2487 - Why some of the optimism might be nir-aadhar - National Medical Journal

THE NATIONAL MEDICAL JOURNAL OF INDIA VOL. 24, NO. 6, 2011 375

Correspondence


The UIDAI project:
Why some of the optimism might be nir-aadhar

The article by Nandan Nilekani in the May–June 2011 issue of the Journal1 provides an interesting laundry list of the advantages which an Aadhar number could provide to those registered through the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). 


Nonetheless, it is surprising that nothing has appeared on the limitations. The article fails to present a holistic picture—there is no reference to the expected challenges, the potential for duplication of the existing mechanisms, the threats the Aadhar project poses, particularly to privacy of personal information of individuals and data security. Further, there is no mention of any proposed measures the UIDAI is taking to address these potential loopholes. Even a cursory uninformed examination of the claims in the article indicates that while the intention is laudable, the process and means can definitely be causes of concern. 


As readers, we had several questions related to the approach to, implementation of as well as legislative adequacy of the UIDAI initiative and the implications of these issues for its success.

Why two sets of identification data?
It is unclear as to why two sets of identification data—demographic and bioinformatics—are required for securing an Aadhar number. Also, the operational aspects and possible misuse could cause concern. As it is, individuals face many problems while trying to meet the requirements of producing proof of residence, date of birth, etc. for securing other key government identification documents (such as a voter’s card, passport and ration card), and nothing has been said on how similar trials and tribulations can be minimized in the case of those seeking an Aadhar number.


Would securing an Aadhar number truly remain voluntary?
The article has pointed out some benefits of having an Aadhar number, such as immunization tracking for children. However, this system implies a clear link between basic health provisioning (such as immunization) and the need for official proof of being an Indian resident (to be certified through the possession of an Aadhar number). If this is indeed the case, it would mean that providers, especially in the public healthcare system, might not be able to provide health services to vulnerable populations such as ‘illegal’ immigrants. It should not be the duty or responsibility of a healthcare provider to sit in judgement over a patient’s legal status regarding his entitlement to health services. A patient presenting at a healthcare facility without an Aadhar number might be suspected of being a non-citizen—and stigmatized—and not provided with health services, or even worse, be pursued by the state machinery. Linking Aadhar to essential public health services such as immunization could mean that undocumented immigrants, among other vulnerable groups, would shun health programmes and hence, put themselves and others in the community at risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable conditions.


Although securing an Aadhar number is currently voluntary, the emphasis on its use in healthcare in the way Nilekani advocates in the article might lead to the risk of the Aadhar number becoming almost ‘mandatory’ for better, swifter and smoother access to healthcare in due course of time. Aadhar has already become compulsory for the provision of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by government oil companies as part of a pilot project in Mysore.2 Concerns regarding the Aadhar number becoming almost mandatory have been expressed by others, too.3


Wouldn’t the proposal to use Aadhar for immunization tracking be duplication of efforts?
The government has already launched a separate system for maternal and child health tracking, including immunization 4 through the National Rural Health Mission Health Management Information System (http://nrhm-mis.nic.in/mchtracking.htm and http://nrhm- mcts.nic.in/), and it is not clear why UIDAI should aim to replicate it through Aadhar. 


We believe there might be other areas in which Aadhar might lead to a replication of efforts. This would not only lead to a waste of resources, but also increase the risk of threats to data security.


Is the health system sufficiently equipped to use the Aadhar number?
Assuming that the Aadhar number could finally be used in the healthcare context as Nilekani delineates, is our health system equipped with the required e-platform across the nation? Also, do we have adequately trained human resources to run such a sophisticated system, or the capability of recruiting such manpower at every level within the health system? It appears that the use of the Aadhar number as envisioned would entail inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral coordination and the investment of substantial resources. It is not clear how this is being planned or how it will be executed.

Would the system to protect privacy and for data protection be truly foolproof?
The article has not dealt with the issue of privacy of personal information (especially health) and the associated challenges. It is also not clear as to how data safety will be ensured. In response to a question in Parliament regarding mechanisms to protect data from un authorized use, it was said that the data would be encrypted at source and measures such as limiting physical use and establishing standard security infrastructure would be taken.5 We wonder if that would be sufficient given the current trend of data theft from the supposedly safe and well-protected sectors, such as banking and information technology, which use similar mechanisms. As instances of theft and misuse of information become commonplace, as evidenced by increasing credit card fraud and frequent hacking of government websites,6 any framework for information collection which does not have robust safeguards should be a cause of concern. In addition, India does not have any coherent policy or law governing data encryption.7–9


In the contemporary context of global terrorism, it would also be challenging for the UIDAI to keep to its promise of confidentiality of data collected if faced with mounting pressure from investigation and intelligence agencies, whether domestic or foreign, to share bioinformatics information of individuals suspected to be associated with terrorism and violence. 


Although the context is somewhat different, the vaccination campaign launched by a US intelligence agency aimed specifically at collecting DNA samples from the Osama Bin Laden household in Abbottabad in Pakistan10 is an example of how a public health programme collecting identifiable data may be misused.


The initial Aadhar registration system being implemented is also a cause of concern. As the enrolment process has been sub-contracted via tenders to private firms, there is seemingly no guarantee of how information and data security will be maintained. Moreover, ensuring data protection from interested parties, such as insurance companies which could choose to deny health insurance coverage to individuals on the basis of their health profiles, is of paramount importance. Unless stringent safeguards are built in, the Aadhar number could be a serious and risky intrusion into our privacy.


Furthermore, it is not clear as to how harmonization and reconciliation across various legal apparatuses, such as the National Identification Authority of India Bill and the proposed Right to Privacy Bill,11 would be achieved in the context of protecting personal information gathered under the Aadhar project.


Against this backdrop, we believe that the editorial by Nilekani raises more questions than provides answers, and hence there is reason to question the claims of the article.


Finally, we also find it disconcerting that though the author declares his affiliation with the UIDAI, there is no conflict of interest statement in the article. Nilekani, as head of the initiative, is expected to have a positive bias towards the programme. We believe it would have been good practice for a conflict of interest statement to have been appended with the article.


REFERENCES

1. 1  Nilekani N. Building a foundation for better health: The role of the Aadhaar number. Natl Med J India 2011;24:133–5.
   
2. 2  Milton L. Aadhaar number to be must for LPG services. The Times of India 2011 Aug
   

8. A vailable at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mysore/Aadhaar-number- to-be-must-for-LPG-services/articleshow/9533385.cms (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).

3. 3  Ramanathan U. A private right or a public affair? Tehelka 2011 Jul 9, vol 8, issue 27. Available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ne090711 PROSCONS.asp (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
   
4. 4  Government Health. Now, a tracking system for immunisation in India: The name- and telephone-based tracking of pregnant mothers and children through a web-
   

CORRESPONDENCE

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enabled system makes sure they receive complete vaccination. 2011 Aug 3. Avail- able at http://www.igovernment.in/site/now-tracking-system-immunisation-india (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).

5. 5  Unique Identification Authority of India. Planning Commission, Government of India, Rajya Sabha Questions. Question no 393 (answered on 2011 Feb 24). Available at http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=171&Itemid=150#rs (accessed on 20 Aug 2011).
   
6. 6  Kurup D. ‘State actor’ linked to major cyber intrusions in India, world. The Hindu, Bangalore edition. 2011 Aug 4. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/ article2319894.ece (accessed on 18 Aug 2011).
   
