses the issue of inclusion. It’s most important because we have hundreds of millions of Indians who don’t have an acknowledged existence by states. And if you don’t have acknowledged existence, you can’t avail of many public and other services. You can’t rent a house, you can’t get a job. In a way, identity is the foundation for life in some sense. First, it gives a chance to a large part of people who are not in the banking system to be a part of the system.

Second, it addresses the problem of migration. India is already a migrant country. We have 120 million migrant population. And the migration is going to go up in the next 20 years. We can give them a portable identity which they can carry with them and authenticate wherever they are.

What does a migrant do now?

Nilekani : Either he has no identity or even if he has one, say a ration card, the moment he moves out of his area, it does not have any validity. The ration card is a state document, not a national document. What Aadhaar does is that you get a number in one part of the country, and it is valid in all parts of the country. It gives you national portability. Ours is a nationally verifiable identity infrastructure. So it makes identity portable like a mobile phone makes communication portable.

Also, it provides a platform for innovation. The way we have made this architecture, it allows new innovators to build new services on the top of it. Therefore, it can be a platform for delivery.

What’s the road map ahead?

Nilekani : We launched it on September 29, now we have already crossed 100,000 in seven states so far. We are sending the users a letter, and that itself sometime will be a proof of their identity. And we are providing online authentication all over India.

887 - Welcome to the Matrix of the Indian state - The Hindu

Monday, Nov 29, 2010

Siddharth Varadarajan
 

The Radia tapes reveal the networks and routers, the source codes and malware that bind the corporate and political establishments in India.

As squeamish schoolchildren know only too well, dissection is a messy business. Some instinctively turn away, others become nauseous or scared. Not everyone can stomach first hand the inner workings of an organic system. Ten days ago, a scalpel — in the form of a set of 104 intercepted telephone conversations — cut through the tiniest cross-section of a rotting cadaver known as the Indian Establishment. What got exposed is so unpleasant that several major newspapers and television channels that normally scramble to bring “breaking” and “exclusive” stories have chosen to look the other way. Their silence, though understandable, is unfortunate. Even unforgivable.

After all, the tape recordings of Niira Radia's phone conversations have come to light against the backdrop of the recent Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) report on the allocation of 2G spectrum, which demonstrated how the rules were arbitrarily bent by the then Telecom Minister, A. Raja, in order to favour a handful of private companies at government expense. Among the beneficiaries of Mr. Raja's raj were Anil Ambani. And also Ratan Tata. In one of the tapes, an unidentified interlocutor asks Ms Radia, whose clients include both Mr. Tata and Mukesh Ambani, why “you people [i.e. the Mukesh Ambani group] are supporting [Raja] like anything ... when the younger brother [Anil Ambani] is the biggest beneficiary of the so called spectrum allocation”. “Issue bahut complex hai,” Ms Radia replies. “ Mere client Tatas bhi beneficiary rahein hain (my client, the Tatas, have also been a beneficiary).”

Apart from telecom, the tapes also provide valuable insight into the gas dispute between the two Ambani brothers. This was a dispute in which Mukesh Ambani made skillful use of the “gas is a national resource” argument with a pliant media even as he used his influence with individual MPs to try and orchestrate a massive tax concession for his company from the same national resource, Krishna-Godavari (KG) basin natural gas.

In an interview to NDTV and the Indian Express on Saturday — two media houses that have so far avoided covering the tapes — Ratan Tata has called the recordings a “smokescreen” designed to hide the real truth. He is wrong. Utterly wrong. No doubt we know very little about who leaked the recordings and why these were cherry-picked from a wider set of 5,000 recordings the Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax authorities made as part of their surveillance of Ms Radia. But even if the story they tell is partial and designed to expose only a fraction of the corporate lobbying which has been going on, we would be naive to ignore the contents of the tapes or be dismissive about their significance.

In the science fiction film, “The Matrix”, Morpheus tells Neo, “You're here because you know there's something wrong with the world.” The Matrix, he says, is the world that has been pulled over everyone's eyes to blind them from the truth that they are slaves. He offers Neo the choice of a blue or red pill. “You take the blue pill and the story ends. You wake in your bed and believe whatever you want to believe. You take the red pill ... and I show you how deep the rabbit-hole goes.”

The Niira Radia audio archive loaded on to the Internet by Open and Outlook magazines last week is the red pill of our time. It reveals the source codes, networks, routers, viruses and malware that make up the matrix of the Indian State. The transmission of information, also known as “news”, between different nodes is vital for the system to work efficiently. The news is also the medium for reconciling conflicts between different sectors of the establishment. If you hear the recordings, you begin to understand the truth about the Wonderland that is India. No wonder there are many amongst us who would rather swallow the blue pill. For once you go in, the only way out is to keep digging. And yes, the rabbit-hole runs deep.

So deep, for example, that we hear a Member of Parliament, N.K. Singh, who is meant to represent the people and the state who voted for him, brazenly batting for a single-man corporate constituency, Mukesh Ambani.

In one recording, Mr. Singh tells Ms Radia of the firefighting he is doing on behalf of Mr. Ambani to ensure a tax concession the finance minister had announced in the 2009 budget for gas production is made applicable retrospectively. Ms Radia says she has killed news stories about the Rs.81,000 crore super profit Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL) would make were that to happen but Mr. Singh is more concerned about what happens in Parliament during the debate on the Finance Bill. His fear is that if Opposition MPs make a noise about a largesse being given to one company, the finance minister would be on the defensive and the prospect of extending the concession retrospectively would not even arise. Mr. Singh accuses BJP leader Arun Shourie of being on Anil Ambani's side and reveals how he has managed to get Mr. Shourie replaced as the BJP's lead speaker by Venkaiah Naidu. How well does Mukesh know Venkaiah, asks Mr. Singh, who is a Rajya Sabha MP from Bihar on a Janata Dal (United) – JD(U) ticket. Ms Radia replies that a senior RIL executive, P.M.S. Prasad, knows Mr. Naidu well. “Then I am going to get him flown in today to talk to Venkaiah,” Mr. Singh says, “because if he is the first speaker, and he already takes a party line, then it will be very difficult for Shourie in his second intervention, to take a different line. Then we have to orchestrate who will speak, you know, this is the immediate problem right now. Because, frankly, if this doesn't go through, this tax thing, then it's a major initiative taken that then fails to materialise.”

