Biometric national identity systems are rare in industrial democracies. Recent attempts to introduce them in the United Kingdom and the United States have been defeated by civil libertarian opponents. In both cases, the proposed identity systems were closely linked to national security and the US-led Global War on Terror. A biometric identity database is now being introduced on an unprecedented scale in the world's largest democracy: India. By 2015, 600 million Indians will be issued a Unique Identification Number (UID), a number linked to a resident's fingerprints, iris scan, and facial photograph. This time the primary motive is not national security, but rather social benefits.
The UID began life in a form similar to that of the abortive UK and US systems. In 2003, the then-ruling center-right coalition proposed the creation of a Multipurpose National Identity Card for the purpose of fighting terrorism and crime. After the coalition failed to win reelection, its successor, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), temporarily suspended the idea. The UPA's 2009 election manifesto, however, revived the notion of a biometric identity system but with a new function. The Unique ID, later branded "Aadhaar," is intended to revolutionize the nature of welfare schemes in India.
Aadhaar is the brainchild of the Unique Identification Authority of India, a new government agency headed by Nandan Nilekani, billionaire software entrepreneur and former Chairman of Infosys Technologies. The scheme has the backing of the three most important figures in the Indian government: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, and her son Rahul, and the first numbers will be issued before the end of 2010. It took the United States three decades to create a de facto identity system in the form of the Social Security number; India is attempting to do the same in biometric form in under five years.
The UID began life in a form similar to that of the abortive UK and US systems. In 2003, the then-ruling center-right coalition proposed the creation of a Multipurpose National Identity Card for the purpose of fighting terrorism and crime. After the coalition failed to win reelection, its successor, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), temporarily suspended the idea. The UPA's 2009 election manifesto, however, revived the notion of a biometric identity system but with a new function. The Unique ID, later branded "Aadhaar," is intended to revolutionize the nature of welfare schemes in India.
Aadhaar is the brainchild of the Unique Identification Authority of India, a new government agency headed by Nandan Nilekani, billionaire software entrepreneur and former Chairman of Infosys Technologies. The scheme has the backing of the three most important figures in the Indian government: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, and her son Rahul, and the first numbers will be issued before the end of 2010. It took the United States three decades to create a de facto identity system in the form of the Social Security number; India is attempting to do the same in biometric form in under five years.
That OECD countries do not have biometric identity schemes is a frequent criticism of Aadhaar. Yet its advocates point out that the absence of identity is a unique impediment to India's poorest, who are thereby excluded from the very welfare programs that are created to help them. For example, millions of the poorest Indians do not possess ration cards, as they are unable to pay the requisite bribe to the local panchayat (village council).
Two schemes that could be cleaned up in the short term are the Public Distribution System (PDS), which distributes food grains, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which provides enrollees with 100 days work at slightly more than US$2 per day. It is estimated that of the US$9 billion annual outlay for NREGS, up to US$3.6 billion is lost to mid-level corruption; enrollees consequently typically receive only 60 percent of the promised income.
By giving such concrete identity credentials to the poorest Indians, many of whom have never possessed any kind of identity proof in their lives, Aadhaar can ensure that PDS food grains reach their intended source. The benefits to NREGS will come through Aadhaar's pledge of financial inclusion. It is proposed that anyone with an Aadhaar number will receive a basic, no-frills bank account; in a country where only a small fraction of the population use formal financial services today, this change would have a revolutionary impact. Enrollees in NREGS could have their salary directly deposited to their biometrically-authenticated bank account, entirely bypassing the myriad network of middlemen that account for the 40 percent income loss.
In the long-run, financial inclusion could be an essential step in a complete overhaul of India's welfare state. For decades, many economists have recommended that India replace its labyrinthine system of subsidies and price controls, many of which benefit the wealthy, with a system of direct cash transfers to the poor. Bank accounts for all will make this possible. This possibility, however, has never been formally acknowledged by the ruling Congress Parties and is bitterly opposed by the left.
Aadhaar neither confers citizenship nor inherently guarantees benefits; rather, it provides an unimpeachable identity with which citizens will be able to avail themselves of the benefits to which they are entitled. Residents of India will not, at the moment, be required to apply for an Aadhaar number; rather, as with the US Social Security number, enrollment will be technically voluntary. Service providers will, however, be allowed to mandate that customers possess a number.