7. 7  Data Security Council of India. Recommendations for Encryption Policy Regulation u/s 84A of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. Prepared by DSCI/ NASSCOM with inputs from the industry. 2009 July 13. Available at http:// www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/encryption_policy_dsci_ final_submission_to_dit.pdf (accessed on 16 Aug 2011).
   
8. 8  Dalal, P. Encryption policy of India needed. 2011 Jun 19. Available at http://ictps. blogspot.com/2011/06/encryption-policy-of-india-is-needed.html (accessed on 5 Aug 2011).
   
9. 9  Waris S. Government asleep over encryption regulations. 2009 Aug 20. Available at
   http://www.legallyindia.com/20090820138/Legal-opinions/government-asleep-
   over-encryption-regulations (accessed on 21 Aug 2011).
   
10. 10  Reardon S. Pakistan. Decrying CIA vaccination sham, health workers brace for
    backlash. Science 2011;333:395.
    
11. 11  Venkatesan J. Bill on ‘right to privacy’ in monsoon session: Moily. The Hindu 2011
    Jun 7. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article 2082643.ece (accessed on 17 Aug 2011).
    Anant Bhan
    anantbhan@gmail.com
    Sunita V. S. Bandewar
    sunita.bandewar@utoronto.ca
    Pune Maharashtra
    
12. ______________________________

2486 - An integrated system for citizen-friendly policing - eGov

An integrated system for citizen-friendly policing - eGov

Filed under: Current Issue,Featured,Interviews,Magazine,March 2012

Manoj Agarwal
IGP, SCRB, Government of Gujarat

Gujarat IG of Police Manoj Agarwal heads the State Crime Records Bureau (SCRB). He has an important role in the implementation of the Home Department Integrated IT Solution that would bring about far-reaching changes to the functioning of the state’s Home Department, including the police. In a discussion with Anand Agarwal and Sunil Kumar, he talks of the vision behind HDIITS, its current implementation status and how it is broader in scope than the CCTNS of the Union Home Ministry

How was the HDIITS conceptualised, and what benefits are sought to be derived from it?

The Home Department Integrated IT Solution or HDIITS was conceptualized when it was realized that a lot of initiatives are taken down the line at the district level or block level. It was realized that we should be thinking about the whole process holistically. It should be centrally tackled and each and every function should be covered and this led to HDIITS being planned.

HDIITS would build a centralised repository of crime and criminal information database, which will be shared across various law enforcement agencies in the state. This will help in effective crime investigation and quicker turnout times for cases solving. The system also has a citizen website interface, which will help the police to deliver quality services to citizens and hence will promote a strong and cordial relationship between police and citizens in the state. It will also increase transparency and openness.

So the entire paperwork-based system is going to be transformed into an electronic system…
Yes, more or less. The concept is that we would move maximum record keeping to electronic mode. It would not be entirely paperless police station, as a number of documents are legally required. For example, the FIR requires signature of the complainant etc., so some paperwork would still be there, but yes, we will be deploying electronic record keeping to a large extent.

And what is the implementation status of the system?
We are at a very advanced stage. The software is more or less ready and a lot of user acceptance tests have been conducted. Data digitisation has also been completed for a number of years and we have conducted many training sessions as well. The only thing is that the hardware has not yet been purchased.  The tender has been awarded recently. Once the hardware comes in, it will be more or less online for everyone. Already we have very good connectivity in Gujarat, so that would not be a problem.

We finalised the hardware contract just a while back, and expect around 90 working days for the entire system to be operational. However, I would be a little more conservative, and think that by the middle of 2012, we should have the system in place.

The Ministry of Home Affairs has proposed a similar system – the CCTNS. What are the points of divergence between your project and the central one?
I would not call it divergence. The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) project is a successor to the CIPA project – Common Integrated Police Application. At the time CIPA was planned, we had very politely told them that we would not be taking up CIPA and since we already had connected police stations through the Gujarat State Wide Area Network (GSWAN), we decided not to go for a standalone type of system that was envisaged under CIPA. We decided to go ahead with HDIITS.

The centre has now realised the importance of interconnected police stations and the CCTNS is now talking of connecting police stations. Even the CCTNS is covering only the core applications that are limited to investigation and police complaints. HDIITS is covering a much broader range of applications, including investigations, administration, prisons, home guards etc. So the HDIITS is much broader in scope than CCTNS which is covering uniform aspects of police work across states, and make records available nationwide.

Going forward, do you see a situation where every state would have to develop systems similar to HDIITS for the aspects not covered by the CCTNS?
That is already happening. They are now asking the system integrators in the states to take up other parts of police functioning of the state not covered by the CCTNS. So while the CCTNS would provide a common nationwide system for the investigative and crime-related work, other areas would be covered by state-specific systems. We are well on the way to implementing this through the HDIITS which is an integrated system that would cover around 70,000 police personnel, 30,000 honorary staff and 5,000 administrative staff in over 1000 offices across the state.

2485 - A Taste of Nadra (Pakistan)

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/business/20-Jan-2012/kcci-demands-withdrawal-of-cnic-ntn-condition

KCCI demands withdrawal of CNIC/ NTN condition

By: Our Staff Reporter | January 20, 2012

KARACHI - Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry has demanded immediate withdrawal of mandatory condition of CNIC/ NTN for all purchasers.

KCCI President Mian Abrar Ahmad has stated that numerous complaints were received from members on revised Income Tax, Sales Tax and Federal Excise Returns especially on CNIC/ NTN condition which became mandatory from January 1, 2012.

He said that unilateral decision should not be taken by FBR and this is very unfortunate that major changes have been made without consultation with the business and industrial community of Karachi.

Abrar said only Karachi contributes 68 percent of the revenue so before framing any policy, FBR should be taken KCCI on board. He demanded that FBR should not burden the already registered tax payers who are facing manifold problems like power, gas and water shortage, law and order situation and 2-weekly holidays.

He demanded that FBR should involve its own tax machinery to increase the tax net and revenue target of Rs 1,952 billion in current fiscal year. He further urged for equal treatment to the taxpayers by the tax collectors, with no discrimination in respect of penal action.

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/03/31/news/national/sc-orders-nadra-to-devise-strategy-for-cnics-to-hindu-women/

SC orders NADRA to devise strategy for CNICs to Hindu women 

30 March 2012

Staff Reporter

ISLAMABAD - Hearing a suo motu case involving problems faced by the women of Hindu community in obtaining computerised national identity cards (CNICs), the Supreme Court on Friday ordered the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to sort out permanent solution of the issue, as it was the matter of three millions Pakistani Hindus.

A three-member bench comprising Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Justice Khilji Arif Hussain and Justice Tariq Parvez was hearing a suo motu case initiated on media reports, which highlighted problems faced by a Hindu woman, Pram Sari Mai, a resident of Rahimyar Khan. She failed to get a passport to visit India even after paying a large amount in fee.

During the hearing, Attorney General Maulvi Anwarul Haq told the bench that NADRA had issued a new circular about issuance of CNICs to the Hindu female through a simple affidavit.

Upon this, the chief justice observed that it was a temporary solution. He said the NADRA chairman had legal authority to amend the law pertaining to the matter. 

He said government should be consulted, if needed. The court directed NADRA to sort out permanent solution of the issue and submit report on April 23.

On last hearing, the court had expressed reservations over the miseries of the Hindu community, particularly verification of their women’s marriage contract before issuance of CNICs to them. 