We don't know if Mr. Prasad flew down and met Mr. Naidu as N.K. Singh wanted him to do. But the BJP leader's speech in Parliament two days later has this telltale suggestion: “The Bay of Bengal has become the new North Sea of India. Government departments should not be seen quarrelling whether mineral oil is a natural gas or not. Whatever concessions [are] needed for infrastructure, exploration ... are connected with the energy security of the country.” This was a veiled reference to the Petroleum Ministry's letter to the Finance Ministry asking for natural gas to be given the same tax concessions available to oil retrospectively and not just from the New Exploration Licensing Round (NELP) VIII round which would exclude RIL's KG basin output. A request the revenue secretary had turned down.

In other recordings, we see journalists and editors, who are meant to report and analyse what is going on objectively, offering to become couriers and stenographers and foot soldiers in the war one set of corporate fat cats is waging against another. We also see a political fixer, Ranjan Bhattacharya, whose USP once was his familial proximity to the Bharatiya Janata Party, seamlessly open a line to the Congress and go about his business as if election results don't matter. He boasts about his proximity to Ghulam Nabi Azad and his ability to send a message to “SG, boss”, a reference to the Congress president. He then quotes Mukesh Ambani telling him the Congress party is now “ apni dukan”. Mr. Bhattacharya may have been lying about his influence but then the formidable Ms Radia is anything but a dupe.

We also hear in the tapes an iconic businessman, Ratan Tata, who today makes sanctimonious statements about crony capitalism and the danger of India becoming a banana republic, lobbying through his PR agent, Ms Radia, for A. Raja to be given the Telecom portfolio.

If the allocation of spectrum by the Manmohan Singh government in 2008 and 2009 is one of the biggest scams in independent India, then the involvement of businessmen like Ratan Tata, Sunil Mittal and Mukesh Ambani in lobbying for their choice of telecom minister when the UPA government returned to power in May 2009 is surely a very important part of the back-story. But it is a story none of the journalists who liaised with Ms Radia during this time chose to report. More than the squabble within the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) or between the DMK and the Congress, the involvement of India's biggest companies in the process of cabinet formation was the story that should have been headlined. Ms Radia talks of Sunil Mittal and AT&T using Times Now to push out stories about Dayanidhi Maran being the frontrunner for telecom and Mr. Raja being in disfavour. 

Her own strategy appears to have been to use her relationship with Barkha Dutt and Shankar Aiyar to get the opposite message out onto news channels like NDTV and Headlines Today.

Instead of using Ms Radia as a “source” for covering the DMK, her role, and the role of her principal clients, in trying to push for a minister who was seen even then as tainted ought to have been exposed. But then Delhi is a hothouse of power, and proximity to power deadens one's reflexes and weakens one's nerves. What Indian journalism needs more than anything else today is distance. From both politicians and industrialists. It is never too late to swallow that red pill.

886 - UID gives identity, bank account to 27 homeless- The Times of India

NEW DELHI: Khaiver Hussain can now think of saving some money without the fear that it might get stolen while he's asleep at night. The brand new unique identification card issued by the government of India has empowered Khaiver not only by giving him an identity that he always longed for , but also by allowing him to open a bank account for the first time. Khaiver is undergoing deaddiction treatment and does odd jobs at construction sites. He is one of the 27 homeless persons who got their accounts opened with Corporation Bank. Another 50 homeless persons will join the league next week.

"All of us can now save for any eventuality," Khavier told Times City on Saturday evening as he settled after a day's work at the night shelter in Nizamuddin.

Ansari Rajjab , another homeless who works as a daily wage labourer , flashes his laminated UID card and passbook. He proudly declared that he had already deposited some savings. The new set of documents have given back Rajjab an identity he lost three years back when he left his home in Mumbai. He lost all his ID proofs in Delhi and had since been living on the streets and in shelters for the homeless.

On Saturday , Tufail Ahmed from Uttar Pradesh also made his way into the world of banking. "This passbook and the UID card have given people like me a new identity. It has empowered us," said Ahmed. Ahmed earlier lived at the Nizamuddin night shelter but has now taken up a single room with four others in Sarai Kale Khan. All of them are daily wage labourers.

Nitesh Kumar , project coordinator , Homeless Citizen's Resource Centre (south Delhi), said 50 more homeless persons will be issued passbooks early next week.

Dr Amod Kumar from the state-appointed mother NGO on homeless said that all those who are registered under the ongoing survey on homeless are being gradually issued provisional ID cards. A unique number is issued to each of the sites where the homeless are found to be residing. This will be considered as their address. In the 'contact details ' section of the ID card the address of the Homeless Resource Centre in-charge of the area will be mentioned. There are five homeless resource centres in the city.

All those who are being put through the process for issuance of provisional ID cards under the state's Mission Convergence programme are simultaneously enrolled for UID. "Now that the UID cards have started coming in the exercise of creating an identity for a homeless person has come full circle ," Kumar said.

The provisional ID and the subsequent issuance of UID by the Union government will allow the homeless to seek old age pensions and other benefits for which identity proofs are essential.

The Union government had constituted the Unique Identification Authority of India led by Nandan Nilekani in January, 2009 with an aim to issue Unique ID numbers to the residents of India. As a follow-up , the Delhi government signed an MoU with UIDAI to issue unique ID numbers to residents of the capital.

ambika.pandit@timesgroup.com

885 - UIDAI: Inside the World’s Largest Data Management Project- Business

Nov 29, 2010

The scope of India’s UID project is breathtaking; but what’s even more incredible is that it has got the most unlikely partners to work smoothly together
by Mitu Jayashankar, N.S. Ramnath 

 W hen Ranjana Sonawane, a 30-year-old housewife from Tembhli, a tribal village in Nandurbar district of Maharashtra was allotted the UID number 7824-7431-7884, the team at the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) would have been quite justified in feeling a little pleased with themselves. A small team — 160 people — had achieved the first milestone of a very ambitious project in a very short time.

The UIDAI is a government body mandated with the task of assigning every single one of India’s 1.2 billion citizens a Unique Identity (UID) number.

If you’re beginning to wonder what the big deal really is, consider this: By 2014, the government wants half of India’s population to be allotted UID numbers. To do that, the Authority will photograph a staggering 600 million Indians, scan 1.2 billion irises, collect six billion fingerprints and record 600 million addresses.

Let’s put this simply. No system in the world has handled anything on this scale. Period.

Think about it.

