In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Saturday, March 31, 2012

2487 - Why some of the optimism might be nir-aadhar - National Medical Journal


THE NATIONAL MEDICAL JOURNAL OF INDIA VOL. 24, NO. 6, 2011 375
Correspondence


The UIDAI project:
Why some of the optimism might be nir-aadhar


The article by Nandan Nilekani in the May–June 2011 issue of the Journal1 provides an interesting laundry list of the advantages which an Aadhar number could provide to those registered through the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). 


Nonetheless, it is surprising that nothing has appeared on the limitations. The article fails to present a holistic picture—there is no reference to the expected challenges, the potential for duplication of the existing mechanisms, the threats the Aadhar project poses, particularly to privacy of personal information of individuals and data security. Further, there is no mention of any proposed measures the UIDAI is taking to address these potential loopholes. Even a cursory uninformed examination of the claims in the article indicates that while the intention is laudable, the process and means can definitely be causes of concern. 


As readers, we had several questions related to the approach to, implementation of as well as legislative adequacy of the UIDAI initiative and the implications of these issues for its success.


Why two sets of identification data?
It is unclear as to why two sets of identification data—demographic and bioinformatics—are required for securing an Aadhar number. Also, the operational aspects and possible misuse could cause concern. As it is, individuals face many problems while trying to meet the requirements of producing proof of residence, date of birth, etc. for securing other key government identification documents (such as a voter’s card, passport and ration card), and nothing has been said on how similar trials and tribulations can be minimized in the case of those seeking an Aadhar number.


Would securing an Aadhar number truly remain voluntary?
The article has pointed out some benefits of having an Aadhar number, such as immunization tracking for children. However, this system implies a clear link between basic health provisioning (such as immunization) and the need for official proof of being an Indian resident (to be certified through the possession of an Aadhar number). If this is indeed the case, it would mean that providers, especially in the public healthcare system, might not be able to provide health services to vulnerable populations such as ‘illegal’ immigrants. It should not be the duty or responsibility of a healthcare provider to sit in judgement over a patient’s legal status regarding his entitlement to health services. A patient presenting at a healthcare facility without an Aadhar number might be suspected of being a non-citizen—and stigmatized—and not provided with health services, or even worse, be pursued by the state machinery. Linking Aadhar to essential public health services such as immunization could mean that undocumented immigrants, among other vulnerable groups, would shun health programmes and hence, put themselves and others in the community at risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable conditions.


Although securing an Aadhar number is currently voluntary, the emphasis on its use in healthcare in the way Nilekani advocates in the article might lead to the risk of the Aadhar number becoming almost ‘mandatory’ for better, swifter and smoother access to healthcare in due course of time. Aadhar has already become compulsory for the provision of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by government oil companies as part of a pilot project in Mysore.2 Concerns regarding the Aadhar number becoming almost mandatory have been expressed by others, too.3


Wouldn’t the proposal to use Aadhar for immunization tracking be duplication of efforts?
The government has already launched a separate system for maternal and child health tracking, including immunization 4 through the National Rural Health Mission Health Management Information System (http://nrhm-mis.nic.in/mchtracking.htm and http://nrhm- mcts.nic.in/), and it is not clear why UIDAI should aim to replicate it through Aadhar. 


We believe there might be other areas in which Aadhar might lead to a replication of efforts. This would not only lead to a waste of resources, but also increase the risk of threats to data security.


Is the health system sufficiently equipped to use the Aadhar number?
Assuming that the Aadhar number could finally be used in the healthcare context as Nilekani delineates, is our health system equipped with the required e-platform across the nation? Also, do we have adequately trained human resources to run such a sophisticated system, or the capability of recruiting such manpower at every level within the health system? It appears that the use of the Aadhar number as envisioned would entail inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral coordination and the investment of substantial resources. It is not clear how this is being planned or how it will be executed.


Would the system to protect privacy and for data protection be truly foolproof?
The article has not dealt with the issue of privacy of personal information (especially health) and the associated challenges. It is also not clear as to how data safety will be ensured. In response to a question in Parliament regarding mechanisms to protect data from un authorized use, it was said that the data would be encrypted at source and measures such as limiting physical use and establishing standard security infrastructure would be taken.5 We wonder if that would be sufficient given the current trend of data theft from the supposedly safe and well-protected sectors, such as banking and information technology, which use similar mechanisms. As instances of theft and misuse of information become commonplace, as evidenced by increasing credit card fraud and frequent hacking of government websites,6 any framework for information collection which does not have robust safeguards should be a cause of concern. In addition, India does not have any coherent policy or law governing data encryption.7–9


In the contemporary context of global terrorism, it would also be challenging for the UIDAI to keep to its promise of confidentiality of data collected if faced with mounting pressure from investigation and intelligence agencies, whether domestic or foreign, to share bioinformatics information of individuals suspected to be associated with terrorism and violence. 