“How can we satisfy three million Pakistani Hindu community, as they have equal rights as you have,” the chief justice had asked a NADRA official. He had said that the court was bound to protect the rights of minorities under Article 36 of the constitution.

http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/05/punishment-for-giving-false-id-information-enhanced.html

Punishment for giving false ID information enhanced

Iftikhar A. Khan 5th November, 2011

The bill adopted by the National Assembly last year moved in the Senate by Leader of the House Nayyar Hussain Bokhari and was passed within minutes without any opposition at the end of proceedings on the last day of the session. – File Photo

ISLAMABAD: The Senate on Friday passed a bill which amends the National Database Registration and Registration Authority (Nadra) Act 2000 by enhancing the punishment from one year to 10 years for deliberately providing false information for obtaining Computerised National Identity cards (CNICs).

The bill adopted by the National Assembly last year moved in the Senate by Leader of the House Nayyar Hussain Bokhari and was passed within minutes without any opposition at the end of proceedings on the last day of the session.

Since offences entailing punishment of less than three years are non-cognizable according to schedule II of the code of criminal procedure, federal investigation agencies and police were handicapped in acting effectively against people providing false information and Nadra employees involved in providing fake CNICs. Now the FIA and police will have powers to arrest such people without any warrant.

The Senate also adopted the Criminal Law (amendment) Bill providing for rigorous imprisonment of up to 14 years for those committing or abetting in tampering with petroleum pipelines for theft or disruption of supply. Damaging or destroying transportation and transmission lines by an act of subversion by explosive material will also entail a punishment of up to 14 years and not less than seven years in any case, with a fine of not less than one million rupees.

The bill also makes tampering with domestic, commercial and industrial gas metres a cognizable offence.

http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/business-a-economy/39315-non-disclosure-of-ntncnic-number-of-unregistered-buyers-st-returns-e-filing-to-be-blocked-from-jan-1-.html

Non-disclosure of NTN/CNIC number of unregistered buyers: ST returns e-filing to be blocked from Jan 1 

SOHAIL SARFRAZ

ISLAMABAD: The Federal Board of Revenue's (FBR) electronic system will not accept sales tax and federal excise returns from January 1, 2012 of all those registered manufacturers, importers and exporters who would not disclose their computerised national identity card (CNIC) number or national tax number (NTN) of their unregistered buyers.

Sources told Business Recorder here on Sunday that the system would automatically declare all such non-compliant registered persons as 'inactive', which would block their sales tax returns due to non-submission of the CNIC number or NTN of their unregistered buyers. The FBR will impose these restrictions over the non-compliant manufacturers, importers and exporters from January 1, 2012. Following introduction of the e-filing of returns for all sales tax registered persons, the FBR can easily declare non-compliant taxpayers as 'inactive' and subsequently sales tax returns could be blocked through the electronic system. The system can also declare the non-compliant manufacturers, importers and exporters as 'defaulted' as sales tax returns would not be accepted by the electronic system. From January 1, 2012, the facility given to the registered persons to show sales made to unregistered persons without submission of particulars would be ended under SRO821(I)/2011.

According to sources, the FBR had repeatedly relaxed implementation of SRO 821(I)/2011 to fulfill the demands of the business and trade community. The implementation of the said notification has been suspended till December 31, 2011. As a result of relaxation given by the Board, a number of people have started providing details of their unregistered buyers in the sales tax returns. With the passage of time, the tax department has been able to obtain identification of the unregistered buyers. The taxpayers have started to realise that it is necessary to provide details of the unregistered buyers to remain compliant and ensure tax adjustment facility for their registered buyers.

From January 2012, importers, exporters and manufacturers have to maintain the particulars of the buyers in the form of NTN/CNIC. It is also learnt that registered persons of the above category have started maintaining their records in this manner so that they should be able to show the compliance from January 2012. Keeping in view the fact the FBR has already introduced e-filing of returns for all sales tax registered persons and, with the help of this electronic filing system, the FBR can easily impose restrictions on electronic submission of returns till they provide the complete details prescribed by the Board. As a result of failure to provide particulars of the unregistered buyers, they would not be able to file the returns and consequently they may become non-active taxpayers. The major impact of non-active taxpayers would be on their buyers who cannot take input credit of the purchases made from such non-active taxpayers. Therefore, it is in their own interest to maintain proper records of all sales, whether made to registered persons or unregistered persons, for filing of their returns, sources said.

As a business practice, large majority of sales made by manufacturers, importers, and exporters is through the dealers and distributors who are otherwise required to be registered under the Sales Tax Act. The manufacturers have to provide the details of these registered dealers, etc, to remain compliant under the FBR system. As some of the manufacturers and importers have their retail outlets, they can continue to report their sales through the retail outlets as provided in the sales tax returns without providing the NTN/CNIC of the end consumers.

Sources said that it is obvious from the above stated facts that the NTN/CNIC to be provided by the manufacturers, importers and exporters is only in respect of their sales made to wholesalers, dealers and distributors and retailers. The non-compliant persons would be unable to file their sales tax returns as the system would automatically block their returns. Thus, the registered buyers would not be able to obtain input from these non-compliant taxpayers. Even registered buyers of manufacturers importers and exporters are compliant but they cannot be able to obtain input in case these manufacturers/importers etc were unable to provide particulars of their unregistered buyers. Thus, non-compliance of SRO 821(I)/2011 by the registered manufacturers/importers and exporters would also create problems for their compliant buyers in obtaining tax credit. The registered buyers would not be in a position to claim input tax credit due to 'inactive' status of their manufacturers.

Despite the fact that the registered buyers of the manufacturers etc are compliant they would not be able to claim input tax adjustment due to inactive status of their registered manufacturers, importers and exporters. This would be applicable in cases where registered manufacturers were unable to provide details of the CNIC/NTN of the un-registered buyers. In this way, the registered buyers would force their manufacturers, importers and exporters to become active/compliant taxpayer to enable them to claim input tax adjustment.

Over 90 percent of the supplies are being made by the manufacturers to the unregistered wholesalers, distributors and dealers of all essential commodities and items. These businessmen have to be registered with the sales tax department as they are directly obtaining supplies from the manufacturers, who are avoiding sharing of basic information with the tax department. The major documentation measure of the Board to obtain the CNIC/NTN from the unregistered buyers/sellers would bring these potential wholesalers, distributors and dealers within the documented regime as per current provisions of the law, sources added.

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/12/30/news/national/nadra-to-issue-cnics-to-orphans-from-today-na-told/

Staff Report Friday, 30 Dec 2011 3:40 am   

ISLAMABAD - Interior Minister Rehman Malik on Thursday said the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) had been directed to issue Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) to orphans and the process would start from today (Friday). “I have directed NADRA to issue CNICs to orphans on production of an authority letter from any registered orphanage centre,” Malik said while responding to supplementary questions during the National Assembly question hour. He said Pakistan’s name had been removed from the international watch list on human trafficking due to efforts of the FIA.

On its role in addressing corruption, the minister said the FIA had so far recovered Rs 808 million lost in corruption. To a question, the minister said Transparency International was a small institution, therefore, its report was not final and it should be noted that corruption in Pakistan could never measured on the same tools used in Europe. 

http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/23/12m-people-removed-from-voters-list-in-balochistan.html

1.2m people removed from voters’ list in Balochistan

By Our Staff Correspondent       

23rd August, 2011

Mr Anwar said the commission would have the support of army or Frontier Corps in the verification campaign. After the completion of first phase of the drive, new computerised electoral lists would be put on display for 21 days for the purpose of correction. However, a person who could not be registered during the drive can get himself registered with the commission till the announcement of holding of elections. — File Photo  

QUETTA: The Election Commissioner of Balochistan, Mehboob Anwar, has said the names of about 1.2 million people have been removed from the list of voters because theses were not verified by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).