When the 600 millionth person is assigned a unique 12-digit UID, the system that generates it will have to compare it against 599,999,999 photographs, 1,199,999,998 irises and 12,999,999,990 fingerprints to ensure the number is indeed unique.

By the time the system reaches out to cover every Indian resident, the complexity, well, doubles. When in full flow, the system will be adding a million names to its database every single day until the task is complete.

Now, here’s the question: There’s nobody in the world who’s handled anything like this. Because it is government-owned, there are no private profits or stock options to be had for cracking the problem. In fact, if the current government loses at the next polls, there is a chance the next one may think the idea a waste of time and money and simply disband the project, and the team may lose five years of their lives.

Assuming for a moment all goes well, the only tangible gain most of the team on the project will have is the pleasure of knowing they worked on the most complex data management problem the world has ever known. And perhaps the warm glow that comes with knowing they tried to change the world. After which, they will go back to wherever it is they came from. How many people do you know who’d have the spunk to be in full-time on an assignment like this?

When Raj Mashruwala heard that the PM had parachuted in Nandan Nilekani to head UIDAI, he immediately sent him a congratulatory note and offered to assist. Nilekani, co-founder of Infosys, was Mashruwala’s junior at IIT Bombay. Mashruwala, 58, now an investor and mentor to a few companies in Silicon Valley, had first moved to the US in 1976 to pursue a Masters in engineering from the University of California at Berkeley. He stayed on, founded a few companies in the manufacturing software space and did well for himself. Nilekani wrote back right away and asked Mashruwala to join him and an assorted bunch of people from various parts of the world to discuss a broad framework for the project.

The two had a common friend: Srikanth Nadhamuni, an engineer from the University of Mysore who, like Mashruwala, had pursued a Masters in the US and had put in 15 years in Silicon Valley. In 2003, Nilekani and Nadhamuni co-founded eGovernments Foundation, a non-profit organisation to help municipalities deliver better services to citizens using IT. When Nilekani left Infosys to head the UID project, he invited Nadhamuni to head the technology centre.

At Nilekani’s invitation, Mashruwala flew down to Bangalore in July last year, to attend a conference organised by the UIDAI. In the room, there were bankers, professors from Ivy League colleges, technology professionals, people from NGOs, even representatives from the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). And of course Nilekani’s many friends and acquaintances, such as Nachiket Mor, co-President, ICICI Foundation.

The diversity floored Mashruwala.

Ram Sevak Sharma, the designated CEO — or the Director General as he is called at the UIDAI — graduated with a masters in mathematics from IIT Kanpur in 1976. He went on to join the Indian Administrative Services (IAS) in 1978. Sharma was perhaps the first officer in Bihar to introduce a DCM 10-D computer (in Begu Sarai where he was the district magistrate). He computerised, in succession, the treasury department in Purnia district, Bihar’s public grievance system and the National Rural Employment Program. His passion for technology pushed him to take a sabbatical from the IAS in 2000 and pursue a degree in computer science at the University of California, Riverside.

884 - Legal action on personal data misuse - Live Mint

Posted: Mon, Nov 22 2010. 1:00 AM IST

Govt seeks to ensure that personal data is not revealed without consent, except in case of national security
Surabhi Agarwal, surabhi.a@livemint.com

In what may change the way banks and cellphone companies as well as official agencies collect and process information about individuals, the government is proposing legislation that will empower citizens with sweeping rights to legal recourse against any misuse of personal data.

The first draft of the proposed legislation has been released for public debate by the department of personnel and training (DoPT).

The main aim of the umbrella legislation will be to make sure that confidential personal information disclosed by any individual is not revealed to third parties without the person’s consent.

The legislation will ensure that sufficient safeguards are adopted in the process of collecting, processing and storing such information.

“It is imperative, if the aim is to create a regime where data is protected in this country, that a clear legislation is drafted that spells out the nature of the rights available to individuals and the consequences that an organization will suffer if it breaches these rights,” says the draft.

The proposed legislation was drafted after a group of officials was constituted to develop a conceptual framework around concerns on privacy, data protection and security, as reported by Mint on 20 June.

However, the privacy legislation will provide for exceptions in the event of a likely conflict between the need to protect individual privacy and the interest of national security, which will take precedence.

The proposed law comes in the context of projects such as Aadhaar, which aims to give a unique identity number to every resident of the country, and Natgrid, which will enable investigating agencies to get real-time access to various government databases that will be interlinked for the project.

The proposal has reasoned that since data pertaining to citizens has until now been stored in a decentralized manner, privacy has so far not been a concern. However, as more and more government and private agencies sign on to the UID project, the UID number will become the common thread that links all those databases.

“Such a vast interlinked public information database is unprecedented in India. It is imperative that appropriate steps be taken to protect personal data before the vast government storehouses of private data are linked up and the threat of data security breach becomes real,” says the draft.

The draft has been prepared by the founding partner of law firm Trilegal, Rahul Matthan, with inputs from Kamlesh Bajaj, chief executive, Data Security Council of India, after a discussion by the committee of officials.

The committee was headed by Shantanu Consul, former secretary (personnel) in DoPT. Its members included home secretary G.K. Pillai, finance secretary Ashok Chawla and former secretary in the department of information technology, R. Chandrashekhar (now secretary, department of telecom).

“The private sector is the largest underserved area in terms of jurisprudence and invasion of privacy is a serious concern there,” said Matthan explaining how data is being generated for a range of activities, from bank accounts and cellphone connections to magazine subscriptions.

While it is a step in the right direction and will help control the growing menace of unsolicited calls, text messages and emails along with misuse of data, “its implementation could be a challenge”, says Akhilesh Tuteja, executive director, IT advisory, at consulting firm KPMG.

While the draft has clearly mentioned that the legislation will only intend to protect individual privacy and will not cover corporate entities, it has called for a line to be drawn between “personal information” and “sensitive personal information”.

Most nations that have privacy laws that classify information such as racial or ethnic origin, political affiliations, physical or mental health conditions and criminal records as sensitive personal information. In the Indian context, such information will include a person’s caste identity as well as biometrics.

To ensure compliance and accountability, a regulator would be appointed, who would have “the power to prescribe standards, both technological and operational that could mould the manner in which the legislation is implemented”.

To avoid instances where individuals are not even fully aware that their data is being collected and for what purpose, “informed written consent should be a necessary prerequisite for collection of data”.