Although the context is somewhat different, the vaccination campaign launched by a US intelligence agency aimed specifically at collecting DNA samples from the Osama Bin Laden household in Abbottabad in Pakistan10 is an example of how a public health programme collecting identifiable data may be misused.


The initial Aadhar registration system being implemented is also a cause of concern. As the enrolment process has been sub-contracted via tenders to private firms, there is seemingly no guarantee of how information and data security will be maintained. Moreover, ensuring data protection from interested parties, such as insurance companies which could choose to deny health insurance coverage to individuals on the basis of their health profiles, is of paramount importance. Unless stringent safeguards are built in, the Aadhar number could be a serious and risky intrusion into our privacy.


Furthermore, it is not clear as to how harmonization and reconciliation across various legal apparatuses, such as the National Identification Authority of India Bill and the proposed Right to Privacy Bill,11 would be achieved in the context of protecting personal information gathered under the Aadhar project.


Against this backdrop, we believe that the editorial by Nilekani raises more questions than provides answers, and hence there is reason to question the claims of the article.


Finally, we also find it disconcerting that though the author declares his affiliation with the UIDAI, there is no conflict of interest statement in the article. Nilekani, as head of the initiative, is expected to have a positive bias towards the programme. We believe it would have been good practice for a conflict of interest statement to have been appended with the article.


REFERENCES
  1. 1  Nilekani N. Building a foundation for better health: The role of the Aadhaar number. Natl Med J India 2011;24:133–5.
  2. 2  Milton L. Aadhaar number to be must for LPG services. The Times of India 2011 Aug
8. A vailable at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mysore/Aadhaar-number- to-be-must-for-LPG-services/articleshow/9533385.cms (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
  1. 3  Ramanathan U. A private right or a public affair? Tehelka 2011 Jul 9, vol 8, issue 27. Available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ne090711 PROSCONS.asp (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
  2. 4  Government Health. Now, a tracking system for immunisation in India: The name- and telephone-based tracking of pregnant mothers and children through a web-
CORRESPONDENCE
377
enabled system makes sure they receive complete vaccination. 2011 Aug 3. Avail- able at http://www.igovernment.in/site/now-tracking-system-immunisation-india (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
  1. 5  Unique Identification Authority of India. Planning Commission, Government of India, Rajya Sabha Questions. Question no 393 (answered on 2011 Feb 24). Available at http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=171&Itemid=150#rs (accessed on 20 Aug 2011).
  2. 6  Kurup D. ‘State actor’ linked to major cyber intrusions in India, world. The Hindu, Bangalore edition. 2011 Aug 4. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/ article2319894.ece (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
  3. 7  Data Security Council of India. Recommendations for Encryption Policy Regulation u/s 84A of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. Prepared by DSCI/ NASSCOM with inputs from the industry. 2009 July 13. Available at http:// www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/encryption_policy_dsci_ final_submission_to_dit.pdf (accessed on 16 Aug 2011).
  4. 8  Dalal, P. Encryption policy of India needed. 2011 Jun 19. Available at http://ictps. blogspot.com/2011/06/encryption-policy-of-india-is-needed.html (accessed on 5 Aug 2011).
  5. 9  Waris S. Government asleep over encryption regulations. 2009 Aug 20. Available at
    http://www.legallyindia.com/20090820138/Legal-opinions/government-asleep-
    over-encryption-regulations (accessed on 21 Aug 2011).
  6. 10  Reardon S. Pakistan. Decrying CIA vaccination sham, health workers brace for
    backlash. Science 2011;333:395.
  7. 11  Venkatesan J. Bill on ‘right to privacy’ in monsoon session: Moily. The Hindu 2011
    Jun 7. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article 2082643.ece (accessed on 17 Aug 2011).
    Anant Bhan
    anantbhan@gmail.com
    Sunita V. S. Bandewar
    sunita.bandewar@utoronto.ca
    Pune Maharashtra
  8. ______________________________

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