Speaking at a press conference here on Monday, he said that a door-to-door verification campaign had been launched to compile a final computerised electoral list. He said the Supreme Court had ordered verification of the voters’ list during the hearing on petitions moved by Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf chief Imran Khan and TV anchorperson Mubashir Luqman.

Mr Anwar said that after the removal of 1-1.2 million people from the list the number of registered voters in Balochistan had fallen to 3,004,000 from 4,362,272.

In reply to a question, he said the expelled voters had registered themselves in more than one place. Under a new policy, he added, a person must possess the computerised national identity card (CNIC) to get himself registered with the Election Commission as a voter. No other document will be acceptable.

Mr Anwar said the commission would have the support of army or Frontier Corps in the verification campaign. After the completion of first phase of the drive, new computerised electoral lists would be put on display for 21 days for the purpose of correction. However, a person who could not be registered during the drive can get himself registered with the commission till the announcement of holding of elections.

Mr Anwar said polling offices would be provided new electoral lists having pictures of voters during the elections. Thirty assistant election commissioners, 272 assistant registration officers, 2,000 supervisors and 8,000 other staff would take part in the verification drive in 9,214 census blocks in 30 districts of the province. The campaign will continue till Sept 30.

2484 - Resident I-Cards run into Aadhaar roadblock - Live Mint

Resident I-Cards run into Aadhaar roadblock - Live Mint

EFC meeting fails to clear costing of the project because of objections from UIDAI and the IT department

Sahil Makkar

New Delhi: Divisions between the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI, or Aadhaar) and the home ministry grew wider on Thursday after the Nandan Nilekani-led entity and the department of information technology (DIT) raised objections to the Resident Identity Card (RIC) scheme.

Numbers game: A file photo of residents being enrolled for the UIDAI project. By Hemant Mishra/Mint

Three high-ranking officials, who spoke independently and on condition of anonymity, said a meeting of the Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) to clear Rs. 6,790 crore for the home ministry’s RIC project remained inconclusive. A fresh date is being sought to resolve the differences between the key stakeholders.
The meeting, called by expenditure secretary Sumit Bose, was attended by home secretary R.K. Singh, DIT secretary J. Satyanarayana, UIDAI deputy director general Anil Khachi, Planning Commission member secretary Sudha Pillai, Registrar General of India (RGI) C. Chandramouli and officials of various ministries and public sector firms.

The meeting was inconclusive “in a sense that costing of the project was not cleared. Usually, approval comes in the first meeting and second meeting is not required to clear any project,” said one of the three officials mentioned above.
“But there was a broader consensus on the off-line mode of the project. Objections from the DIT and UIDAI were finally laid to rest on the grounds that RIC is a necessary security requirement. The meeting was told that RIC does not come in way of online verification of Aadhaar number,” the official said.

Another official said a meeting of potential users of the card will now be called. “The users will give their suggestions on kind of applications required to be loaded on the card. There were suggestions to roll public distribution system and MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) schemes through the card,” the official said. “A meeting of different users will be called before another meeting of EFC to resolve the remaining issue.”

“The modalities to issue cards are still to be worked out. I think EFC will clear it in the next meeting,” said the third official, who was present in the meeting.

This is the second time the RIC scheme has run into trouble after opposition from UIDAI and DIT. Nilekani and Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia had opposed the RIC project in the past.

Earlier, the home ministry on the one side, and the Planning Commission and the UIDAI on the other, had fought a bitter and all-too-public battle over the scope of the Aadhaar project because it overlapped, in some aspects, with the National Population Register project (NPR).

A compromise was finally reached on 27 January that allowed the scope of the UIDAI project to be expanded to 600 million and seemingly prevented duplication in the collection of biometric information.
UIDAI director general R.S. Sharma and DIT secretary Satyanarayana refused to comment on the developments.

“We have made our points in the EFC and I don’t want to add anything more,” said Sharma.
The officials cited earlier said the next EFC meeting will take up another controversial proposal—that the RICs carry the Aadhaar number, making it unnecessary for UIDAI to send out letters to all enrolls.


Mint on Wednesday reported UIDAI’s objections to the proposal. “A letter is completion of our process,” an UIDAI official said in the report. “In a sense a letter delivered to a resident is a check that he exists. The letter is the final closing piece in Aadhaar cycle and it should go to every resident.”

The RIC programme was launched in India’s nine coastal states after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The home ministry is seeking to extend the scheme to the rest of the country and has sought Rs. 6,700 crore to fund the programme. The card uses a chip that carries data, photographs and fingerprints of the holder.

sahil.m@livemint.com 

2483 - Govt unveils online info platform for public Zee News

Govt unveils online info platform for public

Last Updated: Friday, March 30, 2012, 22:20

New Delhi: The government on Friday showcased an online platform on which various departments will provide important information to public in a structured website format that will enhance transparency in governance.

"Data belongs to all of us. Sooner we realise as government... better it is for all of us because then government and citizen will collaborate with each other. This project tells us what data can be shared and can be put in public domain," Telecom and IT Minister Kapil Sibal said while launching the Open Government Platform (OGPL). 

The project was conceived during the visit of US President Barack Obama to bring in transparency in governance. The data was jointly developed by US and India government officials along with support from industry.

Sibal said that to bring in transparency government departments should open their non-sensitive data for public.

"The data that is generated is community property and must be shared with them. You can use this data for social audit and also for commercial purposes. We have National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy 2012 in place and this platform is in line with it," Sibal said.

The Cabinet in February approved National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy 2012 which applies on all data and information created, generated, collected and achieved using public funds provided by Government of India. This could be done directly or through authorised agencies by various ministries or departments or any public body.

Director General of National Informatics Centre BK Gairola said that teams developing this online platform have used open source technology.

"This technology is such that any body can use without constraints of any kind. This is beta version of the OGPL and released to selected people for testing. Once testing is complete and necessary changes are made, we will use it for our projects and other governments as well," Gairola said.

Advisor to Prime Minister Sam Pitroda said that the platform will be used separately by each government and will have different website address.

"The benefit is that they will not have to invest separately for developing a portal for governance and they will be able to use the same platform. The domain name will be different for each government," Pitroda said.

Pitroda said that the data on the website will be populated by government department gradually and development of various services on it will take place in phased manner.

PTI

2482 - House panel raps Planning Comm for breach of trust on new UID law - The Pioneer

House panel raps Planning Comm for  breach of trust on new UID law

Friday, 30 March 2012 00:40Seema Sindhu | New DelhiHits: 270


Although the differences between the Planning Commission and the Home Ministry on Aadhaar or Unique Identification (UID) have been resolved, problems for the Plan Panel are not over yet. Now, the Plan Panel has been lambasted for breach of trust by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance. The committee had raised concerns on some of the proposals of the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 and asked the panel to re-introduce the Bill accordingly but it didn’t do the same but got more fund allocated for the project instead.