But there will be some exceptions such as collection of data for investigation of criminal offences and matters pertaining to national security.

Individuals would be allowed access to information about themselves so they can correct or update it; the data controller will be accountable for the safety of the information.

The draft legislation does not state the penalties in case of violations.

“It is a draft so far, which will be finalized soon. The penalties will be decided when the final legislation is scripted,” Matthan said.

883 - PMO hurdle to Sonia food bill? - The Times of India

Nitin Sethi, TNN, Nov 28, 2010, 12.49am IST

NEW DELHI: The setting up of `fiscal-inspectors' by the PMO in the form of the Rangarajan Committee to review the Sonia-Gandhi led National Advisory Council's (NAC) draft of the National Food Security Act could now open up the debate on the basic contours of the social security scheme for the third time in six months.

NAC was informed on Friday that the PMO had set up a group under the PMO's chief economic adviser C Rangarajan to review the draft, which the Council is preparing in consultation with law experts within the government.

The committee is loaded with advocates of fiscal prudence, who have shared their views about keeping the weight of the subsidy emerging out of NFSA as low as possible and shifting to a conditional cash transfer mode instead of revamping the existing subsidised grain distribution system.

Twice earlier, NAC members were made to take a step back from their ambitious plans about the Bill. Both the Planning Commission and PMO intervened, forcing the Council to limit the ambit of food security net.

Initially, the key members of NAC were inclined towards a near-universal spread of subsidised grains with large chunks of the needy population being included, based on their social conditions or subscription to identified vulnerable sections of the society.

NAC, in its early stages of deliberations, seemed disinclined to allow the Centre to impose an artificial cut-off on the number of beneficiaries based on statistical estimates such as the Tendulkar Committee's figures. It retracted from that extreme position to start looking at a mix of automatic inclusion for beneficiaries and some imposed ceiling.

Later, it came up with the idea of a phased rollout of the food security net with at least one-foruth of districts or blocks across the country getting the subsidised grains in the first phase.

Embarrassingly for NAC, this formula, too, was withdrawn even after it had been made public. In October, NAC pruned its plans further upon insistence from PMO and decided that 48% rural and 28% urban population would get 35 kg of foodgrains on a monthly basis. Rice will be given at Rs 3 per kg, wheat at Rs 2 per kg and millets at Re 1 per kg.

At the same meeting, it was decided that NAC would draft the Bill along with legal experts and present it to the government. The drafting committee, sources said, is considering how to make benefits mandatory for SCs/STs despite these constraints. It is likely to submit the final draft to the Council.

But the superimposed `fiscal inspectors' of the PMO, which includes MontekSingh Ahluwalia and Kaushik Basu, would now be able to go through the NAC draft with a fine comb and measure its additional subsidy impact and recommend changes that would keep it within limits that the PMO prefers.

882 - Is UIDN a tool for holocaust? One FB group says so

Nirad Mudur | Sunday, November 28, 2010

Often, projects initiated with well-meaning intentions fall victim to unfounded propaganda. The Unique Identification Number (UIDN) project under the supervision of former Infosys CEO Nandan Nilekani is one such.

If you scout Facebook, you will come across a closed group called “Say No To UID,” which has floated a preposterous theory that UIDN could lead to a Nazi-induced holocaust-like pogrom against the minorities in India.

The description of the group is as follows: “It appears that Nilekani… has misled the key functionaries of Government of India into believing that he is deeply concerned about reaching the poorest of the poor with a 16-digit card (4 numbers are hidden?) to liberate them from poverty.

This proposed UID legislation authorises the creation of a centralised database of unique identification numbers that will be issued to every resident of India but has failed to provide for provisions that precludes abuse of such a database for invading citizens’ rights to privacy and freedom of choice by national and transnational corporations like Vedanta and IBM.”

“The legislation poses one of (the) gravest threat(s) imaginable as far as citizens’ right is concerned. It will damage citizens’ sovereignty beyond repair and has the potential to cause holocaust-like situation in future through profiling of minorities, political opponents and ethnic groups.”

Gopal Krishna, member, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), says in a November 23-dated letter to Oscar Fernandes, chairperson, and members of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resources: “The UID scheme is an opposite of Right to Information. The latter makes the government transparent before their masters, the citizens. The former makes the citizens transparent before their servant, the government. It is a fascist plan.” The letter titled “Aadhaar Scheme Is Against Civil Liberties” was published on CounterCurrents.org.

The UIDN project was undertaken last year to ensure inclusive growth by providing a form of tamper-proof identity to people above 15 years of age so that the delivery of government programmes can be directed better, ensuring effective governance.

But what we have is anall-out attack on this project, the sole aim being to put a dead halt to it.

Gopal Krishna further says in his letter that citizens are “not gullible.” “They can see through the non-existence if any compelling and sane logic for (a) 16th document as an identity proof. Aren’t these pre-existing 15 identity proofs (based on which the government claims its legitimacy after democratic elections) sufficient!”

Firstly, the UIDN is NOT an identity proof. It is intended to facilitate any transaction between citizen and the government, based on the number which will not be duplicated with that of any other.

Besides, what is the guaranteed that the already existing 15 identity proofs (including voters’ identity card or ration card) mentioned by Gopal Krishna will not be tapped to identify minorities to launch a holocaust-like pogrom?
The social security numbers in USA and Australia, too, are similar concepts that have been well-taken by the citizens, based on which data is maintained on unemployment to offer dole money as support until one gets employed.
Has there been stereotyping and picking out people on religious, racial or caste lines to target minorities there?

Why just take Nazi Germany as an example despite knowing that the unfortunate chapter in world history was a result of a homogenous and a fanatical Nazi German — a situation that may never arise in a widely diverse India, US or Australia.

But yes, the government’s fault lies in not ensuring a series of open discussions on the project before launching it. The result is there for all to see — propaganda based on suspicion and half-knowledge.

881 - UIDAI keen to partner with public sector banks - Express Buzz

ENS Economic Bureau
First Published : 26 Nov 2010 03:13:52 AM IST
 
HYDERABAD: The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) said it was in dialogue with public and private sector banks to launch co-branded Aadhaar-enabled products. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with the State Bank of Hyderabad (SBH) on Thursday, to facilitate opening of bank accounts across its 1,200 branches spread across 14 states and two union territories.
UIDAI has already signed pacts with about 15 banks across the country to faiclitate the enrollment excercise.
 