While Aadhaar has received a remarkably enthusiastic reception from its key prospective beneficiaries--the poor--it has also attracted considerable criticism from the kinds of civil libertarians that successfully derailed ID schemes in other countries. Opponents of Aadhaar assert that it is part of a hidden agenda of the creation of a surveillance state, an unacceptable transformation of the relationship between the citizen and the state. They point to the creation of a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID, a proposed national security database), and argue that a biometric number will be misused to track citizens' personal data.
The UIDAI has responded to these concerns by asserting that Aadhaar will only require the most basic demographic information of its enrollees and that it is not linked to NATGRID or any other government database. As of September 2010, it was unclear whether or not the Ministry of Home Affairs intended to proceed with NATGRID. In any case, the success or failure of Aadhaar, which is the subject of legislation currently pending before the Lok Sabha, India's lower house of parliament, will be judged on its effectiveness in using the proof of identity to deliver benefits to the hundreds of millions of deserving Indians who have been denied them for decades.
senior editor
KESHAVA GUHA
Bibliography for: "Making the poor count: India's national identity scheme"
Keshava Guha "Making the poor count: India's national identity scheme". Harvard International Review. FindArticles.com. 07 Nov, 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_32/ai_n56188327/
Two schemes that could be cleaned up in the short term are the Public Distribution System (PDS), which distributes food grains, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which provides enrollees with 100 days work at slightly more than US$2 per day. It is estimated that of the US$9 billion annual outlay for NREGS, up to US$3.6 billion is lost to mid-level corruption; enrollees consequently typically receive only 60 percent of the promised income.
By giving such concrete identity credentials to the poorest Indians, many of whom have never possessed any kind of identity proof in their lives, Aadhaar can ensure that PDS food grains reach their intended source. The benefits to NREGS will come through Aadhaar's pledge of financial inclusion. It is proposed that anyone with an Aadhaar number will receive a basic, no-frills bank account; in a country where only a small fraction of the population use formal financial services today, this change would have a revolutionary impact. Enrollees in NREGS could have their salary directly deposited to their biometrically-authenticated bank account, entirely bypassing the myriad network of middlemen that account for the 40 percent income loss.
In the long-run, financial inclusion could be an essential step in a complete overhaul of India's welfare state. For decades, many economists have recommended that India replace its labyrinthine system of subsidies and price controls, many of which benefit the wealthy, with a system of direct cash transfers to the poor. Bank accounts for all will make this possible. This possibility, however, has never been formally acknowledged by the ruling Congress Parties and is bitterly opposed by the left.
Aadhaar neither confers citizenship nor inherently guarantees benefits; rather, it provides an unimpeachable identity with which citizens will be able to avail themselves of the benefits to which they are entitled. Residents of India will not, at the moment, be required to apply for an Aadhaar number; rather, as with the US Social Security number, enrollment will be technically voluntary. Service providers will, however, be allowed to mandate that customers possess a number.
While Aadhaar has received a remarkably enthusiastic reception from its key prospective beneficiaries--the poor--it has also attracted considerable criticism from the kinds of civil libertarians that successfully derailed ID schemes in other countries. Opponents of Aadhaar assert that it is part of a hidden agenda of the creation of a surveillance state, an unacceptable transformation of the relationship between the citizen and the state. They point to the creation of a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID, a proposed national security database), and argue that a biometric number will be misused to track citizens' personal data.
The UIDAI has responded to these concerns by asserting that Aadhaar will only require the most basic demographic information of its enrollees and that it is not linked to NATGRID or any other government database. As of September 2010, it was unclear whether or not the Ministry of Home Affairs intended to proceed with NATGRID. In any case, the success or failure of Aadhaar, which is the subject of legislation currently pending before the Lok Sabha, India's lower house of parliament, will be judged on its effectiveness in using the proof of identity to deliver benefits to the hundreds of millions of deserving Indians who have been denied them for decades.
senior editor
KESHAVA GUHA
Bibliography for: "Making the poor count: India's national identity scheme"
Keshava Guha "Making the poor count: India's national identity scheme". Harvard International Review. FindArticles.com. 07 Nov, 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_32/ai_n56188327/