In a meeting on Wednesday, Committee Chairman Yashwant Sinha blasted the Plan Panel for its failure to re-introduce the UID Bill. According to highly-placed sources, Sinha sternly told Plan Panel Member Secretary Sudha Pillai that the panel was “bypassing parliamentary procedure and inviting serious problems by not having re-introduced the Bill and simultaneously making further fund allocations for the project”.

In December last year, the Committee had asked the Plan Panel to re-work the UID Bill, 2010. The Bill proposed for the creation of the National Identity Authority of India, which would oversee the implementation of the Aadhaar project. The Bill was to ensure that the authority has the legal footing to execute the project. It also sought to define the penalties for misuse of the data collected under the UID project.

The Committee had said that the Bill was “unacceptable” in its present form. It had also raised concerns over the cost of the project, lack of clarity on the total expenditure on the project, privacy of the data collected under the project.

After which the Panel had withdrawn the Bill and said that it would introduce a new Bill seeking enactment of UID into a law. While this has not happened yet, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee allocated Rs 1,758 crore more for the project in the Budget 2012-13. The Government has already spent Rs 14,232 on the project. Sinha cited this and said that this is violation of parliamentary procedure.

In addition, in January this year, the Government had also extended the mandate Unique Identification Authority of India’s (UIDAI) to enrol an extra 40 crore people. Putting the conflict between the Plan Panel and Home Ministry on the duplication issues to rest, the Government had cleared the UIDAI’s proposal to enrol an extra 40 crore people in 16 States, saying the biometrics in other States will be collected under the National Population Register project.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was created in January 2009 and had been mandated to register 20 crore people for providing a unique identification number, the ‘Aadhar’, by March 2012. The Authority is set to cross the target by the end of this month, with a million enrolments every day.

While the project has been surrounded a number of controversies, it is considered very important from the point of view that it will not only provide each citizen an identification card ensuring online verification and help financial inclusion, but also check pilferage in various social sector programmes which involve huge subsidies.

Sinha has asked the Panel to come up with a reply within next 10 days.

2481 - The new biometrics-enabled e-payment channel is not cheaper to the State Government: Ashok Khemka - Economic Times

The new biometrics-enabled e-payment channel is not cheaper to the State Government: Ashok Khemka

ET Bureau Mar 29, 2012, 12.45PM IST

 New Delhi: Haryana is one of the first states in India to move towards                 e-payments of welfare programmes. Early last year, it began stopped disbursing its social sector pensions through sarpanches, and began using banks and banking correspondents instead.

However, after six or so months, the state government called off the project and went back to the old approach. Given that the rest of the country is also moving towards e-payments of welfare programmes, what does Haryana's experience have to tell us about e-payments? Is the new channel better at rooting out corruption? Is it more cost-effective at delivery than the erstwhile model?


 ET emailed some of these questions to Ashok Khemka, the Director of the state's Department for Social Justice and Empowerment. Read on.


Haryana is an important case study for anyone trying to understand the issues involved in moving towards e-payment of welfare schemes. Given that, can you give me an overview of the reasons why you wanted to move to e-payment of pensions?

The distribution system is well established since long in the State of Haryana. The Department of Social Justice & Empowerment was making payments of social security benefits through the Panchayati Raj Institutions.

A fixed remuneration for this work is paid to the Sarpanches on monthly basis. The cost of the physical mode of distribution works out to Rs 2.50 crores per annum. This is only 0.15% of the total payments made. The decision to move to the E-payments through bank accounts was taken by the Government to give an impetus to the Financial Inclusion Plan of the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission.

The objective was to catalyze the Financial Inclusion of the weaker sections of society into the formal banking system by remitting pensions electronically into the bank accounts. It was expected that the beneficiary would be able to transact from his bank account at the Customer Service Point established by the Business Correspondent of the Bank at the village level.

The welfare benefits would be leveraged to help establish banking infrastructure in the rural areas.


However, after six months of the rollout, you went back to the old system. In my previous interview with you, you cited two reasons. One, under-deployment of BC terminals. And, two, a problem with biometrics identification. Can you tell me about both? For instance, why was there an under-deployment of the BC terminals?

We had created 19.2 lakh bank accounts, of which 18.2 lakh bank accounts are still in active use. Against the 18.2 lakh bank accounts in active use, even allowing a minimum of one withdrawal per month, the infrastructure of the BC ought to have catered to at least 18.2 lakh withdrawals per month, that is, at the rate of just one withdrawal per account per month.

But the BC could do no more than 3 lakh transactions in a month. This means that the BC could cater to just one withdrawal facility to the customer for every six months on an average. This clearly is not acceptable to any customer, including you and me.

The banks while signing the agreement with the Business Correspondent did not take adequate care to lay down the parameters to determine the service quality of the BC, i.e., adequate number of visits of the BC with predictability.
 
The BC is supposed to be a local person to be directly engaged by the Bank at the village level, but unfortunately the BC was reduced to be a subsidiary Company of the Technical Service Provider. The cost cutting by the BC Company resulted to inadequate deployment of terminal-days.

2480 - Before committing to the banking-correspondent model, we need to thrash out the economics -

Before committing to the banking-correspondent model, we need to thrash out the economics

M Rajshekhar, ET Bureau Mar 15, 2012, 06.52AM IST

  These are the heydays for the banking-correspondent (BC) model. Banks want to use them to extend banking into villages. The government wants to use them to deliver welfare payments. In most cases, these transactions will be routed through BC companies, not directed from banks to village agents.
This confidence being reposed in the BC model is a tad premature. Travel down to the field and you see the model struggling. Given the low fees, villagers do not want to become BCs. The outcome?


 Those seeing other advantages in becoming a BC, like the village sarpanch seeking to reinforce his hegemony over the village, are signing up. There are other problems. BC companies, compelled by hyper-competition, are starting to cut corners in the field while placing agents and terminals. State governments like Andhra Pradesh complain BC companies and banks are delaying payments to earn income on the float.

For their part, BC companies say their economics is hamstrung by the banks' unwillingness to offer products that villagers would find useful, and by the government's unwillingness to pay for payment delivery. But will the BC model start working smoothly once the payments issue is resolved?

Before that question can be answered, banks and the government need to define the level of service that will be provided to those banking with the BCs. How many transactions should they be able to make in a month: one, two or 10? How far should they have to travel to access a BC agent? These standards are undefined right now, and vary from bank to bank, state to state. And as Haryana's unhappy experience with pension e-payment shows, service standards can be shockingly low.

Minutes of a meeting between banks, BCs and the Haryana government say, "The infrastructure deployed by the business correspondent of the banks is grossly inadequatea¦ the average frequency of visit of the BC agent in the village has been once every 90 days and, in some villages, there has been no visit at all in the last six months."

The minutes also mention under-deployment of the point-of-service terminals. In 18 of the state's 21 districts, they say, under-deployment ranged between -73.9% and -99.9%.

This is unacceptable. Partly because the poor should not get a level of banking that is markedly inferior to what you and I get. If your withdrawal from an ATM results in your account getting debited but the machine not disbursing cash, your bank doesn't tell you to contact the company that manages the ATM. However, most banks treat no-frill-account customers as clients of a BC company.

There are other non-negotiables as well. To ensure the BC agent doesn't end up with exclusive control over the pipe through which welfare payments flow - the new architecture should be interoperable. Villagers should be able to access their account from any point-of-service terminal - the way we can access our accounts from any ATM. Further, to ensure villagers become BC agents, they need to be paid well.


Add up all these costs and only then will we know the real cost of delivery through the BC channel.