“We are considering options to co-design Aadhaar-enabled financial products in association with banks,” said V S Bhaskar, Deputy Director General, Regional Office, Hyderabad, UIDAI.
 
He added that while other banks are exploring options, Citibank has already started working specifically on Aadhaar-enabled financial products.
 
According to UIDAI officials, the unique identification number will guarantee identity, which would help during the opening of bank accounts, especially in rural areas.
 
Meanwhile, as part of the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India initiative, SBH said it has chalked out a detailed road map for implementation of financial inclusion in the first phase. “By March, 2011, we would be covering 318 villages in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Karnataka having 10.4 lakh population,” said Renu Challu, Managing Director, SBH.
 
Similarly, in the second phase, the bank is planning to expand its presence to about 750 villages covering 31.3 lakh population by March, 2012.
 
In Andhra Pradesh, the state government has allotted five districts for the implementation of smart card projects for electronic benefits transfers.
 
“Of the total 1.3 million beneficiaries, we have so far issued 9,00,000 biometric smart cards, which also have a provision for UIDAI, as part of the financial inclusion plan. We will be soon taking a call whether we can use the same card for UIDAI,” Renu said.
 
While Nellore and Adilabad districts were allotted under one-district- one-bank model, Mahabubnagar, Karimnagar and Medak districts were allotted under service area.

880 - UIDAI to get involved in offering co-branded products- INDIAMART NEWS

Friday, Nov 26, 15:24:19 PM IST

HYDERABAD: In a response to the rising trend of co-branded products, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is planning to offer similar co-branded Aadhar-enabled financial products. The service will be issued from public sector banks.

“We are weighing this option and will sign memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with banks at an appropriate time to implement the same. However, Citibank has already started work on Aadhaar-enabled financial products,” said, V. S. Bhaskar, Deputy Director General, UIDAI.

On Thursday, UIDAI entered a deal with the State Bank of Hyderabad for MoU, which would in turn register it for the identification in Project Aadhar.

879 - UIDAI to help curb diversion of LPG cylinders - Net Indian

Network
New Delhi, November 26, 2010
 

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to curb diversion of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders in the country.

Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora said the MoU would ensure distribution of LPG cylinders to the rightful persons based on certification of their identity through a handheld device having their fingerprints and other personal details.

Mr Deora said the scheme would be operationalized in a few districts, including seven in Andhra Pradesh, Pune in Maharashtra and Chandigarh on a pilot basis.

878 - Privacy Law: A Nightmare For India - Techno Legal News and Views Journalists

Posted on Nov 25th by Gunjan Singh

India must not have thought that Indian civil liberty activists would give it a run for its projects. Without any second thought and without any proper planning and policy formulation, India launched projects after projects that are not constitutionally viable.

According to Praveen Dalal, Projects like Aadhar, National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and System (CCTNS), etc are not subject to Parliamentary Scrutiny. They are also not adhering to the Constitutional; Requirements and are violating various Fundamental Rights in the absence of Just, Fair and Reasonable Laws.

Rahul Matthan also stresses upon the need of a privacy law for the Aadhar project to be valid and constitutional. It would be a shame if a project with the game-changing potential of Aadhaar is questioned just because we have not enacted privacy legislation, suggests Matthan.

The safest course of action for the government of India is to enact suitable privacy and data protection laws before projects like Aadhar, Natgrid, CCTNS are implemented in India, suggests Dalal. Further, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) must also play a more pro active role in these projects, opines Dalal.

However, the government of India is not willing to enact suitable legislations and this is casting a great and serious doubt on the intentions and objectives of these projects. The consequences were very obvious. Aadhar project has faced severe roadblocks, Natgrid project is waiting for CCS clearance and CCTNS project has not received a warm reception from various states. Only time will tell what these projects hold for us.

877 - Privacy Bill a must to strengthen Aadhaa - Live Mint

Posted: Wed, Nov 24 2010. 10:34 PM IST

Privacy Bill a must to strengthen Aadhaar
 

We don’t question this lack of personal space. It is part of the compromise we make when we choose to live in India. And for the most part, no one has ever suffered because of it
Expert View | Rahul Matthan

We are not accustomed to privacy. We live our lives with little thought to the consequences of sharing personal information with neighbours and friends.

Sometimes, the nature of our social circumstance makes privacy irrelevant. In various parts of India, we name our children using traditional conventions that allow them to be identified accurately within the extended family tree of the community. For those of us who live in joint families, personal privacy is at a premium and never taken for granted.

We don’t question this lack of personal space. It is part of the compromise we make when we choose to live in India. And for the most part, no one has ever suffered because of it.

So why, after centuries of carelessly parting with intimate personal information, is a privacy legislation important today?

The government today collects vast quantities of personal information about its citizens, and has been doing so for over a decade. Yet, even though we are dealing with numbers far in excess of anything the Western world has had to handle, we face none of the personal privacy challenges that they suffer.

One reason for this is the inaccuracy of the data that is being collected. By some estimates, up to 20% of government databases are made up of ghosts—persons who are registered within the database, but who do not actually exist. While the obvious effect is inefficiency in the distribution of public services, the unintended consequence is a lack of trust in the database itself. When agencies look to verify identity, they ask for multiple documents, to be doubly and triply sure that the person they are dealing with is who he claims he is.

This coping strategy, made necessary by an inefficient data collection process, has protected us from data theft. Today, it is hard to steal identity in India, as the thief would need to obtain not just one, but many pieces of identity information.

Aadhaar, the most ambitious personal identification project ever attempted anywhere in the world, will create an infrastructure through which public services will be directed more accurately to their intended recipients. The social dividend that it generates will be huge.

But Aadhaar will have one unintended consequence that must not be overlooked. By promising accurate and unique identity, it will allow us to rely on just one piece of identity information. It will strip away the artificial protection that we have relied on all these years, laying us open to identity theft. So, is Aadhaar bad? Most certainly not. The social benefit that we, as a country, will derive from cleaning up our public distribution system will be enormous. The vast majority of our country that remains under-served by government machinery will, doubtlessly, gladly exchange personal privacy for better public service.

But at the same time, we need to be mindful of the law of unintended consequences. It would be a shame if a project with the game-changing potential of Aadhaar is questioned just because we have not enacted a privacy legislation.

Rahul Matthan, a founding partner of law firm Trilegal, has drafted an approach paper on the proposed legislation for a privacy and data protection law.

Respond to this column at feedback@livemint.com

876 - Meeting on UID at IAS Association, Infantry Road on 23rd Nov 2010 by Rajeev Manikoth

Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 8:04 AM
 

Meeting on UID at IAS Association, Infantry Road on 23rd Nov 2010

By Rajeev Manikoth

I was slightly disappointed that there was no one from the UID body to engage with. But all the same it made for some interesting views, including the demo of how easily biometrics could be so easily forged.

Mr.Vidyashankar is a dedicated government official and has naturally taken pride in achieving no.1 status in Karnataka in getting the UID data capturing process going in a short while. He was also eloquent in how tech savvy his team was and were "brilliantly" implementing it. And many more like him across the country will be focussed on implementing a "directive" without really looking at the larger context.

The real worry is that I think we are getting a trifle too caught up in battling the technology - whether it will be accurate, possibilities of duplication, forgery etc. These are aspects that can always be countered. What if they do evolve a foolproof technology to implement this?
( Technology apart, we have a Director in the MHA selling out confidential data ! )

I believe that our focus needs to be on the core issue of the Aadhar concept itself, it's real intent ...  and why it needs to be scrapped.

India is now being viewed as a "market" with huge ROI. Take a billion plus people and see how they can be "milked". The whole business of emerging private micro finance corporations are an example. There are thousands of business plans and models being conceived for our rural hinterland. And believe me the goal is not the uplifting of the masses!

( I had voiced this in the meeting and am not surprised to see it in the article posted today : Money Life Article )
 

What is immensely frightening is the fact that there are some people sitting in high places and scheming these policies as a business equation. And the citizenry are blissfully unaware, just don't care or comes to know too late.

Food security for India is going to be a major issue. We see the initial rumblings already with cases like Monsanto, the sad reality of food rotting in inefficient inadequate storage facilities. A minister and PM who would rather stick to policy and let millions of our own people starve. Huge tracts of agricultural land being diverted for other purposes. The West and institutions like the World Bank work on the principle of creating dependencies. If India does not take a hard stand that guarantees freedom and liberty in all its development goals, and define policies that give our people and resources first priority, we are going to be in big trouble. I am afraid that UID will be only one of the major issues.

But first, we as a nation need to be able to clearly define the idea of what "development" should be for India from our own context, independent of all biases.
 

All policies will then need to be based on this.

Can development be separated from political interests?
Daunting indeed knowing the reality of our current political crop!
 

The real "convergence" that is happening, to my mind is that of "immense profit" bring together the politicians, the corporations, mediahouses, middlemen, PR agencies and other species inbetween ...

875 - UIDAI to partner banks to co-design financial products - Business Standard

Friday, Nov 26, 2010

BS Reporter / Chennai/ Hyderabad 

November 26, 2010, 0:01 IST
 

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is looking at the possibility of partnering public sector banks to co-design Aadhaar-enabled financial products, VS Bhaskar, deputy director general of UIDAI, said here on Thursday.

“We are currently weighing this option and would sign memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with banks at an appropriate time to implement the same,” he told mediapersons, while refusing to comment further.

UIDAI today signed an MoU with State Bank of Hyderabad (SBH), following which it will act as a registrar for the unique identification project Aadhaar. According to the agreement, SBH, the 16th bank to be roped in by the UIDAI so far, will execute the enrolment exercise through its over 1,200 bank branches spread across 14 states and two Union territories.
 

SBH has also been allotted five districts in Andhra Pradesh for the implementation of smart card project for EBT (electronic benefits transfer) payments. The payment through the EBT mode will start by the end of next month.

Stating that SBH had drawn a detailed road map for the implementation of the financial inclusion plan, SBH managing director Renu Challu said the bank would be covering 318 villages in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka with 1.4 million population in Phase I, which will be completed by March 2011.

“In Phase II, we will be covering the remaining 750 villages with a population of 3.13 million. This would be completed by March 2012. Implementation of the total financial inclusion plan will be through kiosk and point-of-sale model, facilitating both enrolment and operations,” she added.

“Of the total 1.3 million beneficiaries, we have so far issued 900,000 biometric smart cards -- which also have a provision for UIDAI -- as part of the financial inclusion plan. Whether we can use the same card for UIDAI that has to be looked at, going forward,” she said.

874 - India's Unique Identification (UID)-related Bill designed to trump the RTI Act on transparency

India's Unique Identification (UID)-related Bill designed to trump the RTI Act on transparency 

By : Venkatesh Nayak
Parliamentary Research Services (PRS), Delhi which is doing very valuable work tracking Parliament and briefing MPs on legislative matters has uploaded the text of The National Identification Authority Bill, 2010 (NIAI Bill) on its website. This Bill is due for introduction during the current session of Parliament. The complete text of this Bill is attached and also available at: NIAI Bill

A comprehensive critique of the contents of the NIAI Bill and the intention of policymakers in Government to put such a legislation on the statute book has already been published by Prof. Jean Dreze. Link to the article in Hindu :

I have keyed below some thoughts on the implications of the NIAI Bill to the transparency regime established by the Right to Information Act, 2005 and related matters.

What is the NIAI Bill all about?

Readers will recollect that in 2009 the Government of India created the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for the purpose of undertaking preparatory work which would eventually lead to the issuing of unique identification numbers (popularly known as Aadhaar numbers) and identity cards for all people living in India. Conceived by the Planning Commission of India and housed currently in that institution, the Unique Identity initiative is also connected to the creation of the National Population Register which is underway. The UIDAI was instituted by executive action. The NIAI Bill has been drafted with the purpose of creating a stautory framework for this entire exercise which is here to stay. The NIAI Bill seeks to establish the National Identification Authority (NIA) for the purpose of spearheading the exercise of giving Aadhaar numbers and identity cards to individuals residing in India on a voluntary basis but upon receiving payment. Prof. Dreze has shown how the voluntarism highlighted in one provisions of the NIAI Bill can lead to compulsion when Aadhaar numbers are made mandatory for accessing benefits of various social welfare schemes and services provided by public authorities. The NIAI Bill provides the statutory basis for compelling people to acquire Aadhaar numbers. As the Planning Commission conceived of Unique Identity as a means to ensure proper delivery of the benefits to the impoverished segments of society, the compulsion falls on them first and foremost. They will have to pay fees (to be specified in the regulations) for enrolling themselves onto the Aadhaar database, acquiring identity cards and also for getting wrong information about them held in country-wide databases corrected. Every time an Aadhaar holder applies to avail the benefit of any welfare scheme and submits his/her Aadhaar information he/she will be required to get it authenticated. This means going back to the NIA, paying fees for authentication with no certainty that it will be authenticated. The NIA has the power to refuse to authenticate but the NIAI Bill does not specify the grounds on which a negative response may be issued to the applicant. The NIA is designed to be an authority unto itself.