Now, that cost of delivery needs to be tested against another set of numbers. Today, the government finds BCs attractive because it thinks biometric verification will severely crimp corruption. But what is the quantum of that reduction? Take NREGA. Even if the payment is made through the BC, the employment records are still created by the sarpanch. So, corruption will not vanish entirely. At best, ghost workers will be excised from the rolls.


 Compare this putative reduction with the cost of delivery and we will have the cost:benefit analysis for switching to the BC model.

The danger of not doing this due diligence is we might end up with a delivery channel that is expensive and/or fails to deliver welfare benefits to some of the most vulnerable constituents of this country. With elections two years away, that is a possibility UPA-II might want to avoid. Worse, by the time we realise that the new channel doesn't work, we might have disbanded the old system as well.
On the whole, India seems to cycle through financial inclusion models the way teenagers move through fashions: cooperatives, bank nationalisation, RRBs, SHGs, MFIs and BCs. We prematurely pin all our hopes on one model and try to roll it out across the country. Given the diversity that characterises India, it inevitably fails. And then we look for the next silver bullet.

The finance ministry is now talking of ultra-small branches in villages which bank staff will visit once a week. And the RBI is thinking of a way to get banks to oversee BC agents, and to use BC companies purely as technology service providers.

That is what is underway here as well. Little wonder that every five years, we start wondering how to solve the last-mile problem in Indian banking.

2479 - Plan panel nod to RIC may reopen home ministry-UIDAI battle - Live Mint

Plan panel nod to RIC may reopen home ministry-UIDAI battle

Posted: Wed, Mar 28 2012. 11:15 PM IST

The panel also recommended that RICs carry the Aadhaar number, said a govt official

Sahil Makkar 

New Delhi: The Planning Commission’s recommendation that the expenditure finance committee (EFC) approve the home ministry’s resident identity card (RIC) project may have reopened the fight between the home ministry and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).




A senior government official who didn’t want to be identified claimed that the Planning Commission has also recommended that RICs carry the Aadhaar number, making it unnecessary for UIDAI to send out letters to all enrolls. Mint couldn’t independently ascertain this.

Planning Commission member secretary Sudha Pillai had previously publicly raised issues about UIDAI’s inadequate financial processes only to have these dismissed by Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia.

Last week, Ahluwalia said an appraisal note had been submitted to EFC and that he wasn’t opposed to the RIC project. He said he was unaware of other details.

UIDAI chairman Nandan Nilekani couldn’t be reached for comment.

A senior UIDAI official who didn’t want to be identified said it would oppose any plan that meant not sending out a letter to enrollees. “A letter is completion of our process,” the official said. “In a sense a letter delivered to a resident is a check that he exists. The letter is the final closing piece in Aadhaar cycle and it should go to every resident”

The official added that UIDAI’s other objection has to do with the fact that RICs will only be given to people above the age of 18. “What will happen to people who are below this age?” he asked.

The home ministry, on the one side, and the Planning Commission and UIDAI on the other, had fought a bitter and all-too-public battle over the scope of the Aadhaar project because it overlapped, in some aspects, with the National Population Register project. A compromise was finally reached on 27 January that allowed the scope of UIDAI’s project to be expanded to 600 million and seemingly prevented duplication in the collection of biometric information. The National Population Registry, being put together by the Census department that falls under the home ministry, is to form the basis of the RIC project. Ahluwalia and Nilekani had previously opposed RIC.

The government official cited above said carrying the Aadhaar number on RICs would save the Rs. 22 UIDAI currently spends on sending each letter with the numbers to enrollees.

However, the UIDAI official cited above said the home ministry’s project would take time and is also against the spirit of the country’s information technology (IT) policy. “RIC will be delivered after a fairly prolonged process that could be couple of months or an year from now,” he said. “Also, we raised the point that we should adhere to the national IT policy that says we should move towards the online verification process in future. The RIC process is getting redundant.”

A home ministry official said the RIC despatch system would cost less since it would consolidate all the cards being sent to a family, rather than seek to deliver them individually as with the UID.

The RIC programme was launched in India’s nine coastal states after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The union home ministry is seeking to extend the scheme to the rest of the country and has sought Rs. 6,700 crore to fund the programme. The card uses a chip that carries data, photographs and fingerprints of the holder.

A second home ministry official said off-line verification was more feasible and effective than online methods.

“Not every one is online in the country. There is no uniformity of Internet and mobile services. This problem is worse in the northeast and bordering areas.”

sahil.m@livemint.com

2478 - The UIDAI project: why some of the optimism might be Nir-aadhar - KR activist

The UIDAI project: why some of the optimism might be Nir-aadhar

A few months ago Nandan Nilekani had published an editorial in the National Medical Journal of India extolling the virtues of the Aadhar project for health. His article is available at Editorial-II.pdf

Anant Bhan  and Sunita Bandewar have responded to this article questioning some of the claims in the editorial.The resposne has been published in the latest NMJI and is  below

The UIDAI project: why some of the optimism might be nir-aadhar

The article by Nandan Nilekani in the NMJI 2011 May-June issue[1] provides an interesting laundry list of advantages which an Aadhar number could provide to those registered through the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). 

Nonetheless, it is surprising to see no equivalent of a limitations section. The article fails to present a holistic and full picture of the landscape- in absence of any reference to expected challenges, the potential for duplication of existing mechanisms; and threats the Aadhar project poses, particularly to privacy of personal information of individuals, and data security- and mention of any proposed measures the UIDAI is taking to address these.  Even a cursory uninformed examination of the claims in the article will lead the reader to believe that while the intention is laudable, the process and means can definitely be causes of concern. As readers, we had several questions related to the approach to, implementation of as well as legislative
adequacy of the UIDAI initiative and their implications for its success. .

Why two sets of identification data?

It is unclear as to why two sets of identification data – demographic and bio-informatics – are required for securing an Aadhar number. Also, the operational aspects and possible misuse could be causes of concern. Currently individuals face many problems in fulfilling the expectations of producing proof of residence, birth date etc. for securing other key government identification documents (such as voting card, passport and ration card) and it is unspecified how similar tribulations would be minimized for those seeking an Aadhar number?

Would securing an Aadhar number truly remain voluntary? 

While some benefits of having an Aadhar number are pointed out like immunization tracking for children, the system also worrying suggests a clear link between basic health provisioning (such as immunization) and the need for official proof of being an Indian resident (to be certified through the possession of an Aadhar number). If this is indeed the case, it would mean that providers especially in the public healthcare system might not be able to provide any kind of health services to vulnerable populations like ‘illegal’ immigrants in the country. It should not be the duty or responsibility of a healthcare provider to sit in judgment on a patient’s legal status of entitlement of health services. A patient presenting at a healthcare facility without an Aadhar number might be suspected of being a non-citizen- and stigmatized- and not provided any health services, or even worse, pursued by the state machinery. Linking Aadhar to essential public health services like immunization could mean that undocumented immigrants, among other vulnerable groups, would shun health programs and hence put themselves and others in the community at risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable conditions.

Although, it is currently voluntary to opt to secure an Aadhar number, the emphasis on its use in health care context in the way Nilekani advocates in the article might run the risk of Aadhar number becoming almost inevitable and “mandatory” for better, swifter and smoother access to health care in due course of time. Aadhar has already become compulsory for LPG provision by government oil companies as part of a pilot project in Mysore[2]. Similar concerns have been expressed by others, too[3].

Wouldn’t the proposal of use of Aadhar for immunization tracking be duplication of efforts? 