The NIA will be vested with vast powers to carry out its umpteen functions under the law. An Aadhaar number or identity card to be issued under this law will neither be proof of citizenship nor domicile status in any State. (I wonder why the name Aadhaar then? 'Aadhaar' means 'basis' or 'foundation' in Sanskrit and Hindi and a host of other Indian languages. When the Government cannot assure fool proof identity cards for citizenship and domicile status for every citizen Aadhaar becomes a misnomer for such initiatives. The underprivileged citizen will continue to remain 'Niraadhaar' (without a firm basis) for purposes other than receiving the benefits of welfare schemes and being under surveillance by State agencies.

The NIA is empowered to collect identity information namely, demographic information and biometric information about every individual who approaches it with a request for an Aadhaar number and an identity card. Demographic information includes only the following data: name, age, gender and address of an individual. The NIAI Bill specifically prohibits the collection of information about race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health of a person. What kinds of biometric information about an individual will be collected will be specified in the regulations by the NIAI. The demographic and biometric information will be held in a Central Identity Depository over which NIAI will have oversight functions. An individual has the right to correct inaccurate data held by the Depository about him/her. As Prof. Dreze points out there is no certainty that the inaccuracies will be corrected or a decision will be taken in a time bound manner. There is no possibility of appeal against the NIA's decisions within the proposed statute. The Identity Review Committee sought to be established under the NIAI Bill can only study the uses to which the Aadhaar system if being put to and submit an annual report. Decisions of the NIA cannot be challenged before this Review Committee.  The NIA is truly designed to be an authority unto itself.

How does the NIAI Bill affect transparency regime established by the Right to Information Act?

Provisions for keeping the demographic and biometric information secret are contained in Chapter VI of the NIAI Bill. Under the title: "Protection of Information" Clauses 30-33 regulate the securing and holding of Aadhaar data about individuals in a confidential manner. Ensuring confidentiality of Aadhaar identity information is the responsibility of the NIA. (Sections 30, 31) Irrespective of any other law, the NIA or any of its officers or employees or agencies that maintain the Adhaar databases, have a duty not to reveal the information they collect and hold. The 3 members of the NIA are required to swear an oath of secrecy after appointment. Secrecy clauses will continue to bind them even after they vacate office. Information from the Aadhaar databases may be provided only upon receiving an order from a competent court. Or information may be dislcosed in the interests of national security if an officer of the Government of India of Joint Secretary rank and above authorises disclosure. In other words the NIAI Bill overrides the RTI Act. It also ousts the jurisdiction of the Information Commissions to deal with information access disputes.

Why is this problematic?
Chapter VI of the NIAI Bill is problematic for the following reasons:

1) The NIAI Bill throws a veil of secrecy over information about individuals already available in the public domain: Identity information about individuals that will be collected by the NIA has two parts- demographic and biometric information. What kinds of biometric information will be collected is left to the NIA to specify in the regulations. This may include a range of data such as thumb and palm prints, iris recognition, DNA data and other similar means of identifying individuals that may be developed by science in future. Demographic information includes- name, age, gender and address of an individual. If this Bill becomes law in its current form this demographic information will become secret. But is this data truly secret now? Every bit of demographic information pertaining to every Indian citizen above 18 years of age contemplated in the NIAI Bill is already available in the Photo Electoral Rolls published by the Chief Electoral Officers under the Election Commission of India on their websites. In fact even the name of the father or husband of a voter is accessible on these public lists which the NIA may not collect under the current version of the Bill. So why should this information be tagged with the 'confidential' label when this is already public information?

In fact the UIDAI  started its pilot projects by collecting information from these Photo Electoral Rolls (See an admission of this fact on UIDAI website: The UIDAI's website clearly mentions this usage of publicly available information. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the NIAI Bill does not explain why this information must be held confidentially when such information about 700 million voters is already publicly available.

2) What about demographic information about under-18 year olds?: The Photo Electoral Rolls mentioned above do not contain demographic information about citizens below the age of 18 years as they are not eligible to vote. This is a sizeable number of India's population (about 450-500 million). Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act exempts the disclosure of personal information if it may lead to invasion of the privacy of the individual. This clause has served well for denying access to personal information for the last five years. However the NIAI Bill does not recognise the RTI regime. It places in the hands of the NIA all authority to determine information access issues. If access to information is denied under the NIAI law, a person cannot seek the same information using the RTI Act. Depsite the NIAI being a public authority as defined in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act the overriding effect of Section 22 will not cover this law as it will be passed after the enactment of the RTI Act. 

The overriding effect applies only to laws in existence at the time of the enactment of the RTI Act. So the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' (a general law cannot override a special law) will come into play. The Information Commissions will have no authority over the NIAI. A major exception to the regime of transparency is being created by the NIAI Bill. This is completely uncalled for as personal information is protected from dislcosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and has served well till date. There is no reason why exceptions to the RTI Act should be carved out in this manner. The NIAI BiIl must be amended to state that information will be provided in accordance with the RTI Act.

3) How is the NIA, a government-controlled body, better placed to decide information access issues than Information Commissions?: The NIA is completely controlled by the Central Government unlike the Information Commissions which decide on information access disputes under the RTI Act. The Chairperson and two part-time members of the NIA are appointed by the Central Government. There NIAI Bill does not provide for a selection committee to shortlist candidates for these positions. The Information Commissioners are not appointed by the respective Governments. They are appointed by the President and the Governors at the Centre and in the States respectively, on the basis of recommendations made by statutorily established selection committees. All members of the NIA can be removed by the Central Government for specific reasons mentioned in the Bill. The Information Commissioners appointed under the RTI Act can be removed only through a special process involving a reference to the Supreme Court which will be investigated and reported upon by the Court. The rank of the members of the NIA is not specified. The CEO of the NIA is of additional Secretary rank. The Chief and Information Commissioners of the Central Information Commission and the Chiefs of the State Information Commissions are equal in rank to judges of the Supreme Court- much higher than an Additional Secretary to Government. The Central Government may issue directions to the NIA and even supersede it if necessary. The Information Commissions cannot be subjected to directives from any authority save the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Given the complete subordination of the NIA to the Central Government, how is it best placed to have sole authority to decide on information access issues?