The government has already launched a separate system for maternal and child health tracking,including immunization[4] through the National Rural Health Mission Health Management Information System  (http://nrhm-mis.nic.in/mchtracking.htm     http://nrhm-mcts.nic.in/) and it’s not clear why 

UIDAI should aim to replicate the same through Aadhar. We believe there might be other instances where such replication of efforts might be probable- this is both a waste of resources and increases the chances of threats to data security.

Is the health system sufficiently equipped to use Aadhar number? 

Assuming the Aadhar number could finally be used in the health care context as Nilekani delineates, is our health system equipped with the required e-platform across the nation; and are there adequately trained human resources to run such a sophisticated system  available, or being recruited, at every level within the health system?  It appears that the use of the Aadhar number as envisioned would warrant inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral coordination and resource investment for its meaningful realization. It is not clear as to how this is being planned and executed.

Would the system to protect privacy and data protection be truly foolproof? 

The issue of privacy of personal information (especially health) and associated challenges are not mentioned in the article. It is also not clear as how data safety will be ensured. In response to one of the questions in the parliament regarding mechanisms to protect data from unauthorised use in UIDAI, it was said that the data would be encrypted at source along with measures such as limiting physical use, and putting standard security infrastructure[5].

We wonder if that would be sufficient given the current trends of data theft from the supposedly safe and well protected sectors, such as banking and information technology which use similar mechanisms. As instances of theft and misuse of information becomes commonplace, as evidenced by increasing credit card fraud and frequent hacking of government websites[6],any framework for information collection which does not have robust safeguards  should be grounds for concern. As well, India does not have any coherent policy or law governing data encryption [7],[8], [9].

In the contemporary context of globalised terrorism, it would also be challenging for the UIDAI to comply with the promise of confidentiality towards data collected if faced with mounting pressures from investigation and intelligence agencies, whether domestic or foreign, to share bioinformatics information of individuals suspected to be associated with terrorism and violence.  Although a
somewhat different context, the recent episode of a vaccination campaign launched by the US intelligence agency CIA aimed specifically at collecting DNA samples from the Osama Bin Laden household in Abbottabad in Pakistan[10] is representative of reasons for our concerns on this front of the potential of misuse of a public health program collecting identifiable data.

The initial Aadhar registration system being implemented also provides reason for worry. As the enrolment process has been sub-contracted via tenders to private firms, there is seemingly no guarantee of how information and data security will be maintained. Moreover, ensuring data protection from interested parties such as insurance companies who could choose to deny health insurance coverage to individuals based on their health profiles is paramount. Unless stringent safeguards are built in, the Aadhar number could be a serious and risky intrusion into our privacy.

Furthermore, it is ambiguous as to how harmonization and reconciliation across various legal apparatuses, such as, the National Identification Authority of India Bill and the proposed Right to Privacy Bill[11] would be achieved with regards to protecting personal information gathered under the Aadhar project.

Against this backdrop,we believe the editorial by Nilekani raises more questions than provides answers, and hence it is apt to question the claims of the article.

Finally, we also find it disconcerting that though the author declares his affiliation with the UIDAI, there is no conflict of interest statement in the article. Nilekani as head of the initiative is expected to have a positive bias towards the program. We believe it would have been good practice for a conflict of interest statement to have been appended with the article.

Anant Bhan, Pune, Maharashtra
anantbhan@gmail.com

Sunita V S  Bandewar, Pune, Maharashtra
sunita.bandewar@utoronto.ca

REFERENCES

________________________________

[1]Nilekani N. Building a foundation for better health: The role of the Aadhaar number. Natl Med J India.2011 May-Jun;24(3):133-5.

[2]Milton L. Aadhaar number to be must for LPG services. The Times of India. 2011 Aug 8 [cited 2011 Aug 18]. Available: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mysore/Aadhaar-number-to-be-must-for-LPG-services/articleshow/9533385.cms

[3]Ramanathan U. A private right or a public affair? Tehelka Magazine. 2011 Jul 9 [cited 2011 Aug 18]; Vol 8, issue 27. Available:  http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ne090711PROSCONS.asp

[4]Government Health. Now, a tracking system for immunisation in India. 2011 August 3 [cited 2011 August 18]. Available:
http://www.igovernment.in/site/now-tracking-system-immunisation-india

[5]  Unique Identification Authority of India. Government of India Planning Commission, Rajya Sabha Questions. Question no 393(Answered on 2011 Feb 24) [cited 2011 Aug 20].  Available:http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=171&Itemid=150#rs

[6]Kurup D. ‘State actor’ linked to major cyber intrusions in India, world. The Hindu Bangalore edition. 2011 Aug 4 [cited 2011 Aug 18]. Available: http://www.thehindu.com/news/article2319894.ece

[7]Data Security Council of India.Recommendations for Encryption Policy Regulation u/s 84A of the Information
Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008.  Prepared by DSCI/NASSCOM with inputs from the industry.  2009 Jul 13 [cited 2011 Aug 16]. Available:http://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/encryption_policy_dsci_final_submission_to_dit.pdf

[8]Dalal, P.Encryption policy of India needed.  2011 Jun 19 [cited 2011 Aug 5]. Available: http://ictps.blogspot.com/2011/06/encryption-policy-of-india-is-needed.html

[9]Waris S. Government asleep over encryption regulations. 2009 Aug 20 [cited 2011 Aug 21], Available: http://www.legallyindia.com/20090820138/Legal-opinions/government-asleep-over-encryption-regulations

[10]Reardon S. Pakistan. Decrying CIA vaccination sham, health workers brace for backlash. Science.2011 Jul 22;333(6041):395.

[11]Venkatesan J. Bill on ‘right to privacy’ in monsoon session: Moily. The Hindu, 2011 June 7 [cited 2011 Aug 17]. Available: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2082643.ece

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2477 - A wag of Nandan Nilekani's tale: Aadhaar funds up - TOI

A wag of Nandan Nilekani's tale: Aadhaar funds up

TNN Mar 17, 2012, 05.24AM IST

If there was a clear political winner in the budget, it was Nandan Nilekani. The finance minister peppered his budget speech with several references to how the corporate honcho-turned techno-politician's plans will become central to the subsidy schemes in the country and become the framework for payments under different schemes.

"I propose to allocate adequate funds to complete another 40 crore enrolments starting from April 1, 2012. The Aadhaar platform is now ready to support the payments of MGNREGA, old age, widow and disability pensions and scholarships directly to the beneficiary's accounts in selected areas," Pranab Mukherjee said.

The allocation for Aadhaar was increased from the previous year's Rs 1,470 crore to Rs 1,758 crore for 2012-13.

While Nilekani might still have to fight the battle of detail with the bureaucracy over his various plans, the signal from the top was clear. The recommendations of the task force headed by Nilekani on IT strategy for direct transfer of subsidy got the thumbs up from the finance minister. A mobile-based Fertilizer Management System (mFMS) along the lines that Nilekani had envisaged will be rolled out countrywide in 2012 to directly transfer subsidy to retailers in the first phase and then directly to the farmers.

Mukherjee mentioned the successful pilots of transferring cash against purchase of LPG cylinders in Mysore, for kerosene in Alwar and validation of PDS beneficiaries in Jharkhand. "It will be our endeavour to scale up and roll out these Aadhaar-enabled payments for various government schemes in at least 50 selected districts within the next six months," the FM said.

Nilekani's UID plans had got locked in a turf war with the National Population Register which is overseen by the home ministry and his institutional framework for computerization of PDS had also not found favour with the food ministry. But Nilekani found support from the highest quarters of the government, the results of which were evident in the budget speech.

Mukherjee also said, "To ensure that the objectives of the National Food Security Bill are effectively realized, a Public Distribution System Network is being created using the Aadhaar platform. A National Information Utility for the computerization of PDS is being created. It will become operational by December 2012."

2476 - The Food, the Bad and the Ugly by Sainath - The Hindu

The Food, the Bad and the Ugly by Sainath - The Hindu

March 22, 2012

P. SAINATH

MORE THAN THREE BAGS FULL: Food not reaching those who need it. A file photograph of wheat being loaded at an open FCI godown at Sonepat, Haryana

Average per capita net availability of foodgrain declined in every five-year period of the 'reforms' without exception. In the 20 years preceding the reforms — 1972-1991 — it rose every five-year period without exception.

The country's total foodgrain production is expected to touch a record 250 million tons this year (2011-12).

Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar

PTI, February 17, 2012

Record foodgrain output of 235.88 million tons in 2010-11.

Sharad Pawar,

PTI, April 6, 2011

India's foodgrain production hit a fresh record at 233.87 million tonnes in 2008-09.

Sharad Pawar, Lok Sabha,

July 20, 2009

The Minister (Mr. Pawar) said food grain production in 2007-08 had reached a record 227.32 million tonnes and record production has been achieved in a number of crops.

Economic Times,

April 23, 2008

“During 2006-07, the agriculture sector has posted new landmarks. The record production of 216 million tonnes of food grains…”

Sharad Pawar,

November 13, 2007

Economic Editors conference

Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar doesn't just deal in foodgrain production, he deals in records. Landmarks he's fond of citing as foodgrain production rises every year. (Barring blips like those in 2009-10, of course). Sticking to absolute numbers helps him maintain a modest silence on another record he's been a big part of.

The daily per capita net availability of foodgrain has been falling steadily and dangerously during the “reform” years. If we take five-year averages for those years from 1992 to 2010 — the figure declined every five years without exception (see table “Declining per capita …”). From 474.9 grams of cereals and pulses for the years of 1992-96 to 440.4 grams for the period 2007-2010 (The 2011 figure is yet to come). A fall of 7.3 per cent. There has not been a single five-year period that saw an upward blip.

What about the 20 years preceding the reforms? That is 1972-1991? The per capita availability figure rose every five-year period without exception. From 433.7 for 1972-76, to 480.3 grams in 1987-91. An increase of 10.7 per cent.

Not reaching the needy

Consider the average for the latest five years for which data are available. It was 441.4 grams for the period 2006-2010. That's lower than the corresponding period half a century ago. It was 446.9 for the years 1956-60. Not great news for a nation where malnutrition among children under five is nearly double that of Sub-Saharan Africa's. (A point the India Human Development Report 2011 — from a wing of the Planning Commission — concedes).

If production is rising, which it is; if the upper classes are eating a lot better, which they are; and if per capita availability keeps declining, which it does — that implies three things at least. That foodgrain is not getting to those who most need it. That the gap between those eating more and those eating less is worsening. And that food prices and incomes of the poor are less and less in sync.

It also tells us how disastrous the reforms-era policy of “targeting” through the Public Distribution System has been. The poor have not gained from “targeting” in the PDS. They have been the targets. The “reforms” period has seen more poor and hungry people shut out of the PDS in practice. The latest budget suggests that “targeting” is about to get more ruthless. A universal PDS covering all would cost much less than what the government gives away each year in concessions to the corporate sector.

Small wonder that Mr. Pawar sticks to aggregate numbers in his claims of records. He stays with production in absolute numbers, because that's rising. As the Big Boss of Cricket in India (and the planet) Mr. Pawar would not be satisfied with totalling up how many runs a batsman of his makes. He'd divide it by the number of innings the batter has played. He'd perhaps even look at the number of balls he faced, strike rate and so on. But when it comes to his boss role on foodgrain, aggregate figures will do. The big numbers look so nice. Why complicate things by looking at how much foodgrain is available per Indian? That too, per day or year?

Economic Survey document

For those worried about food availability, though, it matters. The highest figure for any year in our history was the 510.1 grams for 1991. Aha! Chalk one up for the reformers? Not really. The data are based on the agricultural year — i.e. July to June. So the 1991 figure corresponds to the production of July 1990 to June 1991. Manmohan Singh made his speech launching the reforms on July 24, 1991. And the average for 2010, after nearly two decades of “reforms,” was 440.4 grams.

The decline across the reforms years has been dismal. Indeed, some five-year periods in this era compare poorly even with those in the pre-Green Revolution years. For instance, 2006-10 throws up worse figures than 1956-1960. All figures from 1961 are seen in the latest Economic Survey of 2011-12. (http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2011-12/estat1.pdf See A22, 1.17. Last year's survey has data going back to 1951.

This, of course, is the point at which someone pops up with: “It's all due to the population. The poor breed like flies.” Is it? The compound annual growth of population was much higher in pre-reform decades than it is now. But the CAGR for food production was always higher and ahead of it. Even in 1961-1971, when the CAGR for population was 2.24 per cent it was 2.37 for grain production. In 2001-10, the figure for population was just 1.65 per cent. But foodgrain production lagged behind even that figure, at 1.03 per cent. (For the growth rate in foodgrain, we have not taken 2010-11 into account. We have only advance estimates for that year and these can vary quite a bit from final figures).

In all the southern states the fertility rate is either at replacement level or even below it. And the population growth rate is falling everywhere in the country, and at quite a rapid pace. Yet, per capita availability has declined. So the population claim does not fly. There may be one-off years in which the growth rate of food production (or even per capita availability) gets better, or much worse. Hence, looking at five-year or decadal averages makes more sense. And the trends those show are awful.

This is a context where foodgrain production per capita is on the decline. Where, however, the buffer stocks with the government in fact show an increasing trend. So per capita availability is in fact declining at a faster rate. It means the poor are so badly hit that they cannot buy, or have access to, even the limited grain on offer.

GHI ranking

True, this will invite yowls of rage from the Marie Antoinette School of Economics (or ‘Let-them-eat-cake' crowd). For them the decline only shows that people now care less for cereals and pulses. They're eating much better stuff since they're doing so much better. So much better that we'd be lucky to reach Sub-Saharan Africa's rate of child malnourishment in a few years. Or improve enough in the Global Hunger Index (GHI) to challenge an upstart Rwanda in a few years. Presently we rank 67 in the GHI (out of 81 countries with the worst food security status). Rwanda clocks in ahead of us at rank 60. India's GHI value in 2011 was worse than it was 15 years before that in 1996.

We've spent 20 years promoting cash crops at the expense of food crops. No one knows quite how much land has been converted from the latter to the former, but it would run to lakhs of acres. As food crop cultivation has grown less remunerative, many have abandoned it. As farming tanks across large swathes of the country, more and more land lies fallow. The owners have given up on the idea of making a living from it. Close to seven-and-a-half million people quit farming between 1991 and 2001 (and we still await the figures for 2001-11). Two decades of policies hostile to smallholders, but paving the way for corporate control, have seen public investment in agriculture crash. No surprise then that foodgrain production is “growing” only in absolute numbers but falling at an alarming rate in per capita terms.

psainath@mtnl.net.in