Further, the NIAI Bill does not provide for any forum where a decision of the NIA may be appealed against. This is completely contrary to the principles of data protection that inform privacy laws in other countries. There must be an independent body that will adjudicate over access disputes in the context of personal information. The United Kingdom has established the Data Protection Tribunal for this purpose. In New Zealand the Ombudsman is also the authority for adjudicating personal data access-related disputes. The Privacy Commissioner performs this role at the national level in Canada. The NIAI Bill ignores these international best practices. The NIAI Bill must be amended to give the Information Commissions established under the RTI Act the job of adjudicating information access disputes under this law.

4) The NIAI Bill is silent on how Aadhaar data will be shared with other agencies: The NIAI Bill contemplates situtations where the identity information of Aadhaar number holders will be shared with agencies engaged in delivery of public benefits and public services. The NIA has the power to make regulations to define these procedures. The written consent of the individual is required in such cases. This provision has been drafted ignoring the fact that more than a third of the people in India cannot read or write. When the numbers of neo-literates who can only sign their names is added to this figure, the number of people who cannot possibly give written consent goes up considerably. The NIAI Bill is silent on how the consent of such individuals will be obtained. Yet it is claimed that this statute is intended to serve such underprivilged segments of society.

While this information-sharing provision [Clause 23(2)(k)] appears innocent from the point of view of the Planning Commission's original intention of having Aadhaar type-systems to improve the delivery of welfare programmes, the potential of this provision to enable surveillance of individuals by State agencies becomes clear when viewed through the prism of national security. An officer of Joint Secretary rank and above can authorise disclosure of this data to any person- even without the consent of the individual. An individual - if at all he/she gets to know that information about him/her has been ordered to be shared with some other State agency can appeal this decision only in courts. Even this procedure is not specified in the NIAI Bill.

5) Under data protection laws data collected for one purpose cannot be used for another purpose : Although the right to privavy is a deemed fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, India does not have a privacy or data protection law. The Department of Personnel and Training has recently issued an approach paper aimed at developing such a law for India. In the absence of an overarching data protection law, it is necessary to ensure that crucial international best practice standards informing such laws operational elsewhere on the planet are incorporated in the NIAI Bill. For example, it is a cardinal principle of data protaction laws that personal information collected about individuals by one agency, for a specific purpose, cannot be transferred to some other agency for use in order to achieve a different purpose. This principle is sorely missing in the NIAI Bill. Prof. Dreze has pointed out how Aadhaar system is one of the several measures initiated by the State to create a surveillance mechanism- Big Brother is watching over everybody. This has major implications for people's human rights.

Did the Department of Personnel and Training object to the creation of exceptions to the RTI regime?
The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) under the Ministry of Personnel is the administrative depatrment for the RTI Act. Prior to seeking the Union Cabinet's approval for tabling the NIAI Bill in Parliament, the Government would have sent the text of the Bill to the relevant Departments for inter-ministerial consultations. This is a mandatory requirment. Was the DoPT involved in this consultation process? Did the DoPT object to the implied exclusion of the RTI Act? In an age of RTI we cannot know unless we file RTI applications to find out. Later the Bill would have been put up for deliberations in the Committee of Secretaries. This is also a mandatory requirement. Did the  Secretary, DoPT point out to the contradictions between the NIAI Bill and the RTI Act in this meeting? In an age of RTI we cannot know unless we file RTI applications to find out.  Did the Ministry of Law which is required to vet all Bills for ensuring that no other law is violated by its provisions, point out that the NIAI Bill carves out an exception to the RTI Act? In an age of RTI we cannot know unless we file RTI applications to find out.

The Minister of State for Planning and Parliamentary Affairs is likely to table this Bill in Parliament in the current session. After the exit of the Minister of State for Personnel the Minister of State for Planning is in charge of this Ministry also. Has any attention been paid to the need for harmonising the provisions of this Bill with the regime of transparency established by the RTI Act? In an age of RTI we cannot know unless we file RTI applications to find out.

The effectiveness of the RTI Act is being curbed through other statutes. Readers will remember this trend began with the Collection of Statistics Act, 2008 which ousted the jurisdiction of the RTI Act in a similar manner.

The NIAI Bill may be violative of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution:
Chapter VII of the NIAI Bill lists out penalties for specific offences. Offences such as impersonation, identity theft, unauthorised collection or disclosure of identity information of any individual, tampering, interfering with or causing harm to the management of the Aadhaar databases may be punished with a prison term up to three years and fines extending up to INR 10,000 (US$ 218) The fines for offences committed by companies are stiffer. However there is a sinister clause which prescribes a general penalty without specifying any offence. Clause 41 of the NIAI Bill specifies a prison term of up to three years and a fine up to INR 25,000 (US$ 545) for any offence for which no penalty is provided elsewhere in the Act. Clauses 34-40 are the only provisions dealing with offences under this proposed law. All of them are linked to specific penalties. It is not clear what purpose the general penalty clause will serve in the absence of an identifiable offence. This provision may be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. Every citizen has the fundamental right not to be convicted of "any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence..." So unless a law specificaly terms an act as an offence a person cannot be tried and punished for such an act. Clause 41 may be struck down on grounds of violating a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.

Readers who have been following the unravelling of the UID process will have many more concerns over the provisions of the NIAI Bill. I request them to share this email within their circuits. I have not recommended a course of action to correct these anomalies in the Bill as I would like to learn from other viewers about their thoughts on this important subject. Kindly send your response to this email id.

In order to access the our previous email alerts on RTI and related issues please click on: RTI Alerts
You will find the links at the top of this web page. If you do not wish to receive these email alerts please send an email to this address indicating your refusal.

Thanking you,
Yours sincerely,
 

Venkatesh Nayak
Programme Coordinator
Access to Information Programme
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
B-117, I Floor, Sarvodaya Enclave
New Delhi- 110 017
tel: 91-11- 43180215/43180200/ 26864678
fax: 91-11- 2686 4688
website: www.humanrightsinitiative.org 
alternate email: nayak.venkatesh@gmail.com

venkatesh@humanrightsinitiative.org__._,_